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ABSTRACT
This research takes a rigorous approach to examining available data for 
signs of regional integration and interprets the findings in terms of their illustration 
of the changing structure of the international political economy. A range of 
methodologies are examined and the inadequacies of various commonly-used 
approaches to measure regionalisation are discussed. Bearing this in mind, 
statistical measures of regional bias are developed, and time series of results are 
displayed to show trends in the three major economic areas over the past three 
decades in a way that has not been attempted in other studies. The findings 
suggest that regional integration has been advancing steadily in North America 
and Europe and there are suggestions that preferential trading arrangements 
have helped to promote closer regional integration. Surprisingly, the preferential 
bias between the founder members of the European Union is little changed in the 
past three decades. In the developed world the non-discriminatory qualities of 
some of the deeper aspects of regionalism have helped to blunt its preferential 
impact, as have corporate organisational strategies, which are also important in 
shaping regional production. The impact of preferential regional arrangements on 
internalisation of corporate transactions is ambiguous.
It is argued that multinational corporations are less concerned about 
whether liberalisation is regional or multilateral than is commonly assumed. This 
makes the "building block—stumbling block" debate less important than the 
question of whether barriers to cross-border business are declining. Taking the 
analysis down to the micro level highlights the complex relationship between 
trade and investment flows which is not captured in theoretical literature or the 
available statistics.
Although economics can explain the attractiveness of regional 
agreements, political economy explanations are useful to explain its growing 
popularity. One neglected issue is the benefit resulting from lower systemic risk.
A more accurate description of the structural change identified in this 
research is that of "regional globalisation", where the prime concern of 
multinational corporations is that of globalisation, but it is a trend which is 
currently manifested through regional organisation. This is not a fixed trend and 
could be superseded by sub-or supra-regional integration depending on technical 
change and political co-operation.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Regional integration has become one of the major international political economy 
themes of the decade. In part this is due to the re-emergence of regionalism in the 
major economic areas.1 This research will argue that although regionalisation 
appears to be the dominant trend in the world economy at the turn of the 20th 
century, a more appropriate label is that of "regional globalisation". This is because 
although regionalism is contributing to a rise in intra-regional trade and investment, 
it is also leading to greater globalisation of economic activity. Corporate strategies 
are increasingly global, and although at the moment they are manifested in regional 
organisational structures it is not necessarily the case that this will endure.
Although the terms.are sometimes used interchangeably, regionalism is 
defined as the political measures aimed at promoting closer regional relations, while 
regionalisation (or regional integration) is the economic reality of closer regional 
links. Economic theory on the subject of customs unions is well-developed and it 
has been shown that it is possible to design welfare enhancing agreements, as 
noted in Chapter 2. A customs union can be a liberalising step which takes the world 
closer to free trade, but this is not automatically the case. Moreover, it is not clear 
that recent regional trade agreements have been designed on this basis, and the 
theoretical argument in their favour is only one possible explanation of the re- 
emergence of regionalism since the mid-1980s. Other explanations relate to the 
general spread of economic liberalisation, and defensive reactions to regionalism 
elsewhere. Outside the economic analysis of customs unions, the bulk of recent 
discussion tends to focus on the question of whether regional trading agreements 
are likely to support or hinder the progression of multilateral liberalisation.
This research takes the analysis in a different direction by using concepts 
from international business literature to discuss the likely impact of regionalism on 
the behaviour and structure of multinational corporations. From a microeconomic 
basis, it will be argued that organisational structures of firms are such that 
multilateral liberalisation has limited benefits over regional liberalisation.
One common failing of the analysis of regional integration is that it often has 
a weak empirical basis, which can detract from the conclusions reached. The
1 Bhagwati (1993), W TO (1995).
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inadequacies and complexities involved in various attempts to measure 
regionalisation are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Faults in each approach help 
to explain why there is no standard methodology for measuring regional trends. In 
addition, the potential distortions from temporary price movements, such as nominal 
exchange rates, are noted. These distortions mean that studies which focus on 
discrete time intervals risk reaching inappropriate conclusions due to short-term 
price fluctuations.
One set of studies has used long-established methods for measuring 
bilateral bias, in the form of the trade intensity index. This methodology contains 
some statistical problems, especially when projecting the analysis to the regional 
level, even though most studies typically do not explore the inadequacies of this 
approach. These problems are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and despite some 
imperfections in the approach, regional trade intensity indexes are seen as the most 
practical way to measure changes in the degree of regional trade bias over time. 
However, it is perilous to use this method to make comparisons between the degree 
of trade bias in different regions. The use of gravity models to attempt to explain the 
forces behind regional trade flows appears attractive and enjoyed a period of 
popularity, but more recently the findings from this approach have been shown to 
be "almost certainly wrong" by a long-time head of the IMF Research Department.2
Taking into account these methodological complexities, Chapter 3 uses 
regional trade intensity indexes to measure regional bias. The construction of time 
series facilitates the search for underlying regional trends in a way that has not 
previously been attempted. Distortions to the findings, such as those caused by the 
strong US dollar in the mid-1980s can more easily be seen when using a time series 
approach. A range of other data on cross-border investment flows are introduced, 
but flaws in the data mean they are of limited use in tracking regional trends.
The finding of a rising regional bias to trade flows in North America coinciding 
with moves to intra-regional liberalisation is perhaps unsurprising. On the surface, 
neither is the finding of a gradual increase in regional bias among members of the 
European Union. However, the initial six members of the European Economic 
Community are found to have experienced no increase in the positive bias of their 
trade flows with each other since the late 1960s. Detailed examination suggests this
2 Polak (1996).
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more surprising result is explained by the increase in trade bias with newly joining 
members of what is now the European Union. The situation in Asia is more complex, 
but recent trends have been for little change in regional trade bias. The rise in trade 
bias in Europe and North America has been accompanied by a more general 
opening of their economies which reduces fears that a rise in intra-regional trade 
bias has been accompanied by a reduction of integration with the rest of the world.
Regional integration is the product of regional bias and the overall openness 
of the economy. If both are increasing then economies are becoming more closely 
integrated on a regional basis. This appears to be the case in both Europe and 
North America. Moreover, the general increase in openness to trade appears to 
have been enough to offset a reduced bias towards non-regional trading partners. 
If it has not then this could be a suggestion of trade diversion away from non­
members as their exports are replaced by intra-regional trade.
Exchange rates move to reflect the flow of trade and investment between 
countries, and Chapter 4 considers whether they contain evidence of policies or 
behaviour related to regional integration. It is found that changes in regionalisation, 
as measured by the trade intensity index, are unrelated to exchange rate volatility. 
Moreover, regional trade agreements have no identifiable impact on exchange rate 
volatility unless they are accompanied by an explicit agreement to co-operate to 
promote exchange rate stability. In addition it is argued that exchange rate volatility 
has little impact on trade flows, and European attempts to stabilise exchange rates 
owe more to political forces than economic ones.
Having identified a rise in regional bias in North America and Europe, 
Chapter 5 goes on to discuss the possible causes. Part of the rise in regional bias 
can be explained in terms of the trade creation stemming from reduced barriers to 
intra-regional trade. The "deeper" aspects of some regional agreements have less 
clear implications for regionalisation than more basic border-level tariff reductions, 
as some aspects are difficult to apply on a preferential basis.
In addition to the direct macroeconomic influence from regionalism, the 
organisational behaviour of multinational corporations is also seen as an important 
influence on regionalisation. Producing on a national scale is decreasingly efficient, 
in terms of economies of scale, while global production is technologically feasible, 
but often does not accord with optimal organisational structures. Regional 
production structures allow components and final products to be traded within the
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region, with raw materials and intangibles exchanged between regions, while not 
preventing firms from serving global markets. In "knowledge" related areas such as 
research and development, design, finance and advertising, the trade regime is 
relatively unimportant as long as the fixed costs are spread over as broad a 
geographic base as possible. It is also noted that inter-regional trade contains a 
relatively high proportion of raw materials, relative to intra-regional trade in Europe 
and North America. In this case, the deteriorating terms of trade of raw material 
exporters will give a slight statistical upwards bias to measures of European and 
North American regionalisation.
Considering the forces acting to increase regionalisation, it is perhaps 
surprising that the trends identified in Chapter 3 do not show a stronger upwards 
bias. One explanation is that there is an offsetting trend towards globalisation as 
more domestically oriented firms realise that changes in physical and legal barriers 
to international trade have been falling, allowing them to become exporters or small 
scale MNCs. Lower barriers include factors such as the information technology 
revolution, falling transport costs, reduced uncertainty, looser and more transparent 
foreign investment regulations and lower tariffs.
Although there are persuasive economic arguments in favour of constructing 
regional agreements, there have been few major theoretical developments on the 
subject of customs unions for over two decades. As a result, it is difficult to ascribe 
the renewed enthusiasm for preferential regional agreements to a newly persuasive 
argument in favour, although a similar effect could be the result of the weakening 
of non-liberal ideology with the demise of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is far from 
clear how regionalism fits in with the objectives of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) for multilateral trade liberalisation. As one authority on the subject has noted 
"regional trading blocs can complement the world trading system .... However, 
regional trading blocs could get out of hand".3
It is necessary to consider not just why regionalism occurs from a static 
perspective, but also from a dynamic one, in order to explain its growth over the past 
decade. For example, regionalism can be seen as an effort by states to restore 
some lost authority and change the balance of power between states and markets. 
It can also be a defensive response to increased regionalism elsewhere.
3 Jackson (1992) p. 501, Friedmann Award Address.
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Much of the debate on regionalism relates to whether it is likely to 
complement multilateral liberalisation, or be a barrier to further progress (or even 
increase protectionism). The WTO has taken a more positive attitude towards 
regionalism than its predecessor, in part because the provisions against damaging 
forms of regionalism have been strengthened. One view is that "open regionalism" 
is constructive, and it is implicitly aimed at not damaging non-members. Another 
perspective is that institutional aspects of regionalism strengthen the mechanisms 
for either more liberalisation or protectionism, but it is unclear in which direction the 
bias lies.
The tendency to stress macroeconomic issues (such as the "building block— 
stumbling block" debate) can be to the detriment of two other perspectives. At a 
different level, regional co-operation can deliver significant benefits in terms of 
systemic stability, but these are often neglected as they are a by-product of the 
agreement itself, rather than its specific provisions. In effect the systemic gains 
means that the value of any trade agreement is worth more than the sum of its 
parts. Regionalism implies a commonality of interests and closer communication 
between members which lowers systemic risks to all firms operating within the 
region.
A further perspective on regional integration is a microeconomic one, with 
understanding of the trends at work enhanced by consideration of corporate 
strategies and organisational behaviour. Taking the analysis down to the corporate 
level offers a different perspective of the trends apparent in the macroeconomic 
data. There is also the question of how corporate attitudes affect the political 
process of regionalism through the use of lobbying power.
Although much is made of the differences between deep and shallow 
regionalism, it will be argued that from the perspective of the multinational 
corporation the act of lowering intra-regional barriers is more important than the 
nature of that liberalisation. The difference between deep and shallow regionalism 
will have more impact on how firms react as opposed to whether they do, but 
whether liberalisation is at or behind the border will not affect underlying business 
decisions if the overall change in preferential treatment is the same.
A further microeconomic aspect of regionalism is how it affects the merits to 
the multinational corporation of internalising transactions. Some aspects of 
regionalism will reduce market imperfections and lower internalisation benefits.
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However, if an aspect of regionalism is lower transport and communication costs, 
then this will be an offsetting force in favour of more internalisation. This is 
discussed in Chapter 7, which also considers the likely impact on multinational 
corporations of various possible developments in the world trading system, from 
renewed multilateralism to a slide towards protectionism. Different strategic 
reactions mean that apparently similar firms can behave in different ways, but some 
general patterns are suggested. One feature is that a large number of firms will be 
most concerned about whether regionalism is protectionist or not. As long as 
production networks tend to be constructed on a regional basis, the differences 
between multilateral and regional liberalisation will be limited.
The main discussions and key findings are reprised in the conclusion in 
Chapter 8. Although the bulk of the work focuses on the issue of regional 
integration, the underlying trend in the international political economy can better be 
described as one of "regional globalisation". Economic behaviour is globalising, but 
the main evidence of such a development in the statistics available is in closer 
regional integration.
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CHAPTER TWO
REGIONALISM: THEORY AND POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS
2.1 Introduction
In order to set the scene for subsequent chapters, this chapter will examine the 
theory behind regional trade agreements and their post-war development. It is 
useful to place recent developments in an historical context, in order to see 
whether trends of the past decade represent a structural shift in the world 
economy or are simply part of a long-term cycle which sees the political economy 
of countries and regions move together and then drift apart again.
This chapter will address two main issues. Firstly, the theoretical 
underpinnings for the formation of regional trade agreements. Secondly, the 
post-war experience with regionalism. The bulk of the literature on the subject 
emerged in the two post-war decades and coincided with the first round of 
formation of preferential trade agreements.1 The renewal of activity in forming, 
reviving, or deepening regional agreements occurred from the mid-1980s and 
was not accompanied by significant theoretical advances, but in the case of 
Europe it did see calculations of impressive benefits from regional integration.2 
One of the key differences since the mid-1980s, compared to the earlier spate of 
regionalism, is that the second time around the United States was converted to 
the benefits of regionalism.3
Related to the issue of whether recent moves towards greater regionalism 
will endure is the relationship between economic cycles and trade liberalisation. 
There appears to be a link between periods of relatively strong economic growth 
and reduction in trade barriers, although the causality is unclear.
Before progressing further, it is useful to define the difference between 
regionalisation and regionalism. Regionalisation (or regional integration) is the 
closer interdependence between the economy of one country and that of one or
1 De Melo and Panagariya (1993).
2 Cecchini (1988) calculated the single European market would raise output by 2.5%-6.5, 
while Baldwin (1990) estimated it could add between 0.2% to 0.9% to the European Community’s 
growth rate.
3 Bhagwati (1993).
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more other economies in the same geographic region.4 Regionalism refers to 
political steps aimed at promoted regional integration. For example, a regional 
trading arrangement is a clearly defined set of rules aimed at promoting greater 
regional integration. In fact these agreements are often more broadly based than 
covering just trade issues, but the phrase "regional trading arrangement", albeit 
imprecise, has become the accepted terminology even though they could more 
accurately be labelled "preferential regional agreements". Whether or not a 
regional trading arrangement achieves regional integration is a sign of how 
successful it is, not whether such an arrangement exists.
Thus regional integration may or may not be the result of the formation of 
a regional trading arrangement, which itself may or may not succeed in 
promoting regional integration. Alternatively, increased regionalisation can lead 
to the formation of a regional trading arrangement. For example, it is sometimes 
said that a de facto regional trading bloc is forming in East Asia, where 
economies are becoming integrated as a result of the actions of private 
economic agents, such as regional multinationals, or the family ties of ethnic 
Chinese spread across the region, rather than as a result of any political 
initiative.5 The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum is seen as a political 
response to an economic reality.
Yoshida, Akimune, Nohara and Sato define regional economic integration 
as "deepening intra-regional economic interdependence .... through intra-regional 
trade and foreign direct investment, thereby differentiating it from regional trade 
agreements and institutional integration".6 It is also differentiated from 
regionalism, which is defined as a "political movement towards the creation or 
expansion of regional trade agreements". Anderson and Blackhurst define 
regional economic integration as "the process of reducing significance of national 
political boundaries within a geographic area".7 In fact it appears they are 
defining regionalism rather than regionalisation, which illustrates that the two 
terms are often taken as synonyms.
4 Although note that there are examples of preferential trade agreements occurring 
between countries which are not geographically proximate, as was the case with colonial 
preferences and more recently with the 1985 US-lsrael Free Trade Agreement.
5 Oman (1994), Yoshida, Akimune, Nohara and Sato (1994).
6 Yoshida, Akimune, Nohara and Sato (1994) p. 59.
7 Anderson and Blackhurst (1993) p. 1.
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The above definitions are reasonably broad, but they avoid some of the 
judgmental precepts that are evident in other analyses. For example Graham and 
Anzai address The Myth of a de facto Asian Economic Bloc, but are only able to 
demonstrate that no such regional bloc exists by implicitly defining a bloc as one 
dominated by Japanese interests to the exclusion of countries from outside the 
region.8 To use the criterion of a bloc excluding non-regional countries to 
determine whether regional integration exists is to pre-judge one of the most 
interesting aspects of the subject. The point is that regional integration ties 
geographically proximate countries closer together: whether this is to the 
detriment of other countries and their home multinationals is a key issue.
According to Bhagwati regionalism can be "defined broadly as preferential 
trade agreements among a subset of nations".9 Lorenz takes the same view and 
makes a lucid distinction between regionalism and regionalisation. The former is 
the creation of preferential trading arrangements, while the latter is "the outcome 
of natural locational phenomenon leading to closer economic ties within a 
region".10 This final point illustrates the importance of differentiating between 
formal rule-based systems and the integrating effects of the actions of economic 
agents. Thus in this work I will use the terms "regional trade agreement" and 
"regionalism" to indicate political efforts to foster closer ties and "regionalisation" 
and "regional integration" to refer to closer economic relations.
2.2 Theoretical background
Much of the theoretical work on preferential trade agreements was conducted in 
the first two post-war decades. However, it is worth noting that the classic work 
on the subject, by Viner in 1950, post-dated the 1947 GATT agreement which 
included Article XXIV on preferential trade agreements.11
8 Graham and Anzai (1994).
9 Bhagwati (1992b) p. 535.
10 Lorenz (1992) p. 84.
11 Bhagwati (1993) has suggested the reasons for including Article XXIV were that it was 
viewed as offering a route towards freer trade and that it contained safeguards against a return to 
the protectionism of the 1930s.
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The perspective offered by Viner did not unambiguously support the 
formation of preferential trade arrangements.12 From a Vinerian perspective, 
customs unions can raise intra-regional trade flows as high cost production within 
one customs union member is substituted by lower cost production from another 
member. This process, labelled trade creation, should add to welfare. However, 
there can also be trade diversion from production by more efficient producers 
outside the customs union to less efficient ones inside, which have the 
advantage of not being subject to the external tariff. If both of the countries in a 
customs union were producers of a good before the union, but only one remains 
a producer once tariff barriers have come down, exporting to the other, then this 
is a trade creating result. However, if a non-partner country exported the good to 
one of the members before the customs union, but sees its exports substituted 
by less efficient production from another of the members after the formation of 
the customs union, then trade diversion occurs.13
Lipsey produced some rules of thumb which would give an indication of 
whether a custom union is likely to be welfare enhancing or reducing, on a world 
scale.14 It had already been noted that if trade creation was going to occur, the 
gains would be greater if the differential in cost ratios between the two countries 
is relatively large.15 Lipsey outlined two other generalisations to give an indication 
as to the likely impact of a customs union.
Firstly, Lipsey noted most analysis tended to relate to the effects of a 
marginal change in tariffs. However, with customs union formation, tariffs can 
change radically, with the result that demand and supply curves may not remain 
fixed. Lipsey’s analysis relates to the general theory of second best that he 
developed with Lancaster.16 This theory states that "if it is impossible to satisfy 
all the optimum conditions, then a change which brings about the satisfaction of 
some of the optimum conditions may make things better or worse".17 Drawing 
from this, Lipsey argued welfare is more likely to be increased by a reduction in
12 Viner (1950).
13 Lawrence (1996) sets out a clear example of how the process can work.
14 Lipsey (1960).
15 Makower and Morton (1953).
16 Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57).
17 Lipsey (1960) p. 498.
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tariffs as opposed to their complete abolition.18 This is a significant finding, as a 
feature of Article XXIV of GATT was the elimination of "substantially all" tariffs.
Lipsey’s other generalisation relates to relative expenditure on each 
commodity. If trade volumes are given, then if trade with the customs union 
partner is high in proportion to trade with the rest of the world then it is more 
likely that the agreement will be welfare enhancing. Furthermore, the customs 
union is more likely to raise welfare the lower the total volume of foreign trade. 
That is because the lower the volume of foreign trade, the fewer the number of 
purchases from the outside world compared to those made domestically and the 
less the distortion to relative domestic prices.
Despite the attempts to provide generalisations, Lawrence has argued that 
"the theory does not produce rules that are foolproof. Indeed, it suggests that it is 
dangerous to try to rely on such generalizations".19 As a result, Lawrence argues 
that each case needs to be examined empirically in order to judge its merits.
Cooper and Massell showed that a customs union is always inferior to an 
appropriate level of non-preferential protection, from the point of view of resource 
efficiency, as the former always contains an element of trade diversion. However, 
in their 1965 Economic Journal article they went on to argue that there were 
situations in which a customs union could be the most effective policy if the 
scope of the analysis is broader. Possible gains could occur in the areas of 
economies of scale, terms of trade improvements or reductions in disguised 
unemployment, which are not apparent in simple Vinerian models. Looking at the 
relative efficiency of protective regimes, they noted that concepts such as 
"market swapping" meant that customs unions in small countries could be viewed 
as a superior instrument compared to non-preferential protection. Protection is 
implicitly adopted in order to sponsor industrialisation. By using a customs union, 
participants could still protect their markets, but without the same income loss as 
would occur from a non-preferential tariff. This analysis depends on the view that
18 Taking the example given by Lipsey (1960), assume that there are taxes, subsidies and 
monopolies which prevent optimal resource allocation. If only one tax is allowed to vary then a 
change in the tax could either reduce or increase overall welfare. Assuming there is a unique 
second best solution (which Lipsey argues is common), then a dramatic change in tariffs could 
move the economy towards the second best solution, but it could also move it past the second 
best position. For this reason a small shift in the tax is more likely to raise welfare than a large 
variation.
19 Lawrence (1996) p. 25.
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the state has a role to play in using trade policy to manipulate the allocation of 
resources and it helps to explain attempts to form regional groupings by some 
developing countries in the 1960s.
The most recent significant advance to customs union theory was made 
by Kemp and Wan. They showed, in a concise fashion, that a tariff system could 
be designed "which is consistent with pre-union world prices and, therefore, with 
pre-union trade patterns and pre-union levels of welfare for non-members".20 
Grinols subsequently showed how such a system could be constructed.21 Kemp 
and Wan’s argument was important in that it effectively takes the debate back to 
the pre-Viner view that customs unions can be a step towards free trade and "it 
implies that an incentive to form and enlarge customs unions persists until the 
world is one big customs union".22 That is, from any starting point where tariffs 
exist, there are a series of steps, each of which benefits some without damaging 
others, until global free trade exists.
Another strand to the debate has come from the discipline of geography, 
and Krugman appropriated some geographic concepts to show that the greater 
the proximity of its members, the lower the likelihood of a preferential trading 
arrangement being trade distorting.23 While interesting in terms of its application 
to the real world, it can be seen as a natural extension of the general rules 
expounded in the 1950s and 1960s.
To summarise the state of current attitudes towards customs unions, it 
could be said that, if suitably structured, most observers see them as likely to 
contribute to a move towards free trade and increased economic welfare, but it is 
recognised that exceptions can exist.
Much customs union analysis neglects political economy aspects and the 
comparison of pre- and post-customs union positions is not the only issue; also 
of significance is what happens after the customs union has been formed. For 
example, it can raise the stakes in the bargaining process with foreign MNCs, 
with the benefits of market access and costs of exclusion increased. The threat 
of higher tariff levels in the future can be a stimulus to foreign direct investment
20 Kemp and Wan (1976) p. 95.
21 Grinols (1981).
22 Kemp and Wan (1976) p. 96.
23 See Krugman (1980).
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by multinational corporations. Economic analysis of customs unions also 
neglects international relations aspects in terms of increased bargaining power in 
international negotiations. The most notable example of this was in the Uruguay 
Round where the European Community negotiated on behalf of its twelve 
members.24 Alternatively, Oman has noted that regional integration can be used 
to undermine powerful domestic interest groups, or what Olson has labelled 
"distributional cartels".25 These and other issues will be considered in more detail 
in Chapter 6.
2.3 Typography of preferential agreements
Most theories related to international trade tend to focus on the reasons why 
trade takes place between countries and what determines the pattern that 
emerges. Vinerian analysis of customs unions is unusual in that it does not 
examine trade on a single country basis, but incorporates the concept of regional 
co-operation. One feature of the world system heading into the third millennium 
is the growing trend towards regional economic (and in some cases political) co­
operation, via myriad regional trading arrangements or "trade blocs". There are 
various forms that this co-operation can take.
It is an oversimplification to view all regional trading arrangements in the 
same fashion. There are several, vastly different, types of integration. The lowest 
level of trade preference is that of sectorial co-operation. This involves two or 
more countries agreeing to co-ordinate policies towards a certain industry. On 
paper, an example of this was the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952, 
although in practical terms, there was a political undertone which meant the 
agreement was more than simply for co-operation among six European 
economies over coal and steel policies.
The lowest degree of co-operation on a general basis is the preferential 
trade agreement, where tariffs on imports from member countries are lower than 
on imports from non-members. A special version of this is the free trade area. In 
this case, members agree to eliminate barriers to trade in products created within
24 Although not a trading arrangement as such, the Cairns Group was formed during the 
Uruguay Round to represent the interests of its agricultural product exporting members.
25 Oman (1994) p. 15.
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the area, but each state can still decide on its own tariffs with the outside world. 
As with sectorial co-operation, no strong political ties are needed. Rules of origin 
problems exist and the need to maintain customs posts is seen by some as a 
potential or actual hindrance to trade. The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement of 
1988, which was subsequently widened to include Mexico in 1994, under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, provides a recent example, but many 
others exist.
Non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements also exist, with one 
country or group of countries granting tariff concessions to another, without the 
usual requirements of matching tariff reductions from the other party. The ACP- 
EEC Fourth Lome Convention is the most important example of this agreement, 
where EU members give preferential access to exports from African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) developing economies without demanding similar tariff 
reductions on EU exports.
A customs union is similar to a free trade area, but with a common 
external tariff and consequently no internal customs barriers. Some political ties 
will exist as there is a need for common decision-making in setting the level of 
tariffs, so there is some loss of trade policy independence. The MERCOSUR 
pact between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay which was inaugurated at 
the beginning of 1995 is a recent example of a customs union. Extending a 
customs union to include factors of production results in a common market. In a 
common market there is free movement of factors of production as well as 
goods. As Mundell has shown, this increases the pressure for the equalisation of 
the price of both goods and factors of production.26 A common market implies a 
more significant loss of economic sovereignty than a customs union, as there is a 
need for central co-ordination of more aspects of economic policy. The Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement between Australia and New Zealand 
incorporates most features of a common market, with liberalisation of trade in 
goods and services together with a unified labour market.
An economic union is a common market, plus fiscal and monetary policy 
harmonisation. This requires the formation of supra-national institutions, within 
which are pooled some elements of national sovereignty relating to economic
26 Mundell (1957).
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affairs. A single currency exists, undermining the independent monetary policy of 
member states. The objectives outlined in the Maastricht Treaty are those of 
taking the European Union from being a common market to an economic union. 
The ultimate form of integration is that of political union. This contains all the 
elements of an economic union plus supranational decision-making on non­
economic matters, such as foreign policy and defence. The former Soviet Union 
could be seen as a political union.
An interest group is a slightly different body, in that its aim is not to 
promote trade between members, but to look after the interests of its members in 
the world economy. The Cairns group of agricultural produce exporters and the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are two of the more 
striking examples. Virtually no political integration is needed, but there is a need 
to agree on a uniform agenda (and in the case of OPEC, a need to trust fellow 
members to stick to agreed production quotas).
Not surprisingly, the number of examples of each form of co-operation 
decreases as the level of co-operation rises, although there is often some 
overlap between the various forms of regional agreement. Free trade 
agreements abound, while there are relatively few examples of political union.27 
There is also a more subtle difference in that sectorial agreements tend to reflect 
producer interests, while broader trade agreements are more in the interests of 
consumers.28 It is also worth noting that, even if a free trade agreement is not 
seen as the first step on the path towards a customs union or a common market, 
it can still be worthwhile in its own right, due to the benefits of trade creation. 
While there may be an efficiency gain in an economic sense from each 
deepening of integration, it comes at the loss of sovereignty. This is currently a 
highly charged area of political debate within Europe, but it seems logical that 
ceding decision-making power over aspects of economic policy must lead to a 
reduction of control over national policy-making. Even if the sovereignty does not 
disappear, but is pooled at some higher level, then the individual nation has still 
suffered a reduction in its ability to strike out on its own.
27 There may be more examples of political union than is often recognised. For example, a 
treaty in 1833 established the German Zollverein (customs union) which was the precursor of the 
unified German state.
28 Hufbauer (1989).
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There is plentiful literature on the subject of economic co-operation, but as 
the UN has noted it is "not very good at answering questions about the welfare 
effects of moves from one distorted policy to another—that is, in dealing with the 
problem of the second best".29 Current attitudes towards preferential trade 
agreements will be explored in more detail in later chapters, but it is worth noting 
that there has been an increased interest in regionalism in recent years.30 Some 
attribute this to the apparent difficulties in completing the Uruguay Round of 
GATT negotiations. Rather than persist with multilateral negotiations many 
countries appear to be seeking closer co-operation with a limited number of 
neighbours with whom most trade is conducted. The chances of successful 
negotiations are seen as higher and the rewards are still significant.
2.4 Historical perspective
The idea that two or more nations can gain mutual benefit from bringing their 
economies closer together is not new. Until the 19th century, however, 
integrating one economy with another was generally seen as a means of 
extending or stabilising the military or political influence of the nation state. That 
is to say, it was essentially a mercantilist mechanism, with political interests 
superior to economic ones.31
Even in the 19th century, many trading arrangements were a result of 
exploiting unequal relationships. The scramble of the European powers for 
colonies was as much driven by strategic considerations as economic ones, but 
once acquired the power imbalance meant that colonies could be exploited by 
the Western imperialists.32 The destruction of the Indian hand-loom cotton 
industry following market saturation by mass-produced cloth from the Lancashire 
mills is an oft-cited example of Great Britain abusing its military power for 
economic gain.33 Commodore Perry's "Black Ships" which descended on Japan
29 UN (1990) p. 22.
30 WTO (1995).
31 Gilpin (1987).
32 Krasner (1976), Kennedy (1987).
33 Strange (1988).
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in 1853 are another striking example of the use to force, or the threat of force, to 
open up markets.34
As the intellectual arguments of advocates of free trade gathered pace 
and broader acceptance through the 19th century, lower barriers to trade began 
to occur not through force, but with the volition of both participants. A watershed 
was the Anglo-French Cobden Chevalier Treaty in 1860 which established the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN)35 principle and prompted other European countries 
to negotiate free trade agreements.36 This was the start of a "Golden Age" of 
economic integration, with falling trade barriers, a stable rate of exchange (based 
on the gold standard) and free capital movements. The reduction of barriers to 
cross-border business on both a multilateral and regional basis continued up to 
the Great War. Anderson and Norheim find a rise in the preferential bias towards 
intra-regional trade within Europe in this period, but with trade growing in relation 
to GDP the overall readiness of Europe to trade with the rest of the world was 
also increasing.37
The inter-war years represent the main period of reversal of liberal trade 
policies and growing economic openness in the past century and a half. "Beggar 
my neighbour" policies after the Wall Street Crash in 1929 resulted in higher tariff 
barriers and contributed to the severity of the ensuing recession by reducing 
gains from trade.38 World trade contracted 50% in current US dollars between 
1929 and 1932, or by 30% once the effects of deflation are taken into account. 
Trade was slower to recover than output as a whole and by 1938 primary and 
industrial production were 7% and 11% respectively above 1929 levels, but trade 
volumes were still 10% lower.39
A common assertion is that this was a period of greater regionalisation of 
trade, due to the higher barriers to trade between regions. For example the
34 Hunter (1984).
35 Most Favoured Nation status means that the recipient is offered the same treatment as 
the most favourable terms offered to any other nation. See the List of Abbreviations for the 
mnemonics used in this paper.
36 Kindleberger (1975), Lake (1991), Inwin (1993a).
37 Anderson and Norheim (1993).
38 Note, however, that the debate as to whether the Great Recession was due to monetary 
phenomena, a lack of demand or a result of rising trade barriers is unresolved.
39 See Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) for details.
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Ottawa Agreements signed in 1932 allowed for tariff preferences between 
Commonwealth members and "appear to have reinforced the existing tendency 
toward intra-Commonwealth trade".40 Scherer has offered a different perspective, 
arguing that the reduced trade flows in the 1930s can partly be explained by 
increased cartelisation of major industries. For example, ICI and Du Pont agreed 
to cede spheres of influence to each other in order to reduce competition 41
By the time World War II began, the US had already initiated policies 
aimed at lowering trade barriers with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 
1934. However, it was not until the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 that a 
concerted effort was made to create an international economic system based on 
liberal precepts.
2.4.1 Post-World War II Experience
The history of the half-century following the Second World War is more relevant 
to the present day, due to the widespread adoption of the Fordist mode of 
production and globalisation of mass markets. As noted, it was also the period 
which witnessed the development of most of the theory surrounding preferential 
trade agreements. The period can be broken up into four different phases from 
the perspective of trade liberalisation and regionalism.42 Of course, this being 
international political economy, phases of history are rarely defined by certain 
events or dates, and exceptions tend to occur to most generalisations. 
Nevertheless, trends can be categorised into rough chronological groupings.
2.4.1.1 Reconstruction: 1947-1957
Firstly, there was the immediate period after the end of the war and the 
establishment of the basic system envisaged by the Bretton Woods conference 
in 1944. This saw the re-establishment of peace, the reconstruction of Europe 
and Japan, and the first moves towards modern trading relationships. The
40 Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) p. 16.
41 Scherer (1994) pp. 44-45.
42 Bhagwati (1993) chooses to make the divide between "failure in the 1960s" and "revival
in the 1980s", although the basic approach is similar.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was founded in 1947. Multilateralism 
was one of the guiding principles of the post-war system, although the first five 
GATT Rounds only included between 13 and 38 Contracting Parties (see Table 
2.1 ).43
As Baldwin has pointed out, however, in the immediate post-war period, 
tariff reductions were essentially a series of simultaneous bilateral deals. The 
framework was provided by the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
which gave the US president the right to cut US tariffs by up to 50% through 
bilateral negotiations. These tended to be agreements with major supplier 
countries for various goods and had already resulted in a cut in the average US 
tariff rate from the post Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 rate of 60% to 45% in 
1945.44
The pressures of post-war reconstruction meant that the trade situation in 
the decade or so following the end of hostilities was one-sided, in that Marshall 
Plan funds paid for a large part of US exports.45 In many cases the US was the 
sole supplier and by providing the means to create demand in Europe it eased 
the re-adjustment of US industry which could otherwise have faced over-capacity 
after the end of the war.
Table 2.1 GATT Rounds
Year Place Name Number of 
Participants
Issues
1947 Geneva 23 Tariffs
1949 Annecy 13 Tariffs
1951 Torquay 38 Tariffs
1956 Geneva 26 Tariffs
1960-62 Geneva Dillon Round 26 Tariffs
1964-67 Geneva Kennedy Round 62 Tariffs
1973-79 Geneva Tokyo Round 102 Tariffs & anti-dumping
1986-93 Geneva Uruguay Round 108 Tariffs, non-tariffs & 
framework agreements
Sources: WTO (1995), Gibb and Michalak (1994).
43 Strictly speaking, signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are called 
"Contracting Parties" and not "members".
44 Baldwin (1993).
45 Baldwin (1993).
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2.4.1.2 Lower Barriers: 1958-1973
The second phase in post-war trade occurred from the late 1950s until around 
the time of the first oil shock, the first enlargement of the EEC and the break-up 
of the fixed exchange rate system in 1973. During this phase there was growing 
interest in lowering trade barriers in general and in regionalism in particular. What 
eventually became the European Union began its life in this period, although the 
seed began to germinate in the early 1950s, with the formation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community. It was also a period when some developing countries 
attempted to challenge the existing trading regime which they saw as 
condemning them to a state of permanent underdevelopment. Thus regionalism 
was a feature of relations between developing countries, as well as within 
Europe. Meanwhile in North America, the Canada-US Auto Pact of 1965 laid the 
basis for the broader agreement of 1988. Several trading arrangements in the 
developing world which have gained dynamism in the 1990s were originally 
formed in the 1960s, but fell into disrepair in the intervening period.46
A feature of regional arrangements in the late 1950s and 1960s was that 
they tended to be between countries with similar levels of development.47 Even 
the EEC at that stage excluded the lower income Mediterranean countries. 
Moreover Cable notes that the common feature of regional arrangements in 
developing countries was that they "either failed completely or failed by far to 
match expectations".48 This was most notably the case in Africa and South 
America. Bhagwati explains that the regionalism of the 1960s failed, with the 
exception of Europe, because it did not receive the backing of the United States, 
which was more interested in multilateralism. He notes that "regionalism had 
virtually died by the end of the decade—except for the original Common Market 
and EFTA".49
Moreover, regionalism in small developing country blocs was often 
dominated by import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies which were aimed
46 De Melo, Montenegro and Panagariya (1992).
47 This is labelled "North-North" and "South-South" regionalism by de Melo, Montenegro 
and Panagariya (1992).
48 Cable (1994) p. 2.
49 Bhagwati (1992a) p. 453.
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at reducing dependence on the developed world, to break what was seen as an 
exploitative trade relationship.50 However, such groupings were still unable to 
generate sufficient economies of scale. As Genberg and Nadal de Simone have 
pointed out "the relative failure of CACM [Central American Common Market] 
and LAFTA/LAIA [Latin American Free Trade Area/ Latin American Integration 
Association] .... can be traced back to the incompatibility of inward-oriented 
development—their import-substitution strategy—and regional liberalization".51 
Failure to agree on the allocation of targeted industries compounded the 
problem.
In addition, any increase in regional trade in developing country blocs 
tends to be of the inter-industry type,52 which requires more adjustment 
assistance to compensate losers. Perhaps the most important cause of failure 
was an inability to devise an adequate compensation scheme. The failures of 
various developing country regional groupings are well documented by de Melo, 
Montenegro and Panagariya who also point out that reduction of barriers was not 
automatic and was often delayed.53 Even the Central American Common Market, 
which had initial successes, was undermined by macroeconomic problems in the 
1980s which led to the imposition of quantitative restrictions on trade. Other 
problems were that common external tariffs did not work as various countries 
wanted exemptions for "necessary" imports and that the revenues from tariffs 
were often too important a part of the budget to be lost.
It is interesting to note that while most of the economically oriented blocs 
that emerged in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East in the 1950s and 
1960s did not succeed in promoting regional trade or reducing dependence on 
the OECD economies, the politically oriented bloc of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) held together and has gradually changed to adopt 
an economic agenda.54 ASEAN was formed in 1967 between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand to offer mutual support in
50 Nogues and Quintanilla (1993), Gwynne (1994).
51 Genberg and Nadal de Simone (1993) p. 174.
52 For example, one country could dominate the chemical industry while another could 
focus on steel making.
53 De Melo, Montenegro and Panagariya (1992).
54 Saxonhouse (1993).
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order to counter the perceived communist threat from China and Vietnam. The 
economic dimensions of ASEAN grew to the extent an ASEAN Free Trade Area 
was inaugurated at the start of 1993.55
On the multilateral front, the nature of GATT negotiations changed in the 
1960s. With successive Rounds involving more countries, the limitations of the 
previous item by item, principal-supplier approach became clear. Therefore, with 
the Kennedy Round (1964-67) a tariff cutting formula was used, requiring a 50% 
cut in duties, although exceptions were allowed. The result was an average cut in 
tariffs of around 35%.56 Thus the 1960s saw a sharp drop in tariff restrictions on 
international trade, although the signs of some of the quantitative restrictions 
which were to grow in importance in subsequent decades were already 
emerging. In particular, the "temporary" restrictions on textile trade which were 
the precursor to the Multi Fibre Arrangement were implemented in 1961 and 
1962.57 In general however, the 1960s saw falling barriers to trade, rapid growth 
in trade volumes and a widespread rise in economic prosperity. Trade grew at an 
average rate of 8.3% in the 1960s, while GDP grew at 5.3%. This compares with 
growth rates of 6.5% and 4.2% respectively in the 1950s, 5.2% and 3.6% in the 
1970s and 3.7% and 2.8% in the 1980s.53
2.4.1.3 Stalled Progress: 1974-1985
In terms of trade liberalisation, the process generally stalled from the early- to 
mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, when progress was limited on both a regional and 
a multilateral basis. Although this period saw the success of the Tokyo Round, 
GATT’s seventh set of liberalising negotiations, and a broadening of the 
membership of the European Community,59 these were exceptions in an
55 ASEAN had tried but failed to set up a preferential trading system in the late 1970s.
56 Baldwin (1993).
57 Oxley (1990).
58 UNCTAD (1993) p. 127.
59 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the initial six in 1973, followed by 
Greece in 1981 and then Portugal and Spain in 1986.
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otherwise difficult period.60 Wider adoption of non-tariff barriers led to concerns 
that the world economy was sliding back into protectionism.61
Perhaps the nadir of this period came in 1982 with the failure of the US to 
gain acceptance by other GATT members for a new Round at the Ministerial 
Meeting. The US was eager to begin new GATT negotiations based around 
services and intellectual property rights, and its failure to secure agreement was 
a turning point in US trade policy. From 1982 the United States’ previously 
enthusiastic support for the multilateral system began to be replaced by bi- and 
unilateral action.62
More intense competition from relative newcomers to international trade is 
one reason for the increase in protectionist pressures in this period. As tariff 
imposition had become progressively more difficult without contravening GATT 
rules, other non-tariff restrictions were imposed on trade flows. Voluntary export 
restraints were one method of restricting trade volumes, while others included 
orderly marketing arrangements and more vigilant use of anti-dumping tariffs. In 
the United States, voluntary export restraints (VERs) on Japanese automobiles 
had been on the agenda after the second oil shock in 1979. Rejected by the 
Carter administration, which chose adjustment assistance for auto workers 
instead, they were quickly agreed on under the new Reagan administration in 
1981. Bergsten and Noland estimate that the resultant higher prices charged by 
Japanese automobile manufacturers in the US, which were followed by other 
producers, resulted in a transfer from US consumers to automobile producers of 
between US$5.8 billion and US$10.3 billion.63 The beneficiaries were all world 
automobile producers, including Japanese firms as well as the US Big Three.
At the same time restrictions on trade through the use of anti-dumping, 
countervailing and safeguard procedures increased. Within the EC there were 
nine such actions between 1971 and 1975, 102 between 1976 and 1980 and 127 
between 1981 and 1985.64 The concern that growing trade impediments would at
60 The majority of regional agreements notified to GATT in the 1970s were between 
European countries or between the EEC and countries bordering on the Mediterranean.
61 Dicken (1992), Henderson (1994), Oman (1994).
62 Baldwin (1993).
63 Bergsten and Noland (1993b) p. 106.
64 See Secchi (1990).
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best slow growth, and at worst send the world into recession, helped to form a 
consensus in favour of a new bout of trade liberalisation which began in Punta 
del Este in 1986; the Uruguay Round.
2.4.1.4 Renewed Liberalisation: 1986-1997
From the mid- to late-1980s up to the present, there has been a renewed push 
towards greater liberalisation at both a regional and multilateral level. On a global 
basis this is demonstrated by the success in carrying through the Uruguay Round 
of GATT negotiations and setting up the World Trade Organization. On a 
regional basis, in some areas previously moribund regional arrangements have 
been revived, while in others new ones have been created.65 Europe, as always 
a prime example, saw a marked acceleration in measures aimed at promoting 
integration in the decade from the mid-1980s, with the Single European Market 
programme, the Maastricht Treaty and the enlargement to 15 members being 
some of the key steps.
It is not entirely clear why there should have been a sudden revival of 
interest in trade liberalisation in general and regionalism in particular. Most of the 
major advances in economic theory related to liberalisation and regionalism were 
made well before the latest round of liberalisation began, so it does not appear to 
be the result of a newly convincing argument.66 One explanation is that it is the 
result of the increased spread of democracies operating on liberal economic 
principles—what has grandly been labelled the "end of history".67 Another 
interpretation is that periods of a relatively prosperous world economy create the 
conditions for trade liberalisation.68 Other suggestions are that some regionalism 
is a defensive reaction to regionalism elsewhere, or attempts to lock in domestic 
policy reforms.69 This issue will be explored in more depth in Chapter 6.
65 WTO (1995).
66 Although as Bhagwati (1993) has noted, the conversion of the US to the merits of 
regionalism has played a part in its spread.
67 Fukuyama (1992).
68 Irwin (1993a).
69 Srinivasan, Whalley and Wooton (1993).
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As with the 1960s, regionalism in the past decade has involved the 
developing world, which this time has focused more on outward looking trading 
arrangements. Kelly has pointed out that the regional trade agreements of the 
1980s differed from those of the 1960s in that a recent feature has been 
agreements between developed and developing countries.70
Another new departure is that the US has begun to embrace regionalism. 
This last point was confirmed in a press conference given by then US Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor on 16 May 1995. Speaking in justification of plans 
to impose US sanctions on Japanese automobile exports, Kantor stated the US 
would "act multilaterally where appropriate, regionally where we can, but 
bilaterally where necessary".71 Leaving aside the apparent interpretation by 
Kantor that the proposal to impose US tariffs on Japan was a bilateral rather than 
a unilateral move, the emphasis on regional action is notable. Events in North 
America in recent years have run parallel to those in Europe with the signing of 
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, subsequently enlarged to include 
Mexico. Meanwhile the "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" begun by 
President Bush and continued by his successor has made a pan-Americas trade 
group a genuine possibility.72
Irrespective of an increase in the number of regional agreements made in 
the past decade, the world appears to have headed away from the protectionist 
tendencies of the 1970s and early 1980s. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
means that a greater share of world trade is now governed by agreed rules, while 
tariff reductions have continued. Most Favoured Nation tariff reduction has 
proceeded to the extent that by the time the Uruguay Round is fully implemented 
43% of imports of industrial products by developed countries will be duty-free. An 
average tariff of 6.6% will apply to the remainder.73 Moreover, in that they have 
not resulted in higher barriers to inter-regional trade, it appears to be appropriate 
to consider the regional developments of the past decade to be in keeping with
70 See Kelly (1992). This is a debatable assertion if the Yaounde and Lome accords are 
considered to be preferential trade agreements.
71 Financial Times, 17 May 1995.
72 Lawrence (1996).
73 WTO (1995) p. 2.
Chapter 2: Regionalism: Theory and Post-War Developments
the liberalisation embodied in the Uruguay Round. Whether this is really the case 
or not will be considered below.
Of course history can never be neatly compartmentalised and there are 
counterexamples in every period—the most notable in the current fourth period 
being the break up of both the integrated Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union 
itself. However, the Comecon system which applied in Eastern Europe for most 
of the post-war period was based on different ideological foundations, both 
politically and economically, so it is not unreasonable to exclude it from this 
analysis. Although it is not precise, this division of post-World War II history 
offers a convenient classification of events; reconstruction followed by trade 
liberalisation, then a pause due to economic difficulties until the past decade 
which has seen renewed liberalisation.
2.4.2 Numbers of Regional Trading Arrangements
In addition to the descriptive approach adopted above, it is possible to trace 
regionalism by the number of agreements signed, or by substantive deepening of 
existing agreements. The signing of regional trading agreements indicates that 
political co-operation is increasing. Although simply measuring the number of 
agreements signed contains no qualitative assessment and does not show 
whether they actually have an impact in bringing the economies of the 
signatories closer together, it is a means of measuring the political energy being 
expended. Presumably the political effort would not be made unless there were 
expectations of some kind of benefit, and as most agreements are structured 
around trade or investment flows, it must be assumed that a large part of the 
benefits will be economic. Information on the deepening of existing agreements 
is not readily available, and the judgement of what represents a material advance 
is partly subjective, so focus is on the formation of new agreements, or the 
broadening of existing ones.
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Figure 2.1. Number of Regional Integration Agreements
Notified to GATT, 1948-1994
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Figure 2.1 shows the number of regional agreements notified to the GATT 
between the first in 1948 (the South Africa-Southern Rhodesia Customs Union 
Agreement) to the last in 1994 (the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to 
the EC). It show 98 notifications under Article XXIV as well as a further 11 
agreements that were notified by developing countries under the 1979 Enabling 
Clause.74 From Figure 2.1 it appears that there were two waves of activity related 
to regional integration. The first came in the 1960s and 1970s and the second in 
the 1990s. However, some caution is needed when looking at these figures. Note 
for example that several agreements had little material impact, with little progress 
made on implementing their provisions—or implementation ran well behind 
schedule.75
Of course, even if implemented fully, the degree of preferential treatment 
offered by treaties can vary considerably. Most agreements notified to the GATT
74 W T O  (1995) Appendix Table 1. The Enabling Clause allowed developing countries to 
form regional agreements without meeting the full requirements of Article XXIV.
75 Nogues and Quintanilla (1993).
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have been free trade areas, with few related to customs unions (the European 
Community, CARICOM and MERCOSUR are notable examples).76 Note also 
that one agreement often superseded or enhanced another—for example there 
were three notifications to the GATT of agreements between the EEC (as was) 
and Turkey,77 while the integration of later members as part of the EC 
enlargement process made earlier free trade agreements between them 
redundant. In contrast, the deepening of an existing agreement (such as the 
European Single Market programme) does not register, even though it might be 
more significant in terms of promoting economic integration than many of the 
notified agreements.
It is worth noting that 22 out of the total of 109 agreements were related to 
the formation or expansion of the EC or EFTA, or ties between their members. A 
further 54 of the notified agreements were between the EC, EFTA or their 
members and other countries or groups of countries. Only 33 regional 
agreements (30% of the total) did not involve members of the EC or EFTA. The 
political transition of Eastern Europe since 1989 has seen another round of intra- 
European agreements, and 24 of the 33 deals notified since 1990 have related to 
trade with Central or Eastern Europe.
Excluding EC or EFTA related agreements allows us to consider the 
extent to which regional agreements have been on the increase outside of 
Europe. Figure 2.2 shows the number of regional agreements signed excluding 
those which involved the members of the EC or EFTA. Two features are worth 
noting. Firstly, there have been relatively few agreements signed at any point in 
time. Secondly, it was the 1960s more than the 1970s which was the first decade 
of enthusiasm for regional agreements in the rest of the world, but a similar 
resurgence of interest can be seen in the 1990s.
76 WTO (1995) Appendix Table 1.
77 In 1963,1970 and 1973.
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Figure 2.2. Number of Non-EC/EFTA Related Regional
Integration Agreements Notified to GATT, 1948-1994
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Looking at the 109 agreements from another angle and it is seen that 30 
of the regional agreements notified to the GATT involved only two countries. A 
further 33 agreements were between the EC and one other country. That leaves 
only 46 agreements (42%) which can really be seen as regional deals, rather 
than just bilateral ones.
The conclusion must be that formal attempts to promote regional 
integration are primarily a European phenomenon. Outside Europe, agreements 
have been few and frequently between only two countries. By the time the WTO 
began operating in 1995 few contracting parties were not signatories to one 
regional agreement or another—Hong Kong and Japan being notable 
exceptions. If APEC is transformed into a formal preferential trading area—its 
stated objective is to achieve regional free trade by 2020—then all WTO 
members will be tied to at least one regional trade group. That is to say, every 
WTO member will have regional as well as multilateral commitments.
Considering the importance of various preferential trade arrangements, 
just two can claim to have any real significance on a world economic scale. Only 
the European Union and NAFTA have membership which accounts for over 5%
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of world output and world trade.78 APEC (or any other regional group including 
Japan) would also be significant in world terms, but it does not yet have formal 
preferential agreements. With this in mind, the focus in Chapter 3 when 
examining the data for signs of regionalisation will be on these three regions. 
That is not to say that other groupings are unimportant for the countries involved: 
for example MERCOSUR could have a major impact on its members, but in 
terms of the world economy, they are of marginal importance.
The overall conclusion is that enthusiasm for regional agreements has 
reached levels in the 1990s which surpass the previous peaks of the 1970s in 
Europe or the 1960s for the rest of the world. Not shown by the figures on the 
number of agreements are three other indications that regionalism is a stronger 
trend in the 1990s than at any time in the post-war period. Firstly, existing but 
low-level agreements have been deepened; the ASEAN Free Trade Area is a 
good example. Secondly, existing but dormant agreements have been revived 
and pursued more actively; such as has been the case with the Andean Pact. 
Thirdly, new agreements have tended to involve a greater commitment to make 
genuine progress than was often the case in the past; MERCOSUR is notably 
more positive than the Latin American regional agreements reached in the 
1960s.
2.5 Regionalism and Economic Cycles
History and theory suggest that trade liberalisation and economic integration both 
affect and are affected by the economic cycle.79 It appears that healthy rates of 
economic growth reduce resistance of domestic interest groups to trade 
liberalisation—either regional or multilateral—which in turn boosts growth through 
gains from trade. This virtuous cycle was evident in the 1960s. Conversely at 
times of economic difficulty, such as in the 1930s and 1970s, domestic interest 
groups seek to restrict imports in order to lower competitive pressures.80 On a
78 ASEAN accounts for slightly more than 5% of world trade due to the large amount of re­
exports from Singapore. The group represents only 1.6% of world GDP.
79 Kindleberger (1973), Milner (1988).
80 Conybeare (1987), Milner (1988), Oman (1994).
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macroeconomic basis, this reduces the gains from trade and lowers overall 
growth.
While the link between the economic cycle and trade liberalisation can be 
something of a chicken and egg debate, a strong case can be made for ascribing 
the 1930s Great Depression to either monetary or fiscal phenomena,81 or the 
stagflation of the 1970s to inflationary shocks. That is to say, neither of the major 
economic disturbances of the twentieth century appear to be attributable to 
increased trade barriers, although they may have contributed to the length and 
severity of the downturns.
This would seem to imply that the renewed liberalisation seen since the 
mid-1980s can be partly attributed to the end of the early 1980s recession and to 
the reasonably steady global growth since then.82 If this is the case, then a 
renewed sharp recession could again threaten the progress towards more open 
exchange that has been accomplished over the past decade. It could also be 
argued that rather than being related directly to the economic cycle, shifts 
between the relative strength of forces in favour of protectionism versus 
economic integration have been determined by swings in general economic 
attitudes between liberalism and interventionism. However, this idea does not 
appear to fit closely with the facts: most notably in the first half of the 1980s, 
when the growing popularity of deregulation and free market solutions 
domestically coincided with economic stagnation and also saw more active use 
of non-tariff barriers. Perhaps a stronger influence is the attitude of the dominant 
world economy. From the end of World War II until 1973 the United States 
clearly led. The 1970s was a period of weaker leadership, while greater 
consensus appears to have emerged since the mid-1980s.83
81 Friedman and Schwarz (1963) make the argument for monetary causes, while Temin 
(1976) sees the Great Depression as being explained by insufficient demand.
82 Indeed some have gone so far as to proclaim the end of the economic cycle, but there 
is little empirical support for this view. See Financial Times, 10 April 1997.
83 Frequent G7 meetings and agreements such as the Plaza Accord are indications of a 
trilateral governance of the world system.
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2.6 Conclusion
In the post-war period, there have been two main bursts of regionalism. The first 
period, in a "long" decade around the 1960s, was accompanied by development 
of much of the theoretical work on customs unions. That theory suggested that 
the intuitive approach of viewing customs unions as a step in the direction of free 
trade, and thus a welfare enhancing development, was not necessarily justified. 
Kemp and Wan demonstrated that customs unions could be structured in such a 
way that they were welfare enhancing and represented a move towards free 
trade, but this is dependent on maintaining the level of trade flows with non­
members. However, there are few signs that the Kemp-Wan prescription has had 
a strong influence on the structure of regional trade agreements.84
Europe persisted in making regional agreements through the 1970s, but 
there was a more general revival of regionalism from the mid-1980s. This revival 
has lead to concern that it could involve welfare losses for non-participants, or 
undermine efforts for multilateral liberalisation. However, there is a question as to 
whether an increase in regionalism has had a significant impact on patterns of 
trade. This question will be addressed in the next chapter.
84 McMillan (1993).
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CHAPTER THREE
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: METHODOLOGY AND RECENT TRENDS
3.1 Introduction
Before analysing the implications of increased regional integration, an 
examination of whether such a trend really exists is first necessary. It is important 
to look at the available data to determine, as far as is possible, whether regional 
trade is becoming more preferential and whether national economies are 
genuinely becoming more integrated, and if so, in what ways this integration is 
manifested. This chapter examines a broad range of data and analyses various 
methodologies used to look for evidence of regionalisation. Inadequacies of data 
related to areas such as foreign direct investment frequently mean that in most 
studies only merchandise trade data are analysed when making judgements 
about regional trends. However, data on other forms of integration may also 
prove useful and should not be neglected.
The basic hypothesis is that regionalism leads to closer economic 
integration of the participants. This could be evident in several areas, but trade 
flows are the most readily measurable, with a move towards closer regionalism 
expected to produce an increase in the propensity to trade within the region. As 
will be shown, this is a surprisingly difficult hypothesis to test.
This chapter aims to make three contributions. Firstly, an examination of a 
broad range of data for evidence of regional preferences. Secondly, discussion 
of the merits and faults of attempts to manipulate the data to give a clearer 
picture. Thirdly, analysis of the data bearing in mind the statistical problems 
involved.
This chapter will demonstrate that a marked rise in regional trade bias in 
North America and Europe has occurred since the late 1980s. However, in the 
case of Europe the increase in bias is restricted to trade with the new members, 
rather than between the original ones. In both cases, the increase in regional 
bias has been accompanied by a rise in overall economic openness, which 
reduces fears that regionalism is detrimental to trade flows with non-members.
A range of measures can be employed in the search for bias in trade 
flows. These are considered below, starting with the ratio of intra-regional trade 
to total trade, followed by different forms of trade intensity indices. Trade intensity
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indices allow differentiation between the impact of changing shares of world trade 
and that of genuine shifts in preferential trade bias. Some caution is needed in 
using such measures, and they cannot be used for inter-regional comparisons, 
but they do allow analysis of trends in individual regions over time. Attempts to 
measure regionalisation using gravity models are found to have serious flaws 
and it is shown that conclusions drawn from the gravity model approach are not 
well founded.
After considering the methodological problems, this chapter will search the 
available evidence for signs of regionalisation. It finds that regional trade bias 
rose in Europe and North America, and in the case of the former there are clear 
signs that membership of the EU affects trade bias. More surprising is the finding 
that the original six EU members have seen no increase in trade bias over the 
past three decades. Other data sets are examined, but are not comprehensive 
enough to allow reliable conclusions to be drawn. Later chapters will discuss the 
political, macroeconomic and microeconomic explanations for the findings, which 
will also consider how the identified trends might affect the various actors in the 
international political economy. The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to 
examining the available statistical evidence for signs of regional integration (the 
economic force).
3.2 Evidence of Regional Integration
Before considering the impact of increasing regional integration on the 
international political economy it is necessary to examine whether this is a trend 
which exists in the real world or is simply an invention of academics, politicians, 
journalists and business consultants. Moreover, rather than simply calculating 
whether regional integration is increasing, it is also useful to examine the form 
that such integration takes.
On a statistical basis, there are four main areas that can be examined for 
evidence of regional integration. One of these—merchandise trade—is frequently 
studied for signs of regionalisation. Analysis of foreign direct investment flows is 
not uncommon. I also consider a third area for analysis, that of other non-equity 
forms of corporate activity and the income flows from foreign assets in general. 
Fourthly, financial flows are examined for signs of regional integration.
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Regional integration (or regionalisation) is taken to be closer 
interdependence between the economy of one country and that of one or more 
other economies in the same geographic region. This involves two concepts. 
Firstly, it involves a regional preference (or bias) in the conduct of economic 
activity, such that regional neighbours are favoured over more geographically 
distant economies. Secondly, it relates to the overall degree of economic 
openness within which any regional bias is shown.
The two main issues involved in measuring regional integration relate to 
which methodology and which data should be used. This chapter will discuss the 
availability and merits of the various data sources and the different 
methodologies. A cautionary note is useful at this point. Trade and investment 
data can be used to show degrees of bias between countries and within regions, 
and whether that bias is rising or declining. However, this is only one aspect of 
the issue of regional integration, as will be discussed below in section 3.3.5. The 
relationship between trade bias and the degree of economic openness needs 
examination in order to widen the discussion from trade bias to regional 
economic integration.
3.3 Merchandise Trade Flows
Merchandise trade data are most frequently used to examine whether trends 
towards regionalisation exist. This is justified by their comprehensive nature, with 
a breakdown of almost every country’s trade with other countries of the world 
available from the International Monetary Fund. The IMF publishes timely and 
consistent direction of trade figures from 1948.1 These data can be examined in 
various ways, the basic concept being that if countries in a region show a 
preference to trade with each other to a greater extent than is implied by their 
share in world trade, then this is a sign of regional trade bias. The availability of 
time series data allows the analysis of trends over a long period of time. Indeed 
Bairoch has produced a series dating back to 1830, while Anderson and Norheim 
use detailed figures from 1928 onwards.2
1 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, although the most recent one or two years’ 
data can be subject to revision.
2 See Bairoch (1976) and Anderson and Norheim (1993).
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The methodology used for merchandise trade flows also applies to the 
other data sets which are discussed later in this chapter. Because merchandise 
trade provides the most comprehensive data set, it seems sensible to begin a 
discussion of regional bias with an analysis of trade flows.
3.3.1 Direction of Trade Flows
The basic measure of the share of trade flows between pairs or groups of 
countries has several attractions. The calculation is straightforward, it is readily 
understandable, and the results can contain useful information. However, it is 
poor at dealing with a dynamic analysis of changes in trade shares over time, 
and at answering the question of whether trade flows are surprisingly high or low.
One basic measure of the degree of regional integration is the proportion 
of trade between members of the region as a share of their total trade.3 This can 
be examined by setting out the data for the three major trading areas: North 
America, the European Community and East Asia.4 The results are shown in 
Table 3.1 below, which are the author’s own calculations, as one peculiar feature 
of the debate on regional integration is that different works can show surprisingly 
wide differences in their results, even where the calculation is straightforward.5
3 See Lloyd (1992), WTO (1995), OECD (1995).
4 There is always room for debate about the composition of an Asian bloc. Japan must be 
included or it will not be a significant economic entity, similarly for the People’s Republic of China. 
South Asia is excluded, although its inclusion makes little impact on the findings. I have chosen to 
exclude Australia and New Zealand for geographical reasons.
5 For example Frankel, Wei and Stein’s (1994) calculations for 1990 for the three regions 
shown above are 29.3%, 47.1% and 24.6% respectively, while Anderson and Norheim (1993) 
calculate shares to be 48%, 72% and 40% although their Asian and European measures are 
slightly broader as figures for Asia include Australasia and those for Europe are for all of Western 
Europe. Calculations by Yoshida et al. (1994) show 41.3%, 59.2% and 36.9%. Not one EC 
member had an intra-EC trade share below 50% in 1990, which indicates a problem with Frankel, 
Wei and Stein’s data.
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Table 3.1. Intra-Regional Trade as a Percentage of Total Trade
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
East Asia a 25.5 28.9 29.2 35.4 37.2 42.0 50.0
European 
Community b
47.6 51.8 51.2 52.5 53.5 59.3 55.9
North Americac 35.7 38.6 35.7 33.2 38.6 37.4 42.2
Source: Author’s calculations from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
a: East Asia includes Brunei, the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Republic of 
Korea, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, 
b: The EC 12 pre-1995 enlargement, excluding the former German Democratic Republic, 
c: Canada, Mexico and the United States of America.
The data presented in Table 3.1 appear to support the idea that regional 
integration has increased in recent years in North America, Europe and Asia. 
However, there are serious inadequacies with this form of analysis. From the 
static point of view, the share of intra-regional trade will be affected by the 
number of countries in the region, as well as the relative openness of the 
economies (which tends to be inversely related to the size of the economy).6 As a 
result, comparisons between the regions shown in Table 3.1 can be misleading. 
As we are more interested in whether trade bias is increasing, as opposed to the 
degree of bias, this is not necessarily a problem, but of course the size of the 
countries within the region is also changing, due to differential rates of economic 
growth. For example, between 1970 and 1994, the economies of the 
industrialised world grew by an average 2.7%, with the European Community 
growing 2.4%, while non-Japan Asia grew 6.5% per annum.7 Each country’s 
weight in world trade is also changing as trade growth varies between countries. 
In addition, factors which affect transaction costs, such as language and 
transportation costs, will also affect the degree of intra-regional trade.
In effect, data on intra-regional trade shares does not show whether trade 
has risen more or less than would be expected by any overall change in world 
trade patterns. Shifts in trade preferences or bias imply a change in bilateral or 
regional trade shares even when each country’s share of world trade is
6 Kuznets (1959, 1966).
7 Calculated from indices in the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook (1994). EC figures from Eurostat National Accounts.
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unchanged, or after allowances have been made for changing shares of world 
trade. This is discussed in detail below, where use of synthetic indicators of trade 
bias gives an insight into regional trends that is not available from simply looking 
at trade shares. For example, in the case of Europe, intra-regional trade shares 
have been roughly flat in the past three decades. However, indicators that correct 
for Europe’s declining share of world trade reveal a rising trade bias between the 
founder members and the later entrants.
Considering the handicaps discussed above, Anderson and Norheim go 
so far as to say "the share of intra-regional trade in a region's total trade is a very 
inadequate indicator of preferential policy-induced regional trade bias".8
Interestingly, looking at trends in intra-regional trade shares is exactly the 
approach that the World Trade Organization (WTO) used in its 1995 report 
Regionalism and the World Trading System. The WTO concluded that the 
"analysis does not support the conclusion of an increasing regionalization of 
world trade, nor does it confirm the often-alleged emergence of trading "blocs" 
centred in North America, Western Europe and the Asia-Pacific region".9 This 
appears a bold conclusion, given the inadequacies of the use of simple direction 
of trade figures, and as will be demonstrated, it is not borne out by a more 
detailed examination of the data. The WTO claimed that Western Europe is the 
only region to have seen a policy-induced increase in regional trade flows. 
However, it did not attempt to relate the claimed increase in European integration 
with specific policy initiatives. Many other authors utilise this crude measure of 
regionalisation, which tends to provide little substantiation for the arguments they 
then propose.10 Presumably the reasons for this are that collecting the necessary 
data is an onerous task, while the methodology for more suitable manipulation of 
the data is open to debate.
Although the conclusions of the WTO may be comfortable for a body 
concerned with promoting greater openness and equity in world trade, they are 
based on an inadequate examination of the statistics available. In its defence, 
the WTO argues that major structural differences between various regional
8 Anderson and Norheim (1993) p. 22.
9 WTO (1995) p. 2.
10 Recent examples have been Yoshida et al. (1994) and OECD (1995). Lloyd (1992) 
acknowledges the faults of such a measure, but uses it nevertheless.
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agreements makes statistical analysis difficult, so it chooses to look at 
"institutional complementarity". That is, whether the objectives of regional and 
multilateral liberalisation have been complementary or conflicting. Nevertheless, 
it seems advisable to consider other statistical measures of economic integration 
in search of a clearer picture.
3.3.2 Bilateral Trade Intensities
The standard method of analysing bias in bilateral trade flows is provided by the 
trade intensity index that was first proposed by Brown and later developed by 
others.11 This looks at the share of one country’s exports to another as a 
proportion of that country’s overall share in world import markets. The idea 
behind such a measure is to ask whether one country trades with another to a 
greater or lesser degree than is implied by its share in world trade. That is to say, 
although France’s exports to Germany are twice the size of its exports to 
Belgium, in itself this tells us nothing about any bias in French trade towards the 
two countries, as we need to consider the relative size of Belgium and Germany’s 
trade flows.
The trade intensity index aims to show both natural and policy-induced 
effects on the geographic distribution of trade. Assuming that "natural" factors 
(such as relative size and income, language or distance) change little overtime,12 
movements in the index can be attributed to shifts in other influences on trade 
bias, such as discriminatory tariff policies. Analysis below will expand this 
bilateral measure of trade bias to a regional level. By looking at a time series of 
trade bias the aim is to observe changes in barriers to liberal economic exchange 
or changes in economic actors' treatment of existing barriers. The standard 
formula for the trade intensity index is:13
11 See Brown (1949), Kojima (1964) and Drysdale and Garnaut (1982).
12 Petri (1994) controversially argues that even transport costs are surprisingly unaffected 
by distance (as much of the costs are taken by handling charges). He claims that there is little 
evidence that bilateral trade is significantly affected by changes in transportation costs, such as 
those resulting from the oil price shocks of the 1970s.
13 Brown (1949), Drysdale (1988).
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Mj / (Mw - Mj)
Where
lij is the trade intensity index between countries i and j.
Xjj is the amount of exports to country j from country i.
Xj is country i's total exports.
Mj is country j's total imports.
Mj is country i's total imports.
Mw is total world imports.
The denominator is adjusted to account for the fact that "a country cannot 
export goods to itself".14 The idea is that if imports in country j are 5% of the 
world total (excluding i's imports), but it takes 10% of i's exports, then the trade 
intensity is 2 . This is because country j takes twice as large a share of i's exports 
as is implied by country j ’s share of world trade. The aim is for the denominator to 
be the neutral measure, or control, and the interest is in the degree to which the 
numerator differs from this neutral value. Petri claims that "If each partner's share 
of a country's trade was equal to that partner's share in world trade, then all 
intensity indexes would be one".15
Results from this type of calculation are typically used in three ways. 
Firstly, if the trade intensity is greater than one, then this is taken to indicate that 
the exports of the first country to the other are greater than would be expected by 
the second country's share in world trade. There is said to be a positive bias in 
the first country's exports to the second country. Secondly, if the value of the 
trade intensity index with a certain country is higher for one trading partner than 
for another, then the former is seen to have a greater preferential bias. Thirdly, if 
the trade intensity index is rising over time, then there is said to be an increasing 
bias in exports from the first country to the second.16
There is a problem in all three of these interpretations as, strictly speaking, 
the results only hold if all countries are an equal size and are equally open to
14 Drysdale and Garnaut (1994) p. 25.
15 Petri (1994) p. 117.
16 See for example Brown (1949), Kojima (1964), Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), Drysdale 
(1988), Petri (1994), Primo Braga and Bannister (1994).
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trade. Even in a world where there is no actual bias in the direction of trade flows, 
problems arise when some countries trade more than others, perhaps because 
they are larger, or when some countries are growing faster than others. Clearly 
these qualifications are a fair description of the "real world" and so before 
attempting to extend the analysis to the regional level it is first necessary to 
consider how serious the problem might be. It is unclear whether previous 
studies have failed to recognise this problem, or whether they have simply 
chosen to ignore it as being relatively insignificant. Drysdale and Garnaut refer to 
the 1993 study by Petri which calculates trade intensities without subtracting Mj 
from Mw in equation (1), (i.e. not adjusting the denominator) and claim "the 
variability in the indexes which results from this is only minor".17 However, they 
make no reference to the bias noted below in the index resulting from the 
calculations in equation (1), which is the one that they use.
As an example, consider a world made up of only six countries. The trade 
flows of five are equal in size and the other is larger (as it is a larger economy). 
Assuming the large country’s exports are 200 units and those of the small 
countries are 120, then it is relatively straightforward to deduce bilateral trade 
flows, assuming no bias in direction of trade, and no trade imbalances. The large 
country exports 40 units to each of the small countries (as the 200 must be split 
into five equal parts). The small countries in turn export 40 to the large country 
(as there are no imbalances) and split the remaining 80 equally among the other 
four countries, exporting 20 to each. World trade is 800 (200 plus five times 120). 
This can also be demonstrated algebraically.
17 Drysdale and Garnaut (1994) footnote 8.
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X [ Exports of large country (L) to each small country, 
where i=1, n (and n=5)
So
X [ = X L / n
So in this case 
X [ =2 00 /5  =40
Exports from small country X g = X ^  +XX ls
X s = exports of each small country
X g = exports from small country to large country
XX 3 = exports from small country to other small countries, 
j = 1 .....(n-1) because you cannot export to yourself
X g = X ‘ = X L / n by symmetry
= X s - ( X L /n)
n-1
XI. = (120 - 40)/ 4  = 20
Taking these results to calculate trade intensities using formula (1) gives 
the first sign of problems. The trade intensity index for exports from the large 
country to the small countries is 1.000,18 but the trade intensity index for exports
from the small countries to the large country is 1.13319 and between the small
countries it is 0.944.20 We have already established that there is no preferential 
bias in the above example (as trade flows are determined by the differences in 
total exports of each country), but the trade intensity index is diverging from 1.0 . 
The use of the formula shown in (1) is based on the assumption that the trade 
intensity index should read 1.0 when there is no trade bias.
This shows that the attempt by Brown et al. to correct the denominator to 
give a result of 1.0 when no actual trade bias exists has not quite worked. Even
though each country trades with each other in proportion to its share of total
trade, two of the three trade intensity indices generated do not have the value of
18 (40/200) /  (120 /  (800-200))
19 (40/120) /  (200 /  (800-120))
20 (20/120) /  (120 /  (800-120))
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1.0. It is also evident that exports to the large country generate an apparently 
positive bias, while exports between the small countries generate a figure below 
unity. This is a consequence of the attempt to adjust the denominator to account 
for the fact that "a country cannot export goods to itself".
This tells us that, even in a world where no bias exists, trade between a 
large and a small economy will give a larger reading by this measure than trade 
between two small economies. As a result, the trade intensity index cannot be 
used to make strict comparisons between the trade bias of different pairs of 
countries. Unfortunately this is how it has been used from Brown onwards.21
Another question is whether such an index can be used to make 
comparisons of the degree of bias between pairs of countries over time. As is 
probably expected, again a distortion occurs. In the above example, assume the 
large country grows (and total world trade grows with it) to give a situation where 
exports from the large country are 300 units and the small countries each export 
140. With the same conditions of unbiased trade and no imbalances, this time 
exports from the large country to the small are 60 units. Exports from the small to 
large country are also 60, while the remaining 80 units are still traded equally 
among the other four countries, 20 units going to each. World trade is now 1000 
units.
Now the export intensity index from the large country to a small country is 
still 1.000,22 but the export intensity index from a small country to the large 
country is 1.22923 and the export intensity index between small countries is 
0.878.24 Comparing these results with those above shows a lower value for the 
export intensity index between the small countries, but a larger value for the 
export intensity index from the small to the large country.
The implication is that as the large country has grown in size, even without 
it developing any bias in the direction of its trade flows, the trade intensity indices 
have changed. Export intensities of trade to the large country rise as that country 
grows in size relative to the others, even without the development of a bias in
21 Brown (1949), Kojima (1964), Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), Drysdale (1988), Petri 
(1994), Primo Braga and Bannister (1994).
22 (60/300) /  (140 /  (1000-300))
23 (60/140) /  (300 /  (1000-140))
24 (20/140) / (140 /  (1000-140))
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trade flows. Also note that export intensities between the small countries decline 
as the large country grows in size. Again the reason is the shift in the 
denominator caused by the change in the size of the large country.25
From this it is clear that comparisons of trade intensity measures between 
different pairs of countries must be approached with caution. In the event that 
some countries account for a relatively large share of world trade, even when 
there is no bias in the direction of trade flows, the trade intensity of exports to 
these countries will suggest a positive bias. This problem diminishes with a 
reduction in the relative size of the largest traders and is probably not a critical 
issue in a world containing over 180 countries26 where the largest trader has a 
share of just 12.5%. As we will see, the distortion caused by size differences is 
problematic when looking at relatively large regional groupings. Moreover, if any 
one country is seeing a change in its share of world trade (even with no change 
in trade bias), then all other trade intensities will be affected, because of the 
impact on the size of world trade in the denominator.
Table 3.2 shows the largest dozen exporters in the world in 1995, as well 
as how their share of world trade has changed since 1965. This shows that even 
the largest exporter (the USA) accounts for only one-eighth of world exports, with 
another two (Germany and Japan) each taking a share of just below one tenth. In 
the second above example, the highest trade intensity index was the 1.229 from 
the small countries to the large country, when the former were 14% of world 
trade and the latter was 30%. Compared to the changes in the direction of trade 
flows identified below, the changes that have taken place in the share of world 
trade of the major economies is relatively minor.
Much of the discussion below relates to the degree to which trade bias 
might have changed over the years. As noted above, when there is no bias in 
trade flows, the export intensity index to any country grows with the share of 
world trade of that country, and again the "real world" situation is relatively 
encouraging. In the above example, when the large country grew from 25% of 
world trade to 30%, the export intensity index from the small country to the large
25 The problems in simply looking at trade shares are apparent in this example. The share 
of the large country in the small countries’ exports would rise from 33.3% to 42.9% as its exports 
grow from 200 to 300, even though no change in trade bias takes place.
26 The 1997 issue of the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook contains trade data for 
184 countries and territories.
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country rose from 1.133 to 1.229. Changes in world trade shares of the 
magnitude seen in the past thirty years are not so great that they render all 
results meaningless. Because world trade shares are neither evenly distributed 
nor stable, caution is needed in drawing conclusions from this methodology, but 
in the analysis below the trends are generally sufficiently pronounced that minor 
distortions caused by changing shares of world trade do not have a serious 
impact on the overall conclusions.
Table 3.2. Share of world exports (%)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
USA 16.6 15.2 13.4 12.3 11.7 11.6 12.5
Germany 10.1 11.0 10.2 9.2 9.2 11.4 9.6
Japan 4.2 5.6 5.9 6.5 9.6 8.8 9.3
France 5.5 5.8 5.9 5.4 5.0 6.1 5.3
China 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.5 4.5
UK 7.9 6.5 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.5
Italy 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.8 4.2
Canada 5.1 5.8 4.0 3.4 4.6 3.7 3.8
Holland 3.8 3.9 4.2 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.3
Benelux 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.7 3.4 2.8
Korea 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.3
Singapore 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.8
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
The reason for these distortions is that, as Drysdale and Garnaut noted, a 
country cannot trade with itself, but as is demonstrated above, subtracting the 
exporting country’s trade from the denominator does not provide an unbiased 
result. Thus, to argue as Petri does that "If each partner’s share of a country’s 
trade was equal to that partner’s share in world trade, then all intensity indexes 
would be one"27 is only true if each country trades the same amount.
The problems become more pronounced when bias in trade flows is 
introduced into the picture. In this case the trade intensity index between large 
countries can return a lower figure than for small countries, even when the same 
degree of bias occurs. This is a particularly important feature when discussing 
intra-regional flows. In a world of an infinite number of equally-sized countries
27 Petri (1994) p. 117.
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with no bias, the trade intensity index will be 1.0 , while if just two of those 
countries trade twice as much with each other as with any other countries, their 
trade intensity index will be 2 .0.
The first example above, where the large country exports 200 units and 
the small countries each export 120, shows the effect of relative size. Assume 
two of the small countries have a preferential bias which doubles their bilateral 
trade, while leaving all other trade flows unchanged. These two now export 40 
units to each other and 140 in total, so total world trade rises to 840.28 The export 
intensity index between these two countries is now 1.42929 compared to the 
earlier measure between the two small countries of 0.878.
In contrast, assume one of the small countries trades twice as much as 
before with the large country (so each exports 80 units to the other) while all 
other trade flows remain unchanged. World trade rises to 880 and the export 
intensity index from that small country to the large one is 1.50030 and from the 
large to the small is 1.333.31 In this case the increase in the export intensity index 
is less than when trade flows between two small countries doubled. As will be 
seen with intra-regional trade, the constraint is the adjustment to the denominator 
which has the result of limiting the maximum trade intensity index reading in an 
inverse proportion to the country’s share in world trade.
Taking an extreme example, if there are two large countries, each of 
which accounts for 20% of world trade, but which trade only bilaterally and not 
with any other country, then their bilateral trade intensity index will be 4.O.32 
However, if another two countries also only trade bilaterally, but each only 
accounts for 5% of world trade then these countries’ trade intensity index will be
19.0.33 From this it is apparent that bilateral trade intensities could be rising 
simply because the countries’ share of world trade is falling, which has the result 
of increasing the maximum possible reading from the trade intensity index due to 
the depressive effect on the denominator. The reverse is also true, and so when
28 (200+ (3x  120)+ (2x140))
29 The result of (40 /140 ) /  (140 /  (840 -140))
30 The result of (80 /160 ) /  (240 /  (880 -160))
31 The result of (80 /  240) /  (160 /  (880 - 240))
32 The result of (20 /  20) /  (20/ (100-20))
33 The result of (5 /  5) /  (5 /  (100-5))
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a pair of countries which have a positive bias in their trade are seeing their share 
of world trade increase significantly, the bilateral trade intensity index will fall. 
However, looking at the experience in post-WW2 Asia, Petri notes that 
"spectacular growth of the region’s economies was accompanied by a substantial 
decline in their regional trade bias".34 He argues that the observed decline in the 
trade intensity indices was a result of greater inter-linkages with the rest of the 
world stemming from multilateral liberalisation, increased economies of scale in 
trade linkages and the competitive rather than complementary nature of Asian 
manufacturing. However, part of the decline in the trade intensity indices can be 
explained by the statistical effects of the formula used, resulting from the rise in 
the share of world trade of the Asian economies. This was illustrated in the 
changes in the shares of world trade shown in Table 3.2.
Also significant for the later analysis in this chapter, is that when the 
relative size of trade flows among the small countries changes, the bilateral trade 
intensity with the larger country is affected. So when two of the small countries 
double their trade with each other (as above), the export intensity index between 
an unaffected small country and the large country rises from 1.133 to 1.200.35
Three situations have now been identified where the export intensity index 
from a small country to a large country rises. In the first case, although there is 
no change in actual trade bias, it is because the large country is accounting for a 
larger share of world trade, as its total exports rise from 200 to 300. In the 
second case it is because trade flows with one of the small countries have 
doubled, to show a genuinely preferential bias. In the third case, trade flows 
between the two countries have not changed, but a change in trade flows among 
other small countries has increased the total size of world trade, thereby creating 
a bias.
These findings are important, as the trade intensity index provides the 
backbone of attempts to measure preference in bilateral trade relations. 
However, in a world consisting of large and small economies, comparisons 
between pairs of countries at any point in time are sensitive to their relative share
34 Petri (1994) p. 116.
35 The result of (40 /120 ) /  (200 /  (840 - 120)). The decline in the export intensity index is 
due to the reduction in the denominator stemming from the rise in world trade. In effect the rise in 
the index is because there is now a positive bias towards the large country and away from the two 
countries which have seen bilateral flows double.
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in world trade. Similarly, in a world consisting of countries growing at different 
rates, comparisons over different points in time are sensitive to differentials in 
growth rates.
Ideally, the next step would be to propose a solution that allows 
construction of an unbiased bilateral trade measure. However, I have been 
unable to derive such a measure as there is no satisfactory means of adjusting 
the denominator to provide unbiased results when countries are a different size 
and growing at different rates. As will be seen, these problems recur as attempts 
are made to expand the bilateral trade intensity onto a regional basis.
The conclusion from the above is that results based on the methodology 
originally developed by Brown contain some flaws. However, this does not make 
all analysis stemming from such an approach worthless, as in large regions 
whose share of world trade has not changed significantly the distortions from the 
faults in the methodology are generally small relative to the changes in the 
revealed trade bias. Comparisons of trade intensities between different pairs of 
countries is particularly problematic, but looking at trends over time is more 
acceptable due to the relatively slow rate of change in other determinants of 
trade flows such as income. In the absence of other satisfactory means of 
measuring trade bias, there follows an attempt to extend this analysis to the 
regional level.36
However, before moving on to the regional level, it is worth considering 
another possible distortion to results, which can apply to whichever measure of 
trade preference is used. That is the effect of price distortions, such as swings in 
the relative prices of traded goods, or in the level of exchange rates.
3.3.3 Price Distortions
Another important feature in the analysis of direction of trade flows is that most 
studies focus on the level of trade bias, or changes in bias, at discrete points in 
time—usually at five yearly intervals.37 No doubt this is mainly due to the large 
amount of data which must be manipulated. However, there are potentially 
distortive effects from using this approach, in that the years chosen are to some
36 See section 3.4.1.5 for a critique of the approach using the gravity model.
37 See for example Anderson and Norheim (1993) and Frankel, Wei and Stein (1994).
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degree arbitrary. This leaves the studies open to distortions from short-term price 
effects, either from volatility in relative prices of traded goods, or in exchange rate 
fluctuations. These fluctuations can mean that the nominal trade data paint a 
different picture from the real (inflation adjusted) series. Very few countries 
produce data on trade flows by country in real (inflation adjusted) terms, so there 
is no substitute for the IMF value-based data.
Unfortunately, the tendency to use end and mid-decade data points 
produces a particularly high risk of distortions in recent years. In 1980 oil prices 
were unusually strong, in relative terms 25% higher than in 1990.38 Similarly, 
1985 was the peak of the Reagan strong dollar episode. The US real effective 
exchange rate appreciated by 33.5% between 1980 to 1985 and then 
depreciated by 36.5% from the 1985 peak to 1990.39 Studies which concentrate 
on these points in time risk having their results distorted by temporary price 
shocks which disguise the underlying trend in the real economy. However, 
selecting data points which appear to be less influenced by short-term volatility 
can leave the results open to the accusation that the time periods have been 
chosen to deliver the desired results.
There are two main potential distortions which need noting. Firstly, 
volatility in the relative prices of traded goods can affect trade intensities (or any 
other measure of regional bias). For example, for some countries a shift in the 
price of a major traded commodity (such as oil) could cause their trade intensity 
index to move in a way that does not reflect underlying movements in the volume 
of trade. As a result, selecting a data point immediately after oil prices have just 
doubled, or just halved, could result in unjustified conclusions being drawn.
A second distortion is that sudden shifts in the exchange rate can also 
cause the trade intensity index to move. For example, if the values of European 
currencies appreciate against the US dollar, then the dollar value of intra-EU 
trade rises accordingly. If we assume that the dollar value of extra-EU trade is 
unaffected, then the trade intensity indices between European countries will 
rise.40 This should not be a surprise, as this would be the equivalent of all
38 Calculated from IMF International Financial Statistics, commodity price indices.
39 Calculated from the real effective exchange rate index in IMF International Financial 
Statistics.
40 In terms of equation (1) above, the value of Mw rises, causing the value of the 
denominator to fall.
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European countries raising intra-EU trade, while leaving trade with the rest of the 
world unchanged. This analysis ignores the effects that exchange rate shifts will 
have on trade volumes, but gives some idea of the possible short-term distortions 
involved in measuring trade bias using nominal data.
Large swings in commodity prices and exchange rates have been 
commonplace since the early 1970s, and so, in order to allow clearer 
identification of underlying trends, in the discussion below a time series of the 
data is presented. Graphs are used to show trade intensities for North America, 
Asia and Europe.41 While many other regional groupings exist, I have chosen to 
focus on the three main areas in the world economy. None of the others is 
sufficiently large to have a marked impact on world trade flows, even though 
initiatives such as MERCOSUR are important to the countries concerned.
3.3.4 Regional Trade Intensities
The above two approaches (bilateral trade intensities and intra-regional trade 
shares) form the basis for the calculation of regional trade intensities. However, 
combining the two contains more hazards than there might appear at first sight. 
As a result, the existing literature consists of several different approaches, with 
no consensus on the most appropriate methodology. The main problem in 
broadening out Brown’s bilateral trade intensity measure to a regional basis is 
how (and whether) to make an adjustment to the denominator. As noted above, 
Brown adjusted the denominator to allow for the fact that the potential export 
market for any country is total world imports minus that country’s own imports. As 
was also noted above, the methodology laid out by Brown gives slightly distorted 
results either when countries trade different amounts, or different growth rates 
occur. This is also relevant to an analysis of regional trade flows.
The failure of most studies to calculate trade intensity indices for regions, 
as opposed to countries, is perhaps a result of the uncertainty surrounding the 
methodology.42 The main problem is that when a region (as opposed to a single
41 Tables showing the data for the trade intensity indices used in the charts are presented 
in Appendix A1.
42 For example, there are large differences in the results for 1990 shown by Frankel, Wei 
and Stein (1994) and Anderson and Norheim (1993). These are shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
below. Both use exports and imports in their calculations, for a more complete picture, and this is
Chapter 3: Regional Integration: Methodology and Recent Trends
country) is involved, the calculation is more complicated in terms of what 
adjustments to make to the denominator to allow for intra-regional trade. One 
approach is not to attempt to make any corrections to the original formula set out 
by Brown, and to examine all developments within a region in terms of the 
bilateral relationships of its members. This is the approach taken by Primo Braga 
and Bannister, who calculated trade intensity indices for ten Asian economies. 
They found that although there is evidence of a regional bias in Asian trade, for 
all countries except Hong Kong and Singapore the degree of intra-regional bias 
declined between 1970 and 1990.43 It is also worth noting that the role of these 
two city states is a peculiar one, often acting as little more than an entrepot.
Primo Braga and Bannister found that all major economies in the region 
witnessed a decline in the intensity of bilateral trade with the rest of the region in 
the two decades to 1990. Looking at the 1980s alone, only Taiwan and Hong 
Kong experienced a rise, albeit marginal, in their intra-regional trade bias. Thus 
they concluded that Asia showed an increase in globalisation in the 1970s and 
1980s and a move away from regionalisation, when measured on this basis. 
Primo Braga and Bannister limited their analysis to calculating indices for various 
Asian economies and did not produce figures for a general Asian grouping. 
However, the conclusion that East Asia experienced decreasing regional bias in 
the two decades from 1970 is also reached in section 3.3.4.6 below.
The different methodologies discussed below mean divergent magnitudes 
of change are shown by trade intensity indices. However, in the section below 
which analyses data for Europe, North America and Asia, this approach is most 
useful for showing the underlying trend as well as showing the timing of when 
new trends emerge. For example, in the case of Europe it can be used to show 
how the trade bias of European countries shifts with each expansion of the 
European Union.
This approach can address issues such as whether trade bias is rising or 
falling and whether trade integration rising or falling, as well as identifying the 
timing of those changes. However, it does not show whether the degree of trade 
bias higher or lower than we would expect, or whether one region more or less
also the approach used below.
43 Primo Braga and Bannister (1994) effectively measured bilateral flows between 
individual countries and the rest of the region.
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integrated than another. In effect, the trade intensity index can be used in a 
dynamic analysis of changes in bias over time within a region, but not to conduct 
a static analysis of the degree of trade bias in relation to other macroeconomic 
variables.
3.3.4.1 Unadjusted denominator (Method 1)
In terms of calculating general regional measures, the most straightforward
approach is that which makes no attempt to correct for intra-regional trade.44 The
method used is intra-regional trade divided by total trade of the region, as a
proportion of total trade of the region divided by world trade.
Tri/Ti (2)
ln= ------------------
T j /W
In is the trade intensity index within region i.
Tri is the amount intra-regional trade in region i.
T  is total trade of the region.
W is the total amount of world trade
Frankel, Wei and Stein also make calculations of intra-regional trade 
intensities using this approach and the results are shown in Table 3.3. Although 
Frankel, Wei and Stein's main focus is on a gravity model, they conclude that 
trade intensities show that East Asia's bias did not increase over the period while 
"In the case of APEC, the Western Hemisphere, the EC and most of the other 
groupings, however, there was indeed a trend towards intra-regional trade bias 
over the period by this simple measure".45
44 That is to say, no adjustment is made to the denominator. This is the measure used by 
Frankel, Wei and Stein (1994) and Page (1996).
45 Frankel, Wei and Stein (1994) p. 8.
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Table 3.3. Intra-Regional Trade Intensities (Frankel, Wei and Stein)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
East Asia a 1.219 1.011 0.974 0.913 0.842 0.931
APEC0 0.529 0.911 0.908 0.872 0.967 1.015
European 
Communityc
0.566 0.640 0.677 0.716 0.790 0.802
Western 
Hemisphered
0.787 0.784 0.878 0.795 0.783 0.848
Source: Frankel, Wei and Stein (1994).
a: East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Republic of 
Korea, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand 
b: APEC is the fifteen members prior to the 1994 enlargement. Australia, Canada, 
People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the USA. 
c: The EC 12 (pre-1995 enlargement), excluding Luxembourg and the former German 
Democratic Republic
d: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
the United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela.
From equation (2) it can be seen that if the proportion of intra-regional 
trade is held constant, then the higher the share of the region in world trade, the 
closer the value of In is to one.46 This explains some of the apparently odd results 
from using this formula for regions which are only a very small part of world trade. 
In effect, the maximum value possible of lri for any region is the reciprocal of that 
region’s share in world trade (i.e. the inverse of the denominator in equation [2]), 
as when T n -^ T j, then the trade intensity index lr j-> W /T j. For example, if we have 
a region which trades only internally (i.e. the numerator in equation [2] is 1), and 
where trade is one third of the world total, the value of In is 3. However, a 
different region which again only trades internally, but which accounts for only 
five percent of world trade would have a trade intensity of 20. This is the reason 
why regions which account for only a small share of world trade can have a very 
high trade intensity, when calculated by Method 1, in equation (2). So although 
Page uses this approach and finds an export intensity of 12.4 for MERCOSUR in 
1995, compared to 1.7 for the EU,47 this is a reflection of the relatively small 
share of MERCOSUR in world exports Gust 1.5%) compared to the EU (34.6%). 
It does not necessarily mean that there is higher degree of trade bias within 
MERCOSUR compared to the EU.
46 The typical case is where Tri /  T  > T, /  W, in which case lri > 1. Holding the numerator 
constant, as Tj rises relative to W, the value of lri falls towards 1.
47 Page (1996) p. 18.
Chapter 3: Regional Integration: Methodology and Recent Trends 62
From this it is clear that cross-regional comparisons of the results 
generated by this method are not valid as the value of In varies depending on the 
share of the region in world trade. However, the calculation can be used to track 
the development of regional bias in any given set of countries over time and as 
Page notes "the only interesting measure, I think, is changes in the intensity, not 
the level".48 An attempt to normalise the denominator to account for this bias by 
expressing the value of In recorded as a proportion of the maximum possible 
value of In simply gives the result of regional trade as a proportion of total trade.49
This measure of regional trade bias will tend to give a relatively low result 
compared to the other two methods outlined below, as no attempt is made to 
adjust the denominator for intra-regional trade. The other two methods discussed 
below involve an adjustment which has the effect of lowering the value of the 
denominator and thereby raising the regional trade intensity measures.
3.3.4.2 Adjusted denominator A (Method 2)
The numerator of equation (2) used by Page, and by Frankel, et al., is not the 
problem in producing an unbiased measure of regional trade intensities. 
Difficulties lie in the denominator. When there is only one country involved, 
simply subtracting its imports from the total world trade figure in the denominator 
(as Brown does in equation [1] above) is straightforward (while bearing in mind 
the caveats noted above). When a region is involved the calculation is more 
complicated as the issue is how to make adjustments to allow for intra-regional 
trade.
The most detailed study which makes an adjustment to the denominator is 
by Anderson and Norheim, who amended the basic formula developed by Brown 
to make allowance for the fact that countries in a region trade among themselves 
as well as with the rest of the world.50 Anderson and Norheim study a wide range
48 Page, "personal correspondence", 8 October 1997; on file with the author.
49An attempt to express the value of I returned as a proportion of the possible maximum 
value would give 
Normalised lri = lri. W  /T ,
Which reduces to
Normalised In = T ri/Tj  using equation (2), which is the numerator in (2).
50 Unfortunately, Anderson and Norheim (1993) do not state their formula for the intra- 
regional trade intensity index, but it can be “reverse engineered” as shown in equation (3).
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of data, calculating trade intensities for various groups of countries at various 
points in time since 1830. Some of their findings are shown in Table 3.4.
Anderson and Norheim conclude that there is evidence of an increase in 
the intra-regional trade bias of most regions in the post-war period. However, 
they go on to look at the relative openness of the regions in terms of trade to 
GDP ratios and conclude that "even if RIAs [regional integration agreements] 
have caused some trade diversion, integration between regions—at least as 
measured by merchandise trade—has continued for the world as a whole".51
Table 3.4. Intra-Regional Trade Intensities (Anderson and Norheim)
1948 1958 1968 1973 1979 1983 1990
Western Europe a 1.21 1.38 1.51 1.54 1.57 1.72 1.60
Eastern Europe D 10.22 7.62 7.30 7.67 7.88 7.28 10.88
Asiac 2.74 3.15 2.84 2.88 2.77 2.41 2.31
North Americaa 2.24 2.72 2.90 3.22 3.09 2.98 3.21
Source: Anderson and 
a Includes Turkey and 
b Includes the USSR, 
c Includes Australia an( 
above.
d Canada, Mexico and
Norheim (1993).
Jugoslavia.
i New Zealand as well as the countries listed under “East Asia” in Table 3.1 
the United States of America.
The formula used by Anderson and Norheim can be "reverse engineered" 
from their description and their published results:
Trt/Ti (3)
lri =  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Tj x (N-1 )/N) / (W- (Tj x 1/N))
Where
In is the trade intensity index within region i.
Tri is the amount intra-regional trade in region i.
Tj is total trade of the region.
Thus the numerator of the equation is essentially the same as that in the single 
country example in equation (1).
W is the total amount of world trade 
N is the number of countries in the region
51 Anderson and Norheim (1993) p. 45.
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What is happening in this case is that the denominator is being adjusted to 
take into consideration trade among countries in the region. The more countries 
there are in the region, the less adjustment is made to the denominator and the 
closer the result to that under Method 1. Using an adjustment based on the 
number of countries in the region might appear crude, but it is quite effective. If 
all countries within the region trade the same amount, then when no regional bias 
exists the trade intensity will be unity.
For example, assume there are only ten countries in the world, each of 
equal size, all of which trade in equal proportions with each other. There are two 
trade groups, one with four countries and the other with six. By this measure the 
trade intensity indices for the four country group and the six country group will 
both be unity.52 In contrast, using the formula in equation (2), the four country 
group gives an index of 0.833 while the six country group returns 0.926. Some 
distortions arise when the value of trade of the various countries differs, but even 
then the index does not diverge significantly from unity in the base case when no 
regional bias actually exists. That is to say, the error of the trade intensity index 
finding a bias, when none exists in reality, is reduced.
The adjusted denominator A (Method 2) is more effective than the 
unadjusted denominator (Method 1) in showing no bias (in terms of deviation 
from 1), when no bias exists. However, it is worth considered another means of 
adjusting the denominator to take into account intra-regional trade.
3.3.4.3 Adjusted denominator B (Method 3)
Another means of adjusting the denominator for intra-regional trade is one which 
says that in equation (1) the denominator is supposed to be the control or neutral 
measure of the share of the country or the region in world trade. That is to say, it 
indicates how much the countries not under examination (i.e. the rest of the 
world) trade with the country or the region. Thus an alternative calculation of the 
trade intensity could involve subtracting all of the region’s trade with itself from 
the denominator. This allows the denominator to show the share of the region in 
world trade excluding all intra-regional trade.
52 Assuming each exports 2 units to each other, the calculation for the four country group 
is (24/72) /  (54/162), while for the six country group it is (60/108) /  (90/162).
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Where
In is the trade intensity index within region i.
Tn is the amount of intra-regional trade in region i.
Tj is total trade of the region.
W is the total amount of world trade
Although this appears to be a sensible approach it does not give a result 
of unity when no trade bias exists. In the example noted above with ten countries 
split into two groups, formula (4) gives a reading of 1.083 for the four country 
group and 1.389 for the six country group.53 Larger blocs will return a higher 
figure, so the results must be treated with caution, with comparisons between 
regions not valid.
In terms of the difference between the three methods outlined above, 
Method 1 will tend to understate the degree of preferential trade bias because of 
the lack of adjustment to the denominator. Method 3 gives an upwards bias as a 
result of the adjustment to the denominator, while Method 2 usually sits between 
the two. As a result, it is possible to make observations about trends over time 
when all three measures are pointing in the same direction. In fact, as long as a 
consistent formula is used, minor differences in its structure are not that 
important if the objective is to look at trends over time within the same region. As 
has been discussed, however, making comparisons between regions is much 
more problematic. In the following section, the results of calculations based on 
these three approaches are shown.
53 Again assuming each exports 2 units to each other, the calculation for the four country 
group is (24/72) /  (48/156), while for the six country group it is (60/108) /  (48/120).
Chapter 3: Regional Integration: Methodology and Recent Trends
3.3.4.4 Europe
The Europe Union has gone through several enlargements and structural 
changes since its foundation and there are three main areas of interest related to 
this progression.54 Firstly, how the overall level of regional trade bias has been 
affected by initiatives to promote regional integration. Secondly, how the trade 
bias of the original members has changed through the course of their 
membership. Thirdly, what has been the behaviour of the trade bias of later 
members, both before and after their membership.
As with other regional groups, the basic hypothesis is that the 
establishment of, or accession to, the EU leads to an increase in preferential bias 
in trade flows between members. Similarly, subsequent steps to reduce 
restrictions on cross-border activity should lead to a rise in the degree of regional 
bias. This section focuses on merchandise trade flows, with other data sources 
discussed later in the chapter.
(%)
Figure 3.1. Intra-European Trade Shares
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Looking at data for shares of intra-regional trade does not offer much 
support for this hypothesis. As Figure 3.1 shows, the share of trade between the
54 What is now the European Union (EU) has also gone through several name changes; in 
general we will use the most recent form.
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original six members was lower in 1995 than it was 30 years earlier. The share of 
trade between the current 15 members shows only a moderate increase over the 
same period, from 55.0% in 1965 to 61.8% in 1995. This is a surprising result, 
considering the political effort expended on promoting European integration.
However, the situation is not quite as straightforward as the trends in 
Figure 3.1 suggest. Rather than coming to the conclusion that the preferential 
bias between the original six members has fallen and that of the current 15 
members has risen only slightly over the past three decades, the trade intensity 
index provides more insights into developments. The share of world trade 
accounted for by the 15 EU members fell from 47.0% in 1965 to 38.6% in 1995 
and this gives a downwards bias to measures of regionalisation such as intra- 
regional trade shares. This is because as world trade grows more rapidly than 
intra-European trade, then trade between Europe and the rest of the world will 
grow more rapidly than trade within the region, even if no change in trade bias is 
taking place. As discussed above, in order to correct for this effect an adjustment 
needs to be made to account for the reduction in the importance of EU members 
in world trade. This is a case where the trade intensity index can provide more 
useful insights than pure trade shares.
An additional factor is that the behaviour of the broad measures of trade 
shares conceals some interesting trends. Most notably, there has been a rise in 
trade bias between EU members over the past three decades, which has taken 
the form of rising preferences stemming from the incorporation of new members, 
rather than increases in bias between the initial members. This will be illustrated 
by breaking down the EU aggregate figures into smaller groups of countries, 
according to the date of membership. Again, the use of the trade intensity index 
allows differentiation between shifts in trade flows due to changes in the share of 
world trade, and those due to a genuine preferential trade bias. The findings from 
this process lend support to the hypothesis that broadening and deepening of the 
EU has led to an increase in trade bias. The use of a time series approach gives 
a clearer indication of the timing of changes in trade bias, compared to examining 
discrete points in time, as is the norm.
Using the trade intensity index, Figure 3.2 shows the behaviour of the 
trade bias of the original six members.55 The trade intensity index is useful in
55 For the sake of comparison, the results of the three methodologies discussed above in
Chapter 3: Regional Integration: Methodology and Recent Trends 68
showing trends as well as identifying the timing of any new trend. This shows that 
after a quite rapid rise in trade intensities in the first ten years of the EU, there 
has been virtually no increase in the regional bias of the original six since the end 
of the 1960s. This finding deserves elaboration. It also contrasts with the 
impression given simply by looking at intra-regional trade shares (Figure 3.1), 
without making any adjustment for changes in the relative size of the region. The 
implication is that the falling shares of intra-European trade of the original six 
members were the result of a decline in the share of Europe in world trade, and 
not the result of a reduction in preferential bias between EU members.
Figure 3.2. European Union 6 Trade Intensity Index
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A more disaggregated approach both confirms the results shown in Figure 
3.2 as well as showing that individual EU6 members’ trade bias has been stable, 
as well as their aggregate bias. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.3, which 
examines the flows of individual countries with other EU founder members, by 
showing the trade intensity of each country with the other four combined.56 The 
lack of an increase in the trade intensity index for Germany, France and the
3.3.4.1 to 3.3.4.3 are shown. Although different level are shown, each has the same behaviour of 
rising until the late 1960s and then trending sideways.
56 Trade data for Luxembourg are included with Belgium, which is the practice of the IMF.
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Netherlands since the late 1960s is evident, accompanied by a very moderate 
rise in the measures for Italy and Belgium. This confirms that there is no 
evidence of a significant increase in trade preferences within the core of the EU6 
in the past three decades.
Figure 3.3. Trade Intensity Index Between EU6
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Using the original methodology set out by Brown et al. it is possible 
disaggregate the process even further and examine the behaviour of the bilateral 
trade bias of individual member countries. The data are set out in the appendix 
and show that very few bilateral relationships between the EU6 founder members 
saw a meaningful increase in trade bias since the late 1960s, with small declines 
being recorded in several instances. Such a pattern confirms the findings shown 
in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Again, this is a useful progression from simply looking at 
trade shares, as it adjusts for the reduction in the share of world trade and gives 
a clearer view of changes to trade preferences.
So although the preferential trade bias between the six founder EU 
members has not declined over the past three decades (unlike the intra-regional 
trade share), neither has it shown an increase. The absence of a noticeable 
change in the trade bias of the core of the EU over the past three decades 
comes as something of a surprise, set in the context of steady policy
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development.57 As will be shown, the most likely explanation is that there has 
been an increase in bias towards new EU members and towards other countries 
concluding free trade agreements with the EU. Trade bias is a relative concept, 
with an increase in bias towards some countries necessarily offset by a reduction 
in bias towards others.
Although preferential bias between the EU6 core members has been 
neutral, this does not mean that economic integration has shown no increase. As 
will be demonstrated in section 3.3.5, a rise in the degree of openness within 
Europe, as shown by rising trade to GDP ratios, means that economic integration 
has increased. As discussed below in section 3.4, attempts to examine foreign 
direct investment flows (FDI), to see whether stability in trade bias is offset by an 
increase in the bias of FDI, prove difficult due to data problems.
Figure 3.4. European Union 15 Trade Intensity Index
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A gentle rise in the intra-regional trade share of the current EU15 was 
shown in Figure 3.1 and that is more pronounced once adjustment is made for 
the decline in the share of world trade of the EU. Figure 3.4 shows a rise in trade
57 As discussed, the trade intensity index shows whether trade bias has changed, but it 
does not show whether it has changed by more or less than expected, given macroeconomic 
developments. However, it does allow us to test the hypothesis that regionalism leads to greater 
regional trade bias.
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bias as measured by each of the approaches outlined in sections 3.3.4.1 to 
3.3.4.3 since the foundation of the EEC in 1958. Although the degree of increase 
differs according to which method is adopted, the same trends are evident. The 
absence of an increase in trade bias through much of the 1970s suggests that 
the EEC had little impact on trade preferences until it broadened its membership 
and then adopted the single European market agreement at the end of the 
1980s. Since then an increase in preferential bias has resumed.
However, a deeper examination of the trade flows between the EU 
membership is more informative. By disaggregating the trade flows of the overall 
15 countries according to the timing of participation in the organisation, then 
other trends become apparent. Again, the trade intensity index is useful as it 
shows trends in trade bias once allowance has been made for shifts in the share 
of world trade. In the discussion below the trade intensity index is also useful for 
showing the timing of shifts in the trend of trade bias, which allows inferences to 
be drawn in relation to the timing of EU broadening and deepening.
If the preferential bias between the EU15 has been rising over the past 
three decades, while that of the core EU6 has shown little change, then this 
implies a fairly substantial rise in the bias of the other nine members with the 
core EU6 and/or with each other. This will be shown below and to demonstrate 
the significant points the 15 members are split into four groups, determined by 
the timing of their membership:
Founders Original six members
Stage 1 First stage expansion to Denmark, UK and Ireland (1973)
Stage 2 Second stage expansion to Greece (1981), Portugal (1986) and 
Spain (1986)
Stage 3 Third stage expansion to Austria, Finland and Sweden (all 1995).
Figures 3.5 to 3.8 show the trade intensity indices of each of these four 
groups in turn, related to trade with the other three groups and to themselves.58 
This allows us to see swings in trade preferences within the EU, after adjusting 
for the impact of changing shares of world trade. Figure 3.5 shows the trade
58 The lines show the degree of bias of each of the groups in trade with the EU6, using 
equation (1) as set out by Brown et al. The intra-group measure (ie. Founders’ trade with the 
Founders) is calculated using the methodology in 3.3.4.2 above.
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intensity index of the Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3 groups vis-a-vis the Founder 
group. It also shows the trade intensity index for intra-regional trade within the 
Founder group,59 and this ability to examine intra-group flows is another 
advantage of using the trade intensity approach.
Figure 3.5 shows how the bias of new EU members towards the original 
members has changed. Stage 1 countries saw a steady rise in their trade bias 
towards the Founder group in the decade after they joined the EU and it seems 
likely that membership had a positive influence on their trade preferences. 
However, the bias has been little changed from the early 1980s. Stage 2 
countries also saw a rise in trade bias towards the Founders from when they 
joined the EU, in the early 1980s.
Figure 3.5. Trade Intensity Index Towards EU6 ’Founders’
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Figure 3.5 also shows that Stage 3 countries saw a decline in bias towards 
the Founder group until the mid-1970s. The next chart, Figure 3.6, suggests that 
this was because they were experiencing a rise in bias towards members of the 
European Free Trade Area (such as those countries which later became the 
Stage 1 enlargement group) after its formation in 1960. This bias then reversed
59 In Figure 3.5 the line showing the intra-regional trade of the Founder’s group is the 
same at the middle line in Figure 3.2, labelled “EU6 Method 2”.
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when the Stage 1 group joined the EU and saw its trade bias towards the 
Founder members rise. It is notable that the bias of trade between the Stage 3 
enlargement group and the Founder group began to rise from the late 1970s. 
This indicates that full membership of the EU was not necessary for an increased 
trade bias. In 1973 a free trade agreement which removed most tariffs was 
signed between the EEC and EFTA, followed by comprehensive liberalisation in 
the formation of the European Economic Area between the two groups in 1992.60
Figure 3.6. Trade Intensity Index Towards Stage 1 Enlargement
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As discussed above, the absolute levels of the trade intensity indices for 
different groups shown in Figures 3.5 to 3.8 should not be compared. Such an 
approach would suggest that the Stage 2 countries have a stronger bias towards 
Stage 1 countries than do the EU6 Founder members, which seems implausible. 
The indices should only be used to indicate direction and the timing of changes 
in bias.
60 WTO (1995).
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Figure 3.7. Trade Intensity Index Towards Stage 2 Enlargement
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It is notable that the trade intensity indices towards the Stage 2 group 
show relatively little change over the period, as shown in Figure 3.7, although 
there are indications of a rise in bias of trade with the Founder group after the 
Stage 2 countries join the EU. In fact it appears that the major consequence of 
membership was an explosion of trade bias between the State 2 countries of 
Spain and Portugal. This could be a reflection of the EU’s ability to improve 
relationships between members in all areas, not just trade.
Similarly, the most marked rise in bias for the Stage 3 group was between 
the three members themselves in the period up to the mid-1970s, presumably 
due to the effect of EFTA membership. Otherwise, their trade preferences 
appear to be strongly influenced by membership of regional groupings. Up until 
1973 preference was growing towards Stage 1 countries, but when the UK, 
Denmark and Ireland left EFTA and joined the EU, the Stage 3 countries also 
gradually shifted their focus towards all EU countries, assisted by the 
preferences which resulted from the 1973 EEC-EFTA free trade agreement.
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Figure 3.8. Trade Intensity Index Towards Stage 3 Enlargement
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This analysis leads us to an explanation for the surprising observation that 
there was no increase in the trade bias between the original six European 
members from the late 1960s. The Founder members were seeing a rise in trade 
bias towards the nine new members from 1973. Of course bias is a relative 
concept and the rise in bias towards one group implies a reduction in bias 
towards another. The ability of the bias between the Founder six members to 
remain stable while the bias towards new members was rising implies a positive 
response to continued integration effects, which means that it was trade bias 
towards non-European countries that declined over the period.
This more disaggregated approach is useful as it explains why there has 
been a steady rise in trade bias within the EU15, as shown in Figure 3.4. This 
rise in trade bias first occurred mainly through increased trade bias between the 
EU founder members, but this came to a halt in the 1970s and was replaced by 
an increase in preferences between the EU6 and the new members, and among 
the new members. The original six members of the EEC eliminated internal tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions on trade by 1968 which also marks the point at which 
the increase in preferential bias between the original six members levelled off.61 
None of the deeper integration that occurred in Europe after 1968 was
61 Lawrence (1996).
FoundersSource: IMF
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manifested in an increase in the trade intensity indices between the original six 
members.
Using the trade intensity index allows these patterns to be seen without 
being clouded by the impact of changing shares of world trade. Using simple 
trade shares it is not possible to differentiate between the conflicting impact from 
rising trade bias and a declining share of world trade. Rather than coming to the 
conclusion suggested by measures of regional trade shares, the trade intensity 
approach shows that intra-European trade has become more positively biased 
due to increase bias between Founder members and new entrants, and between 
the new entrants.
The increase in the intra-regional trade intensity of all European groups 
since 1990 suggests a renewed policy-led increase in trade bias. The timing of 
the implementation of the Single European Act makes such a conclusion appear 
credible, and later discussion will examine whether this has been to the detriment 
of trade ties with the rest of the world. Although the creation of a single European 
market was frequently referred to as "1992", in fact many of the relevant 
measures were implemented prior to 1992 and others took much longer.62 
Moreover, the "deep" nature of the agreement suggests that its impact on trade 
intensities could well have been seen prior to 1992. This is because firms would 
begin to ready themselves for the consequences of the programme, as well as 
anticipating greater safeguards once it was in place. However, the integrating 
process is also likely to be a lengthy one, with effects seen through most of the 
1990s. This would indicate that measures of regional intensity are likely to rise 
above their pre-1988 trend line (which was around the time business began to 
treat the single European market as a reality).
3.3.4.5 North America
There have been three major landmarks in North American regionalism in the 
past four decades. The first was the Canada-US Auto Pact of 1965, which 
eliminated duties on 95% of bilateral automobile trade (which made up 10.9% of
62 In fact even by the end of 1994 on average only 92% of the measures related to the 
Single European Market had been implemented. In areas such as public procurement or 
intellectual property, fewer than 80% implementation was recorded by the European Commission. 
Daily Telegraph, 23 February 1996.
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total bilateral trade in 1965). The second was the broad Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA) which was signed in 1988 and liberalised trade flows 
across the board, including provisions for services and FDI. The third was the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which, in 1994, brought Mexico 
into the agreement between the US and Canada.63 A reasonable hypothesis is 
that the regional bias of trade would increase as a result of such deals due to the 
preference granted to each partner.
(%)
Figure 3.9. North American Intra-Regional Trade Shares
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Looking at intra-regional trade shares, in Figure 3.9, by the end of the 
period under examination, the share of trade between regional partners was only 
slightly higher than at the previous peak in 1969. The pattern is one of decline in 
intra-regional trade shares until 1980 and then a revival through the 1980s and 
1990s. However, North American trade was growing relatively slowly through this 
period, so the decline in intra-regional trade shares in the 1970s does not 
necessarily mean that intra-regional trade preference declined. CUSFTA’s share 
of world trade fell from 20.7% in 1965 to 16.8% in 1995, while NAFTA’s share fell 
from 21.5% to 18.3% and, other things being equal, this will reduce the intra-
63 See Lipsey, Schwanen and Wonnacott (1994) for details of the differences between 
NAFTA and CUSFTA.
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regional trade share. As with the above discussion of the European Union, using 
the intra-regional trade intensity approach gives a different perspective, because 
this adjusts for changing shares of world trade.
North America also provides a good example of the merits of using a time 
series of annual data rather than comparing certain time periods. For example, 
Anderson and Norheim show data for 1968, 1973, 1979, 1983 and 1990 and 
conclude that for Canada and the USA "the intensity of its intra-regional trade 
rose in the 1970s before falling slightly since then".64 However, this conclusion is 
far from clear when looking at Figure 3.10, where the line labelled "CUSFTA 
Method 2" reflects the same methodology used by Anderson and Norheim.65 
Observation of trends shown in Figure 3.1066 leads to the conclusion that the 
underlying trade intensity index in North America rose in the 1960s, was flat 
through the 1970s and much of the 1980s before climbing again from the late 
1980s. Short-term fluctuations in the 1970s and 1980s are most likely explained 
by movements in the dollar exchange rate and oil prices, rather than by changes 
in the underlying degree of economic integration.67 A strong dollar has the effect 
of lowering the trade intensity measure for North America, as it lowers the dollar 
value of non-dollar denominated trade and thus raises the value of the 
denominator in each of the three calculation methods used.
64 The intensities Anderson and Norheim calculate are 3.57, 3.93, 3.63, 3.63 and 3.50 
respectively. (1993) p. 33. Using the same methodology (i.e. Method 2 in Figure 3.10) the 
corresponding five points on Figure 3.10 are 3.20, 3.67, 3.52, 3.77 and 3.89.
65 It would be possible to represent CUSFTA trade bias in terms of bilateral flows, but the 
regional approach is adopted in order to allow the comparison with Anderson and Norheim’s 
findings. The bilateral export intensity index between Canada and the USA is shown in Figure 3.11 
and that shows a similar trend to the series in Figure 3.10.
66 The data represented in the charts in this chapter are shown in Appendix A1.
67 In theory it is possible to use a given year as a base and to calculate trade volume 
growth figures, but any base year will contain some currency misalignments, while volume growth 
data are less reliable than measures of trade value. Moreover, volume trade data are not generally 
available on a country by country basis. Trade in oil could be excluded, but lower oil prices also 
affect prices of other related primary, intermediate and final traded goods.
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Figure 3.10. Canada-US Trade Intensity Index
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The conclusion for CUSFTA is that the Auto Pact of 1965 had little impact 
on regional bias, which was rising steadily through the 1960s. Given that it 
affected only around 10% of bilateral trade, this is unsurprising. The Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) precedes the increase of trade intensities 
since the late 1980s. There has been a change which cannot be explained purely 
by price movements, and the timing and liberalisation involved in CUSFTA 
suggests that it has been a factor in increasing trade preferences between 
Canada and the United States. The CUSFTA was implemented in 1989 after 
eighteen months of negotiations produced a treaty in 1988. As a result, it tells us 
little about the time lags that might be involved in terms of the response of 
economic actors to discussions over trade deals. Incorporating Mexico into the 
analysis does not produce significantly different trends from those shown in 
Figure 3.10. Mexico is only 18% of intra-regional North American trade, 
compared to 48% for the USA and 34% for Canada. The result of the trade 
intensity index calculations for NAFTA are shown in the Appendix.
Mexico was not a part of CUSFTA, but nevertheless saw its trade bias 
with the US rise from the late 1980s; the export intensity of Mexico and Canada 
with the USA is shown in Figure 3.11. The more extreme volatility in Mexico’s 
export intensity index with the US can be ascribed to fluctuations in the price of
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one of its main exports; oil. As discussed above, price and exchange rate 
volatility can distort findings, especially if discrete data points are used in the 
analysis. This highlights the benefits of using a time series approach. It is striking 
to note the parallel rise in Mexico and Canada’s export intensity indices with the 
USA since the late 1980s, in spite of a period of relative weakness in oil prices. 
This implies that there were other factors at work in North American trade flows 
besides the liberalisation that was part of the 1988 CUSFTA. Possible 
explanations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, but a likely reason is 
that production was becoming regionalised, perhaps in anticipation of the 
eventual NAFTA deal.
Figure 3.11. Mexico & Canada Export Intensity Index with USA
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NAFTA only came into effect in 1995, so as yet it is too early to say 
conclusively whether it has provided an additional boost to regional trade bias. 
However, it is worth noting that 1996 saw the highest level for the NAFTA intra- 
regional trade intensity index in the past 30 years by all three measures used.
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3.3.4.6 East Asia
While the geographic scope of both North America and Europe is reasonably 
well defined, with decisions on whether the smaller peripheral economies should 
be included in statistical calculations having only a marginal effect on the result, 
the same is not true of Asia. There are three realistic measures of a regional 
group in Asia; the small, but clearly defined ASEAN bloc; the large, but loose 
trans-Pacific APEC grouping; and the East Asian subgroup, the definition of 
which is based on the East Asian Economic Group proposed by the Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1990.
As Figure 3.12 shows, the share of intra-regional trade within East Asia 
and APEC has risen steadily for two decades. With the economies of the region 
also becoming more open (see section 3.3.5 below) this means that regional 
integration has increased through the period. However, it does not necessarily 
mean that the preferential bias of trade between regional partners has risen over 
the same period. In fact, the increase in the share of intra-regional trade in APEC 
and East Asia is the result of a rising share of the region in world trade, rather 
than a function of increased bias between regional countries, as discussed 
below. Again, using a trade intensity index helps to differentiate between 
changes in regional trade shares that are a result of an increase in trade 
preferences and those that stem from differential rates of trade growth. Although 
the conclusion that intra-regional trade has not become more strongly biased is 
surprising, given the trends evident in Figure 3.12, it is a sign of greater 
integration in the global economy. This integration has helped to deliver the 
relatively high growth rates that lead to a growing share of world trade for the 
region, and produce the upward bias in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12. Asian Intra-Regional Trade Shares
APEC — East Asia —-ASEANSource: IMF
The East Asia group68 shows a rising share of intra-regional trade, from 
27.5% of the total in 1970, to 44.9% by 1995 in Figure 3.12. This is not 
particularly surprising, given the relatively rapid growth in the region, which has 
seen its share of world trade more than double from 10.7% to 25.1% over the 
same period. As with Europe and North America, in order to see whether this 
change is more or less than implied by the rise in importance of the region to 
world trade, it is useful to use a trade intensity index. Simply observing the rising 
share of intra-regional trade does not show whether this is a result of changing 
trade bias or of differential growth rates.
Using this trade intensity approach, Figure 3.13 shows a gently declining 
intra-regional trade bias until the mid-1980s, since when there has been basic 
stability. In part, the decline in regional trade intensities up to the mid-1980s can 
be ascribed to the increased flow of trade being concentrated on the developed 
economies of Europe and, particularly, North America. The dominance of Japan 
in East Asian trade is not as complete as that of the United States in North 
America,69 but shifts in Japan’s trade bias tend to tell the story of the East Asia 
group as a whole. Thus the decline in intra-regional East Asian bias up until the
68 Appendix A2 shows which countries are included in each group.
69 In 1970 Japan’s trade was 60.6% of the East Asian total, declining to 30.6% by 1995. In 
North America, the United States’ trade comprised 70.7% and 71.7% in those same two years.
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mid-1980s (around the time that US trade policy became notably more 
restrictive) shown in Figure 3.13 was partly a reflection of Japan focusing on US 
markets.
Figure 3.13. East Asian Trade Intensity Index
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Part of the rise in the measured bias between Japan and the USA can be 
attributed to the strong dollar through the first half of the 1980s, peaking in the 
year of the Plaza Accord, 1985. Stability in the measure of trade bias since then 
reflects a greater balance in Japanese trade relations. For example, the share of 
Japan’s trade with the USA rose from 21.2% in 1976 to a peak of 33.3% in 1986 
(a much greater rise than implied by a rise in the USA’s share of world trade from 
13.5% to 14.3%), and then declined to 25.5% in 1996, as the USA’s share of 
world trade fell to 13.3%. In terms of the bilateral trade intensity measure,70 the 
index for exports from Japan to the USA rose from 1.56 in 1976 to 2.02 in 1986 
before declining to 1.71 by 1996. Over the same period the trade intensity index 
for exports from the USA to Japan went from 1.30 to 1.95 and then back down to 
1.79. Again, in part this can be ascribed to the effects of the exchange rate, with 
a reversal in the over-valuation of the dollar since 1985.
70 Using the original measure developed by Brown (1949) shown in 3.3.2.
East Asia Method 1 —  East Asia Method 2 East Asia Method 3
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A second factor related to the trends shown in Figure 3.13 is that there 
has been some genuine regional integration within East Asia since the late- 
1980s, with an increasing number of Japanese firms setting up production 
networks within the region. In particular, this has served to increase trade flows 
between Japan and the rest of Asia.71 Despite this integration, the trade intensity 
index has remained flat, which suggests that either the integration has primarily 
occurred through FDI, or that ties between the region and non-Asian developed 
countries have also increased.
The finding that preferential trade bias in East Asia has not increased over 
the past two decades is a fairly surprising result, especially given the increase in 
regional trade shares shown by the raw data in Figure 3.12. As the trade intensity 
index shows, the rise in intra-regional trade is due to the higher growth rate of the 
region, which means that export markets in the region are relatively more 
important than in the past.
In Figure 3.12, the broad APEC group also shows a steady rise in regional 
trade shares. APEC’s share of world trade rose from 33.1% in 1970 to 43.3% in 
1995. However, using intra-regional trade intensities, virtually no change is seen 
in the broad APEC group over the past three decades, as shown in Figure 3.14. 
The key difference is the inclusion of the United States in the APEC measure.
Thus the decline in the intra-regional trade intensity of East Asia up to the 
mid-1980s was offset by a rise in the bias of trade towards North America (as 
indicated above by the bilateral relationship between Japan and the USA). This 
has since been reversed, leaving the bias of the APEC group as a whole little 
changed. The dynamics are the same as those noted above for the East Asian 
sub-group: exchange rate factors, a genuine re-direction of trade flows and the 
statistical effects of Asia accounting for a greater part of world trade flows.
71 Between 1990-95 8457 Japanese companies conducted foreign direct investment in 
Asia, raising the total number of ventures by 50%, Ministry of Finance (1996).
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Figure 3.14. APEC 15 Trade Intensity Index
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The lack of solid initiatives to promote economic integration in Asia until 
the 1990s means that movements in trade intensities cannot be ascribed to the 
workings of the political force of regionalism.72 APEC was not formed until 1989 
and a decision to establish a secretariat was not made until September 1992, 
with the first summit taking place in late 1993. Moreover it lacked a substantive 
agenda until the long-term plans for a free trade area which were agreed at the 
1994 APEC meeting in Bogor, Indonesia,73 and any early effects from this 
initiative will only be seen in the final data in Figure 3.14. This underlines the 
importance of looking at any change in trade shares or trade intensities in the 
context of political and economic events in the region, as well as suggesting 
caution when attempting to impute causality between political and economic 
changes.
72 Prior to APEC the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) had been set up in 1967 to 
provide a forum for business interests; the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) 
was established in 1968 and is largely a forum for academics; the Pacific Economic Co-operation 
Council (PECC) founded in 1980 also promotes discussion between business, academia and 
government. None can be said to have exerted a significant influence on policy. See Holder 
(1994).
73 Bergsten (1995).
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The situation for ASEAN74 countries is less clear, with the share of trade 
flows between members showing fluctuations, but only a small increase from the 
early 1970s. This observation is somewhat surprising, as the ASEAN members 
saw a collective rise in their share of world trade from 2.8% in 1975 to 6.4% by 
1995.75 So although they were more than doubling in importance to other trading 
partners, they hardly rose in importance to each other. The implication is that 
there was a decline in the bias towards regional trade between ASEAN 
members.
The relatively low share of ASEAN in world trade and the low degree of 
intra-regional trade compared to Europe, North America or broader Asian groups 
suggest that this is not an issue to pursue. For most of this period, ASEAN was 
predominantly a political grouping, aimed at the perceived regional communist 
threat. The ASEAN Free Trade Area was only established in 1993, but relatively 
low income levels suggest that the potential for intra-industry trade between 
members is limited.76 Moreover, competitive industrialisation strategies have 
limited intra-regional trade flows, with each member keen to exploit the 
developed markets of North America, Europe and Japan, while far less ready to 
accept exports from the other members.77
Overall, Asia provides another useful example of the merits of using the 
intra-regional trade intensity index as opposed to simply looking at regional trade 
shares. Figure 3.12 indicates a growing importance of intra-regional trade within 
East Asia. However, correcting for relative changes in growth in trade, as the 
trade intensity index does, no such rise in intra-regional bias can be seen; the 
difference is explained by the growing importance of the region in the world 
economy.
74 Vietnam joined the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, but is not 
included in this analysis. As a relatively small trader, its inclusion would have little effect. The 
countries shown in under ASEAN are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand.
75 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
76 Saxonhouse (1993).
77 Saxonhouse (1993).
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3.3.4.7 Summary
Various observations can be made from the above discussion. One technical 
assertion is that oil price fluctuations and currency misalignments may distort the 
results in the short term, but over the long term the effects balance out. 
Therefore looking at the long-term time series gives a clearer picture of the 
underlying trends than readings at discrete time intervals that run the risk of 
mistaking short-term price effects for underlying changes in trade preferences.
In North America until the end of the 1980s it has been difficult to attribute 
changes in trade intensities to specific policy initiatives. In Europe, achieving 
membership of the core of the EU has brought a sustained rise in bilateral trade 
bias. With the East Asian measure broadly flat in recent years, it also seems 
reasonable to conclude that trade in the rest of the world has also become more 
regionalised, simply as a mathematical result of rising intensities in two of the 
three largest trading areas. That is to say, with over four fifths of world trade 
accounted for by the three regions under examination, an increase in trade bias 
in two of them and no change in the other will most likely produce an increase in 
regional trade bias in the rest of the world.
The hypothesis that since the late 1980s wide-ranging agreements such 
as the Canada US Free Trade Agreement and the Single European Act have 
succeeded in promoting greater regional integration appears worthy of further 
examination, which will take place in Chapter 5. Certainly, there has been an 
increase in the European and North American trade intensity indices since 1989 
which is difficult to explain away as a short-term fluctuation, while the moves 
appear too sharp to be explained by underlying structural economic forces. A 
policy-led influence suggests itself as one explanation. This finding directly 
contradicts the WTO (1995) which claims that there has been no regionalisation 
in world trade.
3.3.5 Trade Intensities and National Income
So far the discussion has concentrated on trade bias, and in order to move on to 
examine regional integration it is necessary to incorporate a measure of 
economic openness. By incorporating trade to GDP ratios into the above analysis
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it is possible to examine whether any change in bias has been accompanied by a 
closing of a region to extra-regional trade. The concern is that although a 
preferential trade agreement might increase trade between members, it could 
reduce trade with non-members, with the net result not necessarily an 
improvement in total welfare. By introducing a measure of economic openness, 
the idea is to examine whether or not any increase in regional preferences has 
been accompanied by a reduction in trade with non-regional countries.
One problem with the analysis of regional groupings is that examining the 
changing shares of intra- and extra-regional trade is not the same as measuring 
trade creation and diversion, or welfare gain and loss. For example, it is quite 
possible for both intra- and extra-regional trade to be growing, but if the former 
rises relatively quickly then the measure of intra-regional trade bias will increase. 
A further problem is that there are other determinants of trade flows apart from 
trade policy. For example, openness is usually inversely correlated to size, and 
positively correlated to per capita income.78 In addition, some regional integration 
agreements result in non-preferential changes in trade policy as well as those 
directly related to the agreement, so the importance of trade to the economy as a 
whole increases. In this case, a regional agreement can mean that trade with 
countries outside the region increases, even if at a slower pace than trade within 
the region, so the degree of openness to the rest of the world rises, even if the 
extra-regional trade intensity falls. To determine whether or not this is the case it 
is necessary to look at trade in proportion to the region’s output.
78 See Kuznets (1959,1966).
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<*> Figure 3.15. Trade to GDP Ratios
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In terms of measurement, the propensity to export intra- and extra- 
regionally is simply the relevant regional trade intensity index multiplied by the 
share of merchandise trade in gross domestic product (GDP). Effectively there 
are two parts to the question. The first is whether the share of trade in the output 
of the region has been increasing. Figure 3.15 shows the ratio of merchandise 
trade to GDP for the three regions discussed above. As can be seen, these are 
relatively volatile ratios, largely because of the nominal effects of exchange rate 
movements and commodity price fluctuations. The impression is one of a gradual 
increase in trade to GDP across all three regions, although at times such as the 
first oil shock (1973-74) the nominal effect of rising oil prices outweighs other 
factors.79 For example, the East Asian measure of trade to GDP was depressed 
from the mid-1980s due to the weakness of the US dollar against the Japanese 
yen, which has the effect of raising Japanese GDP (which was 71.3% of East 
Asia’s total in 1995) compared to trade values.
NAFTA —  EU15 East AsiaSource: IMF
79 Data used in these charts are shown in Appendix A1.
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Figure 3.16. Intra-Regional Trade Propensities
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The second part of the question is where the impact of rising trade to GDP 
ratios has been seen. Is it spread evenly across all countries, or is it mainly seen 
among regional partners? Figure 3.16 shows the intra-regional propensity to 
trade.80 This is a measure of economic integration as it combines the concept of 
trade bias with that of economic openness. From this it appears that the 
propensity to trade with regional partners has increased in both Europe and 
North America, reflecting a combination of the rise in the degree of trade bias 
within the regions, as well as their greater openness. In the case of East Asia the 
situation is less clear, and over the past decade the stable intra-regional trade 
bias noted in 3.3.4.6 combines with a flat trade to GDP ratio to leave the 
measure of regional integration little changed.
80The intra-regional trade propensity is the intra-regional trade intensity (using Method 2) 
multiplied by the trade to GDP ratio.
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NAFTA — EU15 East AsiaSource: IMF
Figure 3.17. Extra-Regional Trade Propensities
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Looking at extra-regional trade propensities81 and the underlying trend is 
difficult to discern amidst the fluctuations in the series. In particular, the effects of 
oil price fluctuations are particularly strong in both Europe and Asia, generating 
large rises in the extra-regional trade propensity measure in 1973-74 and 1979- 
80, and a large fall in 1985-86. In all three cases the ratios in the first half of the 
1990s are above the second half of the 1960s, considerably so in the case of 
North America. As neither of those periods is seen as having a serious 
misalignment of either currencies or commodity prices, this leads to the 
conclusion that the increase in regional trade bias in Europe and North America 
noted in 3.3.4.4 and 3.3.4.5 has not been at the expense of trade with other 
regions. Note that these figures cannot be used for comparisons between 
regions, as they are sensitive to the size of the economy.
Fluctuations in Europe in the 1980s are seen as a function of oil price 
volatility and exchange rate shifts, rather than representing underlying swings in 
trade openness. The peak in the extra-regional trade propensity in 1984 was 
presumably a reflection of the strong dollar which would have reduced the dollar 
value of Europe’s GDP more than it affected trade values, with the decline in the
81The extra-regional trade propensity is the extra-regional trade intensity index multiplied 
by the trade to GDP ratio.
NAFTA — EU15 ---East AsiaSource: IMF
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dollar accompanied by falling oil prices, this pushed down the measure through 
the second half of the 1980s.
In the case of Europe, developments in recent years help to allay fears 
that the Single European Market programme would lead to benefits to European 
Union members at the expense of the rest of the world. In reality there has been 
a moderate increase in overall trade to GDP ratios, and a clear rise in the extra- 
regional trade propensity.
The examination of extra-regional trade propensities is useful as it helps to 
analyse the impact of regional integration on the rest of the world. It is possible to 
argue that greater regional integration accompanied by a general opening of the 
region to trade is an inferior development compared to an unbiased increase in 
the propensity of the region to trade. However, the two factors are often related in 
that the policies required to increase regional trade are often the same as those 
which result in a general opening of the economy.82 It could even be argued that 
without the preferential regional policies, the opening of the economies would not 
take place.
3.3.6 Gravity Models
It is possible to attempt to conduct the analysis of trade preferences from another 
perspective by constructing a "gravity model" which attempts to estimate the 
impact of natural determinants on trade flows. In the basic form of such models 
the variables used are size and distance, although others add GDP per capita, 
common borders and a common language. If there were nothing in the concept 
of regional blocs creating preferential trade relations, then these variables would 
explain all trade flows. Tinbergen provided the first thorough examination of trade 
flows using this method.83 By constructing a multiple regression model the aim is 
to show the significance of the variables used in explaining trade flows.
More recently Frankel, Wei and Stein have conducted this exercise for a 
variety of regions and find "some regional groupings show significant bloc effects:
82 This point is discussed further in Chapter 5.
83 Tinbergen (1962) Appendix VI. See also Balassa and Bauwens (1988) and Jacquemin 
and Sapir (1988) for more recent examples.
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the EC, the Western Hemisphere, East Asia and APEC".84 By using a dummy 
variable for membership of each group, their regression analysis indicates that 
there is a regional intensity to trade which cannot be explained by the natural 
determinants alone.85 For example trade between East Asian economies in 1990 
was more than four times higher than countries which were similar apart from the 
characteristic of being located in East Asia. They also find strong evidence of 
preferential flows across APEC, despite the lack (at the time) of a formal trading 
arrangement, and use this as an argument in favour of pushing ahead with the 
creation of appropriate institutions.
The scale of the analysis is impressive although there are concerns over 
the validity of the findings. For example, the appendix Table 4 of Frankel, Wei 
and Stein’s report shows that in 1980 members of APEC traded with each other 
almost five times more than would be expected from their location and size. By 
1985 this preference had increased to 17 times, and then it plunged to just 2.5 
times in 1990, so the proclivity of APEC members to trade with each other has 
apparently fallen sharply as the countries began to be organised as a regional 
entity.
In addition, the volatility of the coefficients of some of the "natural 
determinants" also suggests inadequacies in this approach. For example, in 1980 
the coefficient on GNP per capita indicated that rich countries trade 36% more 
than poor ones. In 1985 this coefficient fell to show a 6% preference and in 1990 
had recovered to indicate rich countries only trade 17% more than poor ones. 
Similarly, Frankel finds that in 1975 two adjacent countries apparently traded 
60% more than if they were not adjacent. However, by 1990 they traded twice as 
much. Such volatility in the coefficients suggests serious problems in the 
formulation of the model, as in reality the influence of a factor such as GDP per 
capita is likely to be relatively stable over time.
One explanation comes back to the use of discrete points in time which 
makes the findings sensitive to short-term price fluctuations. In particular, it is 
worth noting that Frankel, Wei and Stein find a quite steady R2 in the 0.7 to 0.8 
range, with the exception of 1985 when the R2 falls to 0.57. As noted above in
84 Frankel, Wei and Stein (1994) pp. 1-2.
85 Frankel, Wei and Stein use GDP, GDP per capita, distance and a common border as 
their "natural" determinants.
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the discussion on regional trade intensity measures, fluctuations in the mid- 
1980s are most likely attributable to movements in exchange rates, with the 
dollar peaking in 1985 on a real effective exchange rate basis.
Another problem relates to the use of a dummy variable to act as a proxy 
for regional membership, either because it is reflecting a relationship which can 
best be explained by another factor (perhaps cultural) or there is multicollinearity 
between the dummy variables for the trade groupings and the "natural 
determinants" used. In particular, the distance variable, the adjacency measure 
and the dummy variable for trade groupings are likely to show a close 
relationship. Adjacent countries presumably have relatively little distance 
between their economic centres, while close and adjacent countries are likely to 
form trade groupings. The likely existence of such multicollinearity leads to 
"uncertainty as to which variable deserves the credit for the jointly explained 
variation in the dependent variable .. [and] .. uncertainty as to the true values of 
the coefficients being estimated".86 Moreover, it is noted that "in cases of high 
multicollinearity, the sample data may be compatible with a diverse set of 
hypotheses. Hence the probability of accepting a false hypotheses (i.e., Type II 
error) increases."87 In particular it is a concern that Frankel, Wei and Stein find 
that the dummy variables for the EC, EFTA, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Andean 
Pact are not significant at the 15% level on the majority of occasions.88 Ideally 
the calculations would be repeated without the dummy variables in order to see 
how much they add to the explanatory power of the regression, and to see the 
impact on the coefficients and errors for the distance and adjacency variables.
In fact, there are deeper concerns with the use of a gravity model 
approach. Deardorff referred to the gravity model’s "somewhat dubious 
theoretical heritage",89 while a former head of the IMF’s Research Department is 
less forgiving, asserting that "these findings [produced by the gravity model] are 
almost certainly wrong".90 Polak attributes the findings produced by the gravity 
model used by Frankel, Wei and Stein to "a misspecification inherent in the
86 Kennedy (1979) p. 129.
87 Gujarati (1988) p. 292.
88 Frankel, Wei and Stein (1994) Appendix Table 4.
89 Deardorff (1984) p.503.
90 Polak (1996) p. 533.
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traditional gravity model".91 Polak concludes that "The gravity model lacks the 
theoretical foundation for such far-reaching conclusions. Instead, their findings 
should have led the authors to re-examine the gravity model itself."92 In a similar 
vein, following on from Polak’s criticism, Matyas has shown that "all gravity 
models used in this area are misspecified from an econometric point of view .. 
[and] .. this leads to the incorrect interpretations of the trading bloc dummy 
variable(s) and improper economic inference".93
Polak points out that the root of the problem is that the gravity model 
underestimates the trade flows of any country which is geographically distant 
from its trading partners. This is because demand for imports is determined more 
by income levels than by distance, with additional transport costs absorbed in the 
country’s terms of trade. The distance measure produces a "downwards bias for 
far-away countries and an upward bias for close-in countries. The downward bias 
means large positive residuals for any set of far away countries".94 In Frankel, 
Wei and Stein’s case, the large residuals are, in effect, allocated to the dummy 
variables for regional groupings, producing the illusion of a preferential trade 
grouping in APEC. Similarly, Polak argues that the misspecification of the model 
produces "not only phantom regions but also phantom anti-regions"95 which 
explains the finding of Frankel, Wei and Stein of the non-existence or weak effect 
of the European Union. Polak suggests an improvement to the basic gravity 
model using a term for relative rather than absolute distance, but this still leaves 
no place for the introduction of dummy variables for membership of regional 
groupings.
A gravity model is a superficially attractive approach, but as Polak argues, 
the most interesting findings stem from a misspecification of the model.96 In
91 Polak (1996) p. 534.
92 Polak (1996) p. 540.
93 Matyas (1997) p. 363.
94 Polak (1996) p. 538.
95 Polak (1996) p. 539.
96 As Polak has noted, "Frankel, with whom I had an extensive correspondence before I 
finalized the paper has never responded to my paper. My assumption is that this is a silent 
acknowledgement that my criticism is correct." Polak, “personal correspondence”, 11 October 
1998; on file with the author. The author has similarly failed to elicit a response from Frankel 
regarding some of the issues raised above.
Polak (1996) p. 539.
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addition, the volatility of factors influencing international trade, in particular the 
difficulties concerning exchange rate movements, mean that using such an 
apparently sophisticated approach as a gravity model is questionable, as the 
mass of data required means that calculations are performed at discrete time 
intervals, rather than on an annual basis. Moreover, problems with 
multicollinearity mean that the importance assigned to the dummy variables 
representing group membership are both volatile and not reliable. A gravity 
model approach gives an impression of precision which is misleading and, other 
than confirming that proximate and wealthy countries trade more, while large 
countries trade less, adds little to the discussion related to regional trade 
intensities. Viewed over a reasonable time period the simpler trade intensity 
calculations are sufficient to make a judgement on whether regional bias is 
increasing.
3.3.7 Summary of Findings from Trade Data
Using studies of merchandise trade data to measure the degree of 
regionalisation is favoured above other approaches. This is largely due to the 
availability of a detailed, consistent time series, split by country and produced in 
a timely fashion. Calculating regional trade intensity indices from the 
merchandise trade data shows a clear increase in the regional bias of trade in 
both Europe and North America since the late 1980s. In both of these regions the 
increase in bias coincides with liberalisation aimed at promoting economic 
integration.
In the case of Europe, preferential bias has been rising since the 
formation of what is now the European Union. Initially this took the form of 
greater trade preference between its original six members, while over the two 
decades it has reflected a shift in trade bias towards new members. For all but 
the broadest definitions of Asia, regional trade bias has diminished over the past 
three decades. In part this reflects a statistical feature of the measures used, 
which give an upwards bias to smaller regions which diminishes as they increase 
their share of world trade, but it also likely reflects an increase in trade relations 
with North America. This interpretation is supported by stability in the bias shown 
by the broader APEC measure which includes the USA.
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The rise in regional trade preferences in Europe and North America 
inevitably means a reduced bias to trade with the rest of the world. However, this 
is offset by an increased openness of those regions to international trade. The 
net result is that neither of the regions has seen a reduction in the degree of 
overall integration with the rest of the world. This gives support to what had 
appeared to be an optimistic assessment of the World Trade Organization, in 
that regional integration agreements are more likely to complement the 
objectives of WTO than be in competition.97
There are concerns about focusing too closely on trade data alone. Firstly, 
trade in services is growing more quickly than merchandise trade, but exports of 
services broken down by country are not available on an internationally 
comparable basis. Secondly, it is questionable as to whether merchandise trade 
is the driving force in economic integration: investment flows in various guises 
are growing more rapidly. As the United Nations has reported, by 1991 the value 
of sales of foreign affiliates of multinational corporations exceeded merchandise 
exports.98 In the light of these considerations, this chapter goes on to examine 
other data for evidence of regional trends.
3.4 Foreign Direct Investment
A similar analysis to that used to calculate trade intensities can be conducted 
with data for foreign direct investment (FDI). By analysing FDI flows, it should be 
possible to conclude whether a country is showing a preferential bias to invest in 
its regional neighbours. As Mundell has shown, movements of goods and 
transfers of factors of production can be substitutes.99 Therefore, if increased 
regional integration in trade flows is matched by a decline in the regionalisation of 
FDI, then it is not necessarily the case that the region is becoming more 
integrated. If regionalisation is progressing then an increase in trade bias will be 
complemented by FDI flows. In fact the experience of some regional agreements
97 WTO (1995) p. 62.
98 United Nations World Investment Report, Executive Summary (1994) p. 9.
99 Mundell (1957).
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is that as they become deeper, the incremental measures promote integration of 
FDI more strongly than trade.100
A major problem is that the data series for foreign direct investment flows 
are far less reliable than those for trade, as definitions vary from country to 
country as do the mechanisms for reporting and measuring FDI flows. Even 
when data from a multilateral body such as UNCTAD are used, these problems 
are not necessarily overcome as the original sources are still the individual 
countries, with their inconsistent standards. Another problem in using annual 
bilateral data is that a single project can cause a major fluctuation and make 
trends difficult to isolate. As a result, some studies use five year averages, 
although the lack of availability of reliable lengthy time series data is a further 
limitation.101 A further problem in making calculations is that FDI flows can be 
negative, because the sale by country X of an asset held in country Y is counted 
as a negative flow from country X into country Y, rather than a positive flow from 
country Y into country X.
Portfolio flows and foreign direct investment (FDI) both involve the 
purchase of a stake in a company, with the definitional difference between the 
two being that FDI involves some degree of control over the asset. The definition 
used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that "Direct investment is the 
category of international investment that reflects the objective of obtaining a 
lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in 
another economy".102 As defined by the IMF, the level at which an investment 
ceases to be classed as portfolio investment and is defined as foreign direct 
investment is when a single foreign investor owns 10% or more of the 
outstanding stocks in a company, as long as this includes some voice in the 
management of that company. This is now the generally accepted definition 
across the OECD. In reality, however, FDI tends to be thought of as meaning 
majority ownership and this is generally the case. As Graham and Krugman have 
pointed out, in the United States, on average the foreign parent controls 77.5% of
100 For example, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
began in 1983 with a focus on liberalising trade flows, but later broadened to include measures to 
integrate capital and labour markets.
101 Primo Braga and Bannister (1994).
102 IMF Balance of Payments Manual (1993) p. 84, paragraph 359.
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the subsidiary. Raising the ownership threshold to 20% or even 50% would have 
minimal impact on the measure of the amount of FDI.103
Primo Braga and Bannister looked at regional integration in Asia from the 
point of view of FDI data, using figures from the UNCTAD database. They 
calculated that in the first half of the 1980s, 42% of total FDI in East Asia came 
from North America, with East Asia accounting for 36%. However, in the second 
half of the decade the position was reversed, with shares of 21% and 57% 
respectively. They also found "evidence of a significant intra-regional bias with 
respect to FDI originating from the Asian newly industrializing economies".104
As with trade data, looking at proportions irrespective of the size of the 
home and host economies does not paint a true picture of any bias in flows. 
Undertaking an exercise similar to the one they used to calculate trade 
intensities, Primo Braga and Bannister calculate that in the 1980s the intra- 
regional FDI intensity rose significantly for Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, as it did 
for Hong Kong if China is included in the regional totals. At the same time, FDI 
into Japan became less regionally biased, as had been the case with its trade 
flows. Primo Braga and Bannister use a formula which is essentially the same as 
Method 1 used in section 3.3.4.1 above in calculating trade intensities.105
103 Graham and Krugman (1995).
104 Primo Braga and Bannister (1994) p. 108.
105 By = F, /  Iwj = (FDI, /  FDIiw) /  [(FDI* - FDI,) /  (FDIW -FDI*)]
Where
i is the home country 
j is the host country 
w is the world
Bj, is the FDI intensity index between countries or regions i and j. That is to say, it is a measure of 
the importance of country j as a recipient of FDI from country i, relative to total receipts of FDI from 
the rest of the world.
Fjj is the share of country j in country i’s FDI.
Iwj is the share of FDI from the rest of the world into country j as a share of total FDI in the rest of 
the world.
FDIjj is foreign direct investment from i to j.
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Table 3.5. Investment Intensity Index for East Asia3
1980-1984 1985-1989
East Asia 3.637 5.808
Japan 2.551 3.149
Hong Kong 4.722 6.664
Korea 1.855 5.654
Singapore 24.172 39.620
Taiwan 6.049 5.880
Source: Primo Braga and Bannister (1994).
a: The investment intensity index shows the importance of East
Asia as a host for investment from each country or region listed.
Table 3.5 summarises some of the findings of Primo Braga and Bannister. 
Only Japan and the four Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) are 
included, as investment flows from other Asian economies are too small to show 
meaningful trends. The definition of East Asia excludes China, which results in a 
lower measure for Hong Kong and Taiwan in particular, and the rest of East Asia 
in general,106 in the second half of the 1980s when FDI flows into China began to 
surge. As the table shows, there was a positive and (for all except Taiwan) 
increasing bias towards intra-regional investment in the 1980s. These results 
contrast with those derived for trade intensities above, which showed no increase 
in regional trade bias occurring in the 1980s. One interpretation is that in East 
Asia regionalisation has been taking place through FDI rather than through trade 
flows.
Primo Braga and Bannister’s findings demonstrate two of the major 
problems with using FDI data: a reliable long-run of statistics is not available, 
while the volatility from one year to the next means that relatively long-term 
aggregates must be used for all but the largest economies. Moreover, FDI tends 
to be more volatile than trade as it is more dependent on the economic cycle. For 
example, Japanese FDI outflows hit a peak of US$51 billion in 1990 and then slid 
to just US$14 billion in 1993 as the domestic recession hit capital spending
106 Legally, Taiwan and Korea were not able to invest in China in the 1980s. The ban on 
Korean investment was lifted in 1994. Taiwanese companies overcame the restrictions by 
conducting investment via Hong Kong. There is also a problem with investment funds "round 
tripping" out of China into Hong Kong and back into China where it becomes FDI and as such is 
able to exploit favourable treatment. See Lardy (1994).
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plans, and then recovered to $23 billion in 1996 as the domestic capital spending 
cycle temporarily revived.107
Another problem with using aggregate data on FDI flows is that it reveals 
nothing about the use to which the investment is put. Simply looking at the value 
of the investment gives no information about the numbers or skill levels of 
employees in the host country, the degree to which supplies are procured locally, 
the destination of the end product or the technology used. In short, the raw 
figures tell us nothing about the quality of the investment or what it means for 
regional integration on a broader scale, as whether the output is sold 
domestically, is exported back to the home country or is exported to a third 
country will have an impact on the level of regional integration. Total employment 
effects are unclear: for example, the US sports wear maker Nike employs 9,000 
people outside the US, but its subcontractors employ another 75,000,108 which is 
a creation of employment not captured by measures of the value of the FDI flow.
For this reason some studies have attempted to disaggregate the data in 
order to analyse its impact on the host economy and on links between home and 
host. As the 1994 United Nations World Investment Report noted, the impact of 
MNCs in terms of numbers employed may be small, but "the longer-term 
consequences through stimulating economic growth and improving international 
competitiveness cannot be underestimated".109
Using OECD data,110 I have calculated FDI intensities for investment flows 
between Canada and the USA. Although some data for Mexico are available, 
they are insufficient. Figure 3.18 shows the annual trend over the past decade. In 
spite of the extreme volatility of the series, there is the impression of rising 
investment intensities in North America. Net disinvestment in Canada by US 
firms in 1985-86 accounts for the negative readings in those years. However, 
even for two countries with generally good quality data sources there are doubts 
as to the reliability of the figures (for example in any given year, US reported 
outflows to Canada can be very different from Canadian reported inflows from
107 Ministry of Finance (1997).
108 UN World Investment Report (1994)
109 UNCTAD (1994) p. 1.
110 OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook (1997).
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the US) and combined with the volatility of the series, this makes any conclusions 
provisional.
Figure 3.18. North American FDI Intensity Index
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Let us now consider Europe. One of the notable features of the analysis of 
trade flows in 3.3.4.4 was the absence of an increase in trade bias between the 
two largest original members of the EU, France and Germany, since the late 
1960s (Figures 3.10 and 3.11). As such it is interesting to take France and 
Germany, and see if the bias of their FDI flows differs from that of trade. This is 
shown in Figure 3.19.
From Canada to USA From USA to Canada
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Figure 3.19. European FDI Intensities
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Just as with the USA and Canada the data are relatively volatile, which 
makes any underlying trend difficult to discern. Nevertheless, it is not possible to 
make a case that there has been an increase in the bias of FDI flows over the 
past decade. In fact, flows from Germany into France appear to show a declining 
bias. In the case of flows from France to Germany the volatility stems from the 
fact that FDI can be a negative flow as well as a positive one, and in 1994 the 
flow of FDI from France into Germany was larger than the entire flow of FDI from 
the OECD into Germany. The reason for this is that North America dis-invested 
from Germany in 1994 to the sum of DM1909 million, while net investment from 
France was DM1188 million, among OECD total FDI of minus DM381 million. 
Total FDI into Germany was DM2507 million in 1994.111
In conclusion, examination of the available statistics tentatively indicates a 
growing regional bias of FDI flows in East Asia and North America. However, the 
quality of the statistics is poor, which makes any findings indicative rather than 
conclusive. This may become a more practical approach in coming years, as a 
longer time series becomes available.
111 OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook (1997). Table 3, pp. 120-
121.
From Germany to France From France to GermanySource: IMF
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3.5 Non-Equity Relationships
Although trade and direct investment flows make up a large part of cross-border 
corporate activity, non-equity relationships are of growing importance. Licensing, 
franchising and other vehicles a company uses to extend its influence across 
borders, without leaving a trace in trade or investment data, all appear significant, 
but are difficult to track.
The vast amount of manpower needed to search through newspaper 
articles, press releases and other historical records of non-equity co-operation 
makes it an impractical approach. Even if such an exercise were to be 
conducted, it would by necessity be incomplete, with a bias towards countries 
with the best reporting systems. Much would be omitted. Moreover, the value of 
such agreements is rarely immediately apparent.
One reasonably comprehensive survey of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), as well as strategic alliances, is conducted by KPMG, one of 
the leading advisors on these ventures.112 Although containing useful information 
on the number of M&A, joint-ventures and minority investments, broken down by 
country, the data available do not show the regional direction of the investments. 
The lack of a long time series as well as the possibility that the data are biased 
by the location of KPMG’s operations are also arguments against using these 
data as a base for analysis.
The challenge is therefore to find a more efficient and reliable method 
which is not biased by the source reporting the data. While some countries 
publish a data series showing income flows from royalty payments and licenses, 
it is not broadly available from a source such as the IMF’s Balance of Payments 
Statistics. Moreover, the data that are available are not broken down by country 
or by region which prevents analysis similar to that used to identify signs of 
regional bias in merchandise trade flows. Hopefully improved data reporting will 
allow such an analysis in the future.
112 The United Nations has begun using KPMG data to measure M&A activity. See 
UNCTAD (1996).
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3.6 Investment Income Flows
While detailed information is not available about the flow of income from non­
equity relationships, some detail is available on the income flow from all foreign 
assets. Data on interest, profits and dividends (IPDs) flows show the income 
stream generated by a country’s foreign assets. Again, the idea is that these data 
can be examined for signs of regional bias in the allocation of the underlying 
assets which generate the flow.
Unfortunately, few countries produce figures showing anything other than 
a total for IPD flows. However, Japan does release figures for interest, profits and 
dividends flows disaggregated by some countries and regions and these can be 
used to examine any bias in foreign investment holdings on a broadly defined 
basis.
Undoubtedly there are problems associated with looking at data on the 
income flow from an asset and drawing conclusions about the underlying value of 
the asset. It must be assumed that each asset generates the same rate of return 
irrespective of the country or the asset in question. This might seem far-fetched, 
but it can be justified. For example, it could be expected that in a higher risk 
environment, such as China, a firm will be seeking a higher payback ratio than in 
a lower risk country like Belgium. In theory, resources will be allocated until the 
expected total return, which is a function of risk and profitability, is equalized.113
Looking at income flows is a reasonably efficient means of measuring the 
current value of foreign assets. This contrasts markedly with most data on foreign 
direct investment, where one year’s flow is simply added to the accumulated 
stock of previous years. This is clearly unrealistic, as the value of that stock may 
well have appreciated in the interim. This is demonstrated by the contrast 
between data which show the United States as the world’s largest debtor 
country,114 while at the same time, looking at the interest, profits and dividends
113 That is to say that, for example, although an investment in Belgium is expected to yield, 
say US$5,000 per annum, there would be a target return of US$10,000 for the same investment in 
China. However, the higher return is justified by the higher degree of risk and there is the chance 
that the return would actually be zero. So making two investments expected to yield US$5,000 
each in Belgium generates US$10,000 while making two investments aimed at yielding 
US$10,000 in China also generates US$10,000 as one pays in full while the other pays nothing.
114 Graham and Krugman (1995).
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data in the current account figures and the US is seen to have recorded a net 
US$3 billion surplus in 1995.
The United States is one of the few countries to correct foreign direct 
investment figures for valuation changes. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
produces figures on both a book value and a market value basis in the June 
issue of its Survey of Current Business, and the divergence can be sizeable. For 
example in 1989 the ratio of inward to outward investment was 1.01 on a book 
value basis, but on a market value measure it was 0.66 (that is to say, the US 
was a major creditor on FDI). The gap had been largely eliminated by 1992 
following a rise in the US stock market which raised the value of foreigners’ US 
assets.
Examining returns overcomes this valuation problem, as an investment 
made twenty years ago with a nominal value of, say, US$50 million has a present 
value of, say, US$200 million. A similar investment which is ten years old had an 
original nominal value of, say, US$100 million, but again has a present value of 
US$200 million. However, both will (theoretically) generate the same return. 
Looking at flows compensates for the impact of revaluation of assets.
There are of course some problems with examining flows and not stocks, 
especially in the case of those resulting from FDI. One area where potential for 
distortion exists is in transfer pricing, when the profits earned from an investment 
are manipulated through the use of transfer pricing and therefore the "official" 
profit figures could represent an under- or overvaluation of the underlying asset. 
It is also important to note that the interest, profits and dividends figures 
examined below include interest on holdings of foreign bonds which represents a 
large part of income flows. There appears to be less scope for such manipulation 
in the income from other forms of capital flows, such as foreign bond holdings.
Figure 3.20 shows calculations for Japan’s intensity of interest, profits and 
dividends (IPD) flows with various regions. In this case, the statistics available 
limit the North American measure to Canada and the USA, while the Asia 
definition is broad, stretching across as far as Afghanistan. Data are only 
available since 1987. The figures indicate that there has been a shift in Japan’s 
investment income bias away from Asia and towards North America since 1987. 
It is assumed that this also implies a similar shift in Japan’s investment bias.
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Figure 3.20. Japan’s Interest, Profits and Dividends Intensity
Index
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Comparing these results with the figures for Japan’s merchandise trade 
intensities provides interesting results. Table 3.6 shows the results for North 
America (Canada and USA only) and for the Asian Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs: Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan). This offers the 
interesting observation that while Japan’s trade bias towards North America has 
been declining, there has been a rise in the bias of IPD flows with the region. 
One explanation could be that the reduction in trade bias has been offset by a 
rise in the production linkages between Japan and North America. However, 
given that only 5.6% of Japan’s IPD credits are related to either FDI or property 
investments,115 with the remainder largely representing interest on holdings of US 
bonds and bills, such a conclusion is not supportable. It is more accurate to 
conclude that there is a growing bias towards North America of all capital flows— 
not just FDI.
115 Ministry of Finance, Balance of Payments Monthly.
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Table 3.6. Japan’s Trade and IPD intensities
North America Nl Cs
Trade IPD Trade IPD
1987 1.762 1.228 2.065 9.896
1988 1.661 1.152 1.968 11.663
1989 1.652 1.185 1.945 12.023
1990 1.674 1.288 1.923 13.465
1991 1.612 1.395 1.843 12.550
1992 1.599 1.528 1.793 10.979
1993 1.501 1.474 1.645 9.545
1994 1.514 1.252 1.661 9.119
Source: Author’s calculations from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 
Balance of Payments Statistics and the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance Balance of Payments Monthly.
Unfortunately, detailed reporting of income flows by region or country is 
not widespread, so this analysis cannot be conducted for each region, as was the 
case for merchandise trade flows. Nevertheless, where possible it seems 
reasonable to use this approach to test for signs of regionalisation in investment 
flows.
3.7 Currency Flows
Data on financial flows are partly discussed above in terms of investment income 
flows in their various guises. It is also possible to consider exchange rate 
movements for signs of a regional bias. Frankel attempted to address the 
question of whether a yen bloc was forming in Asia by looking at exchange rate 
movements, interest rate dependencies and composition of foreign reserves.116 
He found that most financial centres in Asia were not sufficiently liberalised to be 
influenced by interest rate movements in other countries, but in the cases where 
there was a connection, the role of New York was more powerful than that of 
Tokyo in everywhere except Taiwan. There was, however, evidence of a greater 
role for the yen in the region, both as a weight in the pegged currency baskets of
116 Frankel (1991).
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some countries, and as a reserve currency. Note also that an increasing 
proportion of Japan’s trade with Asia is denominated in yen.117
On a slightly more anecdotal basis, the behaviour of currencies in the first 
quarter of 1995 merits observation. At a time of instability resulting from various 
factors including the economic crisis in Mexico, the Japanese earthquake in 
Kobe and the collapse of the British merchant bank Barings, there was a clear 
regional bias in exchange rate movements. At times of uncertainty, funds tend to 
flow to any perceived "safe haven". For most of the post-war period this safe 
haven has been the US dollar. Indeed the creation of the Euromarkets in the 
1960s owed much to the willingness of the Soviet Union to hold "safe" US 
dollars, but outside the jurisdiction of the US authorities.
By the 1990s, however, other currencies have come to be regarding as 
safe havens to rival the US dollar. In the first quarter of 1995 the Deutschmark 
and Japanese yen both appreciated within their regions and vis-a-vis the US 
dollar. However, at the same time the US dollar was stable on a trade weighted 
basis. In spite of depreciating against the yen and Deutschmark, the US dollar 
rose against the Canadian dollar and against Mexican and South American 
currencies—which still saw the US dollar as their safe haven—with the net trade 
weighted effect being neutral.
Currency movements are also important in Europe as a single currency is 
the next proposed milestone in European integration. The European Monetary 
System represents a clear political effort to integrate European economies and 
while its merits are still furiously debated, there are clear signs of a currency bloc 
forming in the EU around the Deutschmark.
Although it is difficult to provide clear statistical measures of the degree of 
regional integration from the point of view of currency movements, it appears to 
be the case that economies in the three main economic regions are becoming 
more closely tied to the currency of the dominant economy in each region. While 
it is arguable whether currency movements per se are causing regional 
integration, it is possible that closer currency ties are a reflection of integration in
117 According to the Ministry of Finance (1996) in 1986 only 36.5% of Japan’s exports and 
10% of imports were denominated in yen. By 1994 the proportions had risen to 40.7% and 21.6% 
respectively. In 1970 less than 1% of trade had been yen denominated.
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other areas, such as trade or investment. The issue of exchange rates is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
3.9 Conclusion Is Regionalisation Increasing?
This chapter has highlighted the problems in calculating whether regionalisation 
has increased in recent decades: there are statistical inadequacies in all of the 
measures used. In addition, there are serious flaws in all data (either because of 
the lack of a suitable time series, or due to the lack of a regional breakdown) 
apart from merchandise trade flows. These flaws mean that only merchandise 
trade data can be used in an attempt to produce reliable, statistically-based 
conclusions, in spite of the possibility that economic integration is occurring at far 
more levels than simply the exchange of goods. It is hoped that development of a 
longer time series or more geographic detail will allow some of the areas outlined 
above to be used to examine regional economic bias in the future.
There are various methods available to calculate the degree of regional 
trade bias. The most practical one is the regional trade intensity index which 
allows the examination of trends over time. Changes in the direction of trade are 
strong enough to outweigh marginal inadequacies in the index. The trade 
intensity index is frequently misused, but if employed prudently it is superior to 
the other methodologies discussed.
Although trade data are thought to give a reasonably accurate portrayal of 
the real world, even they contain some errors or a degree of incompatibility. This 
is best illustrated by noting that in 1993 adding up the merchandise trade 
balances of all countries (on an fob / fob basis)118, the world had a US$30 billion 
surplus, while summing the current account positions of all countries in the world 
gave a deficit of US$105 billion,119 although by definition, the global trade and 
current accounts must be in balance. Therefore varying degrees of sophistication 
of different methods should not conceal the fact that all the figures used are to 
some extent flawed. Errors in the data are not necessarily a problem if the 
degree of error remains constant, but there is little reason to believe this is the
118 Fob stands for free on board. Using fob figures for imports and exports means 
comparing like with like, and in theory the difference between the two should be zero.
119 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1996).
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case—the world current account "black hole" has fallen in recent years, from a 
peak deficit of US$138 billion in 1990 down to US$24 billion in 1995. A further 
problem is that if regional integration promotes more intensive flows of foreign 
direct investment within a region then these may be substituting for existing trade 
flows, with the result that the intra-regional trade intensity index could decline in 
spite of a rise in overall economic integration. This problem is examined in more 
detail in Chapter 5.
As noted in Chapter 2, political efforts towards promoting regional 
integration have revived since the mid-1980s. Preferential trade policies are by 
no means the only influence on trade flows, but there is evidence in Europe that 
countries joining the core of the European Union have seen an accompanying 
rise in regional trade bias. Similarly, increased bias in North America coincides 
with efforts to reduce barriers to regional trade since the late 1980s. However, 
there is no sign of an increase in bias between the original six European Union 
members since the enlargement process began.
In the case of Asia, until recently policy has not been oriented towards 
reduced regional barriers to trade. Movements in trade bias within Asia are 
dominated by price effects, by the impact of a rising share of world trade and by 
the changing relationship with North America. As yet it is too early to see any 
impact of efforts to lower regional trade barriers in the data. A gravity model 
approach does find evidence of strong Asian regional preferences, but as Polak 
has pointed out, this is due to a mis-specification of the model rather than the 
genuine existence of trade preferences. Using trade intensities the preferential 
bias within Asian has been on a steady decline until levelling off in the past 
decade.
Introducing a measurement of economic openness and it is seen that 
preferential trade liberalisation within a region has not been accompanied by an 
overall decline in trade with the rest of the world. One explanation is that some of 
the liberalisation measures are non-discriminatory and lead to an increase in 
overall openness. This is an extremely positive finding, as it implies that so far 
the renewed trend towards more regional agreements has not come at the cost 
of reduced trade with non-members.
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CHAPTER FOUR
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
4.1 Introduction
Regional integration is not just about increasing the movement of goods and 
services between neighbouring countries, under the watchful eye of approving 
governments. The price at which those transactions take place (i.e. the exchange 
rate) is also vitally important to both the state and the multinational corporation. 
That price is determined as a result of transactions in the markets for goods and 
service, and for capital.
This chapter will investigate the issues related to regionalism and 
regionalisation surrounding exchange rates and examine the attitudes and 
behaviour of states and firms. One question is whether the objectives of a 
government vis-a-vis exchange rates are likely to be in harmony with those of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) operating across its borders. A further issue is 
whether the government is paying too high a price in attempting to secure 
exchange rate stability, if a side-effect is the erosion of control over the economy 
due its inability to use various policy tools. It will be argued that MNCs are less 
concerned about exchange rate volatility than is commonly assumed, and that 
such volatility has little impact on trade flows. As such, governments' attempts to 
stabilise exchange rates are better explained by political economy factors, rather 
than economic ones.
It will be shown that changes in regionalisation, as measured by the trade 
intensity index developed in the previous chapter, are unrelated to exchange rate 
volatility. Moreover, regional trade agreements have no identifiable impact on 
exchange rate volatility unless they are accompanied by an explicit agreement to 
co-operate to promote exchange rate stability. Related to this is the question of 
whether fixed exchange rates, or even a single currency, bring significant 
economic benefits to aspiring regional groups. It will be argued that the economic 
benefits of a single currency are marginal while the costs are unpredictable, 
which is an indication that political rather than economic explanations need to be 
sought.
Financial flows have often been neglected in discussions of regionalism. 
The most comprehensive text on the subject contains minimal reference to
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exchange rate movements,1 while most other studies concentrate on trade or 
foreign direct investment flows. This is an unjustified omission in a world where 
the value of foreign exchange dealing in a single week is greater than the value 
of exports of goods and services in a whole year,2 so this chapter will analyse the 
role of exchange rates in regional integration.
4.2 Exchange Rate Movements
The exchange rate has been described as "the single most important price in the 
economy".3 This is because a movement in the exchange rate alters the price at 
which all foreign goods trade in the domestic economy and the relative price 
between traded and non-traded goods. A weakening exchange rate raises the 
domestic price of imports which will attract resources into import-competing 
sectors. It also improves the competitiveness of exports, attracting resources into 
the export sector. This is at the expense of the non-traded goods sector, which 
sees its relative profitability decline compared to that of the traded goods sector. 
Some monetarists would argue that the effect on the real economy is temporary, 
as the rise in prices implicit in a depreciating currency will soon restore the pre­
depreciation equilibrium,4 but there do appear to be a substantial number of 
examples of an export boom following a drop in the international value of the 
currency. The experience of Italy and the UK following the depreciation of their 
currencies against other European countries following the exchange rate crisis of 
1992 is a recent example.5
1 In the 435 pages of text in Anderson and Blackhurst (1993), only 15 contain a reference 
to exchange rates.
2 BIS (1996).
3 Eichengreen (1994) p. 2. I would prefer to argue that, alongside the interest rate, the 
exchange rate is one of the two most important prices in the economy.
4 For example, see Frenkel and Johnson (1976) for a discussion of the monetarist 
perspective.
5 According to the IMF International Financial Statistics, between 1992 and 1995 the 
volume of exports from the UK and Italy rose 21.9% and 36.1%. In contrast, France saw export 
volumes rise 13.5%. Figures are not available on a comparable basis for Germany due to a break 
in the series.
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In theory, the economic impact of exchange rate volatility6—as opposed to 
unidirectional depreciation or appreciation—is ambiguous. The intuitive approach 
(and one which can be supported by models which incorporate a strong degree 
of risk aversion7) is that a volatile exchange rate is a "bad thing", as it will create 
a preference towards domestic transactions above foreign ones, resulting in a 
sub-optimal level of foreign trade.8 Firms will be more prepared to trade and 
invest domestically, safe in the knowledge that their revenues will not be affected 
by arbitrary shifts in the exchange rate. As the economic advisor to the Bank for 
International Settlements said, "It is hard to imagine that the volatility of such a 
key price as the exchange rate could have anything other than an adverse 
influence on economic decision-making".9 However, this is not borne out by the 
evidence.
Gagnon has shown that the degree of risk aversion necessary to yield the 
conclusion that exchange rate variability has a negative effect on trade is 
"implausibly high",10 while strong assumptions are also needed in the 
construction of the model. Without strong risk aversion it is difficult to 
demonstrate a relationship between exchange rate volatility and the level of 
foreign trade. Moreover, repeated studies have found no significant relationship 
to suggest that exchange rate variability leads to a reduced level of trade or 
investment. For example, Gagnon finds that "for any plausible parameterization 
of the model the effect of the observed increase in exchange rate variability on 
trade flows is too small to be statistically detectable".11 A similar study by the IMF 
found no link between exchange rate volatility and trade, noting that "the 
evidence from surveys provides little support for the proposition that exchange
6 Where volatility is defined as short-term fluctuations around an underlying trend.
7 The idea is that firms prefer to operate in an environment where exchange rate volatility 
is low to one where it is high, as variability of its foreign revenues will be commensurately lower. 
This is the case even though exchange rate movements are a zero sum game— i.e. when one firm 
loses, another gains.
8 See, for example, Clark (1973) for a presentation of this view.
9 Alexandre Lamfalussy, opening address at the Financial Times Conference on Foreign 
Exchange Risk, February 1983, quoted in IMF (1984) p. 1.
10 Gagnon (1993) p. 286.
11 Gagnon (1993) p. 270.
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rate variability has a major adverse effect on the volume of international trade".12 
Meanwhile, studies focused on Europe have also been unable to provide 
evidence that trade flows have been damaged as a result of exchange rate 
fluctuations.13 Although these findings seem surprising, one possible reason is 
that given the array of uncertainties facing international business, those related 
to exchange rate volatility are relatively short-term and unimportant.
The above findings cannot be attributed to innovations in financial 
markets, such as foreign exchange hedging. Eichengreen and Irwin have 
examined the sensitivity of trade flows to exchange rate volatility over three 
periods in the 1920s and 1930s. They find it is statistically insignificant in 1932- 
34 and 1935-37, while between 1925 and 1927 it reduced foreign trade by an 
"economically insignificant" 0.13%.14
Nevertheless, forward foreign exchange markets are important in placing 
a value on the cost of the uncertainty. Forward foreign exchange markets provide 
an insurance policy for the domestic value of foreign currency earnings, and so 
the cost of the uncertainty can only be as high as the cost of buying a futures 
contract. This cost is very low, with the spread between bid and offer prices in 
forward markets only one or two tenths of one percent.15 In fact it is difficult to 
hedge foreign exchange risk entirely, due to a degree of uncertainty about the 
stream of revenue a foreign project will generate, but the bulk of the risk can be 
offset.
There is also the question of whether exchange rates have been 
"excessively" volatile, which would imply inefficiencies in the forex market. In a 
stringent study of eight major currencies, Bartolini and Bodnar find that "major
12 IMF (1984) p. 21. In fact the IMF did qualify its findings due to the relatively short time 
span that floating rates had been in operation and due to technical questions related to the 
surveys. Notable concerns were that sample sizes tended to be relatively small, that they included 
diversified firms which would presumably be more indifferent to currency changes and that the 
question was not always precisely directed at the effects of volatility. In the end the IMF 
equivocated that "no strong conclusions should be drawn from the results reported here" (1984) p. 
22.
13 See IMF (1984), Cushman (1988) and Emerson etal. (1992).
14 Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) p. 20.
15 It is the spread which is the measure of the cost, rather than the full price of the futures 
contract, as if exporters hedging currency risk in one direction face a premium, those hedging in 
the opposite direction will see a discount. It is the price of financial intermediation—the spread—  
which is the true cost.
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exchange rates over the post-Bretton Woods period do no appear to violate the 
predictions of even the most restrictive version of the monetary model".16 In other 
words, criticisms of the speculative or random nature of foreign exchange rate 
movements are not borne out by the evidence, although the conclusions depend 
in part on the definition of "excessive".
While the evidence from economics is that currency volatility does not 
adversely affect trade, an international political economy perspective offers 
further insights. Bhagwati has noted the danger that protectionist pressures will 
be generated by excessive swings in the exchange rate.17 Producers of traded 
goods in the strong currency country will seek relief from their loss of 
competitiveness by restrictions on imports or assistance for exports, as was seen 
for example in the United States in the post-1982 Reagan "strong dollar" period. 
There is an asymmetry to the process, as producers will be slower to accept a 
drop in the level of protection once the exchange rate overvaluation corrects and 
there will not be a focused interest group to argue for liberalisation. In addition, 
there may be a shift of resources into industries which become temporarily 
profitable during a period of undervaluation, which will then seek government 
protection when the exchange rate moves back to equilibrium levels.
Fear of protectionist pressures was one of the reasons behind the 
adoption of fixed exchange rates in the Bretton Woods system, as Nurkse had 
argued that speculative runs and irrational exchange rate movements had been 
responsible for disruption to the world system in the inter-war period.18 The 
implication is that exchange rate volatility is not necessarily a danger because of 
the economic actions of firms, but it is a danger because of the political response 
that can be generated. There is also a view that trade liberalisation is a "bicycle" 
process, in that it must keep going forward if protectionist pressures are to be 
prevented. If exchange rate volatility creates swings in competitiveness, then the 
result could be greater difficulty in promoting further liberalisation, which in turn 
could allow protectionists to hold sway.19
16 Bartolini and Bodnar (1996) p. 24.
17 Bhagwati (1992a).
18 Quoted in Krugman (1989).
19 Bergsten and Cline (1983).
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In spite of the concerns that protectionism can result from misaligned 
exchange rates, it should be noted that trade liberalisation has managed to 
proceed at the same time that exchange rates have fluctuated strongly. The 
Tokyo Round was conducted immediately after the transition to floating 
exchange rates, while the Uruguay Round seemed similarly unaffected by the 
exchange rate swings of the late 1980s and early 1990s.20 Moreover, it is 
possible to ascribe too much importance to the issue; as the IMF notes:
In the final analysis, the openness of markets depends critically on 
the strength of a government’s adherence to free trade principles. 
Although exchange rate factors can provide industries seeking 
protection an additional argument for countering deteriorating market 
shares of the domestic industry, a government’s trade policy is likely 
to be influenced by its assessment of the political risk of not 
accommodating the demand for restrictions, against the likelihood of 
retaliatory restrictions by other countries and greater demands for 
protection from other domestic producers.21
Moreover, in spite of the presumed importance of exchange rate 
movements, Krugman has shown that in the 1980s extreme shifts in exchange 
rates did not produce violent changes in trade flows. This was because in a 
range of situations exporters will find that their optimal strategy is to wait and see 
whether the new exchange rate is enduring before committing resources or 
withdrawing from the market.22 Both imports and exports are slower to react to 
changes in the exchange rate than basic theories would suggest. This 
observation complements the finding that exchange rate volatility and trade 
volumes show no identifiable correlation.
A final point is made with reference to the theory of customs unions 
discussed in Chapter 2. In fact the real issue is not whether currency movements 
increase or decrease the volume of trade, but whether they increase or decrease 
the efficiency of resource allocation. The "more trade is good, less trade is bad" 
analysis is the only practical way of approaching the issue, but it should be borne 
in mind that it contains potential pitfalls. That is, unless we have information
20 Of course it is impossible to know how the Rounds would have progressed if conducted 
in an environment of exchange rate stability.
21 IMF (1984) p. 32.
22 This process is known as hysteresis. See Krugman (1989).
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about the welfare effects of changes in the level of trade, it is not possible to 
conclude whether a reduction or an increase in trade which results from 
exchange rate volatility is beneficial. In general it is assumed that a higher level 
of trade implies a welfare gain, but this is not necessarily the case.
According to the above findings, imprecision of welfare implications is not 
a major inconvenience, as there has not been a demonstrated relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and trade volumes, but is does give an 
indication of the problems faced when analysing such an issue.
4.3 Government Attitudes Towards the Exchange Rate
There are three separate issues facing governments with regard to exchange 
rates. Volatility and the level or value of the currency are two related issues, while 
the further question of the desirability of a single currency (which eliminates 
volatility and fixes the level) is investigated below. The attitude of a government 
towards the strength of the exchange rate is likely to vary, depending on the 
focus of economic policy. If fighting inflation is the main concern, then a firm 
currency may be favoured as a means of reducing imported input costs and 
slowing the domestic economy. Conversely, if the government is more concerned 
with boosting economic growth, a weaker currency will improve export price 
competitiveness, while making imports more expensive in domestic currency 
terms. There is debate among economists about the effectiveness of such shifts 
in the exchange rate in generating lasting changes in the real economy,23 but the 
post-Plaza attempts to lower the value of the US dollar to improve the 
competitiveness of the US economy is an example of its appeal to policy­
makers.24 How effective the government can be in controlling the exchange rate 
is discussed below, but for most countries it is an important policy variable.
Although governments might find it possible to fix nominal exchange rates, 
by an implicit or explicit peg to another currency or basket of currencies, it is 
more difficult to fix real exchange rates. For example, the nominal value of two 
currencies can be linked together, but a differential in the inflation rate in the two
23 See for example, Frankel and Johnson (1976).
24 Funabashi (1988) Chapter 3 gives an insight into the political processes.
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countries will mean a gradual shift in the real exchange rate—that is, how much a 
given amount of one currency will buy in each country will change. This does not 
prevent the enduring popularity of pegging nominal exchange rates, although the 
trend of the past decade has been a gradual move towards floating exchange 
rates.
According to the IMF, at the end of 1995, 66 currencies were pegged, of 
which 22 were tied to the US dollar, 14 to the French franc and 30 to other 
currencies or to a currency basket.25 A further 14 had limited flexibility (including 
those within the EMS), 46 came under the label of "managed float" and 54 were 
classed as "independently floating".26 This appears to represent a profound 
change in the space of just six years: at the end of 1989 a total of 93 currencies 
were pegged, while only 20 were independently floating (see Figure 4.1). 
However, it is worth noting that many of the recent converts to floating exchange 
rates are the newly independent former Soviet republics such as Armenia or 
Tajikistan, or other developing economies. Of the 25 OECD members, only 11 
are listing as floating. Nevertheless, the underlying trend seems clear: in 1982 
only 5% of currencies had been floating.
25 IMF International Financial Statistics, April 1996, p. 8.
26 Under limited flexibility the government acts to hold the exchange rate within a certain 
stated range, while a managed float implies the government intervenes at times, but allows the 
market a greater role in determining the level of the exchange rate.
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Figure 4.1. Exchange Rate Arrangements
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Even in countries with floating exchange rates, swings in the value of the 
currency which are not based on economic fundamentals are viewed as 
undesirable.27 So although Japan and the US are listed by the IMF as having an 
independently floating exchange rate, they are ready to intervene in foreign 
exchange markets if they feel that currency valuations have become damagingly 
detached from underlying fundamentals.28
There is no clear pattern as to when countries choose to peg and when 
they choose to float. An expected guide would be the degree of trade 
dependence on a particular country, with a pegged currency offering greater 
certainty about the value of export revenues. However, while several Caribbean 
countries (such as Barbados and Dominica) choose to peg to the US dollar, 
others (Guyana, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago) float.29
27 The G7 statement after the April 1997 Washington G7 meeting contained the sentence 
"excess volatility and significant deviations from fundamentals are undesirable", Reuters, 27 April 
1997.
28 In 1995 Japanese foreign exchange reserves rose some US$95 billion (from US$95 
billion to US$190 billion) as it fought to reverse a sharp rise in the yen’s value against the dollar. 
BOJ (1996).
29 IMF, International Financial Statistics, April 1996.
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Another common motivation for pegging the exchange rate is that it 
represents a statement of the government’s commitment to pursuing policies 
which will enable the link to be maintained. This usually involves a relatively high 
inflation country tieing its currency to that of one which typically enjoys lower 
inflation. In order to maintain the nominal link, the real exchange rate must also 
be harmonised by a stringent monetary policy in the high inflation country. If 
nominal rates are fixed and then real rates forced into line, the pressures on 
adjustment in the domestic economy can be severe. In the case of some 
members of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the 1980s, 
attempts to stabilise both real and nominal exchange rates led to a sharp rise in 
unemployment, which was the consequence of measures aimed at holding 
inflation rates across Europe down to levels which prevailed in the standard- 
setting German economy.
A practical problem, if a government accepts the need to fix real and not 
nominal exchange rates, is that it is implicitly acknowledging that the nominal rate 
must at times change. While this may seem inconsequential, the implications are 
profound in terms of the reaction of foreign exchange markets, because for 
currency traders it is the nominal rate which is important. The threat of a sizeable 
adjustment to the nominal rate to maintain the real exchange rate is likely to 
cause a rapid, and quite possibly excessive, change in the nominal rate. 
Repeated small adjustments might be easier to implement, but their existence 
undermines one of the reasons for pursuing a fixed exchange rate regime, which 
is to add credibility to a government’s anti-inflation credentials.
Of course it is necessary to distinguish between trends in the exchange 
rate and volatility around the trend. While government attitudes to the former will 
depend on policy objectives, high volatility is seen to bring no benefits. The 
standard government response is that volatility causes uncertainty and therefore 
reduces trade, which is detrimental to the economy.30 Even in countries where 
foreign exchange dealing is an important part of the financial services sector, 
such as the UK, policy-makers tend to view volatility related to speculation with
30 This has been a recurrent theme of G7 statements. The G7 statement after the Hong 
Kong summit in September 1997 read "We agreed that exchange rates should reflect economic 
fundamentals and that excess volatility and significant deviations from fundamentals were 
undesirable". Reuters, 20 September 1997. Note also the April 1997 statement above.
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suspicion.31 In spite of the argument that speculation is an important part of price 
formation in financial assets, there tends to be an attitude that earnings from 
such activities are somehow ill-gotten gains.
Irrespective of the government’s attitude towards exchange rate volatility, 
it is questionable as to whether they can act effectively to reduce it directly. This 
is discussed in more detail below, together with the mechanisms that can be 
used in an attempt to influence currency rates.
The discussion of the attitude of the state towards the exchange rate is 
important in emphasising the complex issues involved. It is not simply a question 
of whether the state decides that it would be useful to have low volatility in its 
exchange rate, or to have it tied to another currency. There are definite costs 
involved, which are discussed in the section on the merits of a single currency, 
as well as the question of whether the exchange rate is ultimately within the 
power of the state.
4.4 MNCs and the Exchange Rate
As with states, there are three distinct issues facing multinational corporations 
(MNCs) with regard to exchange rates. The first is volatility, the second is the 
level of the currency and the third is the desirability of a single currency. 
Unpredicted movements in the exchange rate pose a risk to the revenue flow and 
the net asset value of a multinational corporation, but it is possible to insure 
against swings in the exchange rate by hedging in the currency futures market. 
Thus, for example, an American exporting firm can guarantee the amount of US 
dollars it will receive for a given amount of foreign currency at the end of its 
financial year by entering into a futures contract with a financial institution.
In theory, if forex volatility is simply rotation around an underlying stable 
level, then a risk-neutral MNC should view it positively as it increases the 
achievable level of profits. This is because producers can pay for imports when 
their home country currency is strong and repatriate export earnings when their 
currency is weak.32 In this case a strong degree of risk aversion is needed to
31 For example, then Chancellor of the Exchequer Ken Clarke said in an interview with the 
Sunday Times 3 April 1994, "Stability of exchange rates is preferable and attractive".
32 Bliss (1994) pp. 120-121.
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explain any anti-volatility stance of producers: they must be prepared to 
exchange a lower level of expected profit for a lower degree of variability in that 
profit. A more realistic explanation is that it is difficult to distinguish between 
short-term volatility and lasting changes in valuations at the time they occur.
However, there are doubts as to how much importance MNCs place on 
currency risk. As noted above, in a macroeconomic sense there is no evidence of 
currency volatility having a negative impact on trade, although if MNCs were 
currency risk averse, then a correlation would be expected. A 1995 survey of 
1700 British firms by the Confederation of British Industry found little evidence of 
the currency risk averse nature of firms. A single currency can be viewed as the 
ultimate means of eliminating foreign exchange risk, but only 50% of 
respondents viewed a single currency as being positive for UK business as a 
whole and a smaller 41% felt that it would be positive for their own business. 
Moreover, although 19% of respondents replied that the UK should be in the 
leading group of countries moving towards European Monetary Union (EMU), 
12% favoured immediate rejection of EMU and a further 8% felt that the UK 
should attempt to prevent EMU beginning in 1999.33 This study suggests there is 
little support for the assertion that firms have a negative view of foreign exchange 
risk. Presumably one reason for this is that for firms which do see foreign 
exchange rate volatility as potentially detrimental to their business, the availability 
of hedging instruments offers a remedy.
Of course another problem is in distinguishing between volatility and a 
trend move in an exchange rate. The difficulty in attempting to do so is that the 
judgement can only be made in hindsight. At the time it happens it is impossible 
to tell whether a move in the currency is simply a short-term fluctuation, or 
whether it is the beginning of a new trend of depreciation or appreciation.
For those MNCs which are foreign exchange rate risk averse, one 
explanation is that they do not face a symmetrical exposure to changes in the 
currency. In one year, being unhedged when the exchange rate is depreciating 
would mean larger than expected profits, but if the exchange rate moves the 
other way the following year the result could be losses which threaten the 
survival of the company, through bankruptcy or takeover. Apart from in this
33 Taken from the answers to questions 9 and 10 in CBI (1995).
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asymmetric situation, if foreign exchange markets are perfectly efficient then 
there will be no gain from hedging, as the unhedged company will see its 
currency losses and profits even out over time. The hedged company will be less 
efficient as hedging has a price. For a currency hedge, if transactions in one 
direction face a premium due to the interest rate differential (which is the same 
as the expected movement in the currency), then those in the other direction will 
face a discount. The two net out, leaving only the spread between the two (i.e. 
the fees charged by the financial intermediary) as the true cost of hedging.
However, most financial hedging instruments are relatively short term, 
rarely extending much over one year. Thus for anything other than short-term 
tactical hedging of currency risk, this is inadequate. Different strategies are 
needed to guard against longer-term currency movements in order to allow firms 
to concentrate on their main line of business, without undue concern that a 
fundamentally sound business strategy will be de-railed by a protracted period of 
exchange rate misalignment.
As noted above, it is not proven that, as a group, multinational 
corporations tend to be risk averse and favour low levels of exchange rate 
volatility. However, it seems reasonable to assume that firms with a high degree 
of exposure to foreign exchange risk will place more emphasis on reducing it 
than those firms where it is a more marginal concern, due to the noted 
asymmetry of risks. Unlike states, MNCs can have only a marginal impact on 
their environment, in that their actions will have little effect on currency markets in 
industrialised countries.34 The question for risk averse MNCs is therefore how 
best to optimise their strategy in the light of the potential dangers.
For longer-term control, a strategic currency risk management approach is 
needed. The underlying theme is that of matching the currency denomination of 
costs and revenues, or assets and liabilities. So, for example, input costs are 
denominated in the same currency as the market in which the product is sold. 
Alternatively, funding for a foreign investment project is procured in the capital 
markets of the country in which the investment is being made, or funds are 
raised in another market and then swapped into the required currency. The
34 There are some rare exceptions in the financial sector. In 1992 George Soros’ Quantum 
Fund and a handful of other US hedge fund managers were instrumental in pushing sterling out of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism, but it can be argued that this would not have happened unless 
the underlying conditions existed.
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currency matching does not necessarily have to be absolute if it defies business 
logic, but the greater the overlap, the lower the exchange rate risk. It is possible 
that only a proportion of matching can take place, and that at times it will be more 
efficient to use connected currencies (such as the Canadian dollar instead of the 
American dollar, the French franc in place of the Deutschmark), but the net effect 
is to lower exchange rate risk.
Even a system of matching the currency denomination of costs and 
revenues, or assets and liabilities, is an imperfect one. The end objective of the 
venture—profit—will still be denominated in foreign currency and so will still be 
vulnerable to short or long term swings in the exchange rate. Therefore a 
multinational corporation can never fully insulate itself from the vagaries of the 
foreign exchange market.
In the case of risk averse producers, exchange rate uncertainty will reduce 
the amount of investment in a country which is targeted at exports and increase 
that aimed at the domestic market. However, the situation changes if cross- 
border mobility of capital exists. In this case, uncertainty encourages foreign 
direct investment, as this provides a means for an MNC to diversify its production 
base and reduce its exposure to exchange rate movements. This FDI is likely to 
be trade creating, as the output will be shipped to the final market, with lower risk 
achieved by spreading production across several countries. There may even be 
a case for over-investment and duplication of facilities,35 which would allow 
production to shift from one site to another depending on currency movements.
The efficiency of diversified production facilities will depend on the nature 
of exchange rate movements. For example, if the exchange rate moves in a 
random fashion around a stable level, then diversified production sites are likely 
to be a less efficient means of providing inputs than if they are centred on one 
country, due to the loss of economies of scale. However, if an exchange rate 
movement represents a real change in economic conditions, then FDI provides 
genuine cost diversification, which can be seen as efficient.
If regionalism contains measures to reduce the volatility of regional 
currencies, so that the bilateral exchange rates within a region are more stable 
than rates with non-regional countries, this could have a marked impact on risk
35 Helpman and Krugman (1989).
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averse companies. The logical corporate structure that would arise from this type 
of uncertainty is to have independent, co-ordinated production networks within 
each region. Each would be insulated from foreign exchange rate fluctuations 
between the regions, and would benefit from relative stability within each region. 
The observable pattern which should emerge from such a development would be 
stronger trade flows within regions and stronger investment flows between 
regions. While there is some evidence that this is indeed a trend in the global 
economy (see Chapter 3 for details), the causal importance of relative currency 
volatility is difficult to isolate from the effects of other trade and investment 
liberalisation measures. Moreover, it has been noted that, as a group, there is no 
evidence of MNC aversion to exchange rate volatility, so these findings apply to 
only a limited subset of the whole.
With the above in mind, it seems reasonable to conclude that, as with 
governments, the favoured regime for a risk averse MNC is one which produces 
a stable exchange rate and where changes in economic fundamentals produce a 
smooth adjustment in rates. Although short-term volatility may not be a serious 
problem, sustained misalignments (such as the US dollar in the mid-1980s) can 
cause problems. A stable system would allow companies to focus on their area 
of competitive advantage, such as making cars or providing telecommunications 
services. However, for the bulk of MNCs, no evidence has been found of their 
risk aversion, which implies indifference as to the exchange rate system in 
operation.
Inevitably, some financial institutions have an interest in foreign exchange 
volatility, as this provides them with the chance to exploit their competitive 
advantage of trading foreign exchange. However, unlike the trading of equities, 
forex trading is a zero sum game, in that it is not possible for there to be a 
general rise in prices. By definition, a rise in the value of one currency must be 
accompanied by a fall in the value of others. Together with the existence of a 
sizeable group of companies specialised in currency trading, the conclusion must 
be that non-specialised companies (such as those making cars or providing 
telecommunications services) are more likely than not to be the losers if they 
become involved in speculative foreign exchange trading. The likes of Kashima 
Oil, which in early 1994 announced a US$1.5 billion loss from trading foreign
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exchange, are the unavoidable casualties of an activity when one company’s 
gain must be another’s loss.36
MNCs have a clearer attitude towards appreciation or depreciation of a 
currency than towards volatility, where the evidence fails to support the idea that 
MNCs as a group are risk averse and favour stable exchange rates. In terms of 
the effect of longer-run currency trends it is not enough simply to calculate 
whether the firm is a net exporter or importer. The price elasticities of the goods 
being bought and sold are also important, but most firms should be able to 
determine whether they would gain or lose from a weaker currency. In theory, the 
multinational corporation should be more concerned about real exchange rates 
than nominal ones, and these should be more stable. That is to say, inflation 
which raises the costs in a foreign country will also result in a depreciation of its 
nominal exchange rate, keeping the costs stable in terms of an MNC’s domestic 
currency. However, evidence suggests that relationships based on purchasing 
power parity levels are poor at explaining exchange rate trends in anything other 
than the long term.37
There is a tendency for firms in the traded goods sector to view a 
depreciation of their currency positively because it reduces domestic competition 
from imports or helps to raise the competitiveness of their exports. This 
microeconomic analysis might well be valid over the short term for an individual 
firm, but from the macroeconomic viewpoint it is less clear, because of the direct 
and indirect pressures on costs which result from a weaker currency. Exchange 
rate depreciation means higher imported input costs in local currency terms, and 
it also tends to raise the general price level in the domestic economy, increasing 
labour costs and domestic input costs.
The impact of exchange rate movements on trade and production will 
depend on the nature of the product. In the case of a homogeneous product, 
such as semiconductors, the producers are price-takers and they cannot raise 
prices to pass on the effect of a strengthening in the currency of the country 
where they produce. In this case, production will move across the world to 
regions where the costs are lowest. Where some product differentiation exists,
36 Nikkei Weekly, 28 March 1994.
37 See, for example, Aggarwal and Soenen (1989).
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such as for automobiles and electrical equipment, then some of the effects of a 
strong currency will be passed on to consumers in export markets. Depending on 
the proportion of the exchange rate shift which is passed on to foreign 
consumers, the exporter will lose market share in foreign markets and trade 
volumes will decline.
The means of supply to the foreign market will also be important in 
determining what proportion of an exchange rate movement is passed on to 
consumers. If responsibility for the exports ends when the goods are loaded on 
the ship, then the producer may be more prepared to accept a fall in volumes 
and more willing to raise the price in foreign markets. However, if the exports are 
related to a large investment in the foreign market—such as through the creation 
of a network of car dealerships—then the exporter will be less prepared to 
undermine the investment and the longer term relationship with customers by 
raising prices.
While these product and firm specific variables, such as elasticity of 
supply, might be important in explaining a firm's behaviour, it will also be affected 
by the state of the economic cycle in the main economies. As Table 4.1 shows, 
the pass through rate of the costs of yen appreciation by Japanese exporters in 
the January 1994 to April 1995 period was far greater than in the two previous 
phases of yen strength. This can largely be explained by the weakness of the 
domestic Japanese economy, which suffered sub-1 % GDP growth rates for the 
fiscal years 1992, 1993 and 1994. Without a healthy domestic profit base due to 
the protracted domestic recession, Japanese exporters were unable to cut yen 
prices and squeeze the margins on exports or even export at a loss in order to 
limit the dollar price increase and maintain market share, as they had in the past. 
At the same time, their main markets in the US and Asia were growing and were 
able to accept a higher prices. Note also that the pass through rate was strongest 
in the latter period of extreme yen appreciation up to May 1988, when the 
cumulative magnitude of the change meant that only about a third of the change 
could be met through domestic cost savings or margin reductions.
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Table 4.1. Pass Through Rate of Yen Appreciation
From To Change in 
Yen/US$
Absorbed
Domestically
Absorbed
Abroad
Feb 85 May 87 85.2% 55.2% 44.8%
Jul 87 May 88 20.4% 33.1% 66.9%
Apr 90 Nov 90 22.8% 61.8% 38.2%
Jun 91 Aug 93 34.8% 63.3% 36.7%
Jan 94 Apr 95 33.3% 50.1% 49.9%
Source: Author’s calculations from IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of 
Japan Monthly Economic Statistics.
Any MNC should be able to calculate on a microeconomic basis whether it 
would gain or lose from currency appreciation or depreciation. Although the 
response of similar firms may differ, in terms of whether they sacrifice market 
share to maintain margins, or vice versa, the calculations are relatively clear cut.
The third issue regarding the attitudes of MNCs towards the exchange 
rate relates to the extreme situation where both volatility and depreciation or 
appreciation are eliminated through the adoption of a single currency. The 
concerns of MNCs are not simply related to the dynamic aspect of changes in 
exchange rates. There are also static costs of transferring funds from one 
currency to another, which are only eliminated by a single currency and not by 
fixed exchange rates. In Europe some have gone so far as to argue that "one 
market needs one money".38
However, while foreign exchange costs may be large for tourists or small 
businesses, for the majority of transactions conducted by large traders the static 
cost of transferring funds between currencies is already marginal and is still 
falling. Large firms can transfer funds at a cost of about one or two tenths of one 
percent of the total, which does not compare with the potential losses from 
currency movements. Even a positive report on European Monetary Union put 
the benefits at only 0.3% to 0.4% of GDP (but only 0.1% to 0.2% for the larger 
countries), which compares poorly to the estimates by Cecchini of the benefits of 
a single European market, which were put at 2.5% to 6.5% of GDP.39 As Bliss
38 Quote from page 9 of the study by Emerson et al. (1992) of the Economic Research 
Division of the EC Commission titled One Market: One Money.
39 Emerson et al. (1992) p. 251.
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notes "the static costs of currency differentiation cannot be an important part of 
the case for the cruciality of a single currency".40
Thus we have seen that the attitude of multinational corporations to the 
exchange rate can be divided into three distinct areas. Firstly, we have seen that 
volatility is theoretically not a problem for an MNC, and there is no evidence of 
MNCs as a group favouring stable exchange rates, although a sub-set of firms is 
likely to favour stability. Secondly, it is possible to calculate the effects of longer 
term currency depreciation and appreciation, which will depend on the cost and 
revenue base of firms, as well as the nature of the product which they sell. 
Thirdly, the costs of exchanging funds from one currency to another are relatively 
unimportant compared to the larger risks associated with currency movements.
There are some parallels between the attitudes of MNCs to the exchange 
rate and to regional trade arrangements. Firms which favour a strong exchange 
rate as it lowers the cost of their imported inputs will derive much the same 
benefit from lower trade barriers. However, the attitude of the state is not 
necessarily the same as that of domestic firms. If the state is trying to squeeze 
inflation out of the system then it may favour a strong exchange rate (which 
lowers imported input prices and depresses economic activity). This would 
damage the competitiveness of exporting firms which would only have seen 
some of their input costs fall as a result of the currency appreciation.
4.5 Controlling the Exchange Rate
The above discussion indicates that states favour stable exchange rates, valued 
according to underlying economic fundamentals, although MNCs appear less 
concerned about volatility. In both cases attitudes towards monetary union are 
less clear. Leaving aside this latter method of permanently fixing the exchange 
rate by abandoning national currencies, there are three general means of 
reducing exchange rate volatility.
The first is that the state can intervene to try and influence price setting 
behaviour in foreign exchange markets. This can occur directly via foreign 
exchange intervention by the central bank, or indirectly by movements in interest
40 Bliss (1994) p. 116.
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rates aimed at affecting capital flows (and thereby moving the exchange rate). In 
recent years the record of these types of policies is mixed: post-Louvre Accord 
intervention in support of the US dollar after February 1987 did not prevent its 
continued slide against the Japanese yen and German mark. Similarly, interest 
rate hikes and forex intervention could not maintain sterling’s position within the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Central banks are perhaps more 
likely to be successful in defending their currencies when they are under 
pressure to appreciate. Unlike foreign exchange reserves, which can quickly be 
exhausted in buying the domestic currency to support its price, the supply of 
domestic currency which can be sold to counter a rise in its price on the foreign 
exchanges is, in theory, unlimited. The Bank of Japan successfully intervened to 
drive down the value of the yen against the US dollar in the second half of 1995 
by a combination of aggressively buying US dollars and cutting interest rates to 
record low levels for a major industrialised country.41 Moreover, once a 105-100 
yen per dollar rate had been established by early 1996 the Bank of Japan 
demonstrated its determination to prevent a renewed yen appreciation. In late 
February 1996 the yen threatened to break through the ¥103/$ level and again 
head into double digit territory. The Bank of Japan intervened massively, buying 
up to US$12 billion in just ten days and thereby convincing speculators of its 
determination to prevent further yen strength.42
The problems for governments are ones of magnitude. According to a 
survey by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), by April 1995 average 
daily turnover in foreign exchange markets had reached US$1,260 billion.43 This 
was a 46% increase from the 1992 survey, which in turn had recorded a rise in 
forex turnover of 38% between 1989 and 1992, preceded by a 116% jump 
between 1986 and 1989.44 Altogether this represents a more than trebling of 
forex trading in less than a decade. Partly due to a build up in the economies of
41 On 9 September 1995 the Bank of Japan cut the Official Discount Rate to just 0.5%. 
This was some two percentage points below the level which prevailed during the asset price 
"bubble" of the late 1980s.
42 Reuters, 1 May 1995.
43 Bank for International Settlements (1996) p. 3.
44 BIS (1996) Table 2-A. The sample base of the survey has altered over time, making the 
series of value figures inconsistent, but the percentage figures are calculated using constant sets 
of countries.
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East Asia, central banks’ reserves at the end of 1994 were two and a half times 
the level of end 1985, so over the nine year period the differential in growth rates 
was not significant.45 However, the scale is important; by end 1994 the reserves 
of all countries amounted to US$1,186 billion, or less than the average daily 
turnover in forex markets. Moreover the sizeable build up in total reserves masks 
the fact that growth in reserves in G7 countries has been less impressive, rising 
from US$161 billion at end 1985 to US$378 billion by end 1994. Some of the 
countries which have seen their reserves grow (Taiwan, China and India, for 
example) are likely to be less prepared to participate in joint foreign exchange 
market intervention than the G7 members which tend to lead co-ordinated 
attacks on (what they see as) exchange rate misalignments. The impression is 
one of government intervention becoming more "market-wise" but of having a 
decreased chance of changing market direction if it runs against economic 
fundamentals. It is also the case that if countries decide to float their currencies, 
with no intervention, then there is less need for large currency reserves.
The effectiveness of using higher interest rates as a weapon to support a 
weak currency is similarly in doubt. If currency speculators expect, say, a 5% 
depreciation in a currency within a week, then the interest rate needed to make 
such speculation unattractive will be more than 1000 percentage points higher 
than that which prevails in the appreciating country. For example in November 
1992 the Swedish krona came under downwards pressure as the markets began 
to doubt the durability of its exchange rate link to the ECU. Even an increase in 
the marginal interest rate to 500% was not enough to hold the krona within its 
target band.46
Just as the state has problems in controlling the underlying trend of its 
currency, it has limited success in reducing volatility by increasing the costs of 
foreign currency transactions. It is generally recognised that one of the reasons 
for the massive increase in forex trading in the past two decades has been 
technological advances which have reduced the spread between the buying and 
the selling price. For the major currencies such as the yen, the US dollar or the
45 Looking at a longer time period the change is more pronounced. A chart on page 98 of 
The Economist of 13 July 1996 shows the ratio of total official reserves to foreign exchange 
turnover falling from almost 15 times in 1977 to less than five times in 1980 and then continuing to 
slide to parity.
46 Eichengreen (1994).
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Deutschmark, the spread is now as low as five basis points (0.05%).47 Combined 
with a rise in the underlying level of cross-border business transactions, the 
institutionalisation of savings and the reduction of government controls on capital 
flows, this has made feasible forex trading in search of small shifts in the 
exchange rate.
A logical policy for a state seeking to reduce the level of forex volatility 
would be to act to raise the costs of trading. Some measures which have been 
suggested include introducing a transactions tax on foreign exchange trades—a 
"Tobin tax"—and variations thereof, such as penalising trades which are not 
related to real economic activity, or a tax on trades which are unwound within a 
certain time period—say, three months.48 Others advocate requiring banks with 
open foreign exchange positions to make non-interest bearing deposits at the 
central bank, using similar principles to those behind the BIS capital adequacy 
rules.49
Whether such measures can be practicably implemented is less clear. 
The use of offshore markets, derivatives and foreign subsidiaries are likely to 
make the imposition of regulations by a developed country very difficult to 
enforce. Indeed the reduced effectiveness and increased cost of applying capital 
controls were two of the main reasons for their abolition. Unless a clear 
consensus on the need to restrict foreign exchange trading exists across the 
major economies then regulatory arbitrage50 will ensure that the forex market 
relocates to the country where it can operate at the lowest cost.
In addition to short-term policy measures aimed at bringing stability to 
foreign exchange markets, more formal exchange rate agreements have also 
been used. As discussed below, regional trade agreements are seen to have no 
impact on volatility, but incorporating explicit co-operation on exchange rates can 
be effective. In Chapter 6 the view that regionalism offers the state a chance to
47 Bloomberg foreign exchange screen, July 1997.
48 See, for example, Felix (1995) on the potential for implementing a "Tobin tax".
49 See Akyuz (1995) pp. 88-89.
50 Regulatory arbitrage is where firms will MNCs will locate elements of their business in 
the locations where the costs imposed by the regulatory regime are the lowest. This is not quite 
the same as saying that firms will locate where regulations are the loosest, as there may be costs 
associated with overly lax regulation.
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regain lost authority over multinational corporations, or markets, will be put 
forward. In more practical terms, regional agreements on currency stability offer 
support in trying to control exchange rate volatility. Within the European 
Monetary System member states are obliged to assist other members if their 
currency trades at the edge of its range.
The effectiveness of this version of the states’ attempts to regain 
sovereignty appears more dubious than for trade related matters. Exchange rate 
intervention has been reasonably well co-ordinated since the Plaza Agreement of 
September 1985, but as noted above, the G7 countries have seen only mixed 
success when tackling unwelcome movements in foreign exchange markets. 
More specifically, the European Union acting as a bloc rather than as a more 
loosely co-ordinated group would be unlikely to tilt the balance significantly in 
favour of the state when it comes to forex intervention—it certainly proved unable 
to prevent speculators from breaking apart the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in 1992.
4.5.1 A Capital Markets Regime?
It is worth side-tracking for a moment to consider whether events in capital 
markets in recent years offer a new insight into the process of regime formation. 
The standard definition of a regime is that it is a set of "principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue-area".51 The regime is generally constructed by the most powerful 
actor (often labelled the "hegemon") or a set of powerful actors with mutual 
interests.
Recent developments in capital markets suggest that there is another 
possibility for regime construction. The past two decades have seen a 
succession of countries unilaterally liberalising transactions related to capital 
flows. The nature of the process may have differed, from a "big bang" approach 
in the UK on the election of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1979, to the more gradual 
Japanese liberalisation methods, but across a multitude of developed and 
developing countries, restrictions on capital flows have been steadily eased.
51 Krasner (1983) p. 354.
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There have been two forces behind this transformation of restrictions on 
the movement of capital across borders. The first has been the self-interest of 
states, convinced in part by the intellectual arguments in favour of liberal capital 
flows, which see them as contributing to the efficient allocation of resources.52 
The second has been that of the market, where developments have raised the 
opportunity costs of maintaining capital account restrictions. For example, in the 
years prior to the end 1994 crisis, Mexico enjoyed substantial inflows of 
investment capital in response to liberalisation of controls, while India faced a 
crisis in 1992 as tight controls on capital flows meant that funding its current 
account deficit was extremely problematic. Moreover, the market has imposed 
competitive pressures on countries, especially in Europe, with failure to 
deregulate being seen as threatening the loss of domestic financial activities to 
deregulated neighbours.53
Prior to the 1997 Asian currency crisis, a situation had arisen where more 
and more states were adopting a liberal approach to cross-border capital flows. 
Whether or not this meets the definition of a regime noted above is open to 
question. The "issue-area" is clear, as is the set of principles and rules which 
apply to capital flows, which would seem to imply that a regime exists. However, 
to an extent, the decision to pursue open capital accounts is one which is made 
unilaterally, rather than under the auspices of any regime. There are some 
parallels with trade liberalisation seen in the 19th century, when unilateral 
liberalisation was at times the preferred path because of the benefits that it 
brought to the liberalising nation.
An alternative interpretation is that the state is not acting entirely 
voluntarily, but is being pressed to liberalise by the foreign exchange market. The 
costs to the state of continuing to impose capital controls are rising, in terms of 
being able to lend or borrow at the most favourable interest rates,54 and this is 
occurring at the same time that innovations in financial markets are rendering
52 Although the Asian currency crisis which began in mid-1997 has led to some 
challenging this view, most notably the prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad.
53 Helleiner (1994) Chapter 7, sees such a competitive response as a major reason for 
Scandinavian deregulation in 1989-90.
54 Again, it is worth noting that the damaging effects of foreign exchange movements 
since 1997 have led some to question whether the efficiency gains from access to foreign capital 
outweigh the potential damage caused by uncontrolled exchange rate movements.
Chapter 4: Regional Integration and Foreign Exchange Rates 136
those restrictions less effective. If a hegemon exists in the case of capital flow 
liberalisation, then it is the foreign exchange market.
To some extent this is a version of Ruggie’s argument, as he sees liberal 
regimes as a means of reducing transaction costs in the international system.55 
Liberal capital movements result in lower transaction costs for cross-border 
capital flows. However, the mechanism by which liberalisation is occurring is 
novel. It is unclear whether there are other areas where a similar logic might 
apply (broadcasting, perhaps), but it certainly offers an alternative view of regime 
formation by identifying the market or the intellectual argument as playing the 
role of the hegemon.
4.6 Exchange Rate Volatility and Regional Integration
This section considers whether reduced regional exchange rate volatility 
improves the prospects for regional integration. McKinnon argued that optimal 
currency areas and fixed exchange rates were most appropriate to countries with 
high trade to GDP ratios and with high bilateral trade flows.56 At its ultimate level, 
exchange rate stability within an integrated region can be achieved by irrevocably 
fixed exchange rates or by monetary union, the practicalities of which are 
discussed below with reference to Europe.
In measuring the impact of overall exchange rate volatility in terms of 
uncertainty in the economy as a whole, it is preferable to use effective exchange 
rates (i.e. composite measures which are weighted by the bilateral rates with all 
trading partners) rather than bilateral ones. However, this analysis is more 
interested in the links between regional trends and exchange rate volatility, which 
makes a bilateral approach appropriate.
Table 4.2 raises the question of whether there is a correlation between a 
reduction in exchange rate volatility and closer economic integration. As has 
already been shown in Chapter 3, since the late 1980s the US and Canada have 
seen an increase in economic integration in the form of bilateral trade flows, as 
measured by the trade intensity index. In contrast, the trade intensity index
55 Ruggie (1982).
56 McKinnon (1963).
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between Japan and the US rose through to the mid-1980s as Japanese exports 
penetrated the US market, but then fell as the yen appreciated against the US 
dollar and Japanese trade became more oriented towards emerging Asian 
economies.
However, it is difficult to find a change in the degree of exchange rate 
volatility which could help to explain changes in trade intensities. In the case of 
Japan, the first three five-year periods shown in Table 4.2 saw rising exchange 
rate volatility (as measured by the monthly change in the bilateral exchange rate 
and the standard deviation of that change) accompanied by increased trade 
integration. When the volatility of the exchange rate began to fall in the 1990s, 
the degree of trade intensity also began to fall. Thus, contrary to what might be 
expected, this example suggests that higher degrees of foreign exchange rate 
volatility are associated with higher levels of trade integration.57
In the case of Canada, the last three periods shown in Table 4.2 have 
seen no discernible change in the degree of exchange rate volatility, while there 
was a rise in trade integration in the final period. The two cases do not suggest 
that a reduction in bilateral exchange rate volatility brings closer trade relations.
Table 4.2. Trade Intensities and Relative Volatility of Exchange Rate Movements 
of the US Dollar With the Japanese Yen and Canadian Dollar
Japan Canada
Average
Monthly
Exchange
Rate
Movement
Standard
Deviation
Average 
Trade 
Intensity 
Index 
Method 2
Average
Monthly
Exchange
Rate
Movement
Standard
Deviation
Average 
Trade 
Intensity 
Index 
Method 2
1975-79 2.03% 2.41% 1.48 1.01% 0.99% 4.73
1980-84 2.66% 2.18% 1.63 0.98% 0.91% 4.84
1985-89 2.96% 2.31% 1.95 0.94% 0.83% 4.62
1990-94 2.19% 1.79% 1.82 0.99% 0.83% 5.10
Note: Exchange rates are nominal, percentage changes are absolute— regardless of direction. See 
Chapter 3 for methodology of calculations for the trade intensity index.
Source: Author's calculations from IMF International Financial Statistics, Direction of Trade 
Statistics, various issues.
In Europe the situation is rather different in that there were institutional 
attempts to reduce exchange rate movements, as opposed to ad hoc
57 It is worth noting that, unlike with Canadian-US trade, there was a large imbalance in 
Japan-US trade flows, movements of which could account for part of the volatility.
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agreements such as the 1987 Louvre Accord aimed at stabilising the value of the 
US dollar. Notably, since March 1979 France and Germany have been linked 
within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System 
(EMS), although prior to that the "snake" and "snake in the tunnel" were forms of 
managed float following the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
system.58
In the ERM initially only a 2.25% shift away from the central parity was 
permitted (other countries joined with a wider 6% band). The only case in which 
the monthly fluctuation of a currency could exceed 4.5% (i.e. moving from one 
extreme of the band to the other) was when there was a realignment of the 
system. Between 1979 and January 1987 there were eleven such realignments, 
although on only six of those occasions did the French franc / Deutschmark 
cross-rate alter. After January 1987 there were no further shifts until the general 
European exchange rate crisis of September 1992. Another exchange rate crisis 
in July 1993 led to the permitted bands for all but the Deutschmark and Dutch 
guilder widening to 15% in either direction, leaving only the pretence of 
institutional stabilisation of the exchange rate.
The institutional factors behind the movement of sterling are less 
pronounced. In spite of a period of "shadowing" the ERM, Britain did not formally 
enter the system until October 1990 and then at the wider band of 6%. This 
situation continued until September 1992 when extreme pressure in foreign 
exchange markets resulted in sterling crashing out of the ERM.
In terms of economic integration, France, Germany and the UK were 
members of the European Community through the whole period covered in Table 
4.3. However, France and Germany had been founding members and as 
indicated in Chapter 3, the increase in bilateral trade bias occurred before the 
period under consideration. However, the UK was a later entrant, joining in 1973, 
and this is one explanation of the initial rise in the trade intensity index with 
Germany.59
58 Ludlow (1982).
59 Ending the system of imperial preference while integrating with the European 
Community led to a marked change in UK trade patterns in the early 1970s. That is, one form of 
preferential bias was substituted by another. There was also a shift from EFTA to the EC, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.
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There are several noteworthy features in Table 4.3. Firstly, although 
France saw a definite decline in the volatility of the franc-Deutschmark exchange 
rate (both the average monthly percentage change and the standard deviation of 
that change more than halved between the first and last periods), there was no 
change in its trade intensity index with Germany over the twenty year period. 
Secondly, although there was only a slight reduction in exchange rate volatility 
between the UK and Germany, there was a sharp rise in the degree of trade 
integration between the 1975-79 period and that of 1980-84. In contrast, note 
that in the 1990-94 period volatility in the exchange rate declined but the trade 
intensity index was similar to that of the previous decade. As in the US-Canada 
case, exchange rate movements between sterling and the Deutschmark in the 
1970s appear to have had no discernible effect on trade relations.
Table 4.3. Trade Intensities and Relative Volatility of Exchange Rate Movements 
of the Deutschmark With the French Franc and British Pound
France UK
Average
Monthly
Exchange
Rate
Movement
Standard
Deviation
Average 
Trade 
Intensity 
Index 
Method 2
Average
Monthly
Exchange
Rate
Movement
Standard
Deviation
Average 
Trade 
Intensity 
Index 
Method 2
1975-79 1.28% 1.24% 1.56 2.16% 1.91% 0.80
1980-84 0.74% 1.18% 1.60 2.21% 2.10% 1.21
1985-89 0.55% 0.69% 1.59 2.05% 1.59% 1.32
1990-94 0.50% 0.42% 1.62 1.55% 1.50% 1.27
Note: Exchange rates are nominal, percentage changes are absolute— regardless of direction. See 
Chapter 3 for methodology of calculations for the trade intensity index.
Source: Author's calculations from IMF International Financial Statistics, Direction of Trade 
Statistics, various issues.
The overall conclusion is that without institutional agreements aimed at 
currency stability, regionalism has little impact on currency volatility. The Canada- 
US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) inaugurated in 1988 included no foreign 
exchange rate co-operation and has seen no measurable change in the volatility 
of exchange rates, while fluctuations in Europe subsided with the emergence of 
the ERM. However, as noted in Chapter 3, trade bias has risen in both regions 
since the late 1980s.
A further observation is that foreign exchange rate volatility is more 
strongly influenced by formal agreements aimed at exchange rate stability than
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by ad hoc intervention by governments. However, there are limits to the influence 
of regional agreements which include exchange rate co-operation. Membership 
of the ERM did not enable sterling and the lira to maintain their exchange rate 
levels against other European currencies in 1992. An institutional agreement will 
only be effective when currencies are not fundamentally mis-aligned.
The above findings cast further doubt on the policy objective of foreign 
exchange rate stability among developed economies because of the link that is 
assumed to exist with trade flows. The data in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show no clear 
link between the two variables. This supports the earlier finding that foreign 
exchange volatility had no measurable impact on trade flows. In the final 
analysis, the conclusion is that policy-makers’ attempts to stabilise exchange 
rates are puzzling, in that even when some success is achieved there are no 
readily identifiable benefits to trade flows. On that basis, institutional 
arrangements to stabilise exchange rates could be misguided if the objective is to 
contribute to higher levels of economic integration.
4.7 Regionalisation and Capital Flows
Apart from the discussion over exchange rate stability and regionalisation, there 
is also the question of how regionalism and regionalisation affect capital 
movements between countries. Do closer political or economic ties mean that the 
movement of financial flows between countries becomes less (or more) volatile? 
The answer derives largely from the exchange rate system which operates 
between the regionalising countries, as well as the nature of the restrictions on 
capital flows.
As was discussed in Chapter 3, data on capital flows are extremely 
unreliable. The nature of capital flows is such that it is very difficult to identify 
accurately the origin and destination of fund movements. A German bank can 
borrow funds in Japan, switch them into dollars in order to buy the stock of a 
Mexican company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This type of flow 
makes a statistical examination highly complex. However, looking at exchange 
rates is essentially the same as examining capital flows. Exchange rate 
movements are effectively the footprints in the trail left by capital moving from
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one country to another. Thus the comments made above about exchange rates 
apply equally to capital flows.
4.8 Single Market, Single Currency
Unlike the theory surrounding customs unions, that concerning monetary union is 
far less clear. There are a range of economic and political costs and benefits that 
must be considered in assessing the merits of any particular situation. Few 
examples of monetary union exist in modern economic history—the cases of the 
United States in the early 19th century, Germany between 1837 and 1871 and 
Italy up to 1862 are the main examples within single countries.
Examples of currency union between groups of sovereign states are even 
less common. The Latin Monetary Union formed in 1866 and the Scandinavian 
Monetary Union formed in 1875 are the main regional examples.60 The former 
was modest in its objectives and relatively short lived,61 but the latter eliminated 
differentiations between national currencies until close to the First World War. 
Both were based around a metallic standard, silver in the former case, gold for 
the Scandinavian union, and it has been argued that there was no monetary co­
operation as a result of the union compared to the situation if each country had 
unilaterally adopted a gold standard.62 In the 1990s the debate is focused on 
Europe, where some argue that the single market cannot function efficiently 
unless a single currency is also in operation.63
As has been discussed above, there is no evidence that exchange rate 
volatility leads to an inefficiently low level of foreign trade. Therefore, eliminating 
volatility is a poor motivation for introducing a single currency. A clearly positive 
argument in favour of a single currency is that it reduces the transaction costs of 
trading between members of a regional group. However, an EC study showed 
that the static costs of maintaining national currencies in Europe was between
60 The Latin Monetary Union comprised France, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, while the 
Scandinavian Monetary union was between Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
61 The objective was to harmonise the size of the five franc pieces issued in each country, 
but the issue of standard silver pieces ended in 1878.
62 Jonung (1984).
63 Emerson etal. (1992).
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1% of GDP (for smaller countries) and 0.1% of GDP (for larger ones).64 Thus the 
direct benefits in terms of lower transaction costs of monetary union appear very 
limited. Krugman is more sceptical of the size of microeconomic benefits from a 
single currency and claims that any estimates are very loose, asserting "I don’t 
think we even have an idea of the order of magnitude".65
In his seminal paper on optimum currency areas, Mundell showed that, in 
a fixed exchange rate regime, the policy of surplus countries suppressing price 
rises "imparts a recessive tendency to the world economy on fixed exchange 
rates or to a currency area with many separate currencies".66 Although written in 
1961, this accurately foresaw Germany’s role in Europe in the 1980s. Mundell 
also showed that with a common currency (as opposed to fixed exchange rates) 
the result is an inflationary bias, which helps to explain the insistence of 
Bundesbank officials that all participants in monetary union meet the Maastricht 
criteria.67
Another key point in Mundell’s paper is that the relative merits of a single 
currency versus flexible exchange rates depend largely on the degree of factor 
mobility. If factors of production can move between countries then this facilitates 
economic adjustment. If not, then movements in the exchange rate are needed 
to achieve the same adjustment. While Europe in the 1990s includes liberalised 
labour and capital markets, in practice the mobility of labour is limited, although 
capital moves more freely. This is not necessarily a problem if systemic shocks 
apply equally to all members of the union, but with asymmetrical shocks, 
individual nations need a means of adjusting.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen have shown that regions of the US adjust more 
quickly to both supply and demand shocks than do countries in Europe.68 They 
find that supply shocks in Europe are larger in magnitude and less correlated 
than in the US, which suggests problems in forming a monetary union.
64 Emerson et al. (1992) Annex A.
65 Krugman (1995) p. 527.
66 Mundell (1961) p. 658.
67 This has been a repeated theme of Bundesbank President Tietmeyer and other 
officials. See Financial Times, 10 May 1997.
68 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).
Chapter 4: Regional Integration and Foreign Exchange Rates 143
Nevertheless there is evidence of a core group of countries in Europe which 
experience more closely correlated shocks, which is an economic argument in 
favour of a two speed approach to monetary union. Based on Mundell’s analysis 
it is possible to conclude that the costs of monetary union will be relatively large 
for the peripheral or less open European countries, due to the large asymmetric 
shocks and relatively slow speed of adjustment. De Grauwe’s summary is that 
"There is now a broad consensus among economists .... that the EC-12 is not an 
optimum currency area".69 Similarly, Goodhart has argued that "it is doubtful that 
the EC is an OCA [optimum currency area] at all".70
The economic costs of monetary union come from the loss of ability to 
pursue an independent monetary policy. Across the main industrialised countries 
in the 1990s there is still clear evidence of policy-makers cutting interest rates or 
taxes and boosting spending in response to a slowdown in economic growth. The 
state apparently still believes that counter-cyclical policy-making is feasible. The 
idea that the state does not believe its actions will work, but is just acting to allay 
public pressure that "something must be done" is a little too neat, and ignores the 
independence of some policy-making institutions.
Moreover, Kenen has made the point that fiscal and monetary policies are 
complementary and countries need to achieve an optimal policy mix if demand 
management efforts are to be successful.71 Without a degree of centralisation of 
fiscal policy any transition to a monetary union will be painful, due to the lack of 
stabilising fiscal flows. Maastricht convergence criteria which set limits on budget 
deficits and public debt to GDP ratios are likely to be a poor substitute for a more 
federal system which has the ability to provide compensating transfers.72
If the problems which require policy action apply to the whole region 
considering monetary union then there will be no practical difference between a 
single currency with a single monetary policy and individual national currencies 
and policies. Similarly, if factors of production are fully mobile then national 
monetary policies are not needed. However, it seems clear that there are still
69 De Grauwe (1994) p. 87. Italics in original.
70 Goodhart (1995) p. 453.
71 Kenen (1969).
72 Goodhart (1995).
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shocks which apply to individual countries (German re-unification being the most 
extreme in recent years) while European factors of production are not fully 
mobile. This suggests that there will be real costs from the loss of independent 
national monetary policies.
An additional problem for the state is that the number of policy tools at its 
disposal appears to be shrinking. The use of border-level restrictions on trade is 
largely proscribed by the World Trade Organization, which is increasingly 
extending into non-tariff areas as well as explicit tariff barriers. Across the 
industrialised world the automatic stabiliser of the welfare state is coming under 
pressure as governments try to cut taxes to increase economic dynamism. 
Meanwhile, for a member state of the European Union, the use of state subsidies 
is closely monitored, while regional grants are increasingly within the aegis of the 
EU rather than individual governments. Transfer pricing and mobility of factors of 
production is raising pressure to harmonise tax rates, another potential policy 
instrument.73 A move towards monetary union in Europe would remove 
independent monetary policy-making, while the Maastricht criteria on budget 
deficits and national debt remove much flexibility on fiscal policy.
Tinbergen’s rule states that as many policy instruments are needed as 
there are targeted policy variables. On this basis, the policy-makers face a 
problem: even if monetary union removes exchange rate targeting, the number of 
policy instruments is shrinking faster than the number of policy variables. While 
some degree of economic convergence can be expected as a result of the 
European single market and monetary union, the economies of the member 
states are unlikely to move in tandem. The consequences of such an imbalance 
will be an inability to respond to the economic cycles in countries which are out- 
of-step with the main body of countries. In turn this could discredit the national 
government which will be largely powerless to act, while also discrediting the 
central institutions which will lack the flexibility to act.
There is a danger that in pooling their resources in an attempt to regain 
authority over market forces, the separate states are forsaking their freedom of 
independent policy-making. This appears to open the way for a sharp reaction 
against the years of gradual integration, perhaps triggered by a localised
73 Tanzi (1995).
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recession. That would be the case whether or not fine-tuning of the economy 
actually works. In the past, governments were seen to react to economic 
difficulties by cutting interest rates or raising spending. Effective or not, the 
pressure of public opinion for remedial action by the government is well 
documented in the media. If the government cannot act then it is in danger of 
losing its legitimacy.
To look at the inverse of this argument, consider the explanations put 
forward as to why the recession in the early 1970s was not met by the same 
pressure for protectionist tariffs that took place after the Wall Street Crash of 
1929. Milner presents an explanation which focuses on institutional changes and 
pressure stemming from the internationalisation of business.74 However, another 
credible explanation is that the policy instruments available to the state had 
multiplied over half a century, so that more efficient measures were available. For 
example, rather than raising tariffs to protect a threatened industry—as was the 
case in the 1930s—in the 1970s policy-makers were able to address pressures 
for relief from suffering industries by a wider range of policies. In addition to 
measures such as voluntary export restraints, states could also resort to regional 
grants, subsidies or the targeting of fiscal spending measures, while the welfare 
state acted as an automatic stabiliser.75 That there was a more efficient means of 
arriving at the desired result may be one of the strongest explanations of why 
extreme protectionism was resisted in the 1970s.76
It is possible to envisage a situation where the constraints on monetary 
and fiscal action coming from European institutions are stronger and more 
enforceable than restrictions on trade, despite the strengthening of the World 
Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism in the Uruguay Round. Thus 
European countries may find themselves in the position where the only effective 
policy remedy available is related to some form of trade barrier: surrendering 
control of some policy measures means greater reliance on those that remain.
74 Milner (1988).
75 In other words, although the "hierarchy of policies" (to use Corden’s term) may have 
remained the same, there were instruments available which had previously been excluded from 
the set of options.
76 That is not to deny that non-tariff barriers rose in the 1970s, but the point is that the rise 
in protection was far less pronounced than in the 1930s.
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I concur with Bliss who concludes that "the view that says that exchange 
rate stabilisation, or a common currency, is essential to a customs union has not 
found much support from our analysis".77 From the above, it is far from clear that 
the economic benefits outweigh the costs of monetary union in Europe. 
Nevertheless, there is apparently a strong commitment among several members 
of the EU to form a currency union. The conclusion must be that the motivations 
for such a step are primarily political rather than economic.
Feldstein identifies three political arguments which are used by advocates 
of a single currency. Firstly, the establishment of a European central bank is a 
means of preventing national governments from pursuing inflationary monetary 
policies. However, as Feldstein points out, this "implies a possibly very large 
sacrifice of potentially good monetary policy in order to reduce the risk of bad 
policy being chosen".78 Secondly, Feldstein sees the desire of most of Europe to 
take power away from the Bundesbank as being behind the move to monetary 
union. At present Germany effectively sets monetary policy for the rest of Europe 
and it has a stronger anti-inflationary bias than many of the other members (i.e. it 
displays the "recessive tendency" towards European activity identified by Mundell 
as a likely result of fixed exchange rates).
These two arguments are clearly contradictory, the former claiming that a 
central bank would be anti-inflationary, the latter that it would prevent an 
excessively anti-inflationary policy. This leads Feldstein to the conclusion that the 
dominant motivation of advocates of monetary union is that it is a step on the 
road to political union, with one money helping to unify essentially different 
nationalities. It would imply a substantial transfer of power away from national 
government towards a European central government.
Regionalism (the political process) may benefit from the introduction of a 
single currency as it would strengthen central institutions and eliminate one 
symbol of nations’ individuality. However, there is little to suggest that 
regionalisation (the process of economic integration) would be significantly 
enhanced by all countries within a regional bloc adopting the same currency.
77 Bliss (1994) p. 129.
78 Feldstein (1991) p. 82.
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4.9 Conclusion
This chapter has failed to find a link between regional integration and exchange 
rate volatility. There is little to suggest that lower volatility means closer trading 
relationships. In spite of the lack of empirical evidence that currency volatility is 
detrimental to trade and investment, it is viewed negatively by governments, as 
demonstrated by intervention in foreign exchange markets and the continued 
popularity of managed exchange rates. However, options for reducing volatility 
appear limited, with foreign exchange intervention having a chequered record. 
Only when there is an explicit agreement targeted at foreign exchange rate 
stability does a regional agreement appear to have a measurable impact on forex 
volatility.
The ultimate step towards eliminating currency fluctuations is to form a 
currency union. However, the requirements for this to be an efficient economic 
move are stringent and satisfied by few countries. Nevertheless, in Europe the 
political motivations may override any concerns that an economic cost-benefit 
analysis does not give a persuasive case for monetary union. Moreover, the 
motivations for harmonising exchange rates through a pegged system, or of 
moving to a single currency, appear to be relatively limited. When compared with 
the potentially large costs involved in terms of loss of policy independence the 
economic cost-benefit analysis is far from compelling.
Given the continued enthusiasm for EMU among the policy-makers of the 
European Union, the conclusion must be that attempts to promote currency 
stability within Europe are politically motivated, not driven by potential economic 
gains which have been shown to be indeterminate. The political merits of a 
centralised currency system are a further move of power towards pan-European 
institutions and the knowledge that stronger federal fiscal authority is a natural 
corollary if the system is to be effective.
There is no reason to suppose that the arguments which persuade 
countries that it is in their interests to form a free trade area also apply to forming 
a currency union. Taken to the extreme, the optimum free trade area is the entire 
world, while few would argue for a single global currency. The surprising 
conclusion is that although exchange rate movements receive great prominence 
in the media and in the minds of policy-makers, they are less important for world
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trade flows. Trends towards regionalism and regionalisation can be expected to 
remain largely unaffected by the nature of the exchange rate regime under which 
they operate.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CAUSES OF REGIONALISATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
5.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to explain some of the regional trends identified in Chapter 3 
by looking at how and why the structure of world trade and investment has been 
changing. Some key features emerged from the statistical examination of trends 
towards regionalisation. Notably, there has been a marked increase in regional 
trade bias within Europe and North America since the late 1980s. Moreover, this 
increase in trade bias has been accompanied by a greater degree of economic 
openness, suggesting developments have not been detrimental to the rest of the 
world.
I will argue that there are three forces driving the degree of regional bias 
upwards, one offsetting force which is slowing its rise, and one force where the 
effects are indeterminate. Firstly, we can say that, ceteris paribus, preferential 
regional agreements inevitably increase the bias towards trade with regional 
partners.1 This increase in bias can be explained in simple macroeconomic 
terms—preferential regionalism reduces the relative costs of doing business with 
countries within the region compared to those outside the region. The 
consequence of such a change in relative prices is that intra-regional trade will 
increase compared to extra-regional trade. This is the trade creation component 
identified by Viner. Unfortunately, the amount of increase cannot be calculated 
without reasonably detailed knowledge of the elasticities involved and a 
qualitative measure of the value of the preferential agreement, both of which are 
likely to be imprecise. In recent years non-border issues have come to assume a 
greater significance and so it is necessary to consider whether "deeper" 
preferential agreements incorporate different implications for regionalisation than 
more standard free trade areas and customs unions. One particular issue is 
whether the focus on deeper integration which is incorporated in the European
1 As discussed in Chapter 3 this bias tends to exist to some degree due to elements such 
as geographic proximity, transport costs and cultural similarities, but it is the change in the degree 
of bias which is of greater interest.
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Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement contributed to the rise in 
measures of regionalisation noted since the late 1980s.
One caveat is that many regional developments in recent years have been 
of the "deeper" variety and only a subset of those are applicable on a regional 
basis. As the UN has noted, "The elimination of certain non-tariff barriers in a 
region has characteristics equivalent to the provision of a public good".2 Several 
developments have been inherently non-preferential, improving market access 
for non-members of a regional grouping as well as for its members. As a result 
the nature of regional liberalisation needs considering before a judgement can be 
made on whether it is likely to promote regional integration rather than more 
generally increasing the openness of an economy.
The second force becomes evident by viewing regionalisation from a 
microeconomic rather than macroeconomic perspective. It is argued that 
established multinational corporations are increasingly organising production on 
a regional basis, rather than focusing on single countries, and not extending their 
production networks to the global level. More widespread adoption of kanban 
(just-in-time) production techniques means that although producing on a global 
basis may be technologically feasible, it conflicts with optimal organisational 
structures. Regional production structures mean that components and final 
products are traded within the region, with mostly raw materials and intangibles 
exchanged between regions. However, regional organisational structures do not 
prevent firms from serving global markets. For many production processes, an 
efficient scale of operation can be achieved on a regional basis. It is in 
"knowledge" related areas such as research and development, design, finance 
and advertising where the trade regime is relatively unimportant as long as the 
fixed costs can be spread over a broad geographic base.
The third force behind rising measures of regionalisation is more of a 
statistical observation, but is nevertheless important when calculating the degree 
of intra-regional trade bias. Intra-regional trade in Europe and North America is 
relatively biased towards intra-industry manufactured goods, while inter-regional 
trade has a relatively high proportion of raw materials. As a result, a secular 
downtrend in commodity prices vis-a-vis prices of manufactures, combined with
2 United Nations (1993) p. 8.
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an elasticity of demand of less than one for commodities, means that the share 
of commodity trade in world trade is falling. This has the effect of raising the 
share of European and North American intra-regional trade compared to inter­
regional trade, raising measures of the degree of intra-regional bias.
With these three forces driving regionalisation forwards, there is likely to 
be an offsetting dynamic at work, because until recent years the rise in 
regionalisation in Europe and North America was subdued, while it has been 
stable in Asia. I will argue that this counteracting force is one of globalisation, as 
more and more domestically oriented firms realise that changes in physical and 
legal barriers to international trade have been falling, allowing them to become 
exporters or small scale MNCs. Lower barriers include factors such as the 
information technology revolution, falling transport costs, reduced uncertainty, 
looser and more transparent foreign investment regulations and lower tariffs.
One complication to be aware of is that there can be a difference between 
an increase in the actual degree of regionalisation (in underlying economic 
terms) and an increase in the selected measures of regionalisation (in statistical 
terms). For example, the convergence of economic cycles could be taken as an 
indication of regionalisation, but this is not likely to be picked up in measures of 
trade or FDI intensities. Conversely, trade-replacing FDI within a region will lower 
the trade intensity measure, but this does not necessarily imply a reduced degree 
of integration.
While this chapter attempts to explain the causes of regionalisation trends 
noted in Chapter 3, it should first be recognised that any such examination is 
hindered by a lack of detailed information about the flow of investment and 
intangibles across borders. Most notably there is a problem in the treatment of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as it can be either a complement to existing trade 
flows or a substitute. It could be that FDI flows from one region to another 
replace existing trade flows, while within a region they are aimed at building 
regional production networks and so are complementary. On that basis, inter­
regional flows would be expected to be aimed at entire processes (i.e. complete 
transplants), while intra-regional flows would be just parts of processes.
Observing that regionalisation has increased or decreased in recent years 
is important in contributing to understanding how the international political 
economy operates, but the implications of regionalisation must also be
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considered. In particular, how regionalisation affects economic welfare is a key 
concern which will be considered in the final part of this chapter. Much of the 
standard international political analysis is of little assistance in this respect, as it 
is embedded in the "more trade good, less trade bad" framework.
The objective of this chapter is to attempt to identify forces which might 
have contributed towards some of the trends noted in Chapters 3 and 4. 
However, noting what is relevant is much more straightforward than measuring 
the significance of the factors, especially in the face of inadequate information in 
some areas and the indeterminate role played by foreign direct investment. The 
overall complexity is intensified by different interpretations of when a trend 
represents regionalisation and when it is more correctly labelled globalisation.
5.2 Impact of Regionalism on Regionalisation
The theoretical literature gives us a reasonable insight into the likely reactions of 
economic actors towards greater regionalism on a macroeconomic basis. The 
rawest description is that regionalism represents a move between a set of 
countries to lower the costs of doing business with each other. This may come in 
several guises, with lower intra-regional tariffs being the most common and most 
easily identifiable. Other non-tariff features of regionalism, such as mutual 
recognition of standards, elimination of quantitative barriers, liberalisation of 
movements of factors of production and greater transparency all have a similar 
impact on a macroeconomic basis; they lower costs of cross-border transactions.
Moreover, from a macroeconomic perspective it is not necessary to 
examine statistical or survey evidence to support the idea that lower barriers to 
cross-border activity result in a higher level of activity. It is necessarily the case 
that a relatively low cost producer in one country may be prevented from 
exploiting its competitive advantage due to costs which arise as a result of doing 
business in foreign markets. These could stem from transport costs, language 
differences, regulatory compliance, tariffs or any other additional cost which is 
incurred in delivering the product to the foreign market. The incremental cost of 
selling in foreign markets falls as border tariffs decrease, or as other non-border 
differences are reduced by regional trade agreements. That is not to say that 
every firm, or even every industry, will suddenly find trading more extensively
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within the region an attractive proposition. However, it is the case that at the 
margin there will be firms which now find it profitable to expand into other 
regional markets, because the cost of doing so has fallen.
How this regionalisation shows up in the data is a greater problem than 
asserting its existence. If regional co-operation is in the form of lower restrictions 
at the border then the degree of regional trade bias can be expected to rise. If, 
however, it comes in the shape of easier establishment of business operations 
on a regional basis—perhaps through the elimination of negative trade related 
investment measures—then regionalisation could occur through more intensive 
intra-regional flows of capital. This could even be at the expense of the measure 
of the regional trade bias, if the foreign direct investment is of the trade 
substituting variety.
Graphs in Chapter 3 provided an illustration of trends towards regional 
bias in recent decades. The most striking features were that until the late 1980s, 
regional bias had apparently borne little relation to efforts to promote border level 
preferential bias, while since then moves towards "deeper" levels of co-operation 
have been accompanied by a rise in the degree of regional trade bias in the EU 
and North America. However, in the case of Europe, most of the rise in regional 
bias has been through the impact of new members seeing an increase in their 
degree of trade bias with the other members. This suggests the need to examine 
the particular features of deeper integration in order to judge whether it could be 
responsible for the rise in regional bias seen in recent years.
5.2.1 Impact of "Deep" Regionalism
Deep regionalism relates to co-ordination which extends beyond border level 
issues. This could include measures such as harmonisation of national 
standards, unbiased government procurement, uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights, impartial anti-trust legislation and national treatment for foreign 
investment.3
3 Oman (1994), Lawrence (1996).
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Increasingly, these deeper issues were included in multilateral GATT 
Rounds, with the Tokyo Round containing measures on anti-dumping,4 and the 
Uruguay Round covering trade related investment measures (TRIMs) and 
intellectual property rights.5 However, the range and depth of coverage of non­
border issues is, to some extent, at the discretion of the countries concerned. 
Attitudes towards (and definitions of) anti-trust policies, environmental protection 
and public-sector subsidies are likely to differ considerably between countries 
with different cultural and sociological histories. It is likely that smaller groups of 
countries with similar economic, political and social circumstances will find it 
easier to agree on such issues than larger, more diverse groups.6
Issues of deeper integration are seen as being closely linked to the rise in 
regionalism in the EU and North America since the late 1980s, where one 
objective has been to promote FDI by multinational corporations.7 However, 
some of the areas of co-ordination benefit non-regional firms as much as those 
within the region. Elements such as transparency or the banning of subsidies are 
difficult, if not impossible, to apply on a preferential basis. Only a subset of 
measures to promote deeper regional co-operation will raise the degree of 
regionalisation. Others will result in a non-preferential increase in openness. This 
can be shown by looking at some examples of deeper regionalism. 
Unfortunately, most international political economy studies of the issue tend to be 
satisfied with broad assertions that, for example, NAFTA provides for stronger 
provisions on TRIMs than the Uruguay Round, without considering the nature or 
importance of the differences.8 In contrast, legal studies of the differences 
between multilateral and regional treaties are strong on facts, but give little 
consideration to the impact of the differences and tend to be written in a form 
which is inaccessible to the layman.9 The following analysis of deeper integration
4 Baldwin (1993).
5 Evans and Walsh (1994), Lawrence (1996).
6 Kahler (1995).
7 For discussion of the importance of deeper integration see, for example, Lawrence
(1996).
8 This is the approach taken by Hufbauer and Schott (1994).
9 Two exceptions are those of Evans and Walsh (1994) and Parra (1995) who give a 
detailed and understandable presentation of some of the main issues.
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aims to offer greater detail than is available in most political economy studies, in 
order to explore which aspects of deeper integration are likely to promote 
regionalisation.
Subsidies. If a national government offers subsidies to favoured domestic firms 
or industrial sectors then this places them at a competitive advantage to firms 
from within the region as well as those from the rest of the world. Under the 
Uruguay Round subsidies are divided into "green" and "red" boxes, the former 
(such as those related to pre-competitive research) being allowed, the latter 
(such as tax concessions based on export performance) prohibited.10 "Red" 
subsidies tend to be related to export promotion and the preferential use of 
domestic inputs over foreign ones, in violation of national treatment principles. 
Countervailing duties are permitted in response to "red" subsidies in a similar 
way that anti-dumping measures are implemented. However the exemptions are 
largely determined by political considerations, and the use of countervailing 
duties can by abused.
Among regional groupings the European Union has the firmest stance 
against national subsidies, with several high profile cases being drawn to the 
attention of the Commission. These include the UK government’s "sweeteners" 
to encourage British Aerospace to buy the Rover car maker, and French support 
for the state-owned airline Air France and for the bank Credit Lyonnais. However, 
outlawing such subsidies does not imply creating a preferential regional bias. 
British Airways and Lufthansa might suffer from French airline subsidies, but 
such measures are essentially non-discriminatory in that they affect extra- 
regional firms as much as regional ones. Whatever regional discrimination that 
does exist is in the use of countervailing duties, which are not allowed between 
EU members; of course if subsidies are banned entirely then there is no need for 
countervailing duties to offset them. Other regions such as North America have 
not integrated so deeply that the issue of public subsidies is addressed, but nor 
is such a form of industrial policy as prevalent as in Europe.
10 Evans and Walsh (1994) Chapter 8.
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Government Procurement. If the state favours domestic firms in its purchasing 
patterns with the intention of helping them to achieve an efficient scale of 
production then this is a discriminatory policy which goes against principles of 
national treatment. One controversial example in recent years has been the 
Japanese government’s procurement policies for satellites and supercomputers 
which effectively excluded foreign firms until the US forced a lower degree of 
domestic bias through the Structural Impediments Initiative.11
In the original GATT treaty public procurement was explicitly excluded 
from Article III provisions on national treatment. The Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds 
contained some provisions on public procurement attempting to bring it within 
general GATT principles, as well as including services in the deal and applying it 
at levels below the central government. However, there are monetary limits on 
which contracts are covered and it only applies plurilateral^ to signatories of the 
agreement.12
If a regional agreement is such that a government must not show 
preference between firms of the region when deciding its procurement policies, 
then such a deal can generate a regional bias. For example, the European Union 
leaves open the possibility for governments to maintain a 50% EU content 
requirement as well as allowing a 3% price differential in favour of EU firms. 
Similarly, according to NAFTA provisions, bidding for Mexican construction 
projects and oil industry projects will be opened to US and Canadian firms over a 
ten year period, but discrimination against non-NAFTA bidders will remain.13
In practice, however, outlawing discrimination in favour of domestic firms 
in government procurement is likely to mean adopting an entirely non- 
discriminatory policy, and regional discrimination is likely to be the exception 
rather than the rule. National horizons are still sufficiently narrow that if the 
objective of benefiting domestic firms cannot be achieved, then the next best 
option is likely to be the bidder which offers the most competitive tender. As a
11 Although a frequent European Union complaint over the Structural Impediments 
Initiative was that the ensuing openness was heavily biased towards American producers, so a 
domestic bias would be replaced by a bilateral one.
12 For central government only contracts above SDR130,000 are covered, while the 
threshold is SDR200,00 for sub-central governments and SDR400,000 for public utilities. See 
Evans and Walsh (1994) p. 62.
13 Lawrence (1996).
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result, government procurement policies will become increasingly liberal on a 
global rather than regional basis.
Trade related investment measures (TRIMs). These are also covered by the 
Uruguay Round, although the agreement focuses on negative TRIMs (i.e. those 
that restrict investment) rather than positive ones. The TRIMs agreement applies 
to goods and is supplemented by the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
which covers issues such as rights of establishment and treatment of the 
investment after establishment.14 The Uruguay Round provisions are relatively 
weak and negotiations are in progress under the auspices of the OECD to 
produce a more substantial Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). An MAI 
is expected to be modelled on the stronger provisions which already exist in 
regional agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).
NAFTA contains broader provisions on TRIMs than multilateral accords, 
including tighter restrictions on performance requirements and the extension of 
dispute settlement to cover disagreements between private investors and states. 
The NAFTA definition of what comprises an investment is also extremely broad, 
including "an enterprise; equity or debt securities of an enterprise; interests that 
entitle an owner to share in the income or profits of an enterprise; tangible and 
intangible assets acquired or used for business purposes; interests arising from 
the commitment of capital such as under turnkey or construction contracts; and 
contracts where the remuneration depends on the production, revenues or profits 
of an enterprise".15 The EU restrictions on TRIMs are more advanced than those 
of NAFTA and they also broaden the scope of protection to include the returns 
on an asset as well as its capital value.16
This is an area which can be discriminatory on a regional basis, as it is 
feasible to apply closer controls on TRIMs depending on the nationality of the 
firm. It is difficult to make a qualitative assessment of the differences between 
Uruguay Round rules and those under regional agreements such as NAFTA, and
14 Evans and Walsh (1994) Chapter 5.
15 Parra (1995) p. 43.
16 OECD (1995) p. 41.
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even more difficult to assess the role that such differences play in corporate 
decision-making, but it does offer some support to the idea that "deeper" co­
operation implies stronger regional bias. However, this bias is more likely to be 
evident in the investment figures than in trade data, and as has been discussed 
in Chapter 3, series on direct investment flows are erratic and unreliable. If the 
investment is trade-substituting (i.e. aimed at supplying the market in which it is 
located by replacing exports) then the measures of trade bias would be expected 
to show a decline.
Anti-Dumping. The threat or actual use of anti-dumping duties to restrict foreign 
trade has become an increasingly popular means of protection.17 As such, 
restrictions on the use of anti-dumping action can represent a clear move 
towards more open trade. Moreover, restrictions on anti-dumping can be 
imposed on a preferential basis, so this is potentially an area where a regional 
bias could emerge.
Both the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (and subsequently NAFTA) 
and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(CERTA) include co-operation on anti-dumping measures.18 Within NAFTA 
exports cannot be subjected to countervailing duties due to accusations that they 
are being sold at less than fair value on the basis of a unilateral decision; any 
anti-dumping duties are made subject to a binding review by a bilateral panel. In 
the case of the European Union the use of anti-dumping tariffs runs counter to 
the principles of the single market and cannot be applied to intra-regional trade.
An agreement on dumping was also included in the Uruguay Round, in an 
attempt to broaden acceptance of restrictions that had been put in place as part 
of a set of voluntary codes in the Tokyo Round.19 Nevertheless, countervailing 
duties based on anti-dumping are permissible under the WTO and their 
imposition and threat of imposition is a restriction on trade. If a regional 
agreement lifts the threat of the use of anti-dumping measures from other
17 Laird and Yeats (1990b).
18 Kahler (1995).
19 Evans and Walsh (1994) Chapter 10.
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countries within the region then it can be expected to have a positive effect on 
the degree of regional trade bias.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Under the Uruguay Round’s Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, principles such as national 
treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) are applied to IPRs. However, the 
enforcement provisions of the agreement are relatively weak, as a result of the 
negotiating parties having diametrically opposed views towards IPRs.20 The 
majority of I PR holders come from developed counties, which are understandably 
eager to derive the maximum return from their investment in innovative research. 
In contrast, developing countries see innovation as a public good and view patent 
protection as being responsible for inflating the prices of goods they require.
In that protection of intellectual property under the Uruguay Round is 
based on national treatment and MFN it can be seen as only being applicable on 
a non-discriminatory basis. However, in practice the main difference lies in the 
enforcement of I PR protection between countries. Both the EU and NAFTA offer 
stronger protection on two counts; firstly the legal processes are more clearly 
defined (and in the case of the EU not controlled by the national judiciary, but by 
the European Court of Justice); secondly recourse to the law is open to individual 
companies and not just governments.21
Although the provisions of the Uruguay Round are relatively weak, there is 
evidence that the US is ready to act as a worldwide enforcer in this area. It was 
US insistence that resulted in the TRIPs agreement being included in the 
Uruguay Round, while under Section 1303 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act the US can take action against countries which violate 
IPRs.22 The implication is that with the US unilaterally policing the multilateral 
agreement, the level of enforcement will be stronger (although more arbitrary) 
than it appears on paper.
Conversely, although regional trade agreements between developed 
countries such as in the EU and NAFTA offer enhanced IPR protection, these
20 See Chaudhry and Walsh (1995) p. 88.
21 Chaudhry and Walsh (1995).
22 Evans and Walsh (1994) Chapter 7.
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are the same countries that are likely to be holders of intellectual property rights 
and therefore be prepared to enforce multilateral rules effectively.23 As a result, 
coverage in regional agreements between developed countries is likely to add 
only limited practical protection for IPRs. This implies that the marginal benefits 
for IPR protection that result from being inside a regional trading arrangement 
such as the EU or NAFTA are relatively minor.
Harmonisation of Standards. Meeting different standards in each national or 
sub-national market can represent a significant cost for a multinational 
corporation. Products will need to be redesigned to incorporate special features 
in order to be acceptable to other countries in the case of differing standards. If 
standards can be harmonised between groups of countries then the cost of 
supplying a product within the group will be lower in terms of both design and 
production costs. A reasonable degree of centralisation is necessary for 
standards to be harmonised within a region. At the very least an effective 
bargaining process is needed, and an enforcement mechanism and a central 
body to set the rules are also likely to be necessary. It can be a controversial 
area, as it is a relatively high profile one, with consumers in one country feeling 
their choice or traditions are being manipulated by an extra-national authority.24
A move to harmonise standards within a region has similar features to a 
customs union, in terms of the implications for the costs of doing business across 
a region. One recent example has been the harmonisation of business law under 
the Australia-New Zealand CERTA which will reduce the costs of cross-border 
business between the two countries.25 However, harmonisation of standards is 
not an intrinsically discriminatory step, as the same rules will be enforced on all 
suppliers and the average cost of meeting a single standard in a region is likely 
to be lower than meeting separate standards in each country. The costs of 
adherence to the new standards will, in theory, be no higher for established 
extra-regional suppliers than for regional producers, so there should not be a
23 A 1975 joint WIPO/UNCTAD study found that foreign firms held 84% of patents granted 
in developing countries. Cited in Evans and Walsh (1994) p. 37.
24 This is illustrated by sporadic British outrage driven by the popular press against 
supposed EU rulings on various acceptable weights and measures.
25 OECD (1995).
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danger of trade diversion. As Lawrence points out, deeper is not necessarily 
better and harmonising on the wrong policy would have a negative impact.26 
However, this is more a question of the appropriate level of regulation than of 
discriminatory trade policies.
In reality standards can be designed to exclude some producers; for 
example, if Europe were to impose standards on fuel efficiency for automobiles 
then it would be likely to discriminate against large US cars. However, such a 
step would represent an explicitly protectionist policy decision, and is a separate 
issue from that of whether harmonisation of standards per se is applicable on a 
preferential basis.
Mutual Recognition. This is the opposite to harmonisation of standards, 
whereby if a practice or a product is deemed to be acceptable by one member of 
a region then the other members must also accept it. The most famous 
European example is that of the French alcoholic drink, Cassis de Dijon, which in 
1979-80 the European Court of Justice ruled must be allowed access to 
Germany even though its alcohol content fell short of the level required in 
Germany to be classed as a liqueur.27 Mutual recognition overcomes the 
inevitably complex negotiations that surround harmonisation of standards, but it 
does have the drawback that it can lead to "lowest common denominator" 
policies, which is sometimes labelled as being a "race to the bottom" in terms of 
regulations. NAFTA does not include mutual recognition in its free trade 
agreement, so it is not a possible factor in the closer integration seen in recent 
years.
Mutual recognition is to a degree discriminatory because an extra-regional 
supplier will find it necessary to conform to the standards in at least one member 
country, and these standards may differ from those in its home country, while 
those within the region will need to make no adjustments.28 A new extra-regional
26 Lawrence (1996).
27 Turner and Hodges (1992).
28 One of the recommendations of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue in Seville, Spain in 
November 1995 was that the US and the European Union should move to mutual recognition of 
standards for medical devices, telecommunications equipment, information technology products 
and electrical equipment, followed by negotiations on other important sectors.
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supplier might therefore face some extra costs compared to regional producers, 
while established suppliers will benefit from being able to sell across the whole 
region. A move within a region towards mutual recognition is a non-discriminatory 
policy in that if, say, a Japanese bank is granted a license to operate in the 
United Kingdom, then it is also entitled to set up branches across the European 
Union. However, foreign suppliers will find themselves disadvantaged if, as a 
result of a mutual recognition agreement, they find themselves competing with 
firms from a country within the region where regulatory standards are lower. Thus 
it may be plausible to ascribe part of the rise in regionalisation in the EU to the 
adoption of mutual recognition agreements, because in some situations non- 
regional suppliers can face additional costs.
Rules of Origin. One of the major differences between a customs union and a 
free trade area (FTA) is the ability of member countries of FTAs to maintain 
different levels of external tariffs. For this to be effective it is necessary to have 
legislation in place to prevent imports entering the lowest tariff country of an FTA 
and then being shipped across the border to a higher tariff partner after a 
cosmetic alteration. To achieve this, rules of origin are imposed which require a 
product to be transformed or have a specified amount of value added within the 
region.29 It is worth remembering that rules of origin are only necessary in areas 
where tariffs or quotas exist; free trade would make them superfluous.
Rules of origin are inherently discriminatory and when broadened on a 
regional basis they can become more so, or less so. For example when the 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement was extended to include Mexico some local 
content requirements were raised. In the case of automobile parts the value 
added requirement rose from 50% to 62.5%, while tighter limits were also 
imposed for textiles and televisions.30 In that rules of origin are intended to 
enforce the effectiveness of regional tariff preferences, they are aimed at 
discriminating against countries from outside the region.
29 Palmeter (1993) gives a full explanation of the four different forms that rules of origin 
can take; substantial transformation, change in tariff heading, value added requirements and 
specified process.
30 Gruben and Welch (1994).
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Competition Policy. As with the elimination of public subsidies or partiality in 
public procurement, an effective competition policy is likely to benefit non- 
regional firms as much as those within the region (or even more so, considering 
that some regionally-based firms would be favoured by weak application of 
competition policy). Effectively the EU and ANZCERTA both have a regional 
competition policy. NAFTA contains provisions to prevent the abuse of monopoly 
power by public monopolies and requires each member to enact a national 
competition policy (a rule aimed at Mexico or future entrants, as Canada and the 
US already had one).31
The Uruguay Round has little to say on the issue of competition policy, 
although this is expected to be an area for inclusion in any future Round.32 An 
effective regional competition policy has a definite impact owing to the lack of 
multilateral rules, and its non-discriminatory nature means that it cannot be seen 
to be a factor behind the recent rise in regionalisation in North America and 
Europe.
Transparency. Clear and open rules governing all forms of economic 
transactions are a frequent result of procedures being codified by a central 
authority. This is not particularly relevant to North America, as the US is an 
extremely legalistic society, although Mexico is much less so. Transparency is 
also high in the Europe Union, with the member states lacking the freedom to 
make arbitrary decisions. However, if regionalism were to progress in Asia then 
the rules applying in what are frequently seen as "extra-legal" societies such as 
Japan and China would be made explicit.33 Such a step would certainly not be 
discriminatory in favour of other members of the region and could even favour 
extra-regional actors which, perhaps because of cultural differences, currently 
have less clear information on the business operating environment.
Summary. It is clear that shallow regionalism can be applied on a preferential 
basis: this is the heart of old-style regional trading arrangements. However, there
31 Lawrence (1996).
32 OECD (1995).
33 Graham (1994).
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is less scope to impose a preferential regional bias with deeper integration 
involving non-tariff liberalisation. Recall that one of the more surprising findings in 
Chapter 3 was that trade bias between the original six EU members has not 
increased since the late 1960s, with an increase in overall regional bias ascribed 
to the effect of expanded membership. Lawrence notes the success of the EEC 
in eliminating tariffs and quantitative restrictions on intra-EEC-trade by 1968, with 
the focus since then on "deeper" liberalisation.34 This suggests that deeper 
integration measures have not increased the preferential bias between the 
original six.
The foregoing examples of "deeper" integration need to be considered in 
terms of their effectiveness in promoting regional integration by granting regional 
preferences rather than being a non-discriminatory liberalisation. Aspects of 
deeper integration, such as improving transparency, banning subsidies and 
enacting an effective competition policy are difficult, if not impossible, to apply on 
a preferential basis and therefore cannot be responsible for a rise in 
regionalisation. Indeed, in some cases they may actually favour non-regional 
firms if they help to level a previously sloping playing field. The main features of 
regionalism which can be applied on a discriminatory basis are rules of origin, 
TRIMs and anti-dumping. Even those elements of deeper integration which are 
applicable in a preferential fashion are unlikely to be powerful enough forces to 
explain much of the rise in intra-regional integration seen in the EU and NAFTA 
since the end of the 1980s. If deeper integration measures were significant on a 
preferential basis then the EU6 measures of integration in Chapter 3 should have 
risen in recent decades.
The net effect of such "deep" policy steps may be to offer improved 
access to the regional economy to foreign multinational corporations, although 
this will not be as great as the improved access to regionally-based firms. The 
overall effect is likely to be only a slight rise in measures of regionalisation, so 
explanations which point to deeper regionalism as being behind the rise in 
regionalisation appear unsubstantiated by a closer look at the mechanisms.
Even though the tariff reductions in the Single European Market 
programme, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and in NAFTA were
34 Lawrence (1996).
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relatively low, their effect could have been stronger than that of the deeper 
integration which was incorporated in the agreements. For example, NAFTA 
contained progress on lowering barriers to trade in agricultural products, 
automobiles, textiles, telecommunications and financial services, while in Europe 
the 1992 programme helped to implement the provisions of the customs union 
which had previously existed on paper. As such, the impact of border-level 
liberalisation may still have been the most important feature of the North 
American and European regional agreements. In particular, in the absence of 
other convincing explanations for the rise in regionalisation since the late 1980s 
which is noted below, one conclusion is that preferential trade liberalisation is the 
main force at work.
It is also worth recalling that if the world is divided into four regional groups 
and three show an increase in trade intensities as a result of preferential regional 
agreements, then the trade intensity measure of the fourth region will also rise. 
However, this appears to be an unsatisfactory explanation of the rise in trade 
intensities in NAFTA and the EU, as the diffusion of regional trading agreements 
throughout the world over the past decade has not been substantial enough to 
boost other regional trade intensities to the extent that the EU and NAFTA 
measures rise as a residual effect.
5.3 A Microeconomic Perspective
As discussed above, there is a suspicion that a macroeconomic analysis of 
regionalisation may not be sufficient to explain recent trends and that answers 
can be found in a microeconomic perspective. Several observers have claimed 
that firms are increasingly organising production on a regional basis, rather than 
looking at the country as a discrete unit and this is behind the rise in 
regionalisation.35 Such a trend can cause problems in terms of statistical 
measurement, as it will affect both direct investment and trade flows, with it being 
difficult to discern whether the former are complementing or substituting for 
existing trade movements.
35 For example see UN (1991), UNCTAD (1993) p. 130, Oman (1994) and Kobrin (1995).
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This is the core of the observation in Chapter 3 that the links between the 
political process of regionalism and the economic process of regionalisation tend 
to be relatively weak, or to put it another way, it is possible to have either policy- 
led or market-led integration. Microeconomic forces promote de facto regional 
integration in addition to the effects of the de jure regional agreements between 
governments. This occurs as MNCs set up networks within each region and 
thereby advance integration. Essentially this turns the earlier analysis inside out: 
rather than regionalisation being viewed in terms of its impact on the world 
economy, it is the trend towards more internationally mobile MNCs that is 
resulting in a regional bias to corporate activity.
Oman believes that "from a policy perspective, globalisation is more 
usefully understood .... as a microeconomic phenomenon, one that is driven by 
the strategies and behaviour of firms".36 The driving force is not so much 
deregulation, technology or even financial markets liberalisation, but the impact 
of new corporate organisation—"flexible" or "lean" production—or "the new 
competition" which has strained Fordist or Taylorist production systems. The 
consequence is that firms are meeting the trend of harmonising demand across 
the world via a series of regional production networks.
One caveat is that although persuasively argued, Oman offers little solid 
evidence that the majority of firms are adopting these new forms of production 
and there is a concern that the analysis applies to a limited number of high- 
profile, headline catching firms, rather than the less visible majority.37 Although 
the microeconomic explanation of regionalisation is attractive and credible, it 
cannot be proved theoretically or statistically and tends to rely on anecdotal 
evidence such as the observation that a strike at General Motors' Canadian plant 
in Oshawa would "cripple GM operation throughout North America".38
The lack of consistent information on corporate structures and intra-firm 
flows of tangibles and non-tangibles mean that direct verification of such putative
36 Oman (1994) p. 13. Italics in original.
37 Oman also claims that regional production occurs because MNCs are keen to match 
costs and revenues in each region. While this seems intuitively plausible, and might well apply to 
some firms, in Chapter 4 it was shown that various studies have found no evidence that this is 
habitually the case.
38 Financial Times, "GM Canada unlikely to avoid strike”, 3 October 1996.
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behaviour is not possible. The OECD has begun to publish such data in Activities 
of Foreign Affiliates in OECD Countries, but as yet the coverage is sparse.39 A 
detailed and consistent time series is only available from the US in reports on the 
behaviour of US multinational corporations abroad and foreign FDI in the US. 
The 1995 edition of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent 
Companies and their Foreign Affiliates provides limited support for the idea that 
sales are becoming more regional. Preliminary results for 1993 show that of the 
US$1,279 billion sales of goods and services by America majority owned foreign 
affiliates, US$138 billion (10.8%) was exported back to the US (8.6% to US 
parents, 2.2% in unaffiliated US sales), while US$845 billion (66.0%) was sold in 
the country of production, with 3.3% of the total being sold to related local 
affiliates.40 Only US$296 billion (23.1%) was sold in third countries. The figures 
for third countries do not give a regional breakdown, but of the US$296 billion, 
US$168 billion was sold to other foreign affiliates and US$128 billion to 
unaffiliated persons. Thus only 13.1% of total sales of US foreign affiliates were 
intra-firm trade with other third country foreign affiliates (and even then not 
necessarily in the same region) which indicates that extensive regional 
production networks are not yet widespread. However, note also that only 48.7% 
of sales by the affiliates of US parents were in the manufacturing sector and that 
the proportion of manufacturers’ sales made locally in 1993 was 59.7%, 
compared to the 66.0% average figure for all sectors 41 The reason is that sales 
of services such as hotels and retailing tend to be tied to the country in which the 
investment is made. Moreover, sales by manufacturers to affiliates in third 
countries was 17.6% of total sales, compared to the 13.1% average and just 
8.8% in the case of non-manufacturers.
Total intra-firm trade was 25.0% of the total (8.6% plus 3.3% plus 13.1%) 
in 1993, much the same level as has been seen over the past decade. However, 
in the case of manufacturers intra-firm trade stood at 32.9%, comprising 12.3% 
of sales made to the US parent, 3.0% of sales made to affiliates in the country of 
operation and 17.6% of sales to affiliates in third countries. Thus there is
39 OECD (1997b).
40 US Department of Commerce (1995a) Table III.F.2. Author’s calculations.
41 US Department of Commerce (1995a) Table III.F.3. Author’s calculations.
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evidence that manufacturers engage in substantial intra-firm trade, especially 
with affiliates in third countries. Unfortunately a break-down of third country sales 
is not available.
Earlier versions of the same Commerce Department report show that in 
1966 sales to affiliated firms in third countries were 9.8% of total sales, rising to 
12.5% in 1977 and then slipping slightly to 12.1% in 1987. In 1992 intra-firm third 
country trade peaked at 13.5% of total sales of US majority owned non-bank 
affiliates, and then slipped back slightly to the 13.1% level shown in the 1993 
data. Therefore, the historic series indicates a trend to move away from 
supplying either the local market or the US market, in favour of third country 
sales.42 However, there was only a gradual rise in the proportion of sales made 
to third country affiliates between 1987 and 1993.
In the case of affiliates of US firms located in Europe the proportion of 
intra-firm third country sales was 18.5% of total sales in 1993, with a gentle 
upwards trend evident over time. On the assumption that third country sales will 
be predominantly regional, there is some evidence of a regional network in the 
production structures of US multinationals emerging in Europe.
In terms of foreign affiliates located in the US, the publication U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad: Operations of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies provides 
similar details to its sister publication. In 1994 the sales of goods and services by 
foreign affiliates in the US to the local market were 90.9% of total sales of 
US$1402 billion.43 Of the remaining output which was sold outside the US 
market, 4.0% of the US$1402 billion total went to foreign parent and a further 
0.9% to other foreign affiliates. It would appear that the sheer size of the US 
market is sufficient to render the construction of regional production networks 
unnecessary. However, there has been a clear trend towards more foreign 
shipments from the US to the foreign parent and other affiliates; the proportion 
has risen from 3.4% in 1987 to 4.9% in 1994. A substantial part of this increase 
are the "reverse imports" of US-made Japanese automobiles back to Japan in an 
attempt to lower the bilateral trade deficit and reduce trade friction.
42 It is also worth noting that movements of exchange rates will have an effect on the data, 
although sufficient detail is not available to make a reliable assessment of the impact of such a 
factor.
43 US Department of Commerce (1996b) Tables E-12 and H-1. Author’s calculations.
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Encarnation found little to suggest that regional production networks are 
becoming widespread for the foreign plants of Japanese MNCs, which also sell 
around 60% of their output to the home market, with another 20% going to third 
country markets, usually those geographically close to the country hosting the 
FDI.44 Again, the relatively low level of such trade indicates that the regional 
networks envisioned by the likes of Oman are still not pervasive.
Nevertheless, continuing developments in production processes and 
management techniques point in favour of regional units. Economies of scale are 
undoubtedly important to multinational corporations in both the manufacturing 
and service sectors, but their nature has evolved over time. For most industries 
efficient plant size can be achieved in producing for regional markets 45 and 
sourcing strategies are also efficient on a regional network basis. In contrast, for 
costs such as research and development, finance, advertising and information 
systems the most efficient scale is typically reached in supplying the entire global 
market.
The implication is that even if the data show a trend towards a greater 
regional bias in trade and investment flows, this does not necessarily mean that 
the key economic trend is that of regionalisation. The distinction is partly 
definitional; if trade and investment flows show a stronger regional bias, then on 
one level, regionalisation can be said to be increasing. However, what is not 
demonstrated by such figures is the globalisation of the international economy 
which is behind greater regional integration.
At first glance this may appear contradictory, but demand is becoming 
globalised, while supply is still more efficient on a regional basis. At the same 
time competition takes place on a global scale, rather than a regional or national 
one.46 As a result, firms are globalising to meet demand and compete worldwide, 
but the productive mechanics of doing so are regional. So while regionalisation is 
the trend on a physical production basis, globalisation is the trend in terms of 
strategy or corporate planning. This can be labelled "regional globalisation" in
44 Encarnation (1993) pp. 14-15.
45 See for example Stopford and Strange (1992).
46 Ohmae (1990).
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that the objective is to meet global demand, but through the means of regional 
production.
Note that unlike the macroeconomic factors at play promoting 
regionalisation as a result of intra-regional trade preferences, these 
microeconomic forces are based on the business logic of the industry and not 
any stronger economic "truth". As a result it is quite feasible that in the future, 
technological developments (such as a revolution in transportation systems) 
could make regional production structures inefficient. As Kobrin notes, "There is 
no reason why a larger market area should make discrete borders more 
meaningful or territorial control of economic activity more effective in an 
electronically networked world economy."47 A move to either a globally integrated 
production network or a single site supplying the entire world market via exports 
is quite possible and would reverse the growing regional bias in trade and 
investment flows. Such a change would not, however, alter the underlying trend 
of globalisation in the world economy, in that the objective of meeting demand 
worldwide would remain, with only the strategy of how to do so being revised.
One effect of such "regional globalisation" would be a growing share in 
intra-industry trade within regions. Various studies have found that a rise in intra- 
regional foreign direct investment (FDI) has tended to boost intra-industry trade.48 
One such analysis is a World Bank study of Japanese companies, which used 
JETRO data.49 This found a strong relationship between the propensity to export 
and the degree of foreign direct investment, without suggesting in which direction 
the causality ran. It also found that small firms have a proclivity to move 
production to countries within the same region, and those firms also tend to carry 
out direct investment which complements existing trade patterns. In contrast 
larger Japanese firms are more likely to invest in Europe and North America, with 
the investments being of the trade replacing variety (presumably because of the 
fear of higher trade barriers). Both of these dynamics will raise measures of intra- 
regional trade intensity, the former as it raises the amount of trade within the 
region, the latter because it reduces the amount of inter-regional trade.
47 Kobrin (1995) p. 28.
48 See for example Lee (1989) and Primo Braga and Bannister (1994).
49 Dasgupta, Mody and Sinha (1995).
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As an explanation of the rise in measures of regionalisation noted in 
recent years the microeconomic perspective has its attractions. However, useful 
data are only available for US outward and inward FDI and those figures show 
only a gentle rise in intra-firm trade with third countries, and this is an activity 
which is still of only limited importance. Anecdotal observation suggests that the 
popularity of regional networks has increased substantially in recent years, but 
this could be the result of a tendency to focus on more trend-setting companies. 
In terms of explaining the rise in regionalisation measures noted in Chapter 3, 
regional production networks may be partly responsible, but they seem 
inadequate in showing why the regional trade indices took a jump after the late 
1980s.
5.4 Terms of Trade Effects
Trade among developed countries tends to be of the intra-industry, rather than 
inter-industry variety. Moreover, intra-industry trade between developed countries 
tends to be in manufactured rather than primary products.50 In contrast, trade in 
primary products is predominantly a North-South process. As previously noted, 
regional trading arrangements tend to be established between countries at 
similar levels of development51 and, historically, the effective ones have been 
between developed countries.
Combining this observation with the argument that there is a long-term 
trend for commodity prices to decline relative to those of manufactured goods, 
then a terms of trade effect on measures of regional trade bias also becomes 
evident. There is an active debate on whether the terms of trade of developing 
countries have in fact shown a long-term decline, but the bulk of analysis 
supports such a view.52 On a basic level, IMF series show the price of non-fuel
50 See Greenaway (1988), United Nations (1996).
51 Although Lawrence (1996) p. 68. claims that NAFTA was unusual because it was a 
regional agreement between two developed countries and one developing one, it is worth noting 
that Mexico became a member of the OECD in 1994, the same year that the agreement came into 
place. Moreover, the World Bank ranks Mexico as an Upper Middle Income country, which places 
it alongside Portugal and Greece.
52 Among others, Spraos (1980), Sapsford (1985) and Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) 
have produced convincing evidence of a decline in the net barter terms of trade of primary 
commodities compared to manufactured goods.
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commodities rose by 174% between 1965 and 1994 (i.e. an average of 3.5% per 
annum), while crude oil prices rose 650% (7.2% per annum) and wholesale 
prices in industrial countries (a proxy for manufacturing prices) rose by 300% (or 
4.9% per annum).53
In the European Union and NAFTA, intra-regional trade consists of a 
relatively high proportion of trade in manufactures, while extra-regional trade is 
relatively high in primary products.54 Lower prices of primary products will lower 
both the value of total world trade and the value of extra-regional trade. It will 
also lower the value of intra-regional trade, as some trade in primary products 
occurs, but this will be a lesser effect than on extra-regional trade.55 In terms of 
calculations of intra-regional trade bias, if no change in trade volumes occurs the 
net effect will be to make intra-regional trade appear to be a larger part of the 
whole, raising the intra-regional trade intensity index. However, such a rise in the 
measure of regional bias occurs without any genuine increase in economic 
integration taking place. Moreover, if the result of lower commodity prices is that 
more primary goods are traded inter-regionally, then it can be argued that the 
degree of regional integration will actually fall. This illustrates the danger of taking 
the figures generated by statistical analysis on face value, without any deeper 
understanding of underlying trends.
In terms of seeking to explain the recent rise in regional trade intensity 
indices since the late 1980s, terms of trade effects may account for a reasonable 
part of the increase. From 1988 to 1994 in US dollar terms non-fuel commodity 
prices fell 5.3% (0.9% per annum), while crude oil prices rose 8.0% (1.3% per 
annum) and industrial wholesale prices rose 12.2% (1.9% per annum). The 
implication is that the rate at which the terms of trade of commodity exporters are 
declining has accelerated since the late 1980s. This might go some way to 
explaining the rise in intra-regional trade intensities since then.
Specifically taking the example of North American trade intensities, a 10% 
improvement in the terms of trade (assuming there is no offsetting rise in
53 IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1995.
54 Whalley (1985) p. 192.
55 Price elasticities are also important in such an example, and the price elasticity of 
demand for primary products is typically less than one, which is to say a 10% drop in price does 
not generate an offsetting 10% rise in volumes.
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volumes as a result of the lower prices) generates a rise in the trade intensity 
index of O.2.56 The actual rise in the in the NAFTA trade intensity index observed 
from the beginning of the recent upturn in 1989 to 1995 was 0.49. However, over 
the same period the US terms of trade (as measured by the ratio of export unit 
prices to import unit prices) deteriorated by 0.5%, while Canada’s terms of trade 
deteriorated by 7.0%. The IMF does not publish figures for Mexico, but the Peso 
crisis at the end of 1994 and relatively weak oil prices during the period in 
question are likely to have meant a decline in the terms of trade.57 The 
implication is that terms of trade changes were not responsible for the rise in the 
NAFTA intra-regional trade intensity—if anything the effect should have been to 
lower the regional trade intensity index.
In the case of the European Union an improvement in the terms of trade 
since the late 1980s has contributed to a rise in the intra-regional trade intensity 
index. No unit price index is available for the region as a whole, but of the four 
main economies, three saw an improvement in their terms of trade between 1989 
and 1995 while one saw a deterioration.58 The net effect is that the terms of trade 
for the European Union have improved since the late 1980s, although it is not 
possible to put an exact value on the change. Nevertheless unlike North 
America, terms of trade effects are one of the factors behind a rise in the intra- 
regional trade intensity in Europe since the late 1980s.
Thus the relatively mundane (at least in international political economy 
terms) effect of terms of trade changes needs to be considered as well as the 
other two forces outlined above in explaining changes in the measures of 
regional bias. Each of the three factors discussed above has contributed to the 
rise in measures of regionalisation over the past three decades. In terms of 
explaining the recent sharp rise in the regional trade intensity indices since the 
late 1980s, preferential tariff and non-tariff liberalisation, combined with terms of
56 This is calculated using the trade intensity index (Method 2) as discussed in Chapter 3.
57 In any case, Mexico is a relatively small part of the NAFTA total. There is also the 
problem of double counting in that Canada’s terms of trade, for example, includes the price of 
exports and imports to and from the USA and Mexico, but the underlying finding of a deterioration 
in the terms of trade is not likely to be affected.
58 The terms of trade for France improved 6.6%, Italy 7.4% and the UK 3.1% between 
1988 and 1994, while Germany saw a 0.3% deterioration.
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trade effects in the case of Europe, have been the most influential factors at 
work.
5.5 Offsetting Force of Globalisation
With the three factors outlined above driving statistical measures of 
regionalisation forwards, it is perhaps surprising that the trade intensity indices 
shown in Chapter 3 have not increased more rapidly. One possible reason for 
this is the offsetting force of globalisation which has moderated the impact of 
regional preferences, organisational structures and shifts in terms of trade.
Just as regionalisation is taken to mean the closer interdependence 
between the economy of one country and that of one or more other economies in 
the same geographic region, globalisation is the closer integration of one 
economy with others on a world scale. As shown in Chapter 3, although 
regionalisation has been rising in recent years, there is also a long-term trend 
towards major economies being more open to trade on a global basis. Increased 
regional integration has not been accompanied by a decline in integration with 
non-regional countries. Complemented by similar trends in movements of capital, 
this is the phenomenon know as globalisation. There is some debate as to 
whether globalisation is reaching new heights or simply returning to the pre-1914 
state,59 but the main point is that it is a trend which is progressing alongside that 
of regionalisation.
The three above forces discussed above are all leading to a rise in 
measures of regionalisation in the world economy, but it can also be argued that 
they are resulting in a stronger degree of globalisation. Firstly, although the rise 
in regional preferences is primarily to the benefit of countries within the region, 
there are also benefits to extra-regional firms, because a larger, more coherent 
market offers greater opportunities to an MNC, irrespective of nationality. As is 
discussed above in the section on deeper integration, some measures explicitly 
favour regionally based firms, but others such as restricting government 
subsidies cannot be applied on a discriminatory basis, so liberalisation within a 
region can benefit all firms.
59 See Sachs and Warner (1995) and Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996) for the two sides 
of the argument.
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In relation to the second point about corporate organisational structures, it 
appears that some MNCs are producing regionally, while supplying the global 
market through facilities within each region. While on the basic level this is an 
increase in regionalisation, it can be argued that the more important trend is that 
of a rise in globalisation. As is discussed above, regional production does imply a 
rise in regionalisation in terms of direct investment or trade flows, but in terms of 
what it means for the world economy the stronger force is that of globalisation. It 
is not recognised as such because inter-regional flows are in intangibles such as 
research and development, or other knowledge based assets and as such they 
are not adequately captured by the available data. Unfortunately the data simply 
do not exist to illustrate this assertion that globalisation is the dominant force, as 
such flows of intangibles result in economies becoming more closely linked 
together irrespective of geographic location.
Moreover, the factors which are behind the rise in regionalisation as a 
microeconomic trend are also leading to a rise in globalisation. The revolution in 
communications of recent years means that firms’ choices are no longer 
constrained to what is readily at hand within a region. Information about 
production and sales in non-regional markets is available to allow even relatively 
small MNCs to seek scale efficiencies and new customers on a global basis.60 
The avenues of opportunities that have been opened up by information 
technology mean that some firms will be globalising more aggressively than they 
are regionalising. Moreover, as firms with a base across one region expand into 
other markets, globalisation will increase. Such behaviour would counteract the 
pressures towards regionalisation noted above.
A strong case can therefore be made that trends which appear to show a 
rise in regionalisation do in fact represent an increase in globalisation. 
Unfortunately, such an argument cannot be supported (or disproved) statistically 
due to problems in measuring flows of intangibles and it depends to some extent 
on whether a narrow or broad definition of the term "globalisation" is adopted.
60 See Table 2-1 in Herring and Litan (1995) for details of falling communication costs.
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5.6 Impact of FDI
Incorporating foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the analysis is complex 
and imprecise for two reasons. On one level, it is useful to distinguish between 
FDI which is complementary to trade flows (such as establishing car dealerships) 
and that which is a substitute for trade (such as setting up a car production 
plant). On another level, the inadequacies of the statistical material make 
directional and motivational analysis of FDI flows imprecise.
Mundell demonstrated that an efficient allocation of resources within a 
region could be achieved as a result of movements of factors of production or 
movements of goods.61 If perfectly free flows of factors of production already 
exist within a region, then liberalising flows of traded goods does not enhance 
economic efficiency (and vice versa). Simply observing that trade creation has 
occurred, even if it is greater than the degree of trade diversion, does not allow 
us to be sure that it has raised economic welfare. It could be that movements in 
factors of production had already allowed maximum levels of efficiency to be 
reached within the region. It might seem clear to observers of the international 
economy that neither factors of production nor goods move freely across 
borders, and the continued provision of regional assistance in the European 
Union indicates that it does not expect migration to correct regional disparities. 
However, this does highlight the theoretical dangers of making what might seem 
to be safe predictions about the implications of regionalisation without being well- 
informed as to the pattern of both trade and FDI movements.
With trade barriers falling steadily during the post-war period, trade growth 
has regularly outpaced that of output.62 However, the growth in FDI has been 
even faster than that of trade, with FDI outflows quadrupling since 1980 and 
exports doubling.63 This is not necessarily what would be expected from 
Mundell’s theory, as trade growth could be seen as a substitute for FDI flows. 
The fact that they occur contemporaneously indicates that barriers existed to
61 Mundell (1957).
62 See Maddison (1995) tables G-2 and I-4 for details.
63 Between 1981 to 1993 FDI outflows grew by a total of 326% (calculated from UN (1995) 
Table 1.1) while world exports grew by 102% in current dollars (IMF Direction of Trade Statistics).
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both the movement of both goods and factors of production, and both sets of 
barriers have been declining.
Barriers to FDI have been falling faster in the developing world than 
among OECD countries in recent years, irrespective of the impact of regional 
agreements.64 An explanation of this could be similar to that for the erosion of 
capital controls on a unilateral basis that was noted in Chapter 4; technological 
and ideological changes make such restrictions untenable. The consequence is 
that although regional agreements in Europe and North America have covered 
FDI flows, the reduction in protection has not been as great as in a range of 
countries in South America and Asia where the climate for FDI has turned far 
more welcoming.65 This is largely because the OECD restrictions were initially at 
a lower level.
Consider three types of FDI which are commonplace. Firstly, there is FDI 
which is made in search of lower production costs. This tends to occur within the 
region of the investing firm, especially when it is a relatively small firm making the 
investment.66 It tends to be of the trade-creating variety, involving flows of capital 
equipment to the low cost producer and of finished goods back to the home 
country and to other developed countries (often within the region). In contrast, a 
second form is market seeking FDI which aims to secure market access and 
which is likely to be a substitute for trade flows. This is most clearly the case 
when the investment is aimed at guaranteeing market access in the face of the 
threat of trade barriers. Protectionist threats mean that manufacturing facilities 
cannot simply be "screwdriver" plants, incorporating minimal value-added, as 
these would fall foul of rules of origin restrictions. As a result a large part of the 
sourcing and value-added activities will need to be conducted locally, which 
makes the investment trade substituting. However, if the output from the plant is 
to be sold across a region, as is the case with foreign automobile plants situated 
in Canada or the UK, then the investment will create a change in the direction of 
trade flows as it replaces previously existing flows. A third form of FDI is driven 
by a company’s aim of maximising the returns from its ownership, location or
64 UNCTAD (1995).
65 See Kennedy (1992), Ahluwalia (1994) and Parra (1995).
66 See Dasgupta, Mody and Sinha (1995).
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internalisation (OLI) advantages.67 In this case the effect on trade flows is 
indeterminate. For example, the internalised transactions could be trade in 
intermediate goods, which appears in trade figures, or they could be trade in the 
knowledge-based assets of the firm, such as patented processes, which do not 
appear in merchandise trade figures.
These complications make an accurate assessment of regionalisation 
even more difficult. For example, if Toyota sets up a car plant in Spain to make 
cars to sell across Europe then the trade figures would show a rise in the intra- 
regional trade intensity index (especially if the production was substituting for 
cars that had previously been exported from Japan). In terms of actual economic 
integration, from one perspective there has been a rise in regionalisation, but 
from another perspective the situation is unchanged, because a variety of 
European countries are still buying Japanese cars. However, if BMW sets up a 
similar car factory in Spain, but this time plans to sell the output to the local 
market instead of exporting from Germany, then the trade intensity index will 
decline. However, it can be claimed that there has been no change in the degree 
of European integration—it is simply that FDI flows have replaced trade.
Thus the problem is part functional (what is the FDI for?) and part 
definitional (what do we mean by regionalisation?). The net result is that unless 
we can see the whole picture of what is happening to flows of goods, factors of 
production and intangibles, then confident assertions about the actual (as 
opposed to statistical) path of regionalisation and globalisation are problematic.
5.7 Regionalisation and Economic Welfare
That regionalisation is an increasing trend in terms of data on trade and 
investment flows has been demonstrated. This has implications for the behaviour 
of governments and of multinational corporations which will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters, but there are also the questions of whether such a trend is 
positive or negative from an economic welfare perspective, and what principles 
would help to ensure a positive welfare effect.
67 Dunning (1980).
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There are two main areas where regionalisation can detract from 
economic welfare. The first is the classic Vinerian example, where trade 
diversion outweighs trade creation. As has already been discussed, Kemp and 
Wan noted that if trade volumes with the rest of the world are kept constant, then 
there is not a welfare loss as a result of trade diversion. For this to occur 
transfers must exist, and Grinols showed how compensation schemes can be 
constructed.68 Thus a regional group can result in more intensive intra-regional 
trade, but without a welfare loss to the rest of the world. So the conclusion that 
regionalisation is on the increase does not necessarily imply a reduction in 
welfare for countries outside the regional bloc. However, in the real world there is 
little evidence of welfare assessments related to trade bloc formation and so 
trade diversion appears to be a continuing issue.
The second area where welfare losses can take place is that of inter­
sectorial distortions and rent-seeking behaviour, which occur when a free trade 
area is only of a partial nature. The MERCOSUR pact which came into force at 
the start of 1995 is a good example, in that it provided temporary exemptions for 
several important sectors, including capital goods. As Corden has previously 
highlighted,69 direct allocative distortions will result from differential tariff rates 
which in MERCOSUR’S case range from 0% to 20%. Some of the results 
outlined by Krueger regarding rent-seeking behaviour are also relevant here.70 
Substantial efficiency losses could stem from any rent-seeking behaviour by 
interested parties, attempting to maintain the advantage that differential tariff 
rates gives them.
As was shown in Chapter 2, Makower and Morton, and Lipsey noted two 
key features which will help to determine whether a customs union will raise 
efficiency.71 Firstly, the greater the share of trade between the countries entering 
into the agreement as a proportion of total trade, the greater are the benefits. 
More recently, Krugman has argued that free trade areas are more likely to be 
welfare enhancing if they are created along "natural" geographic lines, which
68 See Kemp and Wan (1976) and Grinols (1981).
69 Corden (1984).
70 Krueger (1974).
71 See Makower and Morton (1953) and Lipsey (1960).
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tends to be the same thing as saying they have a relatively high propensity to 
trade with each other.72 Secondly, the greater the cost differentials in the two 
countries, the greater the efficiency gain. So dissimilar, but closely integrated 
economies will benefit most from a customs union. On this basis, the gains in the 
case of NAFTA could be expected to be high, while in the case of the European 
Union the cost differentials are lower, whereas in the case of an Asian bloc, the 
share of trade is lower. It is also the case that the lower the difference in costs 
between the new supplier inside the free trade area and the previous external 
supplier, the lower will be the welfare cost of any trade diversion. These factors 
imply that free trade areas between developed countries, or between developed 
and developing countries, are more likely to be welfare enhancing than those 
between developing countries.
Krugman constructs a relatively simple, but highly informative model 
examining the number of trade blocs and implications for world welfare. Firstly 
looking at tariff levels, he assumes that each bloc will impose the optimum tariff. 
Krugman shows that the larger the bloc, the higher will be the optimum tariff level 
with the result that "a consolidation of the world into fewer, larger blocs will lead 
to higher barriers on inter-bloc trade".73 Combining this finding with welfare 
considerations, he shows that for any realistic elasticity of substitution between 
any two countries the optimum tariff level is much higher than can be observed in 
the real world. This shows that actual trade relationships between major trading 
blocs are much more co-operative than in the case where optimum tariffs are 
imposed. One reason for this could be that the policy actions of trade blocs are 
constrained by adherence to multilateral obligations which prevent them from 
raising tariffs to optimum levels.
Finally, Krugman shows that in a world where welfare is maximised when 
there is only one trade bloc (i.e. global free trade exists), the greatest damage to 
welfare occurs when there are three trade blocs. If the world is approaching a 
situation where this is becoming a reality (European, Pan-American and Asian) 
then this could severely reduce world welfare, if the blocs begin acting in a less 
co-operative fashion and attempt to impose optimum tariffs.
72 See Krugman (1991a).
73 Krugman (1991a) p. 36.
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Issues which were very much in vogue around the time of the inauguration 
of the European Single Market programme relate to the efficiency gains from 
regionalisation. Regionalisation promotes efficiency via the stronger competition 
which results from easier market access for other regional firms. As long as an 
effective regional competition policy exists, this is one unequivocally positive 
dynamic as stronger growth within the region does not imply weaker growth 
outside it—on the contrary, the boost to regional demand will also enable extra- 
regional suppliers to sell more exports.
As noted above, a large proportion of recent developments towards 
deeper integration are non-discriminatory in their nature: the United Nations has 
labelled regional non-tariff barrier liberalisation as a quasi public good in that 
non-regional parties cannot be excluded.74 The implication is that deeper 
integration will contain less trade diversion than more discriminatory tariff based 
schemes, which would indicate that recent European Union and North American 
moves are likely to result in fewer "losers” than earlier bouts of regionalism.75
The issue of welfare gains is clouded as a result of inward and outward 
foreign direct investment. The gains from trade creation within a region will go to 
the firms producing within that region irrespective of ownership. It is quite feasible 
for foreign-owned firms within a regional bloc to enjoy the gains from trade 
creation, while the extra-regional affiliates of firms with their home base within the 
region suffer from trade diversion. Remittances of profits on an inter-regional 
basis will make the distribution of gains from regional integration even less clear.
It has also been argued that FDI can lead to welfare losses due to the 
strategic behaviour of multinational corporations. In an oligopolistic industry firms 
might find it advantageous to over-invest, thereby creating excess capacity that 
can be used to deter other firms from attempting to enter the market.76 It could 
also be the case that uncertainty about a future protectionist slant to the trade 
bloc could cause firms to over-invest, to give them the ability to meet demand in
74 United Nations (1993) p. 8.
75 Although in Europe agriculture may be an exception to this.
76 See Helpman and Krugman (1989).
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the event of restrictions on imports.77 In either case, the welfare effects of such 
behaviour are negative.
There are also dynamic aspects to economic welfare considerations which 
can be tangentially important. Few countries embark on policies which result in 
lower trade barriers or even deeper regional co-operation without engaging in 
broader economic reforms, usually on a non-discriminatory basis. For example a 
report for the Australian government noted that trade liberalisation tends to result 
in other inefficiencies in the economy becoming more apparent, with the end 
result being an increase in pressure for related reforms.78 The idea is that lower 
trade barriers raise competitive pressures within the economy. These make 
existing restrictive practices more evident and more damaging, leading to 
pressure for their removal. Alternatively, there is an ideological overlap, with the 
same arguments used in favour of reducing trade restrictions also relevant for 
liberalising the domestic economy. The implication is that standard trade-related 
calculations of welfare effects will understate the overall impact on the economy, 
as the increase in domestic competition raises welfare gains through dynamic 
effects.
Another aspect of preferential regional agreements is that they lower the 
level of political risk for companies operating within their boundaries. As is 
discussed in Chapter 6, political co-operation reduces the systemic risks (as 
opposed to business risk) faced by multinational corporations as it makes 
damaging military or political conflict between the participants less likely. This 
would indicate that objective measures such as the value of lower trade barriers 
which stem from a regional agreement will understate the real reduction in costs 
to MNCs (on the basis that political risk is a cost).
Overall, evaluating the welfare effects of regionalisation is highly complex. 
The overriding impression is that most static, economic analysis is likely to 
underestimate the degree of welfare gains, although once again, the interaction 
of trade and FDI flows makes definitive assertions inappropriate.
77 See United Nations (1993) p. 14.
78 EPAC (1995).
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5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter it has been shown that there are several possible explanations for 
the statistical findings presented in Chapter 3. It is necessarily the case that an 
increase in preferential trade arrangements results in a rise in regionalisation, 
although the magnitude is unclear. More importantly, it does not appear 
legitimate to ascribe the rise in regionalisation noted in North America and 
Europe since the late 1980s wholly to the "deeper" aspects of the relevant 
agreements, some of which are difficult to apply on a preferential basis. This had 
already been hinted at by the findings in Chapter 3 that in the case of the 
European Union the increase in regionalisation over the past two and a half 
decades was predominantly due to the entrance of new members, rather than 
increased bias between the original six.
Changes in corporate organisational structures also appear to be 
promoting regionalisation as companies establish regional production networks in 
response to changing technologies. Moreover, the statistical effects of changes 
in the terms of trade have played a part in raising European trade intensity 
indices since the late 1980s in addition to any underlying economic 
transformation. However, in North America weaker terms of trade have exerted a 
downward pressure on trade intensities.
It is likely that there has been another agent at work, which is that of 
globalisation, offsetting the power of these three forces. Some of the moves 
towards globalisation will counteract the forces promoting regionalisation, but in 
other cases firms can globalise in terms of meeting demand and competition, 
while regionalising their production systems. The picture is further clouded by 
foreign direct investment flows because of the differing motivations for, and 
effects of, FDI. The implication is that microeconomic forces cannot be ignored 
when examining regional developments.
Having looked at factors which are behind the regionalisation trends 
discussed in Chapter 3, the next chapter will move on to consider issues behind 
the trend towards regionalism. However, the MNC is clearly a key player in any 
discussion of regional integration and its preferences and behaviour will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER SIX
CAUSES OF REGIONALISM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 it was established that the trend towards regionalism had revived in 
popularity in recent years, while Chapter 3 demonstrated a rise in the degree of 
regionalisation of Europe and North America. This chapter examines the factors 
behind the increased popularity of regionalism. In terms of considering why the 
trend towards regionalism has been so strong in recent years it is possible to 
examine a range of motivations. As regional arrangements are primarily bodies 
to deal with trade and investment issues, economic factors can be expected to 
be the strongest force, but other aspects such as political or systemic factors will 
also have a bearing. In particular, it is necessary to consider not just why 
regionalism occurs from a static perspective, but also from a dynamic one in 
order to explain its growth over the past decade.
Marked variability in the forms of regionalism and the potential for 
diverging paths in the future raises the issue of differing implications for 
multinational corporations, as well as for members and non-members of regional 
trade agreements. Such diversity creates ambiguity as to whether regionalism is 
compatible with a fully-functional multilateral system. It will be argued that 
regionalism is not necessarily a substitute or a complement for multilateralism. 
As Jackson noted in almost the same breath "regional trading blocs can 
complement the world trading system .... However, regional trading blocs could 
get out of hand".1 The World Trade Organization (WTO) takes a less ambiguous 
attitude towards regionalism than the GATT had done, and safeguards have 
been reinforced to promote complementarity. Even so, the director-general of the 
WTO, Renato Ruggiero, stated "Unless regional initiatives are firmly grounded in 
the principles and rules of the multilateral system, the risk is that they could 
create divisions between regional areas, a very dangerous trend taking into 
account the political weight of some of the these systems".2 This chapter 
discusses the potential for complementarity between regionalism and
1 Jackson (1992) p. 501, Friedmann Award Address.
2 Quoted in the Financial Times, 7 July 1995 "WTO chief fears wave of protectionism".
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multilateralism, as well as examining the views of the institution established to 
oversee the world trading system. Moreover it will be argued that the international 
political economy debate on regionalism tends to concentrate excessively on the 
building block / stumbling block issue, while neglecting micro issues related to 
the behaviour of multinational corporations.
It is possible to argue that the rise in regionalism implies a concomitant 
rise in protectionism. This is a complex issue, made more so by the variety of 
regionalism evident in the world economy. Analysis can be conducted from the 
viewpoint of the international obligations of a bloc or from its ideological 
foundation, as well as from an institutional perspective. If there is a structural 
bias towards protectionism, irrespective of the ideological stance of a trade bloc, 
then it will undermine the stated benefits from regionalism.
Regionalism affects multinational corporations at three particular levels. 
The first level is regime based, with greater co-operation reducing systemic risks. 
While the impact of lower risk premiums could be significant, it is not an element 
in econometric studies of the gains from regionalism. The second level touches 
on the controversy regarding the changing balance of power between states and 
markets, with one interpretation of regionalism as a means of the state regaining 
lost sovereignty by pooling its power with other states.3 The third level is the link 
between corporate behaviour and regionalism which will be examined in the next 
chapter. This chapter concentrates on the macro and systemic aspects of 
regionalism and the implications for the international political economy.
This chapter will demonstrate that regionalism can take various forms, 
incorporate different regimes and have diverging implications for economic 
integration. The illustration that there is no set formula is interesting in itself and 
implies that multinational corporations need to have a flexible outlook. Laying out 
a range of possible developments will assist in the assessment of corporate 
behaviour in the following chapter.
6.2 Why is Regionalism on the Increase?
An understanding of the motivations for regionalism is needed in order to provide 
the framework for analysis of the nature of various regional agreements.
3 Gibb (1994).
Chapter 6: Causes and Implications of Regionalism 186
Regionalism that is driven by defensive factors will have a different structure from 
that with a GATT-plus agenda based around expanding economic benefits. 
Several possible explanations can be suggested when a reason for the trend of a 
growing number of regional agreements is sought. It is also worth bearing in 
mind the dynamics of the process. That is to say, we do not simply need to 
consider why regionalism takes place, but also why it has suddenly become 
more popular in recent years. The various explanations are summarised as 
follows:
1) There is the basic trade creation argument which stems from the benefits 
of lower tariffs. Moreover, lower barriers within the region will promote 
efficiency all the more if the members already trade a lot with each other.4
2) Groupings of countries with similar trade patterns can produce gains from 
exploiting monopoly or monopsony power, via the optimum tariff.
3) Financial incentives can stem from any transfer payments which 
accompany bloc membership. Transfer payments are a zero sum game so 
they do not explain bloc formation, but they can induce some countries to 
participate.
4) Changing industrial structures mean there is a growing need for "deep 
integration'1 (i.e. a harmonisation of domestic factors behind 
competitiveness) between structurally similar countries, which is more 
easily achieved through regional co-operation. Deeper integration 
reinforces the efficiency gains achieved by border-level trade 
liberalisation.5
5) Regionalism can be an important step in undermining domestic interest 
groups. What Olson has labelled "distributional cartels" resist economic 
liberalisation and it may be easier to erode their power gradually via 
regional agreements, rather than suddenly through multilateral ones. On 
this basis, broad (i.e. multi-sector), regional agreements may be easier to 
implement than narrow sectorial ones which threaten specific interest 
groups.6
4 This was one of Upsets (1960) findings, as discussed in Chapter 2.
5 Ostry and Nelson (1995). Chapter 4.
6 Oman (1994), Milner (1997).
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6) Some issues are inherently regional. Migration and pollution are two areas 
which are most effectively addressed on a regional basis for geographic 
reasons. It could also be that some "new" areas such as intellectual 
property rights, labour standards or trade related investment measures 
(TRIMs) are best tackled regionally, due to the different values between 
regions.
7) Regionalism can be a political response to economic changes which have 
already taken place. For example, some argue that attempts to construct 
some sort of regional institutional framework in Asia have lagged behind 
the economic integration of the region.7 Codifying existing practices is 
relatively uncontroversial and has the effect of reducing uncertainty for 
regional actors. It could also be the case that there are limits to market- 
driven integration and eventually policy or regulatory co-ordination is 
needed.
8) Advancement of political objectives, such as democratic evolution or 
political stability can be assisted by regionalism. The lure of preferential 
access to large markets is seen as a means of promoting or sustaining 
democratic processes. For example in November 1995 Turkey’s Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller warned that rejection of the EU-Turkey customs 
union by the European parliament would destabilise the whole Middle 
East.8
9) Regionalism can reflect attempts by the state to regain power over 
markets. It can be argued that there are several areas—notably in 
financial markets—where national sovereignty has been undermined, 
either by liberalisation or simply by innovation or technical progress. By 
making policy on a regional basis, states can try to restore their authority.
10) Regionalism can be a defensive measure or "insurance policy" to 
counteract growing regionalism elsewhere. The fear of being in a 
weakened bargaining position vis-a-vis regionalised blocs is a recurrent 
theme in the formation of new regional agreements.9
7 For example see Yoshida et al. (1994). Note, however, that the findings of Chapter 3 do 
not support the idea that a de facto integrated trade bloc is emerging in Asia, although such a bloc 
may be being created through investment rather than trade flows.
8 Reuters, 22 November 1995.
9 OECD (1995).
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11) Regionalism provides a means of offering and securing stronger and more 
credible commitments to trade liberalisation. Membership of a free trade 
agreement typically involves less scope for backsliding than the WTO, 
which has weaker enforcement. International treaties are harder to change 
than domestic laws, which means that policy stability is more likely.10
12) It reflects a loss of faith in the multilateral process, with regionalism viewed 
as an alternative.11
13) Regionalism reflects the growing number of states pursuing liberal 
economic policies. "The end of history" type analysis suggests that fewer 
countries are operating on non-liberal ideologies (most notably with the 
demise of the Soviet Union)12 with the result that more countries are 
prepared to lower trade barriers on either a regional or multilateral basis.
What is clear from the above list is that economic gain is by no means the 
only motivation for creating regional agreements. Only the first four items are 
clearly economic issues: relating to the arguments over customs unions, to 
monopoly power, to transfer payments and to broader allocative efficiency. Of 
those, only two are explicitly "trade" issues. All others involve a degree of non­
economic consideration, including issues relating to political theory, game theory 
and various areas of international relations, such as policy co-ordination, 
environmentalism and regime analysis. For example, it would be difficult to argue 
that the free trade agreement signed in 1985 between the United States and 
Israel was based primarily on economic motivations. Credible explanations range 
from promoting US security interests in the region to the power of domestic US 
lobby groups, but the economic benefits come well down the list.
Moreover, the thirteen points listed above give an indication of what is 
relevant to the formation of regional agreements, but they do not tell us what is 
significant. Some consideration of the details of agreements is needed to identify 
elements which have a real impact, but this is complicated by the likelihood that 
the dynamic forces will vary between blocs and even within blocs.
10 Lawrence (1996).
11 Kobrin (1995).
12 Fukuyama (1992).
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To illustrate this point, consider the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico which was put in place 
in 1994, bringing Mexico into the free trade area already established between its 
northern neighbours. The motivations of the participants in signing such an 
agreement differed considerably. For example the US wanted to encourage 
political stability to the south of its border, to address issues neglected by the 
Uruguay Round and to tackle illegal immigration from Mexico, a politically "hot" 
issue in the United States.13 Meanwhile Mexico, as with Canada before it, was 
eager to gain reliable and preferential access to the US market, while also 
"locking in" economic and political reforms, as commitments to the US were seen 
as more credible that those to the GATT. Mexico also hoped to attract foreign 
direct investment that would otherwise have gone to the other NAFTA members, 
or to other low cost countries.
Canada’s initial motivation to form the Canada-US Free Trade 
Arrangement (CUSFTA) was to guarantee access to US markets, and to 
increase the predictability of the US treatment of Canadian goods and sen/ices. 
The accession of Mexico was attractive to Canada in that it helped to offset the 
unequal power relationship implicit in bilateral relations. Note that the free trade 
element of CUSFTA was not in itself significant (although the extension to 
services was important) as pre-CUSFTA average tariffs on US-Canadian 
merchandise trade were only 1%. While, from an economic viewpoint, 
incorporation of services and investment in the free trade agreement were a key 
feature, the non-economic elements stand out. For example, as a part of the 
CUSFTA deal the United States agreed to consult with Canada over any piece of 
domestic legislation that would directly affect its northern neighbour before its 
passage. In addition, the dispute settlement mechanism was based on a bi­
national panel which would ensure that domestic laws had been correctly 
implemented. Canada had felt that the US administration had previously 
influenced verdicts.14
Bergsten noted that North American trade patterns would not change 
much as a result of NAFTA unless seven discriminatory areas were tackled on a
13 As pointed out by Mundell (1957), if commodities can move freely across borders then 
factor price equalisation can occur and there will not be a need for movements of factors of 
production— in this case Mexican labour into the US.
14 Kahler (1995) Chapter 3.
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multilateral basis. However, in each case if liberalisation occurred only between 
NAFTA members then trade diversion would be substantial, as it would generate 
trade with uncompetitive suppliers.15 Similarly, Whalley asserts that the Canada- 
US deal contained so many exceptions that it was "less a FTA than a trade 
agreement".16 In most other areas trade was already liberal, both between 
NAFTA members and with the rest of the world. This suggests that whatever 
trade creation did occur as a result of NAFTA could involve high costs (in terms 
of world welfare) due to trade diversion. One frequently cited example is the shift 
in production from Taiwan to Mexico by Zenith which involved the transfer of 600 
jobs.17
While small countries may join trade blocs as a defensive measure, in 
order to be insulated from any protectionist movement of the dominant economy 
in the future, different forces appear to be behind the US involvement in an Asian 
trade group. In the late 1980s debate in Asia was whether a regional bloc should 
be Asian or Pacific (that is to say, whether or not it would include North America 
and Australasia). The creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation 
(APEC) forum, including the Pacific Americas and Australasia was a triumph for 
the US in that it managed to prevent the construction of a purely Asian bloc, 
which would probably have been dominated by Japan. Such an Asian bloc would 
have further reduced US influence in the region, while APEC enables the US to 
balance out Japanese influence and to prevent developments which might harm 
US interests in the region.
It has been demonstrated that for a small country, in a perfectly 
competitive world unilateral tariff reduction is always superior to a preferential 
regional agreement, from the point of view of resource efficiency, as the latter 
always contains an element of trade diversion.18 This being the case, the efforts 
of small Latin American countries to enter NAFTA, or of small European
15 The sectors noted by Bergsten (1991) were textiles (where South East Asia would 
benefit from non-discriminatory liberalisation), steel (Brazil and Mexico partly, but mostly Europe 
and Japan), autos (Japan, Korea and Europe), machine tools (Europe, Japan and Taiwan), dairy 
products (Australia, New Zealand and Europe), sugar (Latin America and Australia) and meat 
(Latin America and Australia).
16 Whalley (1993) p. 363.
17 Hufbauer and Schott (1992) p. 73.
18 See for example Cooper and Massell (1965), Johnson (1965), Berglas (1979), Robson 
(1980) or Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981).
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countries to join the European Union (EU), must be explained by considerations 
such as potential transfer payments or economies of scale or by political 
factors.19 For example, internally it may be that the partial liberalisation implicit in 
a regional agreement is more acceptable to domestic interests than a 
widespread opening to foreign competition. Externally it could be that there are 
aspects of belonging to a particular group (such as transfer payments or stronger 
bargaining powers) which compensate for the decision not to opt for the more 
economically efficient, but more isolated path of unilateral liberalisation.
In support of this argument, note that there is a clear trend towards 
unilateral tariff reduction as well as towards regionalism. During the course of the 
Uruguay Round more than 60 countries notified GATT of unilateral trade 
liberalisation. Subsequently, 1995 saw unilateral action by countries ranging from 
Indonesia and Thailand to Australia and various Eastern European countries. 
This is related to one of the more important attractions of free trade agreements 
over customs unions, in that an FTA allows a country the option of unilaterally 
liberalising its own tariff regime without first obtaining the agreement or 
participation of the others.
It is also worth noting that once Uruguay Round tariff reductions are fully 
implemented, tariff barriers in developed countries will be so low that the direct 
trade-related benefits from preferential trade arrangements will be extremely 
limited. Again this suggests that marginal economic efficiency gains resulting 
from trade creation due to lower tariffs are not the prime motivation for developed 
countries joining preferential trade arrangements—the pre-CUSFTA tariff level 
was only 1%. The post-Uruguay Round implementation average OECD tariff on 
industrial imports will be just 3.8% while the Generalized System of Preferences 
sanctioned by the GATT in 1971 which gives preferential treatment to imports 
from developing countries means that only five countries face MFN tariffs on all 
of their exports to the European Union.20 All other countries have preferential
19 Harris (1985) examined various trade policies for Canada and found a welfare gain of 
4% of GDP for unilateral elimination of tariffs, 9% of GDP for a bilateral agreement with the US 
and 9% of GDP for multilateral elimination of tariffs. The acceptance of increasing returns to scale 
was a key aspect to the results.
20 The countries are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States, 
although it should be noted that imports from these five make up 60% of the EU’s imports from the 
rest of the world.
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treatment for at least some of their exports. This raises some interesting 
questions:
i) If direct trade-related economic benefits from regional agreements are 
marginal then why has so much energy been expended on their formation, 
especially as in the past decade regionalism has been rising, even during 
a secular trend towards lower trade barriers. Or, implicitly, what are the 
other benefits which appear important?
ii) If the real objective of a regional agreement is to raise the level of political 
co-operation then is it not more effective to concentrate on purely political 
measures, rather than using the "side door" approach of economic co­
operation leading on to "greater" things?
iii) Given that the motivations to form regional agreements are so diverse, is it 
possible to construct a framework to analyse their structure and 
behaviour?
6.2.1 Economic Aspects
One answer to the first of these points is that even if the benefits of lowering 
tariffs within the region are marginal, they still represent a pure efficiency gain. 
The end result of producing more output from the same set of inputs is attractive 
to any nation. Note also that the investment in terms of political effort and 
dislocation effects on previously sheltered domestic industry tend to be one-off 
costs, while the benefits are enduring.
Several studies also focus on the dynamic gains from regional integration, 
in addition to the static gains from more efficient resource allocation.21 That is to 
say, as well as the one-off allocative efficiency gains, continued benefits will 
come from economies of scale and increased competition. Baldwin estimated 
that in the case of the European Single Market the result could be to add 
between 0.2% and 0.9% to the EC’s long term growth rate in addition to the 2.5% 
to 6.5% one-off gains envisaged by Cecchini.22 A more general review of studies 
of the trade and welfare effects of regional trade agreements notes that the
21 See Francois and Shiells (1992).
22 Baldwin (1990).
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results are imprecise but that the welfare gains are small in most cases.23 As 
Corden has noted, it might be possible to measure the rates of tariffs, but it is 
much more difficult to calculate the real costs of protection.24
Estimates vary in the case of the Uruguay Round, but a World 
Bank/OECD study put the increase in world income at US$213 billion (in 1992 
prices) by the year 2002 while the OECD comes up with a figure of US$274 
billion on the same basis. The GATT Secretariat’s estimate was for a US$230 
billion (in 1992 prices) rise by 2005. Most of the gains stem from agricultural 
liberalisation, rather than lower tariffs for manufactures.25 Gains of this magnitude 
would represent a rise of about 1.5% in world GDP.
There is a question as to whether minor tariff reductions are a significant 
enough benefit to developed countries joining regional groupings, considering the 
expenditure of such a major political effort. However, as noted in Chapter 3, the 
experience of Canada and the US after 1989, and new members of the 
European Union over the past two and a half decades suggests that 
regionalisation can respond to reduced trade barriers. However, in both cases, 
greater preferential bias followed agreements which resulted in co-operation at 
levels other than just tariffs which suggests that "deep" agreements can also 
have an impact on regional integration. As noted in Chapter 5, several aspects of 
deeper integration are applicable regionally.
Another noteworthy element is that when business leaders from the 
European Union and North America met in Seville in November 1995 to examine 
the potential for some sort of transatlantic free trade area, the discussion did not 
focus solely on tariffs. The final communique referred to the findings of four 
working groups on standards, certification and regulatory policy, trade 
liberalisation, investment, and third country issues.26 Discussion of tariff 
reductions was even a minor part of the recommendations related to trade 
liberalisation, which also covered issues such as government procurement and 
intellectual property rights.
23 Srinivasan, Whalley and Wooton (1993).
24 Corden (1984).
25 Taken from Evans and Walsh (1994) p. 4.
26 Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Overall Conclusions, Seville, Spain, 10-11 November
1995.
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There is a difference between regional trade agreements which 
concentrate on lowering tariffs and those which cover non-tariff barriers and other 
factors related to economic integration. Many regional agreements do not bypass 
non-tariff barriers. For example, members are only exempted from anti-dumping 
action in the European Economic Area and in the Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement. From a purely practical viewpoint, several 
distortions are outside the scope of regional agreements—domestic support, 
export subsidies, sanitary or phytosanitary regulation and technical barriers to 
trade are difficult (if not impossible) to apply on a discriminatory basis. Therefore, 
while "deeper" agreements can be seen as conferring benefits to members in 
terms of non-tariff barriers, there are many areas where deeper liberalisation is 
non-preferential. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, the preferential bias of trade 
between the six founding members of the European Union has not increased 
since the late 1960s despite efforts to increase European integration.
Another economic aspect of regionalism is the potential to exploit 
monopoly or monopsony power. However, the systematic abuse of monopoly 
power by trade blocs is notable by its absence. Whalley calculated the US could 
see income rise 2% by imposing an optimum tariff.27 Similarly, McCloskey 
estimated the UK lost 4% of national income by cutting tariffs in the mid-19th 
century.28 Krugman show that theoretical optimum tariff level is much higher than 
can be observed in the real world, which implies co-operative trade relationships 
between major trading blocs. Again this suggests that regions are not taking a 
narrow economic perspective when deciding on tariff policy.29 Fear of retaliation 
is one constraint on predatory behaviour by large blocs. This would help to 
explain, in game theory terms, the trend towards bloc formation or expansion as 
a defensive measure. In practice the imposition of optimum tariffs by one bloc 
would be likely to be met by similar tariffs from others, with the end result of 
lowering welfare for all. The World Trade Organization identifies three policy 
responses of countries faced with growing preferential agreements.30
27 Whalley (1985).
28 McCloskey (1980).
29 Krugman (1991a) p. 36.
30 WTO (1995) pp. 51-54.
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i) Join or associate with regional groups. This could be to enjoy the MFN 
benefits of being a member of the agreement, but given the frequently low 
existing tariffs, it is just as likely to be an insurance against suffering from 
any increase in levels of protectionism in the future. The large number of 
bilateral deals with the European Union shows the popularity of this 
strategy.31
ii) Create new regional agreements. This appeared to be a motivation in the 
regional agreements signed in Africa and Latin America in the 1960s, with 
the aim that a group of countries could bargain with other regional blocs 
more effectively than they could as individual countries. This is also a 
factor in the renewed interest in regionalism in the past decade.
iii) Support multilateral liberalisation. There appears to be a clear correlation 
between regional initiatives and acceptance of further multilateral 
liberalisation. In particular, EC integration (through both broadening and 
deepening) was the spark for the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds in the 1960s 
and the Tokyo Round of 1973-79. Although the average German tariff rate 
rose from 6.4% to 10.4% between 1958 and 1968 due to tariff 
harmonisation within the EEC, post-Kennedy Round levels were down to 
6.6% and the average EEC external tariff was halved.32 More recently, 
indications that the US might aggressively embrace regionalism helped to 
produce support for inaugurating the Uruguay Round.
Economic explanations of regionalism based on tariff reductions are 
reasonably persuasive in offering at least a partial explanation why countries 
choose to form trade blocs. It is less clear whether they can explain why there 
has been a sudden revival of the trend in the past decade—if anything lower 
unilateral and multilateral tariffs should suggest the opposite. The recent 
popularity can partly be explained by the "deeper" aspects of economic 
integration which are evident in some agreements between developed
31 Twenty two of the total of 109 regional trade agreements notified to the GATT between 
1948 and 1994 were related to the formation or expansion of the EC or EFTA, or ties between 
their members. A further 54 of the notified agreements were between the EC, EFTA or their 
members and other countries or groups of countries. Only one third did not concern European 
integration.
32 See Resnick and Truman (1975) or Sapir (1992) for details.
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economies. As economies become more integrated, elimination of non-border 
inhibitors to trade and investment increase in importance.
It is difficult to argue that the trend towards regionalism is knowledge- 
based, resulting from sudden and widespread acceptance of the economic 
arguments in favour of regional bloc formation. The basic theory concerning the 
gains from free trade has changed little since Ricardo’s days, while customs 
union theory has not seen major advances for at least two decades. It is possible 
that alternative ideologies have weakened with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
while free market principals have become more widely adopted and as a result 
there is greater acceptance of both regionalism and multilateralism. While the 
economic arguments are reasonably persuasive, other explanations are worthy 
of consideration.
6.2.2 Political Co-operation
It can be argued that political considerations are the real motivation for some 
economically based regional agreements, but these political objectives are more 
easily achievable through tangential means which do not provoke the domestic 
nationalist lobby. However, this portrayal of a "side door" approach can be too 
simplistic. If, for example, the real motivations of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement were political, then would not direct political co-operation have been 
more suitable? An economic deal aimed at political ends will provoke resistance 
from economic lobbies which might have acquiesced to a purely political 
agreement as well as from political opposition which discerns the real motivation 
for such a step. This is similar to Corden’s argument about a hierarchy of 
preferences existing to correct any economic distortion, with the most directly 
relevant policy being the most efficient.33 Here the answer seems to be two-fold. 
Firstly, as the European experience has shown, economic co-operation provides 
an institutional base for future understandings on non-economic matters. 
Secondly, at the end of the twentieth century there is increasingly a seamless link 
between economic and political matters; attempting to define specific issues as 
falling within the sphere of economics or those of politics or international relations
33 Corden (1984).
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is too rigid a demarcation.34 A broad trade agreement may be the most effective 
means of establishing a framework which can be used to address most issues 
between countries.
In that a regional agreement might be a precursor or a complement to 
military co-operation, it would be expected that this motivation would have 
weakened since the end of the Cold War. Security aspects of European 
integration which were strong at the time of its formation in the 1950s are much 
less of an issue in the 1990s following the political transformation of Eastern 
Europe. The fact that there has been a burst in regional agreements since the 
demise of the Soviet Union indicates that military concerns are no longer to the 
fore. The entry in 1995 of Vietnam into ASEAN—the grouping that was initially 
formed in response to the perceived threat from Vietnam and China—is another 
illustration of the changing concerns of regional blocs.
As the OECD has pointed out, the end of the Cold War has allowed trade 
relations between former allies to become more aggressive.35 This is most 
notably the case in US-Japanese relations, where reduced American military 
involvement in East Asia has been accompanied by greater pressure on Japan to 
open its market to foreign goods.36 This comes back to the view that some 
regions are forming trade agreements as a defensive measure against the 
possibility of a more aggressive trade policy from the US or European Union.
Another interpretation is that the modern state sees regional economic co­
operation as a means of re-asserting its authority over the market. There is a 
popular (although contentious) assertion that the state has gradually lost power 
to firms or markets in the post-war period.37 This is illustrated by features such as 
difficulty in regulating some industries for fear of driving them away (notably 
finance), an almost uniformly welcoming stance of states towards multinational 
firms' investment and the growing importance of some issues which can only 
effectively be tackled on a regional basis (such as environmental protection).
34 In 1996 the US attempted to link the issues of trade and politics, by threatening to 
discriminate against any firm which invested in Cuba under the Helms-Burton Act, and similarly 
planned action against firms which invested in countries which the US claimed were sponsors of 
world terrorism, such as Iran or Libya.
35 OECD (1995).
36 Finger and Fung (1994) discuss the structural impediments initiative between the US 
and Japan.
37 See for example The Economist, "The myth of the powerless state", 7 October 1995.
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Regional policy-making implies that firms have less ability to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage and it represents another dimension to state control to which the firm 
must be prepared to respond. Even if the state is not successful in extending its 
power by a pooling of sovereignty, it still creates another institution with which the 
multinational corporation must interact.38 Related to this is the observation that 
the past decade has seen a splintering of many countries and the creation of a 
greater number of smaller states. Even without a change in the relative power of 
states and markets this would point to regionalism as a means of restoring the 
pre-break up status quo, as was seen with the Czech-Slovak customs union 
which emerged following the split of Czechoslovakia.
Milward offered a different perspective when he claimed that the 
European Community was not the antithesis of the nation state and the EC "has 
been an integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an organizational 
concept".39 In Milward’s analysis, the EC allowed the state to offer its citizens a 
higher level of security and prosperity than would otherwise have been possible, 
thus helping to retain the support of the people. In essence, in some issue areas 
the EC is greater than the sum of its parts, so the state benefits from ceding 
responsibility.
Bhagwati has suggested that one reason why regionalism has revived 
since the 1980s, after its failure in the 1960s has been the conversion of the 
United States to the cause.40 In the 1960s the United States had favoured the 
multilateral approach, but in the 1980s constructed free trade deals with Israel 
and Canada, and since then has aired the possibility of a pan-Americas free 
trade area. However, it is unclear whether the US adoption of regionalism was a 
reflection of frustration with lack of progress at the multilateral level, or because it 
was seen as a complement to the multilateral process.
Thus political or international relations based interpretations offer an extra 
dimension to explanations of regionalism. However, they have difficulty in 
explaining the increase in popularity in regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the 
post-Cold War period, when greater security would suggest fewer regional 
agreements.
38 Oman (1994).
39 Milward (1992) pp. 2-3.
40 Bhagwati (1993).
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6.2.3 Structure and Behavioural Aspects
It is difficult to classify regional agreements neatly, either in terms of their 
structure or behaviour. However, it is an area which must be considered in any 
attempt to construct a framework which relates the actions of multinational 
corporations to regionalism. A typography of the various forms that regional co­
operation may take was offered in Chapter 2, ranging from sectorial agreements 
to full political union. The standard view is that closer economic integration goes 
hand in hand with stronger, more centralised institutions.41 Causality is in debate, 
and in fact it is probably an iterative process, with economic integration a force in 
favour of eliminating the merits of political segmentation and the consequent 
differences in national policy, while promoting the development of centralised 
institutions. The more centralised institution then implements policies which in 
turn sponsor further economic integration. The underlying theme is that closer 
economic integration creates the need for, and is a response to, the closer 
harmonisation of policies which occurs as a result of firm, centralised policy­
making.
Regarding structure, greater economic integration has not led to a single, 
functionally driven, pattern of institutional change 42 It does not necessarily lead 
to centralised, rule-based institutions with expanding scope. In fact Kahler goes 
so far as to argue that there is an "arc of information" with loose, decentralised 
institutions likely to exist when information is sparse and expensive, as well as 
when information is plentiful and cheap. This is based on the idea that it is 
difficult to develop a centralised structure when information levels are low, and it 
is not needed when levels are high. Centralised institutions will occur when 
information is moderately accessible at a moderate price. Although intellectually 
appealing, placing the European Union neatly in this typography is difficult43 
although it could be applied to the ANZCERTA. On the available evidence it
41 See Haas (1964) or Kahler (1995).
42 Kahler (1995).
43 In November 1995 the president of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer argued that 
monetary union would have to be accompanied by closer political ties if it was to succeed. In 
February of the same year the UK Chancellor had argued that political and monetary union were 
separate issues.
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appears more feasible to argue that economic integration is likely to be 
accompanied by stronger institutions, but this not necessarily the case.
The behaviour of institutions is discussed below, where it is argued that 
there is a danger that regional trade agreements will behave in a protectionist 
fashion. This occurs through rent-seeking behaviour or through ineffective 
decision-making processes. Although this behaviour may be predictable, it is not 
implied by a structural examination of an institution, but derives from the context 
in which it operates.
6.3 Is Multilateralism Fading?
In spite of the general acceptance that regionalism is a growing force, there is not 
a consensus as to whether this spells the end of multilateralism. This brings us to 
the recurrent question of whether regionalism and multilateralism can be 
complementary. There are four key issues from the point of view of multinational 
corporations as well as the GATT/WTO. The first is whether the rise of regional 
arrangements is hindering, or threatening to hinder, the free flow of goods, 
services and capital between regions. As will be discussed in the following 
chapter, the answer to this question will play a part in determining the optimal 
global strategy of the multinational corporation. The efficient structure of a 
corporation with global activities will differ considerably depending on whether it 
can trade in an uninhibited fashion, or whether its markets are becoming 
increasingly segmented. This will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
The second issue is whether regionalism will prevent further multilateral 
liberalisation. A polemic view is taken by authorities on international trade such 
as Bhagwati and Panagariya, who argue that regional trade agreements are 
undermining the multilateral process. For example Panagariya criticises NAFTA 
for diverting Mexico away from the path of non-discriminatory liberalisation it 
followed in the 1980s, while the side agreements on labour and the environment 
have set a dangerous precedent which will impinge on further multilateral 
discussions. He even goes so far as to assert "Nafta can be judged actually to 
have harmed the cause of multilateral free trade".44 Levy uses a more formal 
interest group approach to show that support for multilateralism can be
44 Panagariya, letter to the Financial Times, 10 May 1995.
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undermined (and never enhanced) by bilateral agreements when product 
differentiation and economies of scale exist.45
The third issue is whether there is a need for further multilateral 
liberalisation. It could be argued that such a high proportion of world trade is now 
covered by the provisions of the Uruguay Round that a cost-benefit analysis of 
further multilateral deals makes them appear unattractive. However, this 
approach is short-sighted: it was the changing structure of international trade that 
made the Uruguay Round necessary, especially the increased importance of 
trade in services, and growth of non-tariff barriers.46 It is already apparent that 
although the Uruguay Round has bolstered the share of world trade that is 
covered by international agreements (for example by reaching agreement on 
services trade), many rapidly growing areas of trade, investment and other types 
of non-equity activity still fall outside the remit of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In future it could be that competition policy comes to be recognised as an 
important element in trade relations, but it is an area that is not covered by any 
multilateral agreements.47 Discussions between the European Union and the 
United States are looking at "deeper" issues than are covered by the WTO, such 
as product standards, patents and taxation: these too are likely to be areas for 
future multilateral debate.48
Defenders of multilateralism argue that regional negotiations may be more 
effective in achieving incremental advances to already laid-out ground rules, but 
they will be ineffective in drawing up rules for tackling new areas in the 
international political economy.49 However, this does not fit well with the evidence 
which shows regional agreements acting as test cases for widening the 
multilateral agenda, as was the case with services treatment in CUSFTA and 
ANZCERTA.
45 Levy (1997).
46 Although the Tokyo Round had partially covered non-tariff barriers, the Uruguay Round 
agreement was stronger and more broadly based.
47 In October 1995 the European Union’s Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan advocated 
the coverage of investment rules, competition policy, the environment and labour standards by any 
future international trade negotiations.
48 Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Overall Conclusions, Seville, Spain, 10-11 November
1995.
49 W TO (1995) p. 56.
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The fourth issue is that even if it is desirable to have further multilateral 
liberalisation, is it practical or feasible? There are serious questions about 
achieving consensus among such a large and diverse membership,50 as well as 
over the speed of negotiations and implementation. For example, the Uruguay 
Round was launched in September 1986, was signed in 1994 and it is not until 
2005 that full implementation of all agreements is required. In fact if the timing is 
dated back to the Ministerial Meeting in 1982 then the process spans almost a 
quarter of a century.
In reality criticism of the slowness and complexity of multilateral 
negotiations is overstated, perhaps as a result of post-Uruguay Round fatigue. 
Although there were 114 contracting parlies to the GATT at the time Uruguay 
Round negotiations were completed in December 1993, a limited number of 
countries outside the OECD have real influence. Few developing countries have 
enough power to contemplate trying to press their own agenda, and if they act 
together when negotiating (the Cairns Group51 is an example) then this again 
reduces the number of actors to manageable proportions. Problems resulting 
from the number of negotiators is relatively slight compared to issue-based 
complexities caused by fundamental disagreements between major actors over 
sectors such as agriculture.
Concern about the length of time involved may also be exaggerated. 
Uruguay Round negotiations did not begin in earnest until 1988 which was the 
year of the Montreal mid-term review. They were completed at the end of 1993. 
Moreover, although liberalisation of some sectors will be slow, most of the effects 
will be seen by the end of the century. Similarly Schott argues that the substantial 
component of the Tokyo Round negotiations only took 18 months, although on 
paper the Round lasted from 1973 to 1979. It is also worth noting that for recent 
regional agreements, once the deal is signed implementation tends to run ahead 
of schedule.52
50 There were 125 signatories to the Uruguay Round while by the time of the Ministerial 
Meeting in Singapore in December 1996 there were already 126 members of the WTO.
51 The Cairns Group represents exporters of agricultural products and comprises 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji (not a GATT member), Hungary, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay.
52 See Schott (1989). The Australia-New Zealand CERTA is an example of this 
acceleration. Signed in 1983, it provided for a free trade deal by 1995, but this deadline was 
brought forward to 1990 after a 1988 review.
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One concept which is much discussed with regard to the European Union, 
but is rarely extended to other regions, is subsidiarity. It could be that this offers 
some insights into the development of the international political economy. For 
example, there is evidence of subsidiarity at work in Asia. While the WTO and 
APEC cover many of the areas of general concern to Asia, there is also scope 
for regional deals such as ASEAN or the Australia-New Zealand CERTA. At the 
same time, the popularity of "growth triangles" has boomed in recent years. For 
example, there exist within ASEAN the Southern Growth Triangle of Singapore, 
the Malaysian state of Johor, and Riau province in Indonesia, as well as and the 
Northern Growth Triangle of northern Sumatra (Indonesia) four northwestern 
Malaysian states and southern Thailand. These arrangements are an effort to 
capitalise on the variety of inputs available within a small geographic region. 
These are signs that, in Asia at least, regional integration is occurring at 
whatever level is most effective.
There are several possible directions for the future regulation of 
international trade. These options will be used in Chapter 7 when considering the 
strategies of multinational corporations. The main ones of interest are:
1) Multilateral negotiations continue at irregular intervals, as has been the 
case since the intensive burst of GATT Rounds in the first fifteen years 
after its formation. Bilateral and regional agreements complement 
multilateral negotiations and help to set the future agenda.
2) No further multilateral agreements are signed, although the growth 
continues of bilateral and regional agreements which deepen integration 
between signatories without raising barriers to non-participants. Some 
elements of deeper integration will inevitably be non-discriminatory in 
nature. This could include a WTO-plus agenda, linking countries with 
similar attitudes towards further liberalisation, but without any regional 
basis. Such an approach could even lower barriers at a faster pace, due to 
the complexities involved in achieving agreements between the diverse 
participants in multilateral deals.
3) Multilateral agreements will be replaced by bilateral and regional 
agreements, which increase integration between signatories, but which 
hinder trade and investment flows with the rest of the world.53
53 This could be a particularly negative situation for developing countries if multilateral
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4) Regionalism falls from favour to be replaced by a renewed faith in the 
powers of multilateralism.
5) Both regionalism and multilateralism are discarded in favour of a return to 
national trade policy. Such a development would be likely to involve a 
more protectionist agenda.
Combinations such as a continuation of multilateralism combined with 
protectionist regionalism are disregarded as being inconsistent. These views are, 
to an extent, cliched, in that the issues are not as clear cut as they are presented 
above, but they provide a useful framework for a discussion of the implications 
for MNCs which will be conducted in the next chapter. Whichever pattern 
emerges will have implications for multinational corporations, and this will also be 
discussed in the next chapter. Much will depend on the behaviour and attitude of 
the three main forces in world trade; the US, the European Union and the World 
Trade Organization. The latter is, by definition, in favour of continued multilateral 
liberalisation. At present the evidence on the US and EU is mixed. In the past 
decade both the European Union and the United States have embraced 
regionalism to a greater extent than at any time in the post-war period. However, 
at the same time both invested considerable effort and made important 
concessions to secure agreement on the Uruguay Round.
The WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in December 1996 failed to 
give an indication as to whether another multilateral Round will be attempted, but 
emerging issues such as competition policy, financial services, product standards 
and non-tariff barriers in general suggest that there is plenty of material which 
another Round could address. The decision is likely to depend on whether the 
wider breadth of a multilateral agreement is worth the additional time and effort. 
Complications stemming from the likely addition of the People's Republic of 
China to the WTO before another multilateral Round begins could be the 
decisive factor which makes the EU and United States opt for regionalism, in 
perhaps a Transatlantic Free Trade Area.
obligations are seen, in part, as restricting the ability of the more powerful developed world to 
exploit its position of strength. A "survival of the fittest" version of competitive regionalism could 
result in less co-operative trade policies vis-a-vis the developing world.
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A final point in favour of multilateralism is the intellectual argument. The 
wealth of literature and the counterexample of the 1930s are powerful forces 
supporting a liberal trading system. They suggest that even if little further 
multilateral progress is made, it will be difficult for countries or regions to act in a 
way which directly goes against existing multilateral norms.
Note also that pure bilateralism does not seem to be a practical alternative 
to the multilateral process. For the 126 countries which had signed up to the 
WTO by the time of the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Meeting to negotiate bilateral 
treaties with each other would mean 7875 separate deals. Avoidance of the need 
for, say, Austria to conduct negotiations with Zimbabwe is one of the efficiencies 
of the multilateral system. That is to say, it reduces transaction costs and or 
associated problems such as lack of information, moral hazard and irresponsible 
behaviour.
On balance, it seems that regionalism is not necessarily a substitute for 
multilateralism, but it would be complacent not to recognise that multilateral 
conventions might be replaced by regional and sectorial agreements in the 
future. The potential for substitutability makes the attitude of the GATT/WTO 
towards regionalism worthy of consideration. It is also possible for regions to 
have a protectionist bent, rather than a liberal one. As the guardian of the world 
trading system, the WTO can be expected to highlight areas where regionalism 
poses a threat.
6.4 The GATT and Regional Trading Arrangements
As noted in Chapter 2, the attitude in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade to regional trading arrangements (RTAs) was ambivalent. Although they 
go against the basic GATT principle of non-discrimination, RTAs were seen as 
potentially being a step towards a distortion-free multilateral system. An attempt 
to ensure this was the case was made in paragraph 4 of Article XXIV which 
reads "the purpose of a customs union or of a free trade area should be to 
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the 
trade of other contracting parties with such territories". An effort was also made 
to ensure that the political determination existed to create a regional agreement
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capable of overcoming protectionist opposition by specifying that the preferential 
arrangement could not be a limited sectorial one.
Regional trading agreements had to be notified to the GATT to allow 
inspection to judge whether they conformed to the rules laid out. Although Article 
XXIV explicitly permitted the formation of customs unions and free trade areas, 
the GATT rules on regional trading arrangements were criticised for their 
ambiguity. The vagueness of Article XXIV, using wording such as "duties and 
other regulations of commerce .... shall not on the whole be higher or more 
restrictive that the general incidence of duties .... prior to the formation of such 
union"54 left the treaty open to manipulation. It is, after all, not the average level 
of tariff rates which matters, but the effective rate. For example, in 1957 the six 
members of the EEC calculated tariff levels according to an unweighted 
arithmetic mean of tariffs existing prior to the signing of the agreement.55 If the 
same method were used to extend NAFTA to a high tariff country within Latin 
America, then it could raise the effective level of tariffs, while still conforming to 
wording of the GATT, if not to its spirit. Other ambiguities left similar scope for 
abuse. For example another GATT Article XXIV requirement was that duties and 
other restrictions "are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to 
substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories".56 However, 
the precise meaning of the word "substantially" was not made clear.57
A more practical problem was that it was rare for a working party to deliver 
its findings before the regional agreement was signed and operational. For 
example, the working party investigating the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement 
began work after a delay of two years. This meant that there was no opportunity 
for interested third parties to raise objections via the GATT before the agreement 
went into force.
54 Article XXIV, Paragraph 5a.
55 So if Germany had imported 90% of a product and had imposed a tariff of 10%, while 
the other five had imported the remaining 10% but had imposed a tariff of 20%, the post-EEC 
formation average tariff would have been 18.3% (110 divided by 6). The effective tariff rate would 
have risen however, from 11% (0.9 x 10% plus 0.1 x 20%) to 18.3%. In fact, tariff rates for 
Germany and Benelux countries generally rose, while they fell for France and Italy. See Sapir 
(1992) for details of how tariff rates actually moved in Europe.
56 Article XXIV, Paragraph 8a.
57 Blackhurst and Henderson (1993).
Chapter 6: Causes and Implications of Regionalism 207
More seriously, the working parties tended to be inconclusive with regard 
to Article XXIV. To the end of 1994, 69 working parties had delivered their 
reports, with a further 15 still in progress and five others ending without 
completing their examinations. Of the 69 completed, in only six cases did the 
working party explicitly find the agreement to be GATT compatible under Article 
XXIV.58 Of those six, only two are currently active—CARICOM and the customs 
union between the Czech and Slovak republics. In the remainder of cases there 
was no consensus as to whether the requirements of Article XXIV were met. 
Moreover, no notified agreement has ever been found to be illegal by a GATT 
working party.59 Thus as the WTO notes "making no pronouncement on the key 
matters they were charged to examine has been the rule for Article XXIV working 
parties".60 Furthermore, no amendments to the structure of a preferential 
arrangement have ever been requested by a working party, no doubt partly 
because the report is usually issued after the agreement has been in place for 
some time. This seems to be the clearest indication of weakness in the wording 
or implementation of Article XXIV.
A 1985 wiseman's report chaired by Fritz Leutwiler found that the 
provisions of Article XXIV were ambiguous and that there was no real 
surveillance. The report found that "exceptions and ambiguities .... have seriously 
weakened the trade rules, and make it very difficult to resolve disputes to which 
Article XXIV is relevant".61 The spirit of the article began to be undermined in 
1957-58 with the first steps in the formation of the EEC, when there was no 
consideration of whether the agreement accorded with Article XXIV.
Perhaps the GATT can be blamed too harshly for the weakness of the 
provisions concerning customs unions and free trade areas. Bhagwati notes that 
regionalism "was not generally considered, by the architects of the GATT or by 
the United States .... as antithetical to the GATT and [its] principles".62 Economic
58 These were the South Africa-Rhodesia Customs Union (1948), the Nicaragua-EI 
Salvador FTA (1951), Nicaraguan participation in the Central American Free Trade Area (1958), 
the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement (1965) and the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM) (1973) and the Czech Republic-Slovak Republic Customs Union (1992).
59 Blackhurst and Henderson (1993).
60 WTO (1995) p. 17. Italics in the original.
61 Leutwiler (1985) p. 41.
62 Bhagwati (1993) p. 28.
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theory on the subject was reasonably limited and it appears that, with certain 
provisions, they were viewed as "a step in the right direction". The inception of 
the European Economic Community in 1958 was the turning point, in that it 
sparked interest in preferential trade arrangements elsewhere, and the treatment 
of the EEC was inconclusive. The GATT failed to reach a decision on whether 
the Treaty of Rome was compatible with Article XXIV and has not formally 
examined the issue since then. Moreover, it was difficult to avoid setting the 
precedent of allowing the formation of the EEC, as any finding which had the 
result of driving the EEC out of the GATT would also have meant the effective 
end of efforts to create a multilateral trading system. The US supported the EEC 
because of the political benefits of a stronger Europe, despite questions as to 
whether it was GATT compatible.63 There was little change through to the closing 
days of GATT, with the US and European Union possessing an effective veto on 
substantive decisions.64
Thus what could be expected to have been one of the main safeguards 
against the establishment of a restrictive set of regional trading blocs has proved 
to be ineffective. Without clear rules and resolute enforcement to prevent 
regionalism from being of an exclusionary nature there is no case for arguing that 
legal or institutional considerations will ensure that economic integration of one 
region does not result in lower welfare for the rest of the world.
If the inability to take a firm position on regional trade agreements is a sign 
of the GATT’s lack of power over members, then this could also be related to the 
weakness of the GATT’s dispute settlement mechanism, which authorised 
retaliation only once—in 1954. In fact this could be interpreted in two other ways; 
either that GATT intervention was so successful that disputes were resolved 
without retaliation being necessary, or that the GATT was scared of a collapse of 
multilateralism and a spiral into a trade war. The process laid out was for: 1) 
consultation; 2) conciliation; 3) panel review (all designed to achieve a "mutually 
agreed" solution); 4) membership vote to make official the panel's findings and 
recommendations and; 5) vote to authorise retaliation.
The weakness of the dispute settlement mechanism was one area 
targeted for improvement in the Uruguay Round. In practice, it had become
63 Bhagwati (1992a).
64 Hindley and Messerlin (1993).
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almost impossible for the GATT to find against any major members as they were 
able to block a panel decision which had to be unanimous. A major change in the 
WTO dispute settlement procedure is that there now has to be a consensus to 
reject a panel ruling.65
As with the firmer guidelines on regional trading arrangements, however, 
it is not clear that stronger rules on dispute settlement will, in themselves, be 
sufficient, as rules do not necessarily indicate power. The GATT’s problems over 
regionalism related to its unclear ideological stance on the issue, the imprecision 
of the wording of Article XXIV and the weakness of the GATT as an institution. 
While the first two of these problems are within the remit of the WTO, it has 
limited control over the third.
6.5 The WTO and Regional Trading Arrangements
On paper, the attitude of the World Trade Organization towards preferential trade 
agreements is similar to the GATT. For trade in goods, the WTO adopted 
existing Article XXIV provisions together with the Uruguay Round Understanding 
on Article XXIV which clarified some (but not all) of the vaguer aspects.66 The 
Agreement on Rules of Origin is also relevant to free trade areas, while the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has similar provisions to those 
for goods.
The Agreement on Rules of Origin was an important step which 
recognised the basic difference between customs unions and free trade areas 
(FTA), namely that members of the latter are free to decide on their own tariff 
rate on imports from the rest of the world. As FTAs are the most common form of 
regional agreement, rules covering a product’s origin need to be clear. Rules of 
origin can divert trade of semi-finished goods or partly processed raw materials, 
and can also be used by protectionist domestic lobbies.
Less than six months after its foundation, the World Trade Organization 
produced a study into the effects of regional trading arrangements. Regionalism 
and the World Trading System looked mainly at the systemic effects of growing
65 Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1997) pp. 144-145.
66 For example, comparisons of pre- and post-customs union tariff rates is to be on a 
weighted average of the applied rate.
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regionalism, but it was less equivocal on the subject than had been its 
predecessor. In particular, the WTO noted that the debate over trade creation 
and diversion was only one element to be considered. It stressed that the 
economies of scale, increased competition and lower consumer prices which 
stemmed from lower trade barriers were often downplayed in ex ante or ex post 
analysis. The WTO also noted the need to consider issues such as investment 
flows when assessing the impact of trade agreements.
In terms of the actual rather than theoretical effect of regional integration 
agreements, the WTO recognised that their diversity makes it difficult to analyse 
the impact on trade flows and trade policy. The WTO also claimed that regional 
agreements tend to focus on tariffs. It asserted that non-tariffs barriers tend not 
to be applied preferentially, while domestic policies (such as production 
subsidies) cannot be applied preferentially. The implication being that the deeper 
the level of co-operation, the more difficult it is for the agreement to contain a 
regional bias. On the whole this is correct, although as noted in Chapter 5 it is not 
difficult to find recent examples of non-tariff barriers being used on a bilateral 
basis (most notably in US-Japan relations). Some non-border restrictions such as 
dispute settlement mechanisms, product standards and anti-dumping can be 
applied preferentially.
In the end the WTO took a more clearly positive view of regional trading 
agreements than the GATT had done, noting that "it is clear that to a much 
greater extent than is often acknowledged, regional and multilateral initiatives are 
complements rather than alternatives in the pursuit of more open trade".67 This is 
not just because regional agreements are structured in a way which results in 
lower trade barriers within the bloc without diverting significant amounts of trade 
with non-members. It also derives from the readiness of some agreements to 
accept higher levels of integration than previously existed on a multilateral level, 
with regional deals on services and intellectual property rights laying the 
foundation for Uruguay Round measures. The acceptance of clear rules and 
procedures—which form the basis of a trading system—at a regional level is also 
viewed positively by the WTO as this provides a framework for extension to the 
multilateral arena.
67 WTO (1995) p. 62.
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The World Trade Organization accepted that regional agreements tend to 
be complementary with multilateralism. For example, a desire to reduce the 
relative degree of preference inherent in regional agreements is seen as a factor 
in leading to other excluded nations pushing for greater multilateral liberalisation. 
Moreover, downplaying the risk of a rise in protectionism it noted "There have 
been no fortress type regional integration agreements among WTO members".68
Unsurprisingly (on the basis of institutional self-preservation), the WTO did 
not see regional agreements as a substitute for the multilateral process. The 
broader application of processes which are already accepted in some regions 
(such as TRIPs) is seen to depend on the WTO. Similarly, the WTO noted that it 
"has also been provided with a strengthened dispute settlement mechanism as 
well as a monitoring function, which together will bring increased transparency 
and predictability to trade and economic policies".69
The treatment of regional agreements under the GATT had met with 
frequent criticism. The WTO accepted that there were problems with the 
interpretation of and compliance with the rules at working party level. Moreover, it 
can be asserted that the GATT’s weakness means that any complementarity 
between regional integration and the multilateral system may not be a result of 
the GATT’s actions. Simply because regional agreements have been compatible 
with multilateralism in the past does not necessarily mean that they will remain so 
unless the rules and procedures are strengthened. The WTO also recognised 
that such weakness is a danger not just in the specific area related to regional 
agreements, but to the overall credibility of the WTO.70 However, the Uruguay 
Round failed to tighten up all the ambiguities in the wording of Article XXIV. The 
WTO sees three areas where reform could improve treatment of free trade areas 
and customs unions:
i) More rapid notification of agreements, so that WTO working parties can 
recommend changes before the agreement is signed.
ii) Improving the clarity of Article XXIV, or re-writing it to improve safeguards 
for third countries.
iii) Improving the surveillance of regional agreements as it has been shown
68 WTO (1995) p. 2.
69 WTO (1995) p. 62.
70 WTO (1995) p. 3.
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that peer pressure is a key consideration when drafting or amending free
trade areas or customs unions.
The guiding principle appears to be that the WTO views regional 
agreements as potentially beneficial, but dialogue and monitoring are needed to 
ensure that they remain complementary to the world trade system. This is a 
profoundly pragmatic conclusion; if the WTO were to find against regional 
agreements then it would need to be in a position to offer a clear and workable 
alternative. In 1995, with the major players still suffering from Uruguay Round 
fatigue, this was not feasible. The only realistic stance of the WTO was to accept 
that regionalism was a force, and to try to guide it towards following the basic 
principles behind the WTO.
6.6 Is GATT/WTO Multilateralism Still Regionalism?
In some ways the distinction between the regionalism of trading blocs and the 
multilateralism of the GATT/WTO is a false one. To treat the GATT/WTO as 
representing the entire trading world is an exaggeration: it has always been 
dominated by the developed world, with many developing countries either 
excluded or emasculated. Important non-participants in the mid-1990s include 
the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Russia and Saudi Arabia, while 
countries such as Mexico (joined 1986) and much of the rest of the former 
Eastern Bloc are only recent members. By 1995 China was the world’s eleventh 
largest nation in terms of merchandise exports, the second largest (behind the 
US) in terms of FDI inflows and in 1994 it was the second largest economy.71 
Excluding China from the GATT and treating it as multilateral is on a par with 
excluding Italy from the European Union and still claiming it represents all of 
Western Europe. More generally, with 123 members as of mid-1996 the WTO 
covers only two thirds of the membership of the United Nations. Nor is this a 
recent situation. Note that only 23 countries participated in the first GATT Round. 
Admittedly, at any point in time there have always been several countries which,
71 The 1995 World Bank report World Tables placed China’s purchasing power parity 
GDP second behind the United States.
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although not members of the GATT, implemented trade policy as if they were, 
but non-membership confers greater flexibility on policies.
That the decision-making process within the GATT or the WTO is not 
multilateral is also clear. As Kahler asserts, "the history of international 
institutions since 1945 demonstrates a record of great-power plurilateralism, 
even when embedded in regimes of large membership".72 In effect, the Tokyo 
Round was a series of bargains struck between major economic powers,73 while 
the horse-trading which occurred between the US and the European Community 
(and even within the European Community) in the scramble to resolve the 
Uruguay Round in late 1993 is a testimony to the dominant power of these two 
economic centres. Smaller nations are often invited to participate on a "take it or 
leave it" basis. An attempt to redress this imbalance in power was behind the 
formation of the Cairns Group of agricultural products exporters, which aimed at 
reducing the high effective levels of protection on agricultural products which still 
exist in many OECD countries.74 There is a sense that the tide may be turning 
following the failure of the United States and European Union to secure two 
seats each on the seven member WTO Appellate Body, but it remains highly 
unlikely that the WTO will be able to force significant policy change in either 
member.
It could be argued that the GATT was not just a regional agreement, but 
also a sectorial one. In 1992 the president of the OECD Development Centre in 
Paris asserted that "if GATT covers 10% of international economic and financial 
flows, this estimate will be on the high, rather than the low side".75 Oxley noted 
that by some calculations the proportion of world trade regulated by the GATT 
was as low as 7%, but most estimates put coverage at 50%. The Office of the 
US Trade Representative calculated that in 1989 two-thirds of trade was within 
GATT rules, with agriculture, textiles and services the major exceptions. 
Whichever is more accurate Oxley claims that even with the largely successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, large pieces of world trade are still not
72 Kahler (1995) p. 17.
73 Kahler (1995).
74 Bliss (1994).
75 Emmerij (1992) p. 10.
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regulated by the WTO.76 Services, trade related investment measures (TRIMs) 
and intellectual property rights are largely omitted (although the Uruguay Round 
dealt with some). In addition, textiles and agriculture were excluded from the 
GATT and it will take until the year 2005 to implement fully the Uruguay Round 
provisions. Even that will not result in free trade in agriculture and textiles, but will 
only bring them under the auspices of the WTO. Meanwhile trade in steel, 
electronics, automobiles and electrical goods does not strictly adhere to WTO 
principles.
Nevertheless the WTO marks a definite advance on the GATT as now all 
members are covered by the agreement’s provisions, including the five Tokyo 
Round Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) Non-Tariff Measures and Anti- 
Dumping/Subsidies Codes (subsidies & countervailing duties; import licensing 
procedures; standards & technical barriers to trade; customs valuation; and 
government purchasing policies) as well as the revised (but still weak) anti­
dumping code. Previously fewer than 50 countries were signatories to the five 
MTN codes. This brings the developing world into line with the global trading 
regime and eliminates "free riding" on the system.
The increasing substitutability of investment for trade (in a practical sense, 
rather than in the theoretical sense demonstrated by Mundell) also indicates that 
WTO-style multilateralism may not cover all the issues. Although the OECD has 
begun to address regulation of foreign direct investment, issues such as 
competition policy remain outside the scope of any multilateral agreement.
Thus although there is the temptation to treat the WTO as if it is the sole 
arbiter of multilateral trade issues, in reality its jurisdiction is limited both 
geographically and sectorially, as well as being restricted to a subset of the range 
of factors which influence cross-border transactions. While WTO-based 
liberalisation covers more countries than any regional agreement, it is not fully 
inclusive and so any WTO prescription remains a second best solution. On this 
basis, comparisons between a regional world and a multilateral world under the 
WTO may be false; the comparison is really between two different types of 
regionalism. From the point of view of the multinational corporation there are 
three possibilities: operating in countries which are not WTO members; operating
76 Oxley (1990) p. 128.
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in sectors which are not fully covered by WTO rules; and operating within the 
WTO framework.
6.7 RTAs, International Relations and International Business
It is a fact of history, and remains true today, that the majority of disputes which 
result in military conflict are between neighbouring countries.77 It is also the case 
that the majority of trade agreements are regionally based; indeed they are 
frequently formed between countries which have been involved in warfare at 
some point in the past hundred years. Just as one of the underlying themes of 
the European Union is that countries with common economic interests are more 
likely to find non-military means of resolving disputes, so it can be argued that a 
world consisting of a web of regional trading agreements is less likely to decline 
into warfare.
Gowa has found that there is a positive relationship between military or 
diplomatic alliances and trade preferences.78 She argues that trade brings 
economic benefits, which inevitably has the effect of raising resources available 
for military spending, so it must be the case that trade with an ally enhances 
security, while trade with a potential adversary diminishes it. Gowa finds that 
since 1905 trade has been more likely within alliances than between them, 
especially in a bipolar, rather than multipolar world. The implication is that 
measures taken by alliances to increase economic integration complement the 
micro effect of greater security on firm behaviour. Unfortunately causality is 
unclear; that is whether alliances lead to economic co-operation which brings 
trade preference, or whether it is the greater security which has a direct impact 
on trading relationships.
Apart from the obvious humanitarian implications of reduced regional 
conflict, which at least is apparent within the developed and newly developed 
world, there are implications for business. Any risk assessment by a multinational 
corporation tends to be conducted, implicitly or explicitly, on three levels.79 The
77 Waltz (1979) p. 138.
78 Gowa (1994).
79 This is the approach carried out by the Economist Intelligence Unit in its Country Credit 
Risk Appraisal reports.
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first level relates to the general microeconomic situation facing a firm, in terms of 
its cost structure, the degree of competition it faces, and the like. On a 
macroeconomic basis, factors such as GDP growth rates, income levels, degree 
of unionisation, quality of workforce, are all issues which will determine the 
profitability of an investment in a country. However, systemic risks, such as 
revolution or warfare threaten not just the income stream from an investment, but 
the value of the investment itself.
A regional trading agreement offers lower systemic risk to the MNC on two 
counts. Firstly, linking two countries economically through a free trade agreement 
involves setting up some kind of forum for discussion, which inevitably involves 
closer political contacts. Mutuality of economic interests also raises the costs of 
warfare, which involves destruction or appropriation of productive facilities, and 
consumer hostility even after the resolution of the conflict. The second area of 
lower systemic risk relates to the impact on each country’s domestic policy­
making as a result of being a member of a regional trading organisation, with the 
implicit or explicit responsibilities to trading partners that this entails. For 
example, the objective of "locking-in" market oriented reforms in Mexico was 
clearly part of the motivation of the United States in pushing for NAFTA.80 This 
provided a more stable systemic environment for US firms operating south of the 
border.
Thus aside from any benefits which stem from more economically oriented 
issues such as resource allocation, there are clear gains to MNCs from a 
reduction of the risk premium which needs to be ascribed to all economies other 
than perhaps the soundest OECD members. This is largely irrespective of what 
the regional group actually does in terms of tariff reductions or non-tariff 
measures; the mere existence of a forum for discussion is sufficient to reduce 
risk. This suggests that studies may seriously underestimate the benefits of 
regionalism as they tend to concentrate on the gains from greater trade flows or 
the more efficient allocation of investment which result from lower trade and FDI 
barriers. The rise in trade and both the quantity of investment and its locational
80 Although it should be recognised that this represented an about face from the policy 
which spanned from the debt crisis of 1982 until 1989 when Mexico tried to reduce dependency on 
the US economy and integrate more with the rest of the world.
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efficiency as a result of lower systemic risk must be added to the benefits 
suggested by more standard econometric calculations.
6.8 FDI, Multilateralism and Protectionism
It is also worth noting that there are important forces at work reducing the 
motivations for creating regional agreements. There has been a secular rise in 
foreign direct investment in the past two decades, to the extent that in almost 
every major economy the role of foreign-owned production has risen. With this 
rise in foreign ownership comes a decline in one political motivation for 
regionalism, because the benefits become spread more broadly. This 
complicates interest group analysis which assumes that the lobbying activity of 
factors of production is aimed at maximising returns only within the individual 
country they are located.81
Most estimates put the share of intra-firm trade at between one third and 
one half of total trade.82 Taking the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) as an example, the impact of NAFTA trade diversion will affect US 
subsidiaries abroad as well as foreign firms, while the benefits of trade creation 
are enjoyed by foreign subsidiaries within North America, as well as domestic 
firms. As a result, the motivations to create a trade bloc will be less clear cut. 
While the direct benefits to consumers may not alter too significantly, the impact 
on foreign and domestic firms will be less clear. Foreign firms will lose less 
through trade diversion and may even gain through trade creation as a result of 
FDI in the region. Domestic firms will not take all of the gains from trade creation 
and will also suffer in the form of trade diversion away from their foreign affiliates.
The sectors in which FDI tends to occur makes this outcome not entirely 
unrealistic. Foreign direct investment into the bloc is likely to be in traded goods 
or services and is likely to be in the more efficient sectors. (Firms may transfer 
technology which has become obsolete in their own economy, but not if it is also 
obsolete in the recipient’s economy.) For example, there was substantial inward 
FDI in manufacturing within the European Community in advance of the Single
81 Levy (1997), Krishna (1998).
82 See Dicken (1992) p. 49, Dunning (1993a) p. 303, or Oman (1994) p. 83.
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European Market in 1992, but very little in agriculture.83 Thus from the 
government’s viewpoint, the benefits to the economy as a whole from forming 
regional blocs are diminished by the effect of inward and outward FDI. In terms 
of corporate political behaviour, it is likely to make domestic MNCs more 
circumspect in their support of a regional bloc.
A higher proportion of foreign direct investment within an economy also 
makes overt protectionism less likely. For reasons outlined above, a general 
increase in tariffs would damage US affiliates abroad, as well as benefiting 
foreign-owned operations within the US which would experience less 
competition. Alternatively, targeted protectionism would benefit some US 
producers, but would damage foreign-owned interests. For example, former US 
Trade Representative Kantor’s plans to impose high tariffs on luxury car exports 
from Japan to the US in May 1995 provoked a rash of lobbying and threats of 
legal action by dealer networks for Japanese cars based in the US. Faced with 
destruction of their livelihoods, the dealers represented an effective counter to 
the US Big Three auto makers.
Thus it is not just political pressures which affect trends towards 
regionalism, but also the underlying structure of the economy. Again this raises 
the point that multinational corporations do not simply observe and respond to 
regional trends, but they are key forces in shaping those trends, as the sum of 
MNCs’ actions has a direct bearing on policy-making.
6.9 Regionalism and Protectionism
There is a view that regionalism is a threat to multilateral liberalisation,84 but this 
is not quite the same as asking whether it actually implies a rise in protectionism. 
It is worth considering whether this is the case, whether regionalism can rise 
while protectionism falls, or whether there is indeed any close relationship 
between the two areas. There are two aspects to this issue. The first relates to 
the nature of the regime;85 whether there are institutional features which cause it
83 OECD (1997a).
84 Bhagwati (1992b), Levy (1997).
85 Krasner defined a regime as a "set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations" (1983) p. 2.
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to lean in a certain direction. This section argues that the mechanics of trade 
blocs tend to give them a protectionist bias. The second aspect relates to the 
incorporation of the regional agreement in the world system and how it interacts 
with non-members. Whether the grouping is "open" or "closed" will also reflect its 
objectives. A bloc aimed at supporting multilateralism is likely to be open. One 
which is defensive or aims to gather economic rents is more likely to be closed. 
In general an ideological stance towards openness can be observed,86 which 
counters the institutional bias towards protectionism.
A free trade area lacks negotiating power as it does not have a common 
approach to import tariffs. Bargaining power is accentuated by forming a customs 
union, as then a trading partner or bloc will face a similar response across the 
members. However, ceding absolute control over setting tariffs is a big step for 
most countries and the only two significant groups in the world which have 
progressed beyond a free trade area are the European Union and 
MERCOSUR.87 None of the other trade blocs in existence has a unified policy, 
which suggests that it is unlikely that in its present form regionalism will adopt a 
protectionist slant, as there is no mechanism through which this can occur. 
Unless members are agreed on trade policy and there is some sort of central 
body to implement policy, then protectionist action will be impractical.
Henderson has presented a stimulating argument that the issues of 
protectionism and regionalism are entirely separate.88 He sees the future of the 
liberal trading system being determined by issues such as the response of the 
US and EU to ever greater competition from East Asia, or by a desire to bring 
labour and environmental standards into the realm of trade policy. To 
Henderson, the question is not whether more blocs mean more protection, but 
whether the major trading nations adopt a less liberal attitude towards trade. In a 
broad sense, this is a reasonable view as few central institutions exist and the 
degree of protectionism will be determined largely by the attitudes of the major 
trading nations. However, there are some areas of overlap in the details of
86 For example, the Uruguay Round took place at the same time as the renewed interest 
in regionalism from the mid-1980s.
87 Although there is even evidence of recidivism in the case of MERCOSUR, as only six 
months after its formation Brazil unilaterally announced plans to impose restrictions on car 
imports.
88 Henderson (1994).
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regional agreements, in terms of effective rates of protectionism and shifts in the 
terms of trade. There is also a question of whether there are institutional 
tendencies of regional blocs to lean towards protectionism, as discussed below. 
So while Henderson argues the issues are "largely distinct",89 there are links 
through game theory and functionalist arguments.
The World Trade Organization disagrees with the argument that regional 
blocs liberalise more rapidly than is possible at the multilateral level. It claims that 
countries’ commitments under the WTO tend to go beyond those in regional 
agreements, with the added benefit of WTO dispute settlement and monitoring.90 
Moreover the Uruguay Round largely resolved the issue of free riding on the 
multilateral system, while the WTO includes trade relations with countries which 
are not members of regional groups and so claims to offer more comprehensive 
liberalisation. Unsurprisingly, the WTO does not really address the question of 
whether its role should be reduced to co-ordinating trade relations between the 
various groupings which would then be able to proceed with liberalisation at 
whatever pace they see fit.
The WTO’s arguments are not entirely convincing. If regional 
commitments are weaker than those already existing to the WTO then there 
would be no motivation to create regional trading arrangements (RTAs) unless a 
collapse of the WTO was envisaged. Most RTAs incorporate some provisions for 
deeper integration than exists under the Uruguay Round—NAFTA, the European 
Union and the Australia-New Zealand CERTA all go further than current 
multilateral obligations. That is not to say that regional deals will cover all non- 
WTO issues—the CUSFTA notably avoided sensitive areas such as agriculture 
and subsidies—but they will extend coverage in one or more issue area. Perhaps 
a more realistic argument against regional trade arrangements is that they can 
set a negative agenda. Ardent multilateralists such as Panagariya argue that 
NAFTA diverted Mexico from its policy of unilateral liberalisation and, more 
generally, Mexican concessions on labour and environment suggest there will be 
pressure for their inclusion in further multilateral Rounds. Widening the agenda 
will prove a distraction from focusing on trade liberalisation.91
89 Henderson (1994) p. 197.
90 WTO (1995) p. 56.
91 Panagariya, letter the Financial Times, 10 May 1995.
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Chapter 3 showed that for most of the past three decades, rising 
regionalisation has been accompanied by the greater openness of economies. 
This allowed trade volumes with the rest of the world to increase, even though 
regional biases were strengthening. While this can still be seen as a second best 
solution compared to increased economic integration on a non-preferential basis, 
it is probably an advance on the situation where both regional integration and 
economic openness were lower. Thus although it has generally been the case 
that regionalism has not damaged the welfare of non-regional members, this is a 
function of the individual structures of the agreements and it is not inherently 
guaranteed by the process of regionalism.
Furthermore it can be argued that regionalism sets in place structures and 
institutions which can be used to implement protectionist policies. It was clear in 
the late 1980s that one of the main reasons for the burst of Japanese direct 
investment into the European Community was concern over the results of the 
European Single Market programme and the possible emergence of a "Fortress 
Europe".92 Moreover the adjustment costs which stem from the formation of 
regional blocs will cause firms which are suffering within the region to lobby for 
relief in the form of protection. Nevertheless, there are relatively few examples of 
bloc formation resulting in a rise in tariff protection.93
Standard trade theories teach us that the larger the economic actor in 
world trade, the greater the opportunity to improve its terms of trade by imposing 
an optimum tariff. This would imply that regionalism should lead to higher tariffs 
between blocs.94 That this is not an observable phenomenon indicates that 
protectionism is not a consequence of regionalism, in spite of the economic 
arguments in favour of higher tariffs. The conclusion is that the link between 
regionalism and protectionism is not proven. Regional trading agreements 
(RTAs) appear to create or strengthen the mechanisms for policy-makers to act 
in either a liberalising or protective fashion. They also raise the potential 
economic benefits from raising tariffs. However, post-war history shows major
92 The Economist, 15 April 1989.
93 The most significant recent example is provided by the expansion of the European 
Union to include Sweden, Finland and Austria. Prior to entry, semiconductors had duty-free 
access to Austria and Finland and faced a 2.3% tariff in Sweden. The EU duty is 14%. The 
European Union claimed that higher duties in some areas were offset by lower tariffs on other 
goods, such as cars, but will compensate affected trading partners— primarily the US.
94 Krugman (1991a).
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blocs using their power to push for lower tariffs with trading partners or on a 
multilateral basis, so a degree of economic enlightenment appears to go along 
with the RTA and the increased economic muscle.
6.9.1 Institutional Bias of Regional Trade Agreements
It is possible to distinguish between the professed ideological stance of a 
regional bloc and the mechanisms behind the actual formulation of policy. That is 
to say, there may be institutional factors within a structure which result in a bias 
towards or against protectionist policy-making. This can manifest itself through a 
political system that favours rent-seeking behaviour or through ineffective 
decision-making processes. Under this analysis, two regional trade agreements 
with identical policy objectives can have differing degrees of success in 
implementation, depending on their institutional structure.
On issues related to trade and competitiveness, the result can be that 
internal conflict is externalised. For example, in the 1970s failure to correct 
distortions in the European market for steel due to state subsidies of inefficient 
production in the UK, France and Italy meant that the response was to resort to 
trade restrictions. Voluntary export restraints (VERs) and the formation of 
Eurofer, a price cartel, occurred because member states were not prepared to 
accept domestic adjustment costs.95 Nor could the VERs be seen as a temporary 
measure to help to ease transition costs—in 1994 the EC Commissioner was 
again negotiating to cut subsidies to reduce over-capacity in the EC steel 
industry.96
Depending on the institutional structure, the result can be a "convoy" 
problem, with the group as a whole moving at the speed of its slowest member. 
The United States, which is perhaps the finest example of full economic and 
political union, has a similar problem, with protectionist measures repeatedly 
finding favour. This is a result of the rent-seeking behaviour of domestic producer 
interest groups combining with the natural stance of Congressmen and Senators 
in favouring interests local to their constituencies. Thus the US can implement 
trade policies in violation of free trade principles and which even damage the
95 Cline (1983).
96 Financial Times, 26 October 1994
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American economy as a whole.97 In Japan belief in the doctrine of free trade is 
more ambiguous, but again the complex political system favours producer 
interests over consumers.98 Japan will likely carry these prejudices to any bloc in 
which it participates.
Conversely, Hufbauer has argued that blocs may be more willing to 
liberalise than single countries. Indeed he goes so far as to claim that "without 
the prior formation of the EC, there would not have been a Kennedy Round".99 
For example, Italy and France would not have made so many concessions in the 
Kennedy Round unless pushed by Germany, which itself would not have 
liberalised unilaterally. (Although Winters argues that it also resulted in Germany 
and Benelux making fewer tariff reductions.100) Meanwhile, other countries that 
want to join the bloc will also liberalise, as was the case with the entry of more 
recent EU members such as Portugal or Spain. Although their liberalisation may 
be biased towards other European countries, it also involves embracing some of 
the more general policies of the group, which means greater openness overall. In 
addition, enlarging a group can dilute the powers of some of the lobbies which 
have previously had a strong influence.101
Whether an institutionalised trading arrangement has a liberalising or a 
protectionist bias will depend on at least three factors. Firstly, the relative 
strength of the members; the EU is notably different in structure from NAFTA in 
that no single country dominates to the extent that it can effectively coerce all 
other members. Secondly, in a long-established organisation, the interests of 
members may become subsumed into the interests of the group as a whole.102 
Thirdly, the nature of the regime which is constructed will play a part in 
determining whether individual members have the opportunity to pursue their
97 In a study of eight anti-dumping duties between 1989-90 in the US, Anderson (1993) 
found that for each US$1 gained by the protected industry, the US as a whole lost US$3.60. The 
cost per job was US$113,800 compared to the average salary of US$14,300 per job in those 
industries.
98 For a description of the processes see van Wolferen (1989).
99 Hufbauer (1990b).
100 Winters (1993).
101 Lawrence (1996) suggests that an enlarged EC had the effect of weakening to power 
of the French agricultural lobby.
102 Although the difficulties of the European Commission in lowering steel subsidies in 
1994 indicates that there are limits to such behaviour.
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own interests above those of the group. It is commonly argued that a rule-based 
regime will be the most effective guard against protectionist forces, but the lack 
of flexibility and adaptability in such a system could make it less effective than 
one geared towards negotiation and mediation.103 This is particularly the case as 
trade-related institutions must deal with "behind the border" issues, making it 
difficult to prove that distortions and barriers exist. That is to say, strong 
institutional design is not necessarily a proxy for a strong regime perse.
There is also the observation that by signing regional agreements, trade 
policy-makers are publicly subscribing to the view that promoting free trade 
raises economic welfare. It would require some degree of sophistry to argue that 
free trade is "good" within a region but "bad" outside the region. Of course this is 
not impossible (as the United States has shown by passing NAFTA and 
simultaneously "bashing" Japan), but the ideology of negotiators behind regional 
trade agreements is likely to be that of free trade.
The issue, as it relates to the legitimacy of trading bloc creation, is 
whether it is possible to create a structure which prevents the rent-seeking and 
decision-making processes in which local or national interests conflict with the 
broader objectives of the whole bloc. If the answer is no, then this must dilute the 
benefits ascribed to any bloc’s formation and could even be an argument against 
the formation of regional trade blocs. When looking at any institutional bias it is 
also necessary to consider the issue of policy shifting. That is, the tendency of 
governments to find alternative policies when their first choice policy instrument 
becomes inoperable, often due to international agreements. An example is the 
move from tariffs to non-tariff barriers in the 1970s and 1980s,104 and if an 
institution is to be effective it must provide a means of preventing such 
behaviour. Within the European Union it is relatively difficult for such policy 
shifting to occur, with precedent setting rulings such as the 1979-80 Cassis de 
Dijon case enforcing equal access for EU members through mutual recognition.
Another caution of viewing regional agreements as always representing a 
clear step towards liberalisation is raised by Gruben and Welch, who see NAFTA 
as part of what they label a Hegelian dialectic.105 In terms of trade policy this
103 Kahler (1995) pp. 11-18.
104 Laird and Yeats (1990a).
105 Gruben and Welch (1994).
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signifies the process by which innovations in trade liberalisation are countered by 
innovations in protectionism, and are succeeded by some synthesis temporarily 
acceptable to both sides. This is followed by more liberalisation, more 
protectionism and another synthesis. In relation to NAFTA, this is seen by the 
main part of the agreement which liberalises trade flows being countered by 
parallel agreements on labour and the environment. Another example is Section 
301 of the 1988 Trade Act which gave the US new manoeuvrability. The US used 
Section 301 (or Super 301 as it was) to threaten and gain concessions from 
others. Although Section 301 was aimed at opening other markets, protectionists 
used it to close the US one, by extracting commitments from trading partners to 
implement voluntary export restraints (VER) with the threat of 301-type action if 
no restraint was shown.
A similar trend is apparent in the EC, where Laird and Yeats have shown 
that in 1986 about 54% of all internationally traded goods were subjected to non­
tariff barriers, compared to 21% in 1966.106 The rise in the use of NTBs was 
particularly acute for agriculture, textiles and steel. This policy shifting is behind 
the agenda expansion of many regimes—including the GATT/WTO. The GATT's 
initial concerns were with tariff reduction, but its focus widened to include non­
tariff barriers and then non-border issues as other mechanisms were used to 
affect trade relations.
However, policy shifting also opens the way for abuse. One of the most 
controversial cases in recent years has been the US ban on Mexican tuna 
exports due to their toll on dolphins.107 In 1991 a GATT dispute settlement panel 
found the US ban to go against its GATT obligations. The GATT saw the US 
attempting to project its national policies onto another country, via the threat of 
denying market access. Moreover, Gilbreath noted that after four years, Mexican 
fishing practices had changed and few dolphins were killed, but the US ban 
remained, leaving the conclusion that US restrictions were aimed at saving the 
US tuna industry and not the environment.
More generally the attempt by environmental lobbies to appropriate trade 
measures to promote their policies is the subject of controversy. Although many
106 Laird and Yeats (1990a).
107 See Trachtman (1992), Gilbreath (1993) and Charnovitz (1993) for alternative 
perspectives.
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economists and lawyers would argue that "the area of actual conflict between the 
goals of a cleaner environment and freer trade would appear to fall between the 
non-existent and the minimal",108 this is one of the clearest examples of policy 
shifting. It could even be argued that a similar offset was seen on the formation 
of the GATT. States were obliged to make political concessions in terms of their 
trade policy, but this was balanced by the ability to offer political rewards via 
reciprocity, or to ease the pain via safeguards.109
Apart from institutional reasons which can result in formal regional trading 
organisations leaning towards protectionist policies, there is also an imbalance 
between the power of the body overseeing world trade, and large trade blocs. 
Note for example, that in 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) set 
external tariffs at the arithmetic mean of the six founder members. In GATT 
terms, this could be questioned, but if the GATT had found that the EEC was in 
violation of Article XXIV stipulations on customs unions, it risked self-destruction. 
Similar concerns surrounded US action against Japanese automobile exports in 
the spring of 1995: debate focused as much on whether a WTO finding against 
the US would cause the destruction of the multilateral system, as on whether the 
US tariffs were justified.110
Thus there is potentially a natural bias towards protectionism in formal 
trading blocs. This bias can only be moderated, and not reversed altogether, by 
pressure from the WTO. However, the ideological stance of the grouping will help 
to determine whether or not any natural protectionist bias translates into illiberal 
policy measures. This tends to be reflected in the "openness" of the grouping, 
which is discussed below. What is clearly suggested by the above discussion is 
that the diverse nature of regional agreements can result in radically different 
outcomes. This is apparent in the post-war history of trading blocs and could 
explain the apparent lack of a relationship between RTA formation and 
integration noted previously.
108 Palmeter (1993) p. 55.
109 Kahler (1995).
110 Reuters, 17 May 1995.
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6.9.2 Open Regionalism
At the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit in Bogor, Indonesia in 
November 1994 the eighteen members111 agreed to liberalise regional trade and 
investment flows by 2020, with developed countries committed to a 2010 target. 
In what C. Fred Bergsten (the head of the Eminent Persons Group formed to 
advise APEC) has described as "the biggest trade agreement in history",112 the 
declaration at the end of the summit included a commitment to "open 
regionalism".
The definition of "open regionalism" is somewhat vague. The Eminent 
Persons Group saw "four nonmutually exclusive elements"113 to achieving open 
regionalism:
i) the maximum possible extent of unilateral liberalization;
ii) a commitment to further reduce their trade and investment barriers toward 
non-APEC countries;
iii) an offer to extend the benefits of APEC liberalization to nonmembers on a
mutually reciprocal basis; and
iv) recognition that any individual APEC member can extend its APEC
liberalization toward free trade to nonmembers on a conditional basis (via 
free trade arrangements) or on an unconditional basis (to all nonmembers, 
or to all developing countries, in conformity with GATT rules), since there 
is absolutely no contemplation of creating a customs union that would 
require members to maintain common trade policies toward 
nonmembers.114
111 By Bogor membership of APEC was Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and United States.
112 Bergsten used this phrase in a presentation on the results of Bogor, reprinted in 
Bergsten (1995) p. 2. Given that a model run by the Australian government produced an estimate 
of a gain of US$366 billion in annual world output by 2010 if the Bogor agreement was 
implemented, compared to a US$112 billion gain by 2002 in the case of the Uruguay Round, this 
may not be hyperbole. However, Lloyd has argued that "it is not possible to measure with any 
degree of precision the extent of intra-area trade liberalisation" because of difficulties in calculating 
the effects of trade barriers, (1992) p. 13.
113 APEC Eminent Persons Group (1994).
114 APEC Eminent Persons Group (1994).
Chapter 6: Causes and Implications of Regionalism 228
Wonnacott interprets open regionalism as meaning "economic relations 
may be strengthened among member nations, while at the same time the region 
also becomes more open to trade and investment with other parts of the 
world".115 As Bergsten notes, the main question is whether the benefits of lower 
barriers within a region should be automatically extended to non-members, or 
whether access should be on a reciprocal basis.116 In the case of APEC at least, 
"open regionalism" does not automatically imply extension of regional 
liberalisation on a most favoured nation basis. In either case, greater integration 
must not result in higher barriers to non-members. The implicit suggestion is that 
open regionalism should meet the Kemp-Wan condition of not lowering trade 
volumes with the rest of the world, but merely not raising external trade barriers is 
not enough to guard against trade diversion.
The argument in favour of open regionalism is that it provides a means of 
achieving greater regional integration while allowing, and indeed encouraging, 
the continuation of multilateral trade negotiations. Nevertheless the main benefits 
will accrue to bloc members and to non-members able to negotiate access on 
either a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) or a reciprocal basis. Schott takes the 
interesting approach that if APEC does not extend benefits to the EU on an MFN 
basis, this will raise Europe’s willingness to begin another series of multilateral 
negotiations.117 Others, Bergsten included, see negotiations within APEC as 
forming the basis for future multilateral Rounds of liberalisation, by covering such 
issues as investment flows.
Proponents of open regionalism argue that it should complement 
multilateralism for two main reasons. Firstly, regional pacts often produce deeper 
liberalisation as agreement is easier to reach than in a large and diverse group 
such as the WTO. Benefits can be extended to non-members or put on the WTO 
agenda. Secondly, regions act as test sites for issues that have not yet reached 
the multilateral arena.118 For example, provisions on trade in services in the US- 
Canada and Australia-New Zealand deals were useful in the subsequent 
Uruguay Round negotiations.
115 Wonnacott (1994) p. 1.
116 Bergsten (1995) p. 13.
117 Schott (1995).
118 Cable (1994).
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Bhagwati has suggested that one means of ensuring that the creation of 
free trade areas and customs unions does not reduce the degree of openness to 
the rest of the world is to strengthen Article XXIV provisions.119 This could involve 
making the level of external protection following the creation of a customs union 
set at the lowest rate of any of the members before the union was formed. This is 
a rather different argument, in that it is an attempt to constrain the actions of 
members of a regional bloc, as opposed to the school of thought which sees 
regionalism as naturally complementary to multilateral liberalisation. In contrast 
Bhagwati recognises that it is possible for regionalism to occur on a basis which 
is damaging to the multilateral system and proposes tightening the rules to guard 
against it.
Of course it is not only the external tariff rate on the formation of the new 
bloc which is important, but also the policy-making processes after the bloc has 
been formed. Most empirical analysis suggests that lower barriers between 
members tend to be accompanied by some degree of reduction in the barriers to 
non-members, and external tariffs have declined steadily in Europe since 1958, 
largely in step with GATT agreements. However, this has been offset by a rise in 
the proportion of trade subjected to non-tariff barriers, from 21% to 56%. It is 
possible to make the argument that effective levels of protection within Europe 
have declined little since the 1960s and may well have increased in sectors such 
as textiles, agriculture and steel.120
Frankel, Wei and Stein suggest other ways to ensure that regionalism is 
"open" rather than "closed".121 By making agreements in new areas such as 
competition policy or the environment compatible with similar arrangements 
elsewhere, it will be easier to integrate the policies of different regions at the 
global level. They also argue that regional agreements should encourage the 
entry of non-members, so if multilateral liberalisation fails to progress, existing 
blocs can expand as a substitute.
The conclusion is that many observers claim that there is some sort of 
natural tendency for regionalism to be "open", but there is little real evidence that 
this will automatically be the case. For example an ASEAN Free Trade Area may
119 Bhagwati (1994).
120 See Laird and Yeats (1990a).
121 Frankel, Wei and Stein (1994).
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be an attempt to increase bargaining power vis-a-vis Japan and/or the United 
States; it would therefore be counterproductive to allow entry to either country. 
The profusion of suggestions about how to ensure openness shows the degree 
of scepticism. What can be asserted with confidence is that "closed" regionalism 
needs to be avoided to prevent damage to world economic welfare.
Closed regionalism can be seen as the opposite of open regionalism, and 
it also has two possible interpretations. The first is that there are explicit limits to 
membership of the group. The second is a more aggressive stance, with the 
region actively raising barriers to non-members, although it is difficult to find a 
recent example of this latter interpretation. Regions which are formed to act as a 
counterbalance to regionalism in other parts of the world are likely to be closed in 
terms of their membership. If access to the group is open then it will lose its 
bargaining power against other countries and groups.
It could be argued that ASEAN is a case of the former type of closed 
regionalism, in that membership is not open to South Asia countries such as 
India or Sri Lanka, or to large East Asian economies such as Japan or Korea. 
However, this is partly because for most of its life ASEAN has been primarily an 
organisation aimed at delivering military security in South East Asia. In recent 
years it has begun to focus more on trade issues and this has been 
accompanied by enlargement of membership.
In the case of the European Union, membership has steadily expanded to 
incorporate suitable candidates122 and, as noted in Chapter 3, the EU is the most 
frequent partner in bilateral trade deals. Common markets of Central America 
and the Andean Group in the 1960s were closed, in that they were designed at 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI), but they failed to develop.
Thus as an opposite to open regionalism, protectionist closed regionalism 
is so rare as to be virtually non-existent. Even if institutional pressures exist 
which lead a trade bloc towards a protective bias, this is very different from 
protectionism being an explicit objective. Note also that such regionalism would 
be in clear contravention of Article XXIV restrictions and that such transgressions 
by a major economic bloc would indicate a serious breakdown in the world 
trading system.
122 This is demonstrated by the expansion from six countries pre-1973 to 15 after the 1995 
widening of the EU to include Austria, Finland and Sweden.
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6.9.3 MFN, Reciprocity and Free Riders
An alternative means of ensuring that regional blocs do not violate the founding 
principles of the GATT is to focus on Article I of the treaty, which refers to Most 
Favoured Nation status. By extending any liberalisation agreed upon within the 
bloc to countries outside the bloc, any regional grouping could stay within 
GATT/WTO rules. Such an approach, if on a non-reciprocal basis, would renew 
the debate on the importance of "free riders" on such treaties. Bergsten sees 
reciprocity as being the way forward in the case of the Asia Pacific Economic Co- 
operation(APEC) forum. Given that APEC is half the world’s economy, Bergsten 
likens an offer of reciprocity from APEC to one from the Mafia "it’s an offer you 
can’t refuse".123
If an economic analysis is conducted, there seems to be an inherent 
contradiction in recommending the reciprocal approach for extending the benefits 
of a trade bloc to non-members. On that basis regional blocs are formed 
because of the apparent benefits of free trade and investment flows between 
members. However, the same analysis shows that these benefits are enhanced 
rather than undermined by including other parties in the liberalising process, 
even if there is no reciprocal lowering of barriers on their part.124 It is quite 
possible to argue, in a neo-mercantilist fashion, that lower trade barriers can 
undermine economic development, perhaps due to the impact on industrial 
policy. However, to adopt a free trade form of analysis at the intra-regional level 
and then what is essentially a variant of mercantilism at the inter-regional level is 
illogical. It is also possible for trade blocs to resist extending tariff benefits so that 
they can adopt an optimum tariff and secure economic rents, but in practice this 
is rarely (if ever) on the agenda.
Presumably part of the attraction of reciprocity is a political one in that it 
offers rewards to specific sectors. These groups will then become a lobby in 
favour of trade liberalisation (along with consumers and importers, who will also 
gain) and will offset the opposition from domestic interests which benefit from the 
status quo. Regardless of its merits, Jackson argues that reciprocity is an
123 Bergsten (1995) p. 3.
124 Although unilateral liberalisation is likely to be inferior to multilateral liberalisation, it is 
likely to be superior to no deal at all.
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obsolete notion.125 In the past it worked well as most barriers were tariffs which 
could be quantified. With non-tariff barriers coming to the fore, practical 
considerations imply reciprocity needs to be rule-based rather than value-based, 
but this makes it difficult to measure the worth of reciprocal deals.
It is also worth noting that reciprocity has not been the norm in trade 
agreements between the developed and developing world, such as the Lome 
Convention which gives preferential access to European markets to developing 
African, Caribbean and Pacific economies. Indeed, McConnell and MacPherson 
claim that NAFTA was the first reciprocal deal between a developed and a 
developing country.126 Moreover, it is also significant that several countries 
choose to adopt unilateral tariff reductions, irrespective of regional or multilateral 
agreements. Various Eastern European countries, Australia, New Zealand and 
several Asian economies have been lowering tariffs in the 1990s without any 
demand for reciprocity from trading partners. While reciprocal liberalisation 
increases the gains, its absence does not negate the attractions of tariff 
reduction.
Discussion of the "free rider problem" too readily assumes that there really 
is a problem. The attitude may be an historically based one, with its roots in the 
US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 when the US sought to lower its 
trade barriers with commensurate reductions in tariffs by trading partners, to 
mutual benefit. However, classical trade theory tells us that the free rider problem 
is mainly a problem for the free rider. If several countries liberalise their trade 
regimes but one does not, while "free riding" on the liberalism of the others, then 
the free rider is the main loser. Other countries will gain less from their trade 
liberalisation than they would otherwise have done had all countries liberalised, 
but it is probable that their welfare will still rise. The free rider will also benefit 
from improved access to other markets, but by maintaining import barriers, the 
free rider's gains are likely to be substantially lower than would be the case with 
liberalisation.
Wonnacott takes a peculiar approach to address the "free rider problem". 
Looking at the example of APEC he notes that there are several products,
125 Jackson (1992) p. 507.
126 McConnell and MacPherson (1994). In fact Mexico became a member of the OECD in 
1994, which makes its classification as a developing country rather dubious. The World Bank 
ranks Mexico as an Upper Middle Income country, which places it alongside Portugal and Greece.
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ranging from electronic equipment to textiles, where more than 70% of the entire 
world supply comes from within the APEC region.127 By focusing on these areas, 
argues Wonnacott, APEC would be able to reap the benefits of liberalisation 
while minimising the free rider problem even with MFN liberalisation. There 
appear to be three major problems with this analysis. The first is that the analysis 
is static: even if there is no "free rider problem" when liberalisation occurs, it 
could soon emerge as an issue once outsiders have access to the market. The 
second is that looking at benefits from liberalisation of certain sectors cannot be 
done on a partial basis. It is also necessary to examine the losses from rent- 
seeking behaviour that will occur as a result of negotiations aimed at liberalising 
some sectors and maintaining barriers on others. It also seems inherently 
illogical to argue in favour of MFN liberalisation if the rest of the world is not 
competing in that product market: if there is no serious producer outside the 
region then whether MFN takes place or not is irrelevant.
Thus, demands for reciprocity are useful in that they help in the general 
worldwide lowering of tariffs. However, it is potentially damaging if the result is 
less liberalisation than would be the case without a requirement of reciprocity. 
Demands for reciprocity can result in a convoy system with trade liberalisation 
proceeding at the pace of the slowest party—MFN liberalisation would accelerate 
the process. Political factors can help to explain attempts to secure reciprocal 
deals, but it is difficult to justify on purely economic grounds.
6.10 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an examination of the trend towards regionalism in the 
world system. While recognising that an additional dimension is offered by 
political and structural explanations of regionalism, the basic economic factors 
must not be neglected. Although tariff reductions may not be significant among 
developed countries, other improvements in economic efficiency stemming from 
regional agreements have the potential to provide a one-off boost to output and 
even to raise growth rates over the longer term.
Economic explanations of regionalism based on tariff reductions offer a 
partial explanation why countries choose to form trade blocs, but it is less clear
127 Wonnacott (1994).
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that they can explain why there has been a sudden revival of the trend in the past 
decade. Stronger arguments stem from the "deeper" integration which has been 
evident in many regional deals of late. An interesting interpretation is that the 
modern state sees regionalism as a means of re-asserting its authority over the 
market. Thus political explanations based on strategic or military factors are not 
as persuasive as those related to attempts to regain lost sovereignty. This is 
important from the perspective of the firm, as it shows the state trying to find new 
means of imposing its authority on corporate behaviour.
From the point of view of multinational corporations one key issue is 
whether the rise of regional arrangements is hindering, or threatening to hinder, 
the free flow of goods, services and capital between regions. An understanding 
of the motivations for regionalism helps to provide the framework for analysis of 
the nature of various regional agreements. The answer to this question can be 
expected to be an influence on the optimal global strategy of the multinational 
corporation. Presumably the most efficient structure of a global corporation will 
depend on whether it can trade and invest in an uninhibited fashion, or whether 
its markets are becoming increasingly segmented.
Whether regionalism and multilateralism are complementary is not proven, 
just as there is no clear link between regionalism and protectionism. A neglected 
argument is that RTAs create or strengthen the mechanisms for policy-makers to 
act in either a liberalising or protective fashion, so whether the structure contains 
a protectionist bias becomes significant. Although it is the case that RTAs are 
pressured to be liberal from an ideological viewpoint and in order to accord to 
multilateral obligations, rent-seeking and institutional factors can point towards 
protectionism. RTAs also raise the potential economic benefits from raising tariffs 
although there is more evidence of major blocs using their power to push for 
lower tariffs with trading partners, rather than exploiting their monopoly position.
The WTO takes a more positive view towards regional trade agreements 
than the equivocal stance of its predecessor and some (but not all) of the 
previous ambiguities on the issue have been resolved. However, the interaction 
between the regional and multilateral development of the international political 
economy remains uncertain. There are at least three diverging paths available, 
and each of which would have differing implications for the environment facing 
cross-border business.
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One feature which is often neglected is the role of regional agreements in 
reducing the risk involved in cross-border investment. This suggests that 
calculations of the benefits of regionalism may be conservative, as they focus on 
factors such as the gains from trade, economies of scale or greater competition.
The uncertainty surrounding the direction and implications of regionalism 
suggests that multinational corporations will not have uniform approaches or 
strategies. The range of possibilities open to multinational corporations, how they 
can respond to different regional trends and how they can act in order to attempt 
to ensure a favourable outcome will be addressed in the next chapter. It is also 
worth remembering that multinational corporations are the main actors on a 
regional and global basis, and are the main vehicle through which regionalism 
can translate into increased regional integration.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
REGIONAL TRENDS AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
7.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to link the behaviour of multinational corporations with regional 
trends in the international political economy. As a key cross-border actor, the 
multinational corporation has an influence on the formation of preferential 
regional agreements, although just how much is discussed below. With no two 
regional agreements being alike, there will be features of some deals which have 
particular appeal to certain firms, features of others to which some firms object. 
Notably the current debates surrounding open and closed regionalism, and deep 
and shallow integration are of interest. The MNC is, by definition, one of the 
vehicles through which regionalism has an effect, and it is also the economic 
actor most affected, which makes the issue a complex one.
Chapter 5 argued that, on a microeconomic basis, the organisational 
structures of firms have a part to play in determining the degree of regional 
integration of trade and investment flows. The influence of regionalism on 
multinational corporations is examined in more detail below, with the different 
forms that regionalism can take seen to have identifiable implications for optimal 
corporate structures.
It has been claimed that the subject of regionalism provokes a "big yawn" 
from US multinationals.1 However, such an assertion is at odds with both the 
lobbying and the strategic reactions of firms. Moreover, preceding chapters have 
shown that regionalism has an impact on both competition and business 
opportunities facing multinational corporations. As a result, any firms that do 
respond with a "big yawn" are being negligent.
Much is made of the differences between deep and shallow regionalism, 
but it will be argued that from the perspective of the multinational corporation it is 
the act of lowering intra-regional barriers which is important, more than the 
nature of that liberalisation. The difference between deep and shallow 
regionalism will have more impact on how firms react as opposed to whether 
they do, but whether liberalisation is at or behind the border will not affect 
underlying business decisions if the overall preferential bias is the same.
1 This phrase was coined by Wells (1992).
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Similarly, whether a region is open or closed will be of concern to globally 
oriented companies. However, this is not because of the popular and, I will 
argue, over-emphasised debate as to whether regionalism helps or hinders 
multilateralism. Relations between regions will have an impact on the means of 
supplying markets, as well as on the decision of whether or not to become 
involved.
A neglected aspect of the debate on regionalism is how it affects the 
merits to the MNC of internalising transactions. Some aspects of regionalism 
(such as stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights) will reduce market 
imperfections and so lower the benefits from internalisation. However, if an 
aspect of regionalism is lower transport and communication costs, then this will 
be an offsetting force in favour of more internalisation. Regional liberalisation 
could also allow firms to expand or consolidate monopoly positions, depending 
on the anti-trust provisions in place.
A further issue for MNCs is that regionalism involves a reduction in 
systemic risks, as well as affecting the micro or macroeconomic environment. 
Regionalism implies a commonality of interests and closer communication 
between members which lowers systemic risks to all firms operating within the 
region.
The lack of homogeneity among multinational corporations means that it 
is difficult to construct reliable rules as to the reactions and preferences of firms 
in relation to regional trade agreements. However, I will propose a matrix which 
attempts to show the implications for multinational corporations of a range of 
situations. One lesson that literature on international business teaches which is 
not accounted for in purer economic theory is that apparently similar firms can 
have different strategic responses to the same situation.2 Inevitably, among 
diversified companies the responses are more difficult to predict, as although it is 
necessary to treat the firm as a unitary actor with a clear list of priorities, the 
impact of regionalism may be difficult to calculate if the firm is involved in an 
array of businesses. Meanwhile other firms will have historical or cultural 
constraints which limit their flexibility, but setting out a general framework is 
helpful in outlining likely reactions.
2 For example, see Dunning (1993a).
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Taking a microeconomic perspective towards the issue of regionalism 
suggests that for a large number of firms, the main concern is whether 
regionalism is protectionist. As long as production networks tend to be 
constructed on a regional basis, the differences between multilateral and regional 
liberalisation will be limited. The main impact will be on how firms supply markets 
rather than whether they do so.
7.2 Methodological Issues
There are serious methodological problems in attempting to examine links 
between a diverse group of multinational corporations and regional groupings. 
For example Wells has colourfully claimed that the issue of regionalism provokes 
a "big yawn" from US multinational corporations.3 However, he provides no single 
piece of evidence to support such an assertion, either in the form of interviews or 
surveys. Although Wells may indeed be correct—and he produces statistics 
which purport to show why US MNCs need not be concerned about 
regionalism—he makes a leap in logic which is not satisfactory for the purposes 
of this research. However, other methods also have considerable flaws.
Most notably, subjective studies such as industry surveys tend to be less 
informative than their proponents claim. There are inevitably temptations to use 
surveys of corporations' attitudes or behaviour to test how they view trends 
towards regionalism. I have chosen not to take this approach for three reasons. 
Firstly, formulating accurate surveys is a highly complex task and clearly false 
conclusions can be drawn from taking the results of some surveys at face value. 
For example, a 1996 survey by KPMG of 70 top Japanese industrial companies 
in the UK found that 53% were earning a lower than acceptable rate of return, 
while 40% were earning an average rate of return.4 In spite of the UK economy 
being at a buoyant stage of the economic cycle, no firms in the survey reported 
their profits to be high. The accompanying newspaper story was along the lines 
that Japanese firms were disappointed with the results of their investments in the 
UK, implying that further capital inflows could be endangered. A more realistic
3 Wells (1992) p. 14.
4 As reported in the Financial Times, 12 February 1996.
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interpretation is that no manager of a Japanese-owned operation is likely to give 
the politically sensitive reply (let alone what it could mean for future wage rounds 
or bargaining with suppliers) that their UK investment was making a very high 
rate of profit.
Along similar lines, Thomsen argued that Japanese FDI in the UK was not 
aimed at bypassing the threat of higher trade barriers which was seen to 
accompany the Single European Market (SEM) programme, but the motivation 
was to obtain proximity to the market.5 This assessment was based on the 
responses to a Japanese survey on motives for investing within the European 
Community. Again, it seems unlikely that the firms involved would be open about 
their motivations if the objective of an investment was to evade future 
protectionist measures. Japanese firms answering that motives such as "avoid 
quantitative restrictions", "concern about protectionism" and "avoid infringement 
of anti-dumping regulations" were factors in their direct investments in Europe 
were unsurprisingly low. More worthy objectives such as "part of globalisation 
strategy" or "meet consumer needs" ranked far more highly.6
Secondly, there is likely to be a degree of sample bias in any survey on an 
issue such as regionalism. Relatively few respondents could be expected to be 
prepared to reply that it is not a subject that they have seriously considered. 
Moreover, there is also the danger of autosuggestion, as the very act of 
answering a survey would, for some, probably generate attitudes which had 
previously not existed.
Thirdly, there tends to be a bias towards larger companies in such 
surveys. The nature of production networks would indicate that large firms are 
likely to view regionalism more positively than smaller firms, because the former 
will believe that they are in a position to benefit from the lowering of trade barriers 
in other markets, which will more than offset the cost of increased domestic 
competition. Small firms, however, tend to be more focused on the home market, 
and as such their cost-benefit assessment will be skewed against measures 
which increase levels of domestic competition. Nevertheless, surveys are often
5 Thomsen (1993).
6 See table from JETRO in Thomsen (1993) p. 309.
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favoured due to the lack of availability of objective statistics, where breadth of 
coverage and consistency are a problem.
When it comes to individual firm or industry behaviour the process is less 
clear. It is not unusual to be able to obtain organisational matrices which show 
how firms’ operations are (on paper) structured. However, publicly available 
material from MNCs rarely gives detailed information as to intra-firm flows of 
goods, sen/ices and capital between or within different regions. The most that 
can usually be obtained is a geographical breakdown of revenues. Industry 
bodies are no more informative than their corporate members.
A less biased process is to impute the attitudes of firms from statistical 
evidence of their behaviour. However, this is not straightforward and even then 
the conclusions need to be treated with caution. Data on trade flows show how 
goods move intra- and inter-regionally, but they give no information as to the 
nationality of the firms producing the goods.7 Figures on direct investment flows 
are less reliable and face similar problems. Moreover, joint ventures, licensing 
and other strategic alliances are rising in significance relative to FDI and these 
are even less precisely measured. A third factor, on top of trade and investment 
flows, is the flow of knowledge or of intangibles. As international production 
networks are increasingly aimed at achieving maximum exploitation of a firm’s 
competitive advantage in knowledge (in the form of production processes, or the 
fruits of R&D) then the flows of value-added resources across borders become 
even harder to trace.8
As was seen in Chapter 5, there are clear problems in attempting a 
statistical analysis of the impact of regionalism on corporate behaviour. Aside 
from difficulties associated with time lags (are investments made in anticipation 
of regional liberalisation, or after the fact?), it is not possible to undertake a 
qualitative examination. If all regions were attempting to promote integration by 
the straightforward expedient of lowering trade barriers then a rigorous analysis
7 The US Department of Commerce produces reasonably comprehensive data on the 
behaviour of their MNCs in other countries, and of foreign MNCs within the US, but the degree of 
regional disaggregation is limited and the data are not available from other countries. The OECD 
(1997b) has recently begun to publish a broader survey, but as yet in not comprehensive.
8 It is broadly possible to measure the growth of the fruits of such a flow, which is the 
return on cross-border non-equity transfers (licenses and the like). UNCTAD (1995) estimates that 
such flows quadrupled between 1984 and 1992, while exports of goods and sen/ices doubled over 
the same period.
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would be possible (although still relatively complex). However, with non-border 
issues taking an increasingly prominent role the situation becomes less clear.9 
The environmental side agreement to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the social chapter of the European Union and the competition policy 
of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement can 
all be seen as important, but an accurate qualitative comparison of their impact is 
not feasible.
Setting aside attempts to use empirical analysis to illustrate the behaviour 
of firms, I believe that it is possible to construct a theoretical framework to outline 
the optimum responses of different groups of firms in a range of situations. The 
lack of homogeneity among firms means that such a framework is not rigorously 
testable, but it is at least indicative of likely behaviour. This is explored in more 
detail at the end of this chapter.
7.3 Building Blocks and Stumbling Blocks
The bulk of international political economy analysis on the issue of regional 
trading arrangements concerns whether they contribute to, or detract from, the 
overall objective of multilateral liberalisation. However, as indicated above, 
including the behaviour of the multinational corporation in the analysis makes 
such a question appear largely irrelevant. The recurring question of whether 
regional trading arrangements are "building blocks or stumbling blocks"10 
neglects the role played by the multinational corporation in the international 
system. Views that regionalism can be detrimental to the multilateral system 
really contain two strands. The first is that large regions will find it advantageous 
to adopt higher tariff barriers because of the beneficial terms of trade effects. The 
second is that countries will abandon efforts to liberalise multilaterally in 
preference for regional liberalisation.
9 Laird and Yeats (1990b) go some way to establishing a methodology for measuring the 
effect of non-tariff barriers, but it is not clear how well it can be applied to the deeper integration 
becoming more prevalent in recent years.
10 Bhagwati (1991), Lawrence (1991b), The Economist, 31 October 1992, p. 69, Far East 
Economic Review, 31 January 1992, pp. 32-33 and too many others to mention have used this 
phrase in recent years.
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The first and potentially more serious of these concerns is much the less 
likely. The network of international trade and production between North America, 
the European Union and Japan implies considerable mutual pain from a genuine 
breakdown in international trade. In a situation where several regional groupings 
exist, if one bloc aims to impose an optimum tariff it must consider the likely 
reaction of other areas. The welfare gains from improved terms of trade resulting 
from an optimum tariff can be eliminated by retaliatory action from other regions 
and so most game theoretical solutions find evidence of a welfare gain only in 
the short run.11
There are also doubts as to how effective a border-level tariff war would 
be. Among the OECD countries, complex financial linkages mean that the 
nationality of firms can be difficult to ascertain precisely. Diversified corporations 
shift their portfolios of subsidiaries and institutional investors switch assets 
between markets, while the popularity of non-equity forms of investment 
continues to increase. Even the nationality of exports can be unclear, as 
indicated by French struggles to restrict imports of cars made by Japanese 
transplant factories in the UK.12 As a result, investment flows are likely to be a 
substitute for those of goods in order to bypass border restrictions. Thus the 
impact of the slim possibility of a full-scale trade war among developed countries 
is reduced even further by the effect of cross-border investment.13
The second question is whether further multilateral liberalisation will occur 
now that the focus is on regional groupings.14 It will be argued below that for a 
multinational corporation the answer to this question is far less important than 
many appear to believe. Intra-regional liberalisation allows firms to achieve 
economies of scale in production, while flows of intangibles across borders mean 
global economies of scale can be achieved on costs such as R&D, design or 
finance, irrespective of the state of trade barriers. As a result, if liberalisation—
11 See Sodersten (1980) pp. 179-183, Krugman (1991a).
12 The Economist 12 June 1993.
13 That is not to say that there will not be skirmishes related to certain issue areas, as has 
been the case between the US, Japan and the EU in recent years, but the chances of an all-out 
trade war are lower.
14 In particular Bhagwati and Panagariya have persistently warned of the dangers of being 
distracted from multilateral liberalisation by focusing excessively on regionalism.
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either deep or shallow—is taking place on a regional basis, then inter-regional 
flows of capital and intangibles will compensate for any lack of liberalisation of 
inter-regional trade flows.
Barring a return to the "dark ages" of higher trade barriers and 
expropriation of foreign investment assets it is difficult to envisage a situation 
where intra-regional flows are constrained to such an extent that the multinational 
corporation is unable to penetrate developed foreign markets effectively. 
Moreover, such a reactionary development is not dependent on whether 
preferential regional arrangements are building blocks or stumbling blocks; it is a 
function of the relative power of the ideological forces behind mercantilism and 
liberalism.15 There is no inherent reason why a trend towards regionalism should 
lead to protectionism or to slower multilateral liberalisation. If anything, countries 
are making a statement of belief in liberal trade by joining a preferential trade 
agreement and it would be counter-intuitive to expect them then to adopt an 
opposite stance to outsiders.
A political economy approach based on the lobbying behaviour of firms 
within the region can deliver the result that preferential agreements swing 
corporate preferences against multilateral liberalisation.16 However, as Krishna 
acknowledges, this approach does not make allowances for capital flows in 
response to trade policy shifts.
The building block—stumbling block debate can be a distraction from 
another important aspect of regionalism, which is how it affects the structure of 
international business. Whether to export to a region or produce within it, 
whether to establish regional networks or independent production sites, whether 
to internalise transactions or conduct them in the market, and whether systemic 
risk is falling or rising are all issues of direct concern to multinational 
corporations. Asking if regionalism will help or hinder multilateralism is of 
peripheral importance compared to these more directly relevant concerns, and 
attitudes to the issue will depend largely on whether comparisons are being 
made with a multilateral ideal or with the current situation.
15 Henderson (1994).
16 Levy (1997), Krishna (1998).
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7.4 MNC Views on Regionalism
Regionalism is important to multinational corporations from several perspectives. 
Firstly there are the opportunities which open up as a result of lower barriers 
within a region, offset by the increase in competition which is implied. Secondly, 
there is the question of whether a regional grouping will be open to outsiders or 
closed. The answer to this issue will help to determine whether production 
networks should be predominantly regional or global in their orientation, as well 
as giving an indication of the level of competition within a region. This relates to a 
fundamental view of how the international political economy operates. If the MNC 
sees the world as one dominated by principles of free trade, with nations working 
co-operatively to lower impediments to mutually beneficial economic exchange, 
then this suggests one strategy. Another strategy altogether would be suggested 
by a view of the world which was oriented around a neo-mercantilist perspective, 
with the main economic centres vying with each other for economic and political 
power. Thirdly, there is the issue of how regionalism affects decisions over 
whether or not to internalise transactions within the firm, rather than conducting 
them in the market, as regionalism will tend to reduce market imperfections while 
also cutting the cost of internalisation. Fourthly, there is the question of whether 
regionalism lowers systemic risk to MNCs, as a consequence of the closer 
political co-operation which is implied. These factors are discussed in more detail 
in the four sub-sections below.
It seems intuitively likely that firms in the same industry will have similar 
views on regionalism. In reality the responses are likely to differ for five reasons. 
Firstly, it is quite possible for firms in the same industry to use production 
processes which involve different degrees of capital and labour intensities. For 
example, Japanese automobile assemblers in the United States have been 
noted for using more capital intensive processes than their US rivals.17 They are 
therefore likely to react differently to a trade agreement which will change the 
relative price of factors of production.18 Secondly, out of several firms in an
17 See Womack etal. (1990).
18 According to the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, trade liberalisation will lower the price of 
the factor of production which is scarce compared to that which is abundant. Thus in the US, free 
trade agreements will reduce the wages of unskilled labour (the relatively scarce factor) compared 
to the cost of capital. Learner (1992) guesstimated that the wages of unskilled US workers would
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industry, at any point in time some will be in a stronger competitive position than 
others; again the automobile industry is a good example. Lower intra-regional 
trade barriers can be seen positively by the strong companies because of the 
opportunities offered in other markets, while at the same time being viewed 
negatively by less competitive companies which fear for their survival if domestic 
competition intensifies.19 Thirdly, firms in smaller markets may view regionalism 
more favourably than those in large markets, as it could help the former to reap 
economies of scale, while the latter may already be operating on an efficient 
scale.20 Fourthly, Dunning has shown that firms with similar endowments of 
ownership, locational and internalisation assets can have differing strategic 
responses to the same event.21 A final complication is that the spatial 
perspectives and time horizons of firms can vary. For example, it is possible that 
a firm will oppose a move to closed regionalism with higher external barriers 
within one economic area even though it directly raises short-term profits. This 
could be because it fears greater losses as a result of similar action in other 
regions or even a trade war, or because it is concerned that sheltering behind 
trade barriers will damage the longer term growth and competitiveness of the 
region.
As a result of the different options it is not possible to make entirely 
confident predictions of corporate attitudes and responses to a range of 
scenarios for the evolution of the international trading system. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to make "best guess" assessments of behaviour under given 
circumstances, while recognising that there will always be exceptions.
A more predictable response should be available by looking at different 
degrees of competitiveness in industrial sectors. If all firms in a sector face 
identical costs and operate under perfectly competitive conditions across a 
region, then lower tariffs will not raise the degree of competition and producers 
will be indifferent to the move. If the producers are oligopolists, but again face 
identical cost structures, then the firms’ attitudes will be determined by how they
fall by US$1000 per year after a NAFTA agreement because of competition from Mexico.
19 Such a reaction was evident in France in response to the Single European Market.
20 Milner (1997).
21 See Dunning (1993a).
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view their opportunity of expanding their oligopolistic power across the region, 
possibly via a series of mergers or strategic alliances, compared to the threat of 
losing a dominant position in their domestic market.
The assumption that the firm has enough information to assess its 
competitive position realistically is also open to debate. A firm which has 
achieved regional dominance within a preferential trade area might feel that it 
can transfer such a success into world markets opened up by multilateral 
liberalisation. However, if its regional success has been dependent on high rates 
of protection for the region as a whole, the result could be a lack of 
competitiveness in world markets and a loss of market share within the region as 
tariffs are lowered as part of a multilateral deal. Whether firms have the 
information and the internal mechanisms in place to base their strategy on an 
impartial analysis of their competitive position is an interesting question, but for 
the purposes of this research it must be assumed that on the whole this is the 
case.
There is a question as to how far multinational corporations are concerned 
with the trend to regionalism in the world economy. That is to say, to what extent 
is regionalism a factor which is considered by MNCs when addressing strategic 
issues. As noted, Wells has argued that American multinationals are 
uninterested in regionalism. However, the roll call of MNCs represented at the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue in Seville in November 1995 seems to indicate 
that it is a subject which is high on the agenda.22
Regional trading agreements address a range of issues, the foremost of 
which is that of tariffs. Other areas which are important include non-tariff barriers, 
equality in local content requirements and harmonisation of standards. These 
elements are all assuming greater importance, as higher fixed costs such as 
R&D or investment in plant and equipment create the need to sell worldwide 
immediately in order to generate profits before competition arrives.23 That is to 
say that even though tariffs have fallen to levels where there are limited 
implications of duties levied at the border, there are increasing effects from other 
constraints on trade. As discussed in Chapter 5, all of these restrictions on cross­
22 The four co-chairmen of the conference were the CEOs of Xerox, BASF, Goldman 
Sachs (Peter Sutherland, who oversaw the finalisation of the Uruguay Round) and Ford.
23Dunning (1993a).
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border business must have an impact on the operations of multinational 
corporations. The effect could be either positive or negative, but it must be an 
input into the decision-making processes.
Regionalism has an impact at two levels. Firstly, it will help to determine 
whether or not a multinational firm attempts to gain access to a market. 
Secondly, it will affect how a firm services the markets it decides to target. The 
distinction is important, as the former will affect the degree of competition within 
an economy, and the associated welfare gains. The second is more of a decision 
on whether to utilise domestic resources and export the products, or whether to 
export the capital and then use foreign inputs.
In the light of these distinctions, it is interesting to look at some of the 
major issues related to regional trading arrangements; whether they are "open" 
or "closed", and whether they involve "deep" or "shallow" co-operation. In 
addition, whether regionalism reduces or increases market failure is another 
aspect worth considering as it will have a bearing on the degree that transactions 
are internalised within the firm. The impact that regionalism has on systemic risk 
is another issue which tends to be neglected.
7.4.1 "Open1 and "Closed" Regionalism
It will be recalled that open regionalism refers to intra-bloc liberalisation without 
raising external barriers, or explicitly excluding new members. It can also mean 
extension of regional liberalisation on an MFN basis, but this is not necessarily 
the case.24 In contrast, closed regionalism implies limits on membership, higher 
external barriers, or no MFN extension of internal liberalisation. The main factors 
for consideration are the extent and nature of intra-regional liberalisation, and the 
issue of whether regionalism is open or closed. Whether regionalism is open or 
closed, and how it is perceived by firms, will be an important input into the 
decision-making process in terms of location of production facilities.
If a regional grouping is "open" on a reciprocal or an MFN basis, and is 
generally supportive of lower trade barriers internally and externally, then the 
trade and investment patterns of MNCs will be largely determined by issues of
24 APEC Eminent Persons Group (1994).
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micro-efficiency together with consideration of the barriers that exist at that time. 
Large multinational corporations with efficiently sized production capabilities in all 
major geographic regions are likely to be more interested in reductions in intra- 
regional barriers than inter-regional ones. Regional production is likely to be the 
norm, simply because for many industries this allows firms to reach an efficient 
scale of production while still being close to the final market.25 However, there will 
still be considerable inter-regional, intra-industry trade, as dictated by Fordist- 
type economies of scale and by product differentiation issues. Under open 
regionalism there is no real threat of production systems being interrupted by 
prohibitive policy measures.
However, the calculations change if there is a perception that the regional 
bloc will adopt a protective stance. If MNCs believe that a regional arrangement 
is established with a protectionist intent then they will need to adopt strategies 
with a stronger bias towards self-contained production facilities in each region. 
Intangibles can still flow across regional barriers, but there will be greater 
pressure for physical investment in each region.26 As discussed above, 
organisational factors are already prompting firms to operate on a regional basis 
as for many this provides the optimal trade-off between gaining economies of 
scale in output and having the flexibility needed for new forms of production. The 
threat or expectation of protectionism merely reinforces this trend.
Such a development could also raise the possibility of a regional grouping 
adopting a protectionist stance, because if firms have production capacity in 
each region they will not be particularly alarmed by the threat of higher barriers. 
Some may even favour any hindrance to imports into a region, as it implies a 
lower level of competition for the goods they are already producing within that 
region, and this would raise the possibility of a fragmentation of the trading world. 
Whether MNCs are so pragmatic in their lobbying behaviour has not been 
demonstrated, but it would appear to be a rational response on a short-term, 
micro basis.27 The suspicion is that broader concerns about the health of the
25 Oman (1994).
26 Kobrin (1995).
27 One example is that of Toys R Us which raised objections to Japan’s restrictive Large 
Scale Retail Law when first setting up operations in the country. Once established, however, it was 
quick to seek recourse in the law when Akachan Honpo, a domestic competitor, was seen to be 
bypassing some of its provisions. In January 1996 MITI ruled that Akachan Honpo had been
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international economic system will lead multinational firms to adopt a generally 
anti-protectionist position, irrespective of the gains available in a particular 
market.
In practice it is likely that the nature of the firm will determine its attitude 
towards open and closed regionalism and this is discussed in more detail below. 
Moreover, while a firm’s response to whether regionalism is expected to be open 
or closed can be predicted, the direction of regionalism is less predictable. Many 
feared that the European Single Market would be a form of closed regionalism, 
as shown by the spate of investment in trade-substituting European resources by 
Japanese and North American companies in the late 1980s, but in the event it 
has complemented multilateral liberalisation efforts.28
Open or closed regionalism has more impact on the means of supplying 
goods to the market than on the decision of whether to supply. A credible threat 
of protectionism is likely to generate an inflow of FDI and prompt firms to 
establish regional networks, while open regionalism allows more globally oriented 
strategies. The issue of deep and shallow regionalism has parallels with that of 
open and closed regionalism.
7.4.2 "Deep" and "Shallow" Regionalism
In terms of its impact on regionalisation, the differences between deep and 
shallow integration have been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The rise in the 
degree of regional bias evident since the late 1980s in the EU and North America 
which was noted in the earlier statistical examination accompanied moves 
towards a "deeper" level of co-operation, although how preferential such 
integration can be is open to doubt. However, it appears that deeper agreements 
have an impact on corporate behaviour and this is supported by the emphasis on 
deeper issues in the Transatlantic Business Dialogue held in Seville in November 
1995.29
violating parts of the retail law. Nikkei Weekly, 29 January 1996.
28 As noted in Chapter 3, there has been an increased opening of the EU in the wake of 
the Single European Market, which has offset the increase in regional bias.
29 Only one of the four working groups was concerned with the issue of trade 
liberalisation. The other three looked at standards, certifications and regulatory policy, investment 
and third country issues. Transatlantic Business Dialogue (1995).
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Exactly why deeper integration should be of such interest to MNCs is clear 
from a consideration of the remaining barriers to cross-border business. The 
most significant of these come in the form of elements of public policy which 
result in a bias in favour of domestically located firms, or more generally, in non­
tariff restrictions which raise the costs of serving foreign markets compared to a 
firm’s home market. Reforms which lower subsidies available to domestic firms, 
eliminate pro-domestic bias in the government procurement process, enact an 
effective competition policy, enforce intellectual property rights or raise the 
transparency of decision-making processes can all be seen as reducing the 
advantage of firms based in the market vis-a-vis outsiders. Such liberalisation 
increases the potential for MNCs from outside a country to compete with 
domestic firms. However, as noted in Chapter 5, it is difficult for such reforms to 
occur on a regional basis: a domestic bias is rarely replaced by a similar 
favouritism towards regional firms.
Harmonisation of standards or mutual recognition reduce the costs of 
supplying another market, as the number of changes which need to be made to a 
product to ensure it conforms to a different regulatory regime will be reduced. For 
example, in the summer of 1996 the US and EU signed a Mutual Recognition 
Agreement covering testing and certification of electronic products which will 
allow goods to be accepted into both markets when approved by one of the 
testing bodies.30 For some products, such as pharmaceuticals, the process of 
gaining approval to sell in other markets can be prohibitively expensive, so 
"deep" agreements which raise accessibility will have real effects on MNCs' 
strategies.
Examples of deeper integration which can be applied on a regional basis 
include rules of origin restrictions, anti-dumping policy and trade related 
investment measures. In terms of the relative importance of the different types of 
deeper co-operation, those which can be applied on a discriminatory regional 
basis are a subset of the whole. So although deeper integration increases 
opportunities for regionally based firms the most, it also raises the overall level of 
competition from firms outside the region as well. As noted in Chapter 3, the 
initial six EU countries saw no increase in their regional bias after the late 1960s,
30 EIU World Trade Outlook, 3Q 96
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in spite of moves to deepen integration, such as the Single European Market. In 
part this was due to the increase in bias towards new members, but the 
increased external trade to GDP ratios suggest that developments such as 
deeper integration also benefited non-regional countries.
In terms of the attitudes of MNCs, the distinction between deep and 
shallow regionalism is akin to that between open and closed regionalism. Both 
deep and open regionalism represent a lowering of barriers to trade and 
investment within a region, but such liberalisation is also likely to involve greater 
opportunities for firms based outside the region. The increased freedom of flows 
between regions will therefore affect global strategies. In contrast, shallow and 
closed regionalism are more explicitly discriminatory in favour of regional firms. 
Each different form of regionalism will alter the most efficient means of supplying 
the regional market as, for example, shallow regionalism tends to affect trade 
flows, while deeper regionalism liberalises both trade and investment flows. How 
each of the possibilities affects corporate structures is analysed below.
7.4.3 Internalisation
In addition to the changes in relative costs associated with regionalism, there is 
the question of how internalisation arguments are affected. Coase showed that 
firms will internalise transactions up to the point where the cost of the internal 
transaction is the same as performing it in the market.31 In particular, a firm tends 
to internalise transactions when licensing its ownership specific advantages to a 
local firm is inefficient, due to problems in placing a value on its worth, in 
monitoring performance or in enforcing the contractual obligations of the 
licensee. Appropriation of intellectual property and damage to brand name or 
reputation are other risks that a firm can face when deciding to externalise the 
transaction32. In addition, the ability to exploit differential corporate tax rates via 
transfer pricing is an incentive to internalise transactions.
If a regional agreement contains provisions for stricter enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and centralised legal institutions (such as the
31 Coase (1937).
32 Dunning (1993a).
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European Court of Justice) then this will reduce the costs of externalising the 
transaction. In addition, if closer regional co-operation leads to a harmonisation 
of corporate tax rates—as appears to be taking place in Europe33—then the 
scope for increasing profits through transfer pricing will be reduced, again 
lowering the benefits from internalising transactions. More generally, if a regional 
trade agreement succeeds in reducing market imperfections within the region, 
then it is likely to lead to less internalisation and more licensing or 
subcontracting. However, the main market imperfection is for knowledge, and 
apart from intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, regionalism has little to 
contribute in this area.
It is also important to remember that the decision on when to internalise 
depends on where the border lies in terms of the balance between the cost of 
market transactions and the cost of internalisation. It could be the case that 
regionalism lowers the costs of performing a transaction in the market, but at the 
same time it makes internalisation cheaper. Lower transport and communication 
costs resulting from European liberalisation of the telecommunications market or 
"eighth freedom" air traffic routes34 would make internalisation more efficient. If 
such savings are strong enough to outweigh the reduction in market 
imperfections, then it is quite feasible for regionalism to result in a rise in 
internalisation.
A UN report attempts to demonstrate a rise in internalisation within 
Europe, by showing that for US firms located in Europe vertical integration has 
risen more rapidly than horizontal integration.35 However, in order to do so it 
assumes that all dealings with affiliates are vertical transactions and are internal 
to the firm, and all horizontal transactions are external. This seems to be an 
inadequate base from which to make the assertion that internalisation has been 
rising in Europe, as horizontal transactions can involve a higher degree of 
internationalisation than vertical ones. In addition, the UN has argued that "The 
theory of regional economic integration has little to say about whether it will 
increase or reduce market failure in intermediate product markets. But it does
33 See Tanzi (1995) Ch. 7.
34 See Hanlon (1996) pp. 76-78.
35 UN (1993) Ch. IV.
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suggest that firms engaged in intra-regional trade will be better able to take 
advantage of the economies and reduced uncertainty associated with the 
common governance of interrelated activities; and this would suggest that, to 
protect and advance this governance, firms may prefer to own their assets rather 
than lease the right of their use to other firms".36
Relative costs are likely to differ between industries and even between 
firms within the same industry. The structure of highly knowledge-intensive firms 
will remain unaffected by regionalism as internalisation will remain the optimal 
strategy, but other firms are likely to find it more profitable to move to more 
intensive use of licenses and subcontracting (US and Canadian firms might find 
this approach more attractive in Mexico due to the stronger I PR protection 
incorporated into NAFTA).37 For others, regionalism could tilt the balance in 
favour of a greater degree of internalisation (European supermarkets could find it 
more efficient to buy from affiliates within the region as a result of improved 
information flows and cheaper transportation costs).
Overall, the structure of firms will be affected by issues related to 
regionalism which alter the relative attractiveness of internalising transactions. 
This is a different issue from that of preferential arrangements which are 
important because of the effect on market access per se. Internalisation issues 
relate to how a firm best structures itself to serve a particular market.
7.4.4 Systemic Risks
It was noted in Chapter 6 that if governments are coming together in a co­
operative fashion to establish mutually beneficial preferential regional 
agreements then the danger that those governments will engage in hostile 
diplomatic, military or commercial behaviour is reduced. Commonality of interests 
reduces the potential for disputes, as does the closer communication and 
understanding implicit in establishing a forum to discuss trade relations. The 
lower systemic risk which is a consequence of such co-operation is of benefit to 
all firms operating within the region.
36 UN (1993) p. 33.
37 Chaudhry and Walsh (1995).
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Most analysis of the impact of regionalism on MNCs tends to focus on the 
implications for micro and macroeconomic risk. That is, factors such as the 
change in the degree of competition, or a boost to the growth rate of an 
economy, can be analysed. However, systemic risk is of broader concern, 
covering issues such as conflict or expropriation which could endanger not just 
the profitability of a project, but also the value of the entire investment.
Whether firms which are based outside the region will have such an 
enthusiastic position is less clear, as there is a chance that greater co-operation 
within a region will also lead to a unified policy in foreign relations or in trade 
negotiations. The implication is that a region bargaining in a unified fashion will 
have more power to coerce other countries and regions, possibly to the detriment 
of their MNCs.
7.5 Impact of MNCs on Regionalism
The role that multinational corporations have to play in regionalism is frequently 
neglected. For example, Panic has noted "the absence of virtually any reference 
to multinationals ....[in] the official reports generated by the European Single 
Act".38 Similarly, Ostry claims that formal links between the GATT and business 
groups were non-existent.39 This does not necessarily mean that MNCs are not 
influential; merely that their activities are not given prominence in official 
documents. There is little doubt that industrial lobbying can at times be effective 
in achieving trade policy goals. The record of the farming lobby in Europe in 
protecting its privileged position is perhaps the most impressive, but is certainly 
not unique.40 Meanwhile, other firms are committed to liberalisation of the 
international economy, with British Petroleum stating that "as an international 
company, BP’s commercial success is crucially dependent on .... the 
maintenance and enhancement of the GATT-based multilateral trading 
system" 41
38 Panic (1991) p. 204.
39 Ostry (1990) pp. 3-4.
40 See Grant (1993) pp. 37-41.
41 Quoted in Stopford (1992) p. 37.
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For firms to be able to lobby effectively they must, of course, have a clear 
idea about the costs and benefits attached to the various forms of regionalism. 
While there is some debate as to whether or not MNCs are unitary actors in 
terms of whether they have an ordered and consistent set of objectives,42 the 
impact of different trade regimes on corporate profitability must be roughly 
calculable and a firm will be able to direct whatever political influence it 
possesses accordingly.
Krishna shows that firms within a region are most likely to lobby in support 
of trade diverting agreements.43 In non-diverting agreements, the gains in the 
partner country are offset by losses domestically, but in a trade diverting 
agreement, the losses are borne by non-participants. The establishment of the 
preferential agreement then becomes a barrier to multilateral liberalisation, as 
the beneficiaries seek to protect their position.
There are two aspects to the issue of whether MNCs can have an impact 
on the course of regionalism. Firstly, are interest groups able to garner specific 
concessions regarding the structure of any trade agreement? Grossman and 
Helpman show that it should be easier for governments to gain support for 
regional deals if some sectors are excluded 44 The second issue is whether 
governments respond to pressure from business organisations when deciding 
whether or not to pursue a trade agreement? That is to say, do firms have the 
power to influence either the shape of an agreement or whether it exists at all?
In Europe, regional agreements behind the formation of the European 
Union and its precursors have always had an implicitly political agenda and as 
such, whether such agreements should be attempted can be expected to be 
relatively independent of corporate lobbying.45 Milner has argued that regional 
agreements result from government attempts to balance consumer interests with
42 Pugel and Walter (1985) found that US Fortune 1000 firms were able to adopt a single 
position on trade policy, irrespective of their degree of diversification.
43 Krishna (1998).
44 Grossman & Helpman (1995).
45 Business groups have tended to support European regionalism, but whether they have 
had a real effect on developments such as the Single European Market programme is less clear. 
See for example Moravcsik (1993).
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those of the corporate sector,46 but European integration has also been part of a 
broader regional political agenda. Moreover, one Commission official has noted 
that the most appreciated lobbyists are those "which can speak on behalf of a 
cross-section of interests throughout the Community",47 which would seem to 
weigh against industry-specific interest groups. The existence of lobbying offices 
based in and around Brussels indicates that firms and industries can (or believe 
they can) garner specific concessions regarding the structure of any agreement, 
but outside of long-favoured sectors these appear minor.
In North America the process may have been more business oriented, and 
the NAFTA negotiating process was noted for support from US business groups, 
such as the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable and 
the US Chamber of Commerce.48 In the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation 
forum the role for business was formalised through the creation of the Pacific 
Business Forum in June 1994, while in the rest of the world most regional 
agreements have been either predominantly political in nature (such as ASEAN) 
or a response to regionalism in Europe and North America, and as such, political 
forces are likely to dominate. Thus, while it would be naive to claim that lobbying 
groups have no effect whatsoever on the form that regionalism takes, it would 
also be overly brave to argue that they are the main dynamic behind the political 
force of regionalism. To put it another way, a government will enter into a trade 
agreement with the end objective of raising welfare in its economy, or as a result 
of one or more of the factors discussed in Chapter 6. The corporate sector—and 
especially larger multinationals which tend to be more politically astute—is the 
main mechanism through which the gains from regional integration are 
transmitted into the domestic economy, so it is likely to enthuse about such a 
deal. Although consumers should also benefit, they are likely to have less clear 
opinions on the effect of regionalism on employment, incomes, prices and 
consumer choice, and are less well organised into lobbying groups.
46 Milner (1997).
47 Hull (1993) p. 86.
48 See Fishlow and Haggard (1992) p. 24.
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Oman has claimed that MNCs were not as enthusiastic supporters of the 
Uruguay Round as could have been expected.49 However, this could simply be a 
consequence of a cost-benefit analysis of the returns from active lobbying, rather 
than a reflection of a lack of interest.50 How effective firms are in influencing the 
course of regionalism is a debatable issue. Milner argues that governments 
respond to “their domestic political situations” when formulating policy, balancing 
consumer interests and corporate lobbying.51 Milner finds that regionalism can be 
a politically attractive middle ground, as it offers benefits to both consumer and 
corporate interests, while limiting the loss of tariff revenues.
Most studies find some degree of correlation between lobbying and 
responses from political institutions.52 Steagall and Jennings found that members 
of the US House of Representatives who received campaign funding from 
political action committees related to organised labour tended to oppose NAFTA 
(as did the unions), while those who depended on business for contributions 
tended to vote in favour.53 Similarly, by mid-1993 90% of the 40 largest 
Congressional recipients of funding from labour interests had declared their 
opposition to NAFTA.54 In his polemic, Choate went so far as to argue that 
Japanese lobbyists are the third political force in US politics,55 but looking at the 
North American Free Trade Agreement raises doubts as to the effectiveness of 
special interest groups in securing favourable concessions for their sectors. As 
with most other regional agreements, NAFTA is notably non-discriminatory in its 
treatment of industrial sectors, with interest groups such as the Latino 
Consensus being bought off with the offer of financial assistance rather than
49 Oman (1994) p. 28.
50 Olson (1965) has argued that the rational attitude is not to participate in organisations 
which seek collective benefits available to participants and non-participants alike, but to free-ride 
on the process.
51 Milner (1997) p.77.
52 See for example Helleiner (1977), Brock and Magee (1978), Ray (1981), Takacs (1981) 
and McKeown (1984).
53 Steagall and Jennings (1996). There is a "chicken and egg" situation here, in that it is 
not possible to know whether a Congressman received contributions as a result of his position on 
NAFTA, or whether he developed a position on NAFTA in response to contributions received.
54 Heritage Foundation report quoted by Conybeare and Zinkula (1996) p. 5.
55 See Choate (1990).
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trade concessions.56 North American interest groups with a long history of 
securing preferential treatment such as textiles, agriculture and automobiles 
continue to enjoy advantages under NAFTA, but these are due to be phased out 
over time, leading to more equal treatment of industrial sectors.
Considering NAFTA in more detail provides an illustration of the 
processes at work. The decision to extend the Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement was made primarily for political economy reasons, with the US eager 
to underwrite Mexican economic reforms and to put a brake on labour migration 
into the US, in addition to the straight economic gains which result from greater 
trade and competition.57 US participation was not primarily a result of American 
business lobbies hoping to benefit from improved access to the Mexican 
economy, although both large and small business groups did support the 
agreement. Although the final structure of NAFTA, especially the side 
agreements on labour and the environment, was influenced by lobbying, it is 
notable for what is included, more than what is omitted. Politically sensitive 
sectors such as agriculture, textiles and automobiles will all see trade liberalised 
over the 15 year implementation period, while the service sector agreement 
follows a negative list approach, specifying what is to be excluded rather than 
included.58 It appears that "traditional" lobbies in the US were relatively 
unsuccessful in distorting NAFTA to their advantage, although there are some 
concerns that active use of anti-dumping provisions will give de facto 
discrimination in some areas59 Even the side agreements on labour and the 
environment were implemented as much as a result of the political agenda of 
President Clinton as a consequence of interest group pressure. Moreover, the 
NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism, as with the Canada-US FTA, was de­
politicised with disputes being resolved by international panels whose decisions 
are final, which takes the implementation of trade policy out of the hands of 
individual politicians who are inevitably exposed to pressure groups.
56 Minor exceptions were granted in areas such as ball bearings, beef, oranges, peanut 
butter, cucumbers and wheat. Conybeare and Zinkula (1996) p. 7.
57 Bliss (1994).
58 OECD (1995).
59 Although one of Canada’s motives for signing CUSFTA was to constrain the US use of 
anti-dumping. Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1997).
Chapter 7: Regional Trends and Multinational Corporations 259
Other regional groupings have similar examples of how interest groups 
can affect the structure of the agreement, ranging from the anomalous treatment 
of automobiles in MERCOSUR to the privileges enjoyed by agriculture in the 
European Union. Even so, the overriding impression among trade agreements 
worldwide is their internal consistency in that most regional agreements treat one 
industrial sector much like any other. More significantly, although some sectors 
will still garner preferential treatment, it will tend to be less than, rather than 
greater than, that which existed prior to the regional agreement. With 
agreements between developed countries broadening to include trade in 
services, the lack of exceptions and distortions illustrates the failure of special 
interest groups to secure significant specific benefits. Agriculture remains a 
frequent exception, but even here the trend is towards liberalisation, in this case 
supported by Uruguay Round commitments.60
Therefore, any consideration of the actions of MNCs in relation to 
regionalism should not overstate the role of interest group pressure. Inevitably 
governments will draw on support from business as a means of presenting 
evidence that a regional agreement will be of economic benefit, but there does 
not appear to be undue influence. If MNCs cannot directly shape regionalism to 
their benefit, then they must inevitably consider business responses to tackle the 
new challenges and opportunities that regionalism presents.
7.6 Impact of Regionalism on MNCs
Regionalism can alter the degree of competition within an economy by granting 
entry to imports or investment from firms located elsewhere within the region, 
while it also increases opportunities for home country firms to expand into other 
markets in the region. Therefore it is an issue which must be of concern to all 
firms within an economy, whether or not they have exposure to foreign markets, 
because regionalism provides a threat as well as a business opportunity.
Firms are affected in a number of ways by regionalism. For firms with their 
home base within the region it will necessitate a re-evaluation of the profitability 
of exporting to the more open markets within the region, compared to dispersing
60 The Uruguay Round provided for tariffication of barriers, together with a reduction in 
overall tariff levels.
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production activity around a region through foreign direct investment flows. It may 
also require a response in the firm’s domestic market as a result of the higher 
levels of competition. Apart from such business responses, regionalism can alter 
the optimum organisational structure adopted by a firm, which is to say that not 
just opportunistic or tactical reactions, but also strategic concerns must be 
addressed.
Chapter 3 discussed trends in regionalisation in recent years, at least part 
of which is a result of lower barriers to trade and investment within regions. The 
combination of increased trade and investment integration which resulted from 
preferentially lower regional barriers, together with the impact of regional 
production networks were seen as two of the main factors behind the rise in 
regionalisation. It appears that far from the "big yawn" that Wells claims is the 
response of US multinationals to the issue of regionalism, the reality is that firms 
react in a predictable, dynamic and rational fashion.
Lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers is likely to raise the volume of trade. 
Similarly for investment flows, an easing of restrictions on cross-border 
investment is likely to raise the size of such flows. In support of such an 
argument, regional and multilateral liberalisation in recent years have seen flows 
of both trade and investment grow more rapidly than output. Between 1981 and 
1993 FDI flows quadrupled, while trade flows doubled and output rose under 
50%.61 In spite of the theoretical substitutability between the movement of 
commodities and factors of production,62 growth in trade flows has occurred at 
the same time as an even more rapid increase in foreign direct investment flows. 
The implication is that this was a response to the removal of distortions to flows 
of both goods and factors of production. On the assumption that some such 
barriers remain,63 their further erosion can be expected to provoke a similar 
response.
61 UN (1995) Table 1.1, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF International Financial 
Statistics.
62 See Mundell (1957).
63 This seems a reasonable assumption given that the post-Uruguay Round average 
OECD tariff will be 3.8%, while discussions of an Atlantic Free Trade Area have focused on non­
tariff issues.
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The question of what regionalism means for corporate structures is more 
complex and will depend to a large extent on the form that the regional bloc 
takes. The unique features of each regional trade agreement that exists in the 
world imply that behaviour in one region cannot simply be transposed directly 
onto another, but some general rules apply. For example, a shallow, protectionist 
bloc requires a different approach from a deep, open grouping, because of the 
implications for investment flows on the one hand, and the degree of competition 
on the other.
There is a debate over the most suitable structure for a corporation with 
business interests around the world. Analysts such as Perlmutter or Bartlett and 
Ghoshal have attempted to formulate typographies for various organisational 
structures.64 However, it seems that the ultimate arbiter of the optimal structure 
of a multinational corporation is a combination of firm and industry specific 
features together with the nature of the international political economy, and as 
such it can be expected that regionalism will affect corporate structures. Analysts 
in the area of international business often appear to formulate prescriptions for 
corporate structures with little reference to the operating conditions facing the 
MNC. While it is clear that microeconomic conditions, such as the degree of 
competitiveness or the rate of technical progress will vary from industry to 
industry, it is just as clear that the same macroeconomic conditions face each 
industry. Thus I believe that the question is not "what is the optimal structure for 
the cross-border corporation?", but more "what is the optimal structure for the 
cross-border corporation given its view of the international political economy?" or 
"what is the cross-border corporation’s optimal structure given the nature of the 
international political economy?". In addressing these questions, the nature of 
regionalism must be considered as it will affect the attractiveness of the different 
choices.
In industries where Fordist-type economies of scale are still the main 
determinant of competitiveness (for example aerospace, automobiles and 
shipbuilding), single site manufacturing will be most efficient from a production 
cost viewpoint. However, other costs can also be important, such as transport
64 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) distinguish between multinational, global, international and 
transnational firms, depending on their organisational structure, while Perlmutter (1969) 
categorises MNCs as polycentric, ethnocentric, regiocentric or geocentric.
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costs and border controls. In the case of aerospace, the existence or threat of 
protectionist barriers will need to be relatively high to justify establishing separate 
production facilities in each major region, because of the loss of economies of 
scale this would entail. However, in the case of automobiles the calculation is 
more finely balanced and the 1981 voluntary export restraint agreement between 
Japan and the US, together with the later fears of a "Fortress Europe" which 
surrounded the Single European Market programme tilted the balance in favour 
of regional production sites for Japanese automobile makers.65 Thus, where the 
cost of border restrictions66 exceeds the benefits of economies of scale from 
single site production, firms will find regional production more efficient. As 
Thomsen has noted, "global firms are not global factories".67
Whether a regional production operation should be established on a single 
site basis, or whether a network within the region is more efficient is another 
question which the cross-border firm must address. Rules of origin permitting, an 
integrated region will allow firms to ship inputs across the region just as they 
would in a large country. This means that decisions on location can be 
determined more by microeconomic business logic, with less need to account for 
man-made restrictions. In this case the structure of the production network will be 
determined by the balance between the need for just-in-time type processes and 
the production cost differentials across the region.
According to the Stolper-Samuelson model, a deal which liberalises trade 
and increases both imports and exports will be of benefit to the abundant factor 
of production.68 This will be used relatively more intensively than before, while 
the scarce factor will be used less intensively, implying that the relative price of 
the former will rise. For this to occur factors of production need to be mobile. If 
factors of production are completely immobile and sector specific, then when 
trade liberalisation occurs both capital and labour in import competing industries 
will be harmed. The analysis below concentrates on the reactions of individual
65 Emmott (1993).
66 This could be the cost of actual tariff barriers, or the product of the probable size of 
such barriers and the risk of their imposition.
67 Thomsen (1994).
68 Stolper and Samuelson (1941).
Chapter 7: Regional Trends and Multinational Corporations 263
firms, with the implicit assumption that there are considerable barriers to a firm 
re-inventing itself as a totally different entity, which is to say that factors of 
production are assumed not to be perfectly mobile between sectors. In this case 
if, say, a semiconductor fabrication plant becomes obsolete due to competition 
from imports which result from a regional trade agreement, it cannot simply close 
down one day and re-open the next day having re-trained its workers and 
reconfigured its capital equipment to produce automobiles.
Chapter 6 noted several possibilities for the future of international trade 
regulation. In the matrix shown in Table 7.1 these are combined with a range of 
corporate structures to provide an outline of the likely impact of different 
situations on different types of firms. The five main alternatives for the 
development of the international trade system are summarised as:
i) Multilateral negotiations continue at irregular intervals, complemented by 
regional agreements.
ii) Bilateral and regional agreements replace further multilateral agreements. 
The regional deals are open and contain deeper elements which are non- 
discriminatory.
iii) Bilateral and regional agreements replace further multilateral agreements, 
but they hinder trade flows with the rest of the world.
iv) Regionalism fades, to be replaced by renewed multilateralism.
v) Both regionalism and multilateralism are discarded in favour of a return to 
protectionist national trade policies.
The various scenarios affect firms in different ways, which in the real world 
can be assessed by a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. In a general sense it 
is only possible to construct a framework for inferring the likely corporate 
response, but the categories below should be broadly applicable:
a) Exporters based within the region. These are labelled "global" firms by
Bartlett and Ghoshal as they build cost advantages through centralised 
global-scale operations.69 The response of firms with a large export 
business will depend on the nature of the regionalism or multilateralism.
69 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989).
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Options i), ii) and iv) all involve a form of reduction in intra- and inter­
regional barriers which implies further opportunities to expand into foreign 
markets, with decisions on the location of production facilities becoming 
less influenced by trade restrictions. Option iii) of closed, protectionist 
regions is more of a threat to firms which rely heavily on exporting for 
delivering their goods to the final market. If closed regionalism provokes a 
retaliatory response from other regions then there will be greater pressure 
to set up production facilities within each region.70 An outflow of FDI to 
other regions could be evidence of this type of defensive measure.
For firms which are producing in one country and exporting to others 
within the same region, liberalisation of the type outlined in i), ii) and iii) 
may bring pressures for a reorganisation of activities to reflect the 
comparative advantage of the different members of the region. This is 
particularly the case within a customs union compared to a free trade 
area, as the former involves the elimination of regional border controls, so 
the bureaucratic costs of crossing national frontiers fall along with the 
tariffs. In this case, unless economies of scale in production are dominant, 
firms could gain from moving some plants to other sites within the region 
where they can benefit from the particular comparative advantage of that 
location. This type of adjustment will raise FDI flows, while the effect on 
trade is indeterminate; if the company adopts a strategy which involves 
intra-firm trade of intermediate goods, then trade volumes will rise with 
FDI. However, if the investments are aimed predominantly at adding value 
for sales in the region’s various domestic markets, then trade will decline.
b) Exporters outside Region. For firms exporting into a region which is 
pursuing a preferential arrangement the calculations are somewhat 
different from those for firms based within the region. The main difference 
is that there will be more pressure to adapt from exporting in order to 
supply regionalising markets, towards an approach which places greater 
reliance on regional production. This is most notably the case in the event
70 The flood of FDI from Japan and the US into the European Community ahead of the
1992 Single European Market is a recent example of such behaviour.
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of closed regional blocs, but it also applies when the trade diversion effect 
is likely to be strong. If economies of scale in production are the key 
competitive advantage of the firm then the trade-off between the higher 
average unit output costs implicit in regional production could still outweigh 
the reduction in competitiveness stemming from exporting to preferential 
regional groupings.
If restrictions on FDI are prohibitive, then foreign firms may need to license 
the technology to domestic producers, although this tends to be the less 
favoured choice.71 Option v) would be the most damaging development, as even 
if firms were able to invest within protectionist countries in many cases it may be 
difficult to produce enough output to allow an efficient scale of operation. 
Exporters with knowledge intensive products would be forced to transform 
themselves into what Bartlett and Ghoshal label multinational corporations, with 
investments behind trade barriers.72
c) FDI intensive MNCs. These are labelled as "multinational" or 
"international" firms by Bartlett and Ghoshal. The former build a strong 
local presence through sensitivity and responsiveness to national 
differences by owning a portfolio of national entities, each with a high 
degree of autonomy. The latter aim to exploit the parent company’s 
knowledge and capabilities through worldwide diffusion and adaptation 
and are somewhere between "multinational" and "global" firms. Firms 
which have production sites across a range of countries (i.e. 
"multinationals" in Bartlett and Ghoshal’s terminology) are likely to be less 
adversely affected by the protectionist scenario v). If restrictions on trade 
result in a reduction in competition within markets where the MNC has 
established production facilities, the result will be a more dominant 
position and probably higher profitability. However, from a broader 
macroeconomic viewpoint the net result could be slower growth which 
would offset some of the gains from more monopolistic pricing.
71 Buckley and Casson (1985).
72 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989).
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The three possibilities which envisage further intra-regional liberalisation 
(that is i), ii) and iii)) are likely to result in a reorganisation of operations 
across a region. For "multinationals" plants will already exist in many of 
the countries of the region, but these will be geared towards supplying the 
home market. Stronger regionalism will make it more efficient to integrate 
the operations of these diverse production facilities and as a result they 
will trade more with other affiliated firms within the region. Under this 
scenario regional production networks are likely to become more 
prevalent.
In the event of a return to active multilateralism, in theory the response 
could be a global version of that outlined above for regions. However, 
technological and communications barriers still remain, which means that 
global production networks are not necessarily the most effective mode of 
organisation. Similarly, neither are regional networks necessarily able to 
reach optimum efficiency, and multilateral liberalisation will allow firms to 
set up production networks on whatever scale suits their business. 
Inevitably some firms will find that autonomous nationally-based 
operations are most efficient, while for others a broader integrated network 
of production sites (on a sub-regional, regional or super-regional basis) will 
be preferred.73
d) Efficient domestic utilities. For these firms (often privatised monopolies) 
the favoured option will be either i) or iv) because this implies lower 
imported input prices due to improved access, which is likely to directly 
raise profitability. Regionalism is a lower priority as it will create few new 
markets and is likely to have a more limited effect on input prices. In the 
case of utilities, whatever foreign expansion that does take place is likely 
to be in the form of FDI aimed at serving individual markets and as such 
will enjoy limited benefits from lower trade barriers.74 However, an easing
73 Foodstuffs is a sector which tends to favour the former approach, while for automobiles
and computers broader geographic networks tend to be more efficient.
74 Although it is worth noting that France is an exporter of electricity.
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of restrictions on the movement of capital, whether delivered by either 
regionalism or multilateralism, could enable firms to exploit their 
knowledge or organisational advantages in other markets. The main 
danger is from new entrants to the home market if monopoly profits 
appear to be available, and this will again be via the FDI route, most likely 
via takeover activity, as has been the case in the UK water and electricity 
supply industries. This threat will be a constraint on pricing behaviour.
e) Inefficient domestic utilities. Such firms (perhaps part state-owned or 
heavily regulated monopolies) will also benefit from any lower input costs 
which result from a regional or multilateral deal. However, if liberalisation 
includes admitting foreign investors into the domestic market then this will 
threaten price levels and market share. The inefficient domestic utility will 
first use its often considerable political influence to oppose such access. If 
that fails it will be forced into rationalisation, and perhaps some form of 
alliance with the more efficient foreign firm. The world telecommunications 
and power generation industries are currently seeing this form of 
behaviour. Any of the options i) to iv) above would prove painful for the 
inefficient monopolist if they included provisions for greater investment 
inflows. If the firm is a price-setter, then the benefits from lower imported 
input prices will be marginal compared to the losses resulting from the 
introduction of effective competition and so it will favour option v) which 
minimises competition.
f) Domestically oriented small and medium firms. For many small and 
medium firms greater openness will imply greater competition in the 
domestic market, often from larger, more efficient foreign firms. Some 
smaller firms will lack the diversity or adaptability to allow them to 
overcome such intensified competition and will close or be absorbed by 
larger operations. When participating economies are at a similar stage in 
development, regionalism tends to imply competition from firms with a 
reasonably similar cost base, while multilateralism offers improved access 
to firms from other regions which may face lower cost structures and i)
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and iv) are therefore the options which would result in the greatest strain 
on domestic firms.
For small firms with a relatively low export sensitivity, the favoured trade 
policy will be v) above which limits the degree of competition they face and 
will allow small firms to expand in market areas vacated by foreign imports 
due to the higher border tariffs.75 In contrast, if the small and medium 
firms are regionally competitive and involved in foreign trade, then a 
regional deal could present them with the opportunity to exploit their 
advantages on a wider base. For most, however, that wider base is likely 
to be available within the home market without the need to look abroad.
75 This can be seen in the support of agricultural interests for trade barriers in many 
developed countries.
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Table 7.1. Matrix of Impact of Regionalism on MNCs
a) Exporters Within 
Region
b) Exporters 
Outside Region
c) FDI Intensive 
MNCs
d) Efficient 
Domestic Utilities
e) Inefficient Domestic 
Utilities
f) Small & Medium 
Domestically Oriented 
Firms
i) Multilateralism 
Complemented 
by Regionalism
Expand into newly 
opened markets 
worldwide, 
especially within 
region.
Expand exports 
and consider FDI 
within integrating 
regions to avoid 
trade diversion.
Integrate production 
on regional basis, but 
with considerable 
intra-regional trade.
Lowers costs and 
allows higher profits, 
but threat of new 
entrants constrains 
profits.
Effect of lower imported 
input costs is positive, 
but offset by threat of 
competition if FDI is 
allowed.
Threat of competition 
from new entrants. Some 
close or are absorbed by 
larger operators.
ii) Open 
Regionalism 
Replaces 
Multilateralism
Export to regional 
and worldwide 
market, and 
consider production 
sites in other 
regions.
Consider FDI 
within integrating 
regions to avoid 
trade diversion 
effects.
Opportunity to 
reorganise 
production on 
regional network 
basis, with less intra- 
regional integration 
than above.
Indifferent unless it 
lowers input prices 
or gives access to 
invest in regional 
markets.
Threat from entry by 
more efficient firms 
within region. Need for 
strategic alliances.
Milder threat of 
competition from new 
entrants. Some close or 
are absorbed by larger 
operators.
iii) Closed 
Regionalism 
Replaces 
Multilateralism
Exploit price 
advantage of 
exports within 
home region.
Create production 
capacity inside 
closed regions if 
possible. Loss of 
economies of 
scale.
Strong focus on 
regional networks. 
Inter-regional flows 
mainly in intangibles.
Negative if it raises 
input prices. 
Compensation if 
opportunities 
emerge to invest in 
regional markets.
Negative if it raises 
input costs, especially if 
it also liberalises FDI 
flows in the region.
Even milder threat of 
competition from new 
entrants. Some close or 
are absorbed by larger 
operators.
iv) Multilateral 
Liberalisation 
Replaces 
Regionalism
Export more 
aggressively 
worldwide.
Export more 
aggressively 
worldwide.
Integrate production 
on worldwide basis, 
with substantial intra­
firm trade.
Lower costs of 
imported inputs 
raise profits unless 
new competition 
emerges.
Effect of lower imported 
input costs is positive, 
but likely to be offset by 
threat of competition if 
FDI is allowed.
Threat of competition 
from new entrants. Some 
close or are absorbed by 
larger operators.
v) National
Protectionism
Replaces
Regionalism
and
Multilateralism
Segregated 
markets damage 
exports and mean 
few economies of 
scale if FDI is 
substituted for 
exports. More 
focus on home 
market.
Segregated 
markets damage 
exports and mean 
few economies of 
scale if FDI is 
substituted for 
exports. More 
focus on home 
market.
Higher profits within 
protected markets 
due to gain in 
competitiveness over 
imports. Pressure to 
establish more 
autonomous 
production units.
Higher imported 
input costs. Little 
chance of FDI.
Positive if it reduces 
competition and allows 
monopoly pricing, in 
spite of higher input 
costs.
Reduction of competition 
offsets losses from less 
dynamic economy.
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As discussed above, I do not believe that it is possible to conduct credible 
empirical tests on such a framework.76 No broadly based data are available in 
sufficient detail, and selected case studies could be put fonward to support or 
undermine the matrix, depending on the firms chosen. Moreover, I do not believe 
that it is necessary to conduct such testing. The matrix of the impact of 
regionalism on MNCs is of interest not because it necessarily represents the 
actual behaviour of identifiable firms, but because it represents a range of 
implications of regionalism. Nor is it necessarily possible to conduct an 
examination on a sectorial basis, as it is quite likely that domestically oriented 
firms and export oriented multinationals will co-exist within the same industrial 
sector of an economy, each with different attitudes and responses to regionalism.
This matrix above implies that similar firms will be affected in a similar 
fashion by the form that regionalism takes, and as a result are likely to react in a 
similar way. However, Dunning has introduced the issue of MNCs’ strategy into 
the picture, suggesting that even apparently similar firms facing similar situations 
can react in different ways due to diverging corporate strategies.77 This brings a 
further complication and is another reason why a case study approach is not 
attractive.
The debate about corporate structures is more of a question of how firms 
service markets than whether they choose to do so. Unless the direction of trade 
policy is reversed so that a reduction of competition becomes a genuine 
possibility, the main issue is whether firms choose to export to meet demand or 
whether they set up local production facilities, perhaps as part of a wider 
network.
Apart from the organisational adaptations imposed by regionalism, there 
are also strategic pressures at work which are leading multinational corporations 
to integrate their activities on a global basis, irrespective of the regional 
dynamics. The view propounded by Levitt was that homogenisation of demand 
across the world makes it decreasingly necessary for the multinational 
corporation to pursue a different strategy in individual countries.78 Therefore,
76 Some examples have been offered to illustrate the points made above, but they do not 
amount to a "proof" of the propositions put forward in the matrix.
77 Dunning (1993a).
78 Levitt (1983).
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even if the world does deteriorate into restrictive regional trading blocs, elements 
of the MNC’s strategy will not change as the underlying market it services is 
unaltered. What has changed is the optimum vehicle by which each market is 
serviced. Homogenisation of demand signals the end of the multinational 
company which pursues different strategies and sells different products from 
country to country. In this case, firms will be increasingly be treating the world as 
a single unit and selling standardised products.
As yet, genuinely global firms are few and far between. Most are 
domestically oriented with some foreign operations, indicating that Ohmae’s 
vision of a "borderless world"79 is still some distance away. Even though Levitt 
has been criticised for taking the argument to an extreme level,80 it applies to an 
increasing number of industries, which suggests that optimal structures depend 
on the nature of the product as well as on the view or state of the world. 
Nevertheless, this additional dynamic adds a further complication to any 
consideration of the reaction of firms to regionalism. Similarly, the tendency for 
governments to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers contemporaneously with other 
domestic liberalisation clouds the issue without altering the underlying cost- 
benefit analysis.81
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show that regionalism is a trend which has a 
definite effect on the business conditions facing both multinational and 
domestically-oriented companies and as such is not an issue which should be 
met with complacency. In particular, the form that regionalism can take is 
important—whether it is "deep" or "shallow", "open" or "closed".
Moreover, regionalism has a part to play in a firm's decisions on where the 
border lies between internalising transactions, or conducting them in the market. 
Regionalism is likely to reduce market imperfections, which argues for less 
internalisation. However, it is also likely to lower the costs of internalising
79 See Ohmae (1990).
80 See for example Douglas and Wind (1987).
81 EPAC (1995).
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transactions, so the overall effect will vary from firm to firm. On a broader level, 
the reduced systemic risk implied by the commonality of interests and increased 
communication involved in regionalism will be of benefit to all firms in the region.
To what extent firms can influence regional agreements to reflect their 
trade policy preferences is open to question. Historically, there has been a 
correlation between lobbying for protectionism and the granting of preferential 
treatment. However, a notable feature of recent regional agreements has been 
the extent of their internal consistency, with relatively few concessions made to 
specific interest groups. Corporate support for the passage of the overall 
agreements may have been politically useful, but does not appear to be a key 
element in their inception or ratification.
Looking at the issue of regionalism from a microeconomic perspective 
makes the popular "building block—stumbling block” debate appear to be of 
limited relevance. For a large number of firms, there are limited material 
differences to whether multilateralism and regionalism proceed side by side, or 
whether one continues and the other ends, as long as regionalism is not 
protectionist. Whether regionalism and multilateralism are complementary or in 
conflict is of more interest to the question of how firms supply markets than 
whether they do so. The scenarios which provoke a different corporate response 
are those which involve a retreat towards protectionism and this is a deeper 
policy issue than whether or not regionalism and multilateralism are compatible.
Having attempted to bring the multinational corporation into the debate on 
preferential regional agreements, the conclusion will bring the pieces together to 
summarise how the international political economy of regional trading 
arrangements interacts with the behaviour of the multinational corporation.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
8.1 Introduction
This research has addressed several issues related to the international political 
economy of regional integration. It is a subject which has been written about 
increasingly in recent years, but there have been all too few rigorous studies of 
the facts or their implications for the international political economy. This work 
has examined several areas for evidence of how the advance of preferential 
regional agreements will alter the structure of the international system.
Firstly, a range of evidence was analysed for signs of closer integration in 
the three major regions. As noted in Chapter 3, there are inadequacies in each of 
the approaches used to measure regional bias. There are various ways of 
adapting the trade intensity index, developed by Brown,1 which measures 
bilateral trade bias, but each of those methods (and indeed Brown’s original 
method) contains drawbacks. As long as the flaws are taken into account (and in 
particular attempts are not made to draw inter-regional comparisons) then it is 
possible to use trade intensity indexes to illustrate trends in regional trade bias 
over time. The more complex, and for a time more popular, method of 
constructing gravity models to explore factors behind regional bias is also found 
to contain serious flaws.
By using time series analysis I have used regional trade intensity indexes 
to display trends over the past three decades in a way that is not possible in 
analysis which relies on comparing discrete points over time. The potential for 
short-term distortions to the data, through fluctuations in prices or in exchange 
rates, makes such a time series analysis more useful when looking for underlying 
trends. Merchandise trade data show that flows of goods have become more 
regionalized in Europe and North America, with an acceleration of the trend 
apparent since the late 1980s. In the case of Europe, since the late 1960s the 
rise in overall trade bias has been the result of increased bias between existing 
members and new members, rather than between the founding six members.
1 Brown (1949).
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One concern is that the quality of non-merchandise trade data is not good 
enough to allow a similar analysis for trade in services or flows of investment. 
Given the potential substitutability between capital and trade flows and the 
growing importance of trade in services, this means that some caution is needed 
when interpreting the results of the statistical analysis of Chapter 3.
Regional trading arrangements are classical international political 
economy territory because of the complex web of motivations for the creation of 
such structures. Economic factors alone provide a powerful reason to form a 
preferential regional bloc, but other explanations are useful to show why 
countries follow this path rather than opting for unilateral liberalisation. Non­
economic factors such as increasing bargaining power, attempting to redress the 
balance of power between states and firms, and reducing systemic risk can all be 
significant.
Most debate on the subject of regionalism focuses on the question of 
whether it will aid or hinder multilateralism, but Chapter 7 offers a different 
perspective by moving away from the standard "building block / stumbling block" 
type of analysis. I have argued that multinational firms which are organised on a 
regional or sub-regional basis will not have strong preferences over whether 
regionalism is the sole vehicle for liberalisation, or whether it is complemented by 
multilateralism. Taking a micro perspective gives another dimension to aspects of 
regional and multilateral liberalisation that are relevant to international business 
and it also allows the construction of a framework which helps to analyse the 
effects of a range of possible scenarios.
8.2 Why is Regionalism a Growing Issue?
Even before considering the implications of increasing regionalism, it is useful to 
note the reasons for the revival of interest in the subject. The existence of 
economic gains from freer exchange is often underplayed, but remains a 
powerful force behind the creation of regional trade agreements. However, 
additional perspectives are needed to explain why regional liberalisation is 
chosen in preference to unilateral action and why the popularity of regionalism 
has increased in recent years. I have argued that the multilateral lowering of 
tariffs in recent decades implies that direct trade-related gains are likely to be
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less of a motivation for regional agreements than in the past, so other 
explanations are needed for the revived popularity of such structures. Non-tariff 
liberalisation is one area where a regional approach is favoured ahead of a 
unilateral one, because in several areas this comes down to agreement on policy 
harmonisation, where unilateralism is not a realistic option. The renewed interest 
in preferential regional arrangements may be a consequence of the fact that they 
are no longer as clearly focused on border-level tariff reductions, and encompass 
a range of "deeper" restrictions on cross-border exchange.
One interesting concept is that regionalism is being used by governments 
in an attempt to regain some of their lost influence over the market. For this to be 
effective there needs to be a degree of policy co-ordination at the central level 
above simple tariff reductions, which makes the European Union the only region 
where this idea can be examined in detail. However, regionalism also implies a 
shrinkage in the number of policy instruments available to governments, so 
although they might gain from acting in a co-operative fashion with other 
countries in the region, they also suffer costs in terms of loss of independence of 
trade policy, as well as less freedom in formulating monetary and fiscal policy.
The effectiveness and the merits of using regionalism to stabilise 
exchange rates was examined in Chapter 4. Although various studies have found 
no evidence of exchange rate fluctuations damaging trade flows, currency 
stability remains a policy objective of many governments. It was shown that 
preferential regional agreements do not help to reduce foreign exchange volatility 
unless they involve explicit institutional agreements targeted at the exchange 
rate, as in the case of Europe. However, exchange rate stability is not an end in 
itself, and without benefits to other targeted economic variables it is of limited 
worth. In particular, there is no evidence that reduced currency volatility 
increases regional trade bias.
As the world regionalises into a relatively small number of groups it might 
be the case that it is not so much that membership of a group necessarily brings 
benefits in terms of market access, but that failure to join a group implies costs 
due to isolation and lack of bargaining power. This could help to explain 
developments such as the Enterprise for the Americas initiative, as well as 
renewed regionalism in Latin America.
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Another issue which is frequently absent from the debate on regionalism is 
how it affects systemic risk. The neglect of such a consideration is perhaps due 
to the difficulties in quantifying any impact, but it seems clear that if nations within 
a region have established a forum for co-operation then the dangers of trade or 
military conflict damaging the interests of multinational corporations operating 
within the region are lessened. A further issue is whether an institutional bias, 
either in favour of, or against protectionism, is likely to develop within a formal 
regional grouping. This seems to depend in part on the structure of the central 
institutions and the nature of decision-making within the regional group, and so 
the result is likely to differ between regions.
One concern in approaching the subject of regionalism on a global basis is 
that the motivations of countries in joining regional arrangements will vary 
considerably, as will the nature of the agreements themselves. This makes it 
difficult to construct a framework to analyse the structure and influence of 
regional arrangements, but in a general sense Chapter 7 presented a matrix to 
illustrate the likely impact of different trade regimes on different types of firms.
8.2.1 Regionalism and Intra-Regional Trade
Regionalism must lead to more regionalisation, ceteris paribus, because at the 
margin the lower costs of doing business inherent in an effective regional 
agreement will cause a bias in favour of regional trade. However, measuring this 
regional bias is fraught with difficulties. Flaws in using the trade intensity index to 
measure bilateral bias, increased problems when projecting the methodology to 
the regional level, and drawbacks in the use of gravity models were discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3. There is no consensus in the literature on which approach is 
most suitable, and statistical inadequacies are commonly overlooked.
Bearing in mind the problems in the approach, I have calculated regional 
trade intensity indexes to show trends in regional trade bias. I introduced the 
innovation of constructing a time series of trade intensity indices over the past 
three decades to enable trends to be identified which can be missed or 
misinterpreted by studies that compare the situation at discrete time intervals. 
Such a process also allows short-term volatility—caused by factors such as
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currency or commodity price fluctuations—to be distinguished from longer term 
structural trends.
Chapter 3 demonstrated that there has been a rise in regional trade bias 
within both Europe and North America in recent decades. However, the rise in 
bias within Europe has not included an increase in the degree of preferential bias 
between the original six members since the late 1960s. Increased regional trade 
bias between the current 15 members over the past three decades is a result of 
a rise in bias between the core and the newcomers, and between the 
newcomers. Looking not just at the bias of trade, but at the overall openness to 
trade of countries shows whether regional economies are becoming more closely 
integrated. This is the case in Europe and North America, where both general 
economic openness (in terms of trade to GDP ratios) and regional bias have 
increased.
Another problem in a statistical analysis is that the focus tends to be on 
merchandise trade flows, as elsewhere the data are poor. Information on foreign 
direct investment flows are too sparse and too volatile, data on trade in services 
are not sufficiently detailed, while figures on transactions of intangibles are even 
less informative. As a result it is useful analyse the factors behind the statistical 
trends an attempt to identify the forces involved.
In welfare terms the relative consistency of regional agreements is a 
positive feature. Allocative distortions on the scale of those created by the 
European Union's Common Agricultural Policy are marked by their absence from 
other regional agreements. Lobbying by industry bodies might have an effect in 
determining the overall success of regional initiatives, but they have mostly been 
ineffective in securing significant sectorial concessions. That is not to say that 
regional agreements do not contain areas of distortion, but that the distortions on 
a regional basis tend to be lower than those which previously existed on a 
national basis.
Regional trade agreements also have an impact on efficiency due to their 
consequences for market failure. Trade liberalisation should mean that structural 
market failure is reduced, as government intervention in the economy is 
constrained and the power of firms to pursue anti-competitive strategies is 
limited. Whether this will continue to be the case is uncertain: in airlines and 
telecommunications at least it appears that there is scope for domestic
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monopolies and oligopolies to be replaced by international ones as a result of 
M&A and strategic alliances. On another level efficiency gains could be 
improved, as the commitment to liberalisation inherent in joining a regional trade 
agreement is often transmitted to domestic policy-making, with eradication of 
domestic regulations frequently accompanying border-level liberalisation.
8.2.2 Regionalism and Extra-Regional Trade
One finding from Chapter 3 was that in spite of a rise in regionalisation, regions 
had also experienced a broader opening of their economies. This meant that 
trade with the rest of the world continued to become more important, even as the 
positive trade bias within the region increased. It is likely that some of the very 
measures which led to an increase in regionalisation also led to a rise in 
economic openness in a more general sense.
As noted in Chapter 5, much of the deeper liberalisation which has been 
taking place is non-discriminatory in nature. Co-operation on issues such as anti­
dumping and TRIMs can be applied discriminatorily, but improved transparency, 
curbs on subsidies and effective competition policy are essentially non- 
discriminatory. The consequence is that although the intra-regional and extra- 
regional bias will change as a result of deeper integration, so does the broader 
domestic versus foreign bias, with the effect being more open economies. This is 
one reason why regionalism does not look likely to result in the creation of a 
small number of economically independent groupings. Moreover, it reduces 
concern about the potentially protectionist implications of the growth of 
regionalism. The elements of deep regionalism that cannot be discriminatory do 
not pose a threat to multilateralism.
From one perspective, a rise in regional independence would imply that 
concern about an end to multilateral liberalisation is misplaced because it is 
decreasingly relevant to more regionally-oriented companies. However, the rise 
in regionalisation identified in the trade data is not necessarily a sign of greater 
regional independence because it tells us nothing about the quality of flows 
between regions compared to those within regions. If it is the case that intra- 
regional trade flows involve intra-industry trade, while inter-regional trade flows 
involve the exchange of inter-industry products and knowledge-based resources
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(and this seems a rough approximation, in relative terms) then regions have not 
become more independent.
This continued interdependence could be one reason why regions 
continue to be more co-operative than is sometimes feared. Part of the "building 
block—stumbling block" debate is founded on the concern that trade relations will 
become more abrasive. Indeed, a world split into three regions is seen as the 
most dangerous in terms of the motivations for regions to impose optimum tariffs 
(and the welfare losses resulting from such action). However, the continued 
decline of inter-regional barriers at a time when the theoretical gains from 
optimum tariffs are increasing illustrates the co-operative nature of trade 
relations.
There is a need for the debate to progress beyond the question of whether 
regionalism will benefit or hinder multilateralism. A more relevant issue is what 
form of liberalisation is most important for multinational actors: I have indicated 
that many MNCs are likely to be indifferent between open regionalism and 
multilateralism. Moreover, with border-level trade barriers among developed 
countries already at extremely low levels, it is deeper integration which is 
becoming the more important concern, and such agreements are frequently non- 
preferential.
8.3 Regional Globalisation
The most striking suggestion from an examination of regional issues is that 
globalisation is a stronger force than regionalisation in the international political 
economy. This is often manifested through regional behaviour, in what I have 
labelled "regional globalisation", which makes the analysis complex, but the key 
dynamic is that of multinational corporations attempting to expand into fresh 
markets irrespective of regional peculiarities.
The assertion that globalisation is more important than regionalisation 
cannot be proved through statistical analysis, but it is a consequence of an 
examination of the microeconomic motivations of the actors. Moreover, 
continued multilateral liberalisation means that the marginal effect of regional 
liberalisation is decreasing. Data on trade flows show members of major regions 
moving closer together, but regionalisation of trade does not necessarily imply
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that globalisation is diminishing. As noted, the data covering foreign direct 
investment are poor and offer no information on whether such flows are 
substituting for existing trade flows or creating new ones. An increasingly 
important failure in the statistics is that the flows of intangibles, such as 
knowledge, are measured imprecisely, if at all. As the shape of the international 
political economy transforms, a fresh approach to compiling statistics on the part 
of national governments would aid analysis of cross-border linkages and 
dependencies. With the exception of the United States, statistical information is 
still wedded to economic structures of decades ago, when merchandise trade 
flows were dominant, FDI flows existed but were poorly explained, and other 
flows were largely absent or ignored. For the sake of effective policy-making a 
better understanding of the integration of the international political economy is 
necessary.
The formation of preferential regional arrangements means that firms are 
able to globalise their operations via the construction of regional production 
networks. These typically offer a large enough scale of operations to obtain 
production economies of scale, while the existence of similar facilities within 
separate regions allows economies of scale for fixed costs such as those 
involved in research and development, marketing or finance. The implication is 
that in most issue areas, liberalisation on a global scale is not necessary, with 
regional liberalisation being sufficient to allow efficient operations. Thus, 
regionalism is not so much a substitute for global liberalisation, but an alternative 
to it. The one caveat is that there is no inherent reason why a regional (or sub­
regional) scale of production should continue to be optimal. At the end of the 
20th century it is simply the point at which the need for economies of scale in 
production meets with the organisational pressures of modern management 
techniques such as just in time production. It is quite feasible that future 
developments will render the region an obsolete unit and will require integration 
of a larger area. Note also that regionalism does not alter the fact that economic 
and political space do not coincide, so the continuing struggle by states to re­
assert control over the market may have to extend from the regional level to the 
global level.
Therefore, although it might seem that global integration can proceed as a 
result of the combination of regional trading agreements with the organisational
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strategies of multinational corporations, there is no inherent reason why closer 
integration will continue to be propelled by these two forces. At present if 
regionalism moves faster than multilateralism then it has its advantages, but in 
the future it could be that global production is necessary for economies of scale, 
in which case multilateralism will increase in importance again.
Rather than the well-developed debate on the relationship between, and 
relative merits of, regionalism and multilateralism, Chapter 7 turned the focus to 
how both regionalism and multilateralism affect the actions of multinational 
corporations operating on a global scale. The conclusion was that as long as 
regionalism is not protectionist, there was little practical difference between them 
in terms of what they mean for MNC strategies. Regionalism is a more important 
influence on the question of how firms should service global markets, rather than 
whether they should do so.
8.4 Methodological and Theoretical Aspects
This research has raised more questions related to methodology than it has 
answered. The inadequacies of each of the approaches commonly used to 
measure regionalisation have been discussed in detail. Problems in the gravity 
model approach mean that the added complexity is not rewarded with added 
clarity of explanation. It is argued that regional trade intensity indexes can be 
used, if handled with care, but no single methodology is conclusively superior.
Another concern is that focusing heavily on trade flows at a time when 
there is mobility of both goods and factors of production could be misleading. 
Even if the data for non-trade flows were available in sufficient detail, the 
potential for flows of capital to either complement or substitute for flows of goods 
adds a further level of complexity.
From a theoretical side, it has been illustrated that there is an 
uncomfortable overlap between theories of international economic integration 
(such as customs union theory) and theories of international production (as 
advanced by the likes of Dunning). This research has drawn on both areas in 
analysing the effects of regionalism, as no single perspective appears to offer a 
full explanation of the dynamics at work. However, the two fields do not sit well
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together, with concepts such as "strategy" within the international business 
literature difficult to incorporate into economic trade theories.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that a new mode of analysis is 
needed which overcomes the current segregation between trade and investment; 
but whether this is possible in a theoretical or a practical sense is unclear. The 
co-existence of trade-creating and trade-substituting FDI would appear to make a 
search for a general theory of international business an unfulfilling one, as would 
the increased flow of intangibles. However, the real world is developing more 
rapidly than the theory on this subject, leaving us ever more poorly placed to 
analyse regionalism, regionalisation and global integration. In the face of such 
theoretical complexities, the tendency is to focus on the details of specific 
sectors, or to collate anecdotal evidence of corporate behaviour. However, such 
findings cannot be extrapolated into a general theory, leaving us little better off in 
our attempt to understand the implications of regional integration.
8.5 Conclusion
The evidence put forward in this research is that international transactions are 
regionalising, partly in response to the establishment and development of 
preferential regional trading arrangements. Methodological difficulties mean that 
this is difficult to demonstrate conclusively, but the weight of evidence suggests it 
is the case for Europe and North America. This, together with inadequacies in 
the data, mean that any conclusions from statistical calculations must be 
considered alongside discussion of systemic, macroeconomic and 
microeconomic factors at work.
While the evidence suggests that world trade and world production are 
regionalising, this should not be allowed to obscure the more powerful force of 
globalisation which is also taking place. Although globalisation is at times 
manifested as regionalisation, this is as much a function of the organisational 
exigencies of the multinational corporation, rather than a reflection of the 
preferential bias imposed by regionalism.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A1. Data for charts in Chapter 3.
Figure 3.1
EU6 EU15
1958 30.6 45.3
1959 33.5 46.8
1960 34.6 48.2
1961 36.8 50.7
1962 38.9 52.4
1963 40.9 53.5
1964 41.9 54.4
1965 42.7 55.0
1966 43.4 55.0
1967 43.8 54.9
1968 45.4 55.4
1969 47.9 57.3
1970 48.5 58.0
1971 49.6 58.8
1972 50.5 60.2
1973 49.5 60.3
1974 45.6 56.8
1975 45.2 56.5
1976 46.0 57.6
1977 44.8 57.5
1978 45.5 58.4
1979 45.3 59.4
1980 43.4 57.5
1981 41.2 55.3
1982 42.0 56.7
1983 42.3 57.8
1984 41.5 57.5
1985 41.8 58.5
1986 44.6 62.1
1987 45.3 63.7
1988 45.2 64.1
1989 44.6 63.9
1990 45.1 64.7
1991 45.1 64.9
1992 45.1 65.3
1993 41.1 60.7
1994 41.1 61.2
1995 41.4 61.8
1996 40.3 61.0
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Figure 3.2
Method 1
1958 1.213
1959 1.303
1960 1.291
1961 1.328
1962 1.350
1963 1.403
1964 1.464
1965 1.456
1966 1.495
1967 1.522
1968 1.570
1969 1.571
1970 1.583
1971 1.582
1972 1.578
1973 1.550
1974 1.545
1975 1.516
1976 1.548
1977 1.514
1978 1.498
1979 1.476
1980 1.484
1981 1.634
1982 1.618
1983 1.644
1984 1.695
1985 1.663
1986 1.578
1987 1.566
1988 1.612
1989 1.609
1990 1.514
1991 1.535
1992 1.569
1993 1.614
1994 1.611
1995 1.606
1996 1.627
Method 2 Method 3
1.439 1.613
1.545 1.789
1.527 1.791
1.568 1.887
1.590 1.961
1.652 2.092
1.725 2.217
1.713 2.223
1.760 2.310
1.793 2.367
1.849 2.496
1.844 2.573
1.857 2.615
1.853 2.651
1.846 2.672
1.814 2.582
1.818 2.458
1.783 2.394
1.820 2.473
1.781 2.381
1.758 2.368
1.732 2.324
1.746 2.288
1.939 2.489
1.918 2.486
1.950 2.541
2.015 2.603
1.975 2.557
1.861 2.489
1.844 2.487
1.902 2.568
1.900 2.546
1.780 2.387
1.807 2.425
1.849 2.488
1.915 2.455
1.911 2.449
1.905 2.450
1.932 2.453
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Figure 3.3
Belgium France Germany Italy Holland
1958 2.050 1.142 1.514 1.000 1.891
1959 2.043 1.333 1.610 1.180 1.976
1960 2.043 1.344 1.581 1.207 1.930
1961 2.076 1.418 1.625 1.238 1.971
1962 2.078 1.471 1.642 1.310 1.939
1963 2.157 1.528 1.705 1.336 2.016
1964 2.254 1.602 1.741 1.395 2.118
1965 2.210 1.623 1.756 1.383 2.084
1966 2.269 1.708 1.794 1.428 2.101
1967 2.280 1.759 1.833 1.462 2.123
1968 2.288 1.860 1.893 1.505 2.176
1969 2.276 1.881 1.881 1.510 2.129
1970 2.297 1.860 1.910 1.550 2.142
1971 2.316 1.845 1.912 1.562 2.107
1972 2.283 1.836 1.884 1.582 2.113
1973 2.258 1.798 1.854 1.546 2.069
1974 2.295 1.774 1.865 1.488 2.113
1975 2.265 1.704 1.837 1.471 2.083
1976 2.335 1.747 1.866 1.530 2.090
1977 2.264 1.715 1.838 1.490 2.061
1978 2.221 1.712 1.805 1.488 2.046
1979 2.187 1.673 1.781 1.488 1.997
1980 2.171 1.662 1.806 1.528 2.029
1981 2.450 1.826 2.043 1.609 2.313
1982 2.427 1.812 2.035 1.615 2.251
1983 2.455 1.850 2.060 1.650 2.293
1984 2.560 1.918 2.109 1.718 2.372
1985 2.517 1.893 2.035 1.713 2.356
1986 2.358 1.815 1.866 1.737 2.198
1987 2.329 1.815 1.856 1.734 2.138
1988 2.389 1.853 1.926 1.807 2.189
1989 2.365 1.860 1.943 1.785 2.178
1990 2.269 1.740 1.794 1.698 2.055
1991 2.298 1.728 1.863 1.721 2.113
1992 2.362 1.756 1.914 1.761 2.165
1993 2.499 1.903 1.850 1.829 2.214
1994 2.429 1.879 1.868 1.809 2.245
1995 2.464 1.902 1.841 1.803 2.186
1996 2.512 1.902 1.882 1.805 2.248
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Figure 3.4
Method 1
1958 1.021
1959 1.051
1960 1.066
1961 1.105
1962 1.115
1963 1.136
1964 1.175
1965 1.171
1966 1.192
1967 1.209
1968 1.245
1969 1.245
1970 1.263
1971 1.257
1972 1.279
1973 1.294
1974 1.308
1975 1.285
1976 1.341
1977 1.342
1978 1.338
1979 1.340
1980 1.349
1981 1.496
1982 1.486
1983 1.523
1984 1.579
1985 1.565
1986 1.502
1987 1.491
1988 1.533
1989 1.544
1990 1.468
1991 1.505
1992 1.540
1993 1.599
1994 1.611
1995 1.602
1996 1.619
Method 2 Method 3
1.065 1.491
1.096 1.564
1.111 1.610
1.151 1.720
1.161 1.765
1.182 1.827
1.223 1.926
1.219 1.929
1.242 1.977
1.260 2.011
1.298 2.103
1.296 2.145
1.316 2.206
1.308 2.210
1.331 2.305
1.347 2.344
1.365 2.282
1.340 2.221
1.400 2.381
1.401 2.377
1.396 2.398
1.398 2.434
1.408 2.396
1.569 2.662
1.557 2.689
1.595 2.816
1.656 2.938
1.640 2.946
1.569 2.947
1.557 2.989
1.602 3.125
1.613 3.146
1.531 2.973
1.571 3.086
1.608 3.208
1.675 3.133
1.688 3.190
1.678 3.195
1.697 3.196
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Figure 3.6
EU6 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
1958 0.445 1.154 0.958 1.169
1959 0.459 1.145 0.944 1.201
1960 0.455 1.168 1.068 1.282
1961 0.459 1.290 1.095 1.347
1962 0.462 1.312 1.122 1.347
1963 0.461 1.351 1.099 1.417
1964 0.474 1.397 1.126 1.522
1965 0.455 1.421 1.111 1.539
1966 0.454 1.486 1.122 1.616
1967 0.464 1.553 1.112 1.713
1968 0.477 1.597 1.162 1.866
1969 0.455 1.686 1.146 1.882
1970 0.456 1.837 1.186 1.941
1971 0.444 1.893 1.164 1.953
1972 0.487 1.875 1.215 2.000
1973 0.532 1.871 1.161 2.044
1974 0.599 1.938 1.104 1.988
1975 0.608 1.929 1.004 1.824
1976 0.680 2.088 1.020 1.974
1977 0.724 2.070 1.031 1.828
1978 0.720 2.155 1.001 1.766
1979 0.752 2.126 1.017 1.762
1980 0.778 2.051 0.942 1.651
1981 0.947 2.328 1.079 1.866
1982 0.961 2.187 1.048 1.806
1983 0.999 2.105 1.164 1.878
1984 1.079 2.044 1.257 1.985
1985 1.079 1.944 1.232 1.890
1986 0.973 1.885 1.301 1.672
1987 0.938 1.821 1.273 1.584
1988 0.967 1.787 1.280 1.587
1989 0.990 1.830 1.255 1.584
1990 0.907 1.814 1.180 1.471
1991 0.941 1.916 1.205 1.533
1992 0.979 1.998 1.227 1.543
1993 1.063 1.899 1.377 1.659
1994 1.111 1.930 1.401 1.728
1995 1.119 1.964 1.409 1.703
1996 1.136 1.885 1.417 1.704
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Figure 3.7
EU6 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
1958 1.188 1.092 0.563 0.925
1959 1.042 1.059 0.980 0.898
1960 1.101 1.185 0.898 0.952
1961 1.077 1.243 1.252 0.956
1962 0.985 1.249 1.101 0.901
1963 0.966 1.160 1.079 0.913
1964 0.993 1.148 1.393 0.917
1965 0.971 1.119 1.065 0.879
1966 0.934 1.120 1.098 0.928
1967 0.945 1.157 1.337 0.913
1968 0.905 1.235 1.407 1.008
1969 0.850 1.238 1.439 0.957
1970 0.832 1.205 1.345 0.908
1971 0.842 1.271 1.633 0.922
1972 0.836 1.226 1.460 0.988
1973 0.885 1.216 1.512 1.036
1974 0.872 1.100 1.409 0.983
1975 0.845 0.980 1.431 0.931
1976 0.862 0.990 1.268 0.951
1977 0.918 1.074 1.399 0.831
1978 0.907 1.059 1.524 0.762
1979 0.918 1.033 1.453 0.743
1980 0.912 1.037 1.405 0.735
1981 1.098 1.176 1.703 0.885
1982 1.065 1.128 1.575 0.786
1983 1.106 1.203 1.394 0.803
1984 1.135 1.256 1.770 0.819
1985 1.172 1.287 1.668 0.883
1986 1.195 1.345 2.389 0.932
1987 1.210 1.303 2.643 0.920
1988 1.282 1.388 3.178 0.965
1989 1.292 1.314 3.157 0.971
1990 1.197 1.244 2.960 0.924
1991 1.225 1.241 2.961 0.925
1992 1.288 1.249 3.251 0.927
1993 1.402 1.252 3.779 0.979
1994 1.446 1.300 4.090 0.976
1995 1.442 1.276 4.202 0.908
1996 1.504 1.287 4.265 0.893
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Figure 3.8
EU6 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
1958 1.150 1.102 0.952 0.876
1959 1.136 1.127 0.919 1.082
1960 1.089 1.227 0.857 1.324
1961 1.088 1.279 0.844 1.482
1962 1.013 1.290 0.876 1.501
1963 0.978 1.340 0.885 1.468
1964 0.965 1.481 0.883 1.631
1965 0.933 1.496 0.861 1.731
1966 0.909 1.565 0.901 1.982
1967 0.875 1.637 0.906 2.116
1968 0.866 1.761 1.023 2.246
1969 0.810 1.795 0.927 2.613
1970 0.781 1.855 0.935 2.827
1971 0.756 1.835 0.898 2.963
1972 0.748 1.896 0.937 3.089
1973 0.767 1.962 0.991 3.130
1974 0.801 1.932 0.929 3.194
1975 0.766 1.748 0.836 3.194
1976 0.802 1.894 0.932 3.152
1977 0.850 1.777 0.779 3.018
1978 0.847 1.741 0.726 2.994
1979 0.834 1.707 0.680 3.027
1980 0.886 1.622 0.670 3.175
1981 1.020 1.828 0.723 3.485
1982 1.006 1.784 0.729 3.305
1983 1.044 1.850 0.689 3.103
1984 1.107 1.955 0.737 3.293
1985 1.098 1.854 0.755 3.210
1986 1.032 1.645 0.819 3.058
1987 1.020 1.549 0.821 2.985
1988 1.075 1.556 0.856 3.071
1989 1.090 1.540 0.879 3.205
1990 1.012 1.472 0.843 2.959
1991 1.071 1.503 0.905 2.923
1992 1.111 1.525 0.836 2.731
1993 1.303 1.697 0.935 2.854
1994 1.266 1.739 0.894 2.894
1995 1.152 1.525 0.801 2.654
1996 1.210 1.511 0.850 2.667
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Figure 3.9
CUSFTA NAFTA
1960 32.3 33.7
1961 33.0 34.3
1962 33.5 34.8
1963 32.8 34.1
1964 33.2 34.5
1965 34.7 35.7
1966 36.1 36.9
1967 38.4 39.1
1968 39.3 40.0
1969 40.8 41.5
1970 37.9 38.6
1971 39.5 40.1
1972 39.9 40.6
1973 37.6 38.3
1974 35.0 35.9
1975 34.8 35.7
1976 35.0 35.8
1977 34.3 35.1
1978 33.5 34.5
1979 32.8 34.1
1980 31.4 33.2
1981 33.0 34.9
1982 33.0 34.4
1983 35.8 37.1
1984 36.9 38.1
1985 37.3 38.6
1986 35.0 36.2
1987 35.1 36.3
1988 35.2 36.5
1989 35.4 36.8
1990 35.8 37.4
1991 35.9 39.1
1992 36.5 39.9
1993 37.9 41.3
1994 39.1 42.7
1995 38.5 42.2
1996 39.5 43.6
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Figure 3.11
Mexico Canada
1960 4.151 3.547
1961 4.575 3.777
1962 4.223 3.851
1963 4.583 3.852
1964 4.472 3.807
1965 4.025 3.865
1966 3.586 3.733
1967 3.735 4.050
1968 3.573 3.922
1969 3.758 4.337
1970 3.961 4.146
1971 3.927 4.253
1972 4.328 4.151
1973 4.253 4.527
1974 4.079 4.336
1975 4.449 4.644
1976 4.284 4.373
1977 4.380 4.314
1978 4.543 4.339
1979 4.852 4.361
1980 4.778 4.362
1981 3.995 4.496
1982 3.804 4.614
1983 3.885 4.510
1984 3.238 3.948
1985 3.268 3.924
1986 3.558 3.968
1987 3.797 4.134
1988 4.086 4.212
1989 4.388 4.273
1990 4.667 4.933
1991 5.582 5.201
1992 5.603 5.279
1993 5.153 4.926
1994 5.234 4.969
1995 5.499 5.185
1996 5.440 5.279
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Figure 3.12
ASEAN East Asia APEC
1970 18.3 27.6 55.6
1971 18.7 27.2 56.3
1972 16.9 26.9 57.0
1973 16.4 30.3 56.6
1974 14.7 29.8 53.3
1975 15.5 29.1 51.6
1976 16.1 28.7 53.1
1977 16.3 29.3 52.9
1978 16.3 31.1 54.1
1979 17.9 32.9 53.8
1980 18.2 33.1 52.7
1981 18.4 33.0 54.3
1982 22.4 34.0 56.0
1983 23.7 34.1 58.3
1984 20.4 34.1 60.4
1985 19.7 34.8 61.3
1986 18.2 32.7 61.3
1987 18.9 34.7 61.4
1988 17.8 36.2 62.0
1989 17.5 37.1 62.4
1990 17.7 37.8 61.5
1991 18.8 40.4 62.2
1992 19.0 41.4 62.6
1993 19.7 42.1 63.7
1994 20.2 43.8 65.0
1995 20.4 44.9 65.1
1996 21.3 44.8 64.1
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Figure 3.13
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
1970 2.769 3.016 3.812
1971 2.641 2.876 3.619
1972 2.577 2.805 3.530
1973 2.709 2.947 3.877
1974 2.472 2.688 3.493
1975 2.552 2.777 3.568
1976 2.407 2.616 3.354
1977 2.388 2.595 3.346
1978 2.314 2.511 3.312
1979 2.468 2.679 3.629
1980 2.348 2.548 3.441
1981 2.230 2.418 3.257
1982 2.233 2.420 3.291
1983 2.110 2.285 3.106
1984 2.010 2.175 2.953
1985 2.077 2.248 3.084
1986 1.986 2.149 2.883
1987 2.070 2.239 3.108
1988 2.009 2.170 3.076
1989 2.027 2.189 3.147
1990 2.113 2.282 3.329
1991 2.081 2.245 3.397
1992 2.074 2.235 3.438
1993 1.904 2.048 3.163
1994 1.940 2.086 3.298
1995 1.971 2.119 3.416
1996 1.997 2.152 3.255
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Figure 3.15
NAFTA EU15 East Asia
1965 8.4
1966 8.2
1967 8.1
1968 8.1
1969 8.5
1970 8.5
1971 9.0
1972 8.4
1973 9.4
1974 9.5
1975 10.0
1976 10.0
1977 10.7
1978 12.5
1979 16.0
1980 14.9
1981 15.4
1982 15.6
1983 16.1
1984 17.7
1985 19.0
1986 18.1
1987 16.3
1988 15.4
1989 16.5
1990 15.8
1991 15.6
1992 16.4
1993 17.6
1994 17.7
1995 17.8
1996 18.0
29.8 19.9
30.2 20.1
29.6 21.0
31.3 22.3
33.4 22.7
33.9 23.4
33.9 24.1
33.8 22.8
36.9 24.9
44.4 33.5
39.9 29.9
42.9 31.6
42.9 30.1
41.4 23.9
43.5 27.5
45.1 32.4
46.2 32.9
46.3 32.5
46.1 31.4
48.9 33.1
49.7 32.0
43.5 26.3
42.7 26.7
42.8 27.1
45.2 28.9
43.9 31.2
42.0 30.8
40.3 30.7
39.3 29.2
42.2 31.2
44.6 33.5
44.9 32.6
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Figure 3.18
From Canada From USA
1985 0.354 -0.469
1986 1.059 -0.939
1987 0.652 2.499
1988 0.882 2.304
1989 0.806 1.930
1990 1.414 2.498
1991 0.134 3.571
1992 3.064 2.061
1993 2.349 2.059
1994 1.813 3.660
1995 3.033 1.987
Figure 3.19
From Germany From France
1985 0.839 0.3898
1986 0.513 1.8469
1987 1.027 0.1540
1988 0.781 3.0409
1989 0.771 2.0108
1990 0.521 1.4960
1991 0.528 1.2959
1992 0.368 1.4824
1993 0.681 2.4491
1994 0.500 3.0290
1995 0.396 0.4691
Figure 3.20
North America Asia NICs
1987 1.228 5.370 9.896
1988 1.152 5.596 11.663
1989 1.185 5.903 12.023
1990 1.288 6.342 13.465
1991 1.395 5.592 12.550
1992 1.528 4.437 10.979
1993 1.474 3.911 9.545
1994 1.252 3.596 9.119
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Belgium’s trade intensity with:
France Germany Italy Holland
1958 1.919 1.524 0.668 4.658
1959 1.938 1.502 0.745 4.569
1960 1.944 1.625 0.708 4.545
1961 2.096 1.573 0.720 4.681
1962 2.132 1.663 0.766 4.478
1963 2.273 1.754 0.895 4.443
1964 2.321 1.928 0.856 4.375
1965 2.360 1.871 0.805 4.335
1966 2.465 1.959 0.788 4.446
1967 2.563 1.932 0.863 4.405
1968 2.690 1.935 0.832 4.285
1969 2.733 2.029 0.828 3.880
1970 2.782 2.059 0.848 3.811
1971 2.760 2.117 0.828 3.751
1972 2.734 2.065 0.850 3.714
1973 2.727 2.012 0.889 3.558
1974 2.788 2.022 0.857 3.757
1975 2.631 2.057 0.832 3.680
1976 2.701 2.105 0.935 3.726
1977 2.596 2.033 0.896 3.748
1978 2.566 2.015 0.892 3.653
1979 2.491 1.981 0.914 3.677
1980 2.438 1.937 0.932 3.755
1981 2.758 2.175 0.970 4.429
1982 2.771 2.168 0.957 4.326
1983 2.777 2.221 0.941 4.371
1984 2.992 2.220 1.014 4.635
1985 3.042 2.147 0.997 4.579
1986 2.873 1.978 1.041 4.243
1987 2.822 1.987 1.059 4.146
1988 2.789 2.064 1.083 4.345
1989 2.831 2.025 1.081 4.312
1990 2.679 1.995 1.060 4.034
1991 2.683 2.050 1.041 4.095
1992 2.771 2.081 1.060 4.260
1993 3.023 2.187 1.124 4.282
1994 2.960 2.055 1.054 4.365
1995 2.903 2.154 1.089 4.401
1996 3.003 2.142 1.073 4.698
Appendices 302
France’s trade intensity with:
Belgium Germany Italy Holland
1958 1.719 1.230 0.906 0.606
1959 1.731 1.435 1.297 0.759
1960 1.830 1.421 1.271 0.777
1961 1.966 1.485 1.360 0.829
1962 1.977 1.561 1.415 0.844
1963 2.106 1.567 1.539 0.886
1964 2.195 1.657 1.542 0.996
1965 2.201 1.656 1.537 1.090
1966 2.320 1.722 1.685 1.117
1967 2.470 1.729 1.770 1.172
1968 2.552 1.809 1.886 1.308
1969 2.550 1.803 1.954 1.356
1970 2.605 1.788 1.968 1.241
1971 2.574 1.769 2.009 1.224
1972 2.541 1.749 2.031 1.193
1973 2.551 1.673 2.054 1.162
1974 2.639 1.638 1.920 1.186
1975 2.457 1.574 1.867 1.208
1976 2.438 1.610 2.068 1.167
1977 2.344 1.556 2.067 1.197
1978 2.323 1.521 2.081 1.249
1979 2.258 1.488 2.026 1.218
1980 2.223 1.450 2.117 1.165
1981 2.416 1.627 2.205 1.356
1982 2.484 1.601 2.192 1.319
1983 2.532 1.642 2.199 1.382
1984 2.722 1.650 2.290 1.470
1985 2.766 1.632 2.204 1.454
1986 2.576 1.554 2.267 1.305
1987 2.543 1.566 2.237 1.317
1988 2.524 1.602 2.293 1.379
1989 2.544 1.605 2.245 1.428
1990 2.424 1.517 2.059 1.327
1991 2.422 1.515 2.059 1.290
1992 2.528 1.532 2.079 1.298
1993 2.601 1.741 2.109 1.422
1994 2.519 1.723 2.128 1.359
1995 2.466 1.788 2.111 1.392
1996 2.480 1.791 2.065 1.421
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Italy’s trade intensity with:
Belgium France Germany Holland
1958 0.599 0.878 1.397 0.595
1959 0.669 1.252 1.539 0.665
1960 0.702 1.315 1.523 0.701
1961 0.699 1.368 1.578 0.650
1962 0.745 1.441 1.659 0.716
1963 0.869 1.531 1.609 0.767
1964 0.872 1.603 1.669 0.892
1965 0.851 1.567 1.616 1.001
1966 0.864 1.674 1.648 1.008
1967 0.963 1.776 1.640 0.990
1968 0.926 1.882 1.683 1.018
1969 0.882 1.961 1.682 0.958
1970 0.905 1.932 1.777 0.992
1971 0.891 2.009 1.784 0.948
1972 0.879 2.031 1.800 0.977
1973 0.878 2.017 1.732 0.968
1974 0.884 1.916 1.660 0.968
1975 0.841 1.891 1.643 0.961
1976 0.964 2.058 1.639 0.954
1977 0.882 2.073 1.598 0.874
1978 0.838 2.065 1.588 0.923
1979 0.864 2.025 1.579 0.968
1980 0.908 2.068 1.633 0.932
1981 0.940 2.156 1.719 1.000
1982 0.968 2.271 1.655 0.994
1983 0.993 2.306 1.696 1.052
1984 1.109 2.356 1.768 1.095
1985 1.121 2.323 1.756 1.134
1986 1.151 2.372 1.761 1.156
1987 1.172 2.366 1.765 1.099
1988 1.209 2.424 1.851 1.162
1989 1.202 2.417 1.799 1.176
1990 1.169 2.223 1.742 1.131
1991 1.177 2.220 1.786 1.160
1992 1.197 2.217 1.843 1.219
1993 1.136 2.283 2.005 1.213
1994 1.107 2.294 1.971 1.220
1995 1.094 2.323 1.954 1.201
1996 1.107 2.355 1.909 1.283
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Netherlands trade intensity with:
Belgium France Germany Italy
1958 4.610 0.659 2.048 0.678
1959 4.521 0.802 2.132 0.672
1960 4.503 0.787 2.182 0.683
1961 4.721 0.868 2.185 0.674
1962 4.550 0.888 2.159 0.696
1963 4.452 0.995 2.319 0.767
1964 4.438 1.085 2.419 0.867
1965 4.309 1.132 2.295 0.945
1966 4.305 1.148 2.367 0.934
1967 4.352 1.212 2.423 0.933
1968 4.103 1.342 2.509 0.962
1969 3.790 1.413 2.475 0.938
1970 3.727 1.303 2.573 0.965
1971 3.671 1.304 2.514 0.935
1972 3.797 1.256 2.540 0.929
1973 3.628 1.233 2.474 0.921
1974 3.757 1.268 2.580 0.896
1975 3.673 1.281 2.556 0.894
1976 3.771 1.270 2.502 0.925
1977 3.624 1.284 2.488 0.876
1978 3.570 1.310 2.440 0.900
1979 3.598 1.263 2.398 0.868
1980 3.738 1.239 2.452 0.912
1981 4.409 1.422 2.827 0.992
1982 4.279 1.415 2.730 0.957
1983 4.196 1.476 2.793 0.976
1984 4.302 1.549 2.908 1.001
1985 4.466 1.533 2.859 0.987
1986 4.166 1.444 2.535 1.054
1987 4.136 1.422 2.437 1.018
1988 4.336 1.450 2.474 1.056
1989 4.288 1.476 2.474 1.026
1990 4.064 1.416 2.300 0.991
1991 4.108 1.417 2.396 1.008
1992 4.297 1.441 2.441 1.034
1993 3.629 1.533 2.678 1.046
1994 3.669 1.585 2.674 1.060
1995 3.515 1.588 2.613 1.014
1996 3.644 1.665 2.675 1.052
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NAFTA Trade Intensities
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
1960 1.449 2.005 2.014
1961 1.543 2.143 2.170
1962 1.552 2.154 2.194
1963 1.572 2.188 2.210
1964 1.607 2.237 2.271
1965 1.664 2.317 2.391
1966 1.655 2.298 2.407
1967 1.765 2.452 2.649
1968 1.769 2.453 2.683
1969 1.903 2.647 2.958
1970 1.846 2.575 2.765
1971 1.946 2.718 2.978
1972 1.994 2.788 3.079
1973 1.998 2.806 3.000
1974 1.916 2.695 2.788
1975 1.931 2.718 2.805
1976 1.921 2.702 2.792
1977 1.935 2.726 2.792
1978 1.901 2.679 2.719
1979 1.924 2.715 2.743
1980 1.928 2.726 2.722
1981 1.959 2.765 2.821
1982 1.968 2.780 2.820
1983 2.029 2.857 3.005
1984 1.871 2.616 2.787
1985 1.896 2.651 2.845
1986 1.877 2.635 2.736
1987 1.985 2.796 2.911
1988 1.957 2.752 2.872
1989 1.955 2.749 2.881
1990 2.111 2.979 3.149
1991 2.171 3.062 3.314
1992 2.201 3.102 3.397
1993 2.108 2.956 3.302
1994 2.191 3.073 3.504
1995 2.298 3.237 3.666
1996 2.321 3.264 3.778
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APPENDIX A2
Definitions of regional groupings used in calculations
CUSFTA
NAFTA
EU6
EU9
EU12
EU15
ASEAN
EAST ASIA
APEC 15
APEC18
Canada and United States of America 
CUSFTA and Mexico
Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg and 
Netherlands
EU6, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
EU9, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
EU12, Austria, Finland and Sweden 
Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand
ASEAN and China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan
East Asia, Canada, the United States of America,
Australia and New Zealand
APEC 15, Chile, Mexico and Papua New Guinea
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